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2002 (1) TMI 1334
The Supreme Court ruled that once the selection process is complete and an appointment is made, any subsequent vacancy should be treated as a fresh vacancy. Temporary arrangements during this time do not entitle a candidate to claim permanent employment. The Court set aside the High Court's order and dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent.
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2002 (1) TMI 1333
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Validity of Annexure-L and whether it requires judicial interference.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
The respondents contested the jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court, arguing that no cause of action arose within its territorial limits. They relied on Article 226(2) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court judgment in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpat Kumar Basu. Conversely, the petitioner argued that part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court, as certain equipment was to be installed in Karnataka.
The court examined Article 226(2), which states that a High Court can exercise its power if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its jurisdiction. It referenced several judgments, including D. Munirangappa v. Amidayala Venkatappa and Anr., which clarified that even a fraction of the cause of action is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
The court found that part of the cause of action did indeed arise within Karnataka, as the equipment was to be supplied there. Therefore, it held that the petition was maintainable under Article 226, rejecting the preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction.
2. Validity of Annexure-L and Whether it Requires Judicial Interference:
The petitioner challenged Annexure-L, an endorsement rejecting their bid as non-responsive based on the tender conditions. The petitioner argued that the rejection was arbitrary and not based on the bid document. The court examined various clauses of the bidding documents, including Clauses 5, 11, 24.4, and 26.2, which outline the requirements for a responsive bid and the grounds for rejection.
The court noted that the petitioner's bid included an additional annexure stating that new taxes/levies/duties added by the government after the date of tender opening would be charged extra. This annexure was not part of the prescribed bid documents and was used as the basis for rejecting the bid.
The court found that the rejection based on this annexure was arbitrary and outside the scope of the bid documents. It referenced the principles of judicial review, particularly the Wednesbury test, which limits the court's role to examining the legality, rationality, and procedural propriety of administrative actions.
The court concluded that Annexure-L was arbitrary and required to be set aside. However, it recognized the time-bound nature of the project and the involvement of World Bank funds. Therefore, it directed the respondents to reconsider the petitioner's bid strictly according to the contract terms and bid documents. If the petitioner's bid met the requirements, the respondents were to cancel the award to the third respondent. The court also directed the parties to maintain the status quo for 15 days to allow for reconsideration.
Conclusion:
The petition was allowed, and Annexure-L was set aside. The matter was remitted to the second respondent for reconsideration within 15 days, with directions to cancel the award to the third respondent if the petitioner's bid met the tender conditions. The court emphasized the need for a decision based on the bid documents and the observations made in the order. Each party was to bear its own costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1332
The Allahabad High Court ordered the release of seized money amounting to Rs. 16,32,500 in favor of the petitioners, subject to them providing security and a personal bond for cooperation in Income-tax Department proceedings. The court noted the absence of any rival claimant to the money seized from a third person, who was claimed to be the petitioners' driver. The decision of a cited case by the respondents was deemed inapplicable.
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2002 (1) TMI 1331
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case, as per the order by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Santosh Hegde and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Doraiswamy Raju, JJ. (Citation: 2002 (1) TMI 1331 - SC)
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2002 (1) TMI 1330
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the State of Punjab and alternatively, the Union of India, were and are bound to construct and complete the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal Project.
2. Maintainability of the suit.
3. Limitation of the suit.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Obligation to Construct and Complete the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal Project:
The State of Haryana filed a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution, seeking a decree for the completion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal Project. The State of Haryana argued that the canal is essential for its farmers to receive their share of Ravi and Beas waters, as allocated under various agreements and orders, including the 1976 Notification, the 1981 Agreement, and the 1985 Settlement. The State of Punjab, however, contended that the dispute falls under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, and thus, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is barred. Punjab also argued that Haryana's claim is barred by limitation and that the earlier suit filed by Haryana was withdrawn without leave, barring the current suit under procedural rules.
The Court examined whether the dispute is a "water dispute" as defined in Section 2(c) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act. It concluded that the dispute centers on the construction of the canal, not the allocation of water, and thus does not fall under the Act. The Court emphasized that the agreements and orders, including the 1981 Agreement facilitated by the Prime Minister, mandated the canal's construction. The Court held that the State of Punjab is bound by these agreements and must complete the canal. The Union of India, having facilitated these agreements, also has an obligation to ensure their implementation.
2. Maintainability of the Suit:
The State of Punjab argued that the suit is not maintainable under Article 131 due to the provisions of Article 262 and the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, which oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in water disputes. However, the Court found that the present dispute is not about the allocation of water but about the construction of the canal, which is a distinct issue. Therefore, the suit is maintainable under Article 131.
3. Limitation of the Suit:
The issue of limitation was raised by the State of Punjab but was not seriously pressed during the hearing. The Court noted that Article 112 of the Limitation Act, which provides a 30-year limitation period for suits by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, does not apply to suits under Article 131. The Court also observed that the cause of action is continuous, as the canal's construction remains incomplete. Therefore, the suit is not barred by limitation.
Judgment:
The Court directed the State of Punjab to complete the construction of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal within one year. If Punjab fails to do so, the Union of India is directed to ensure the canal's completion through its agencies. The Court emphasized the importance of the canal for Haryana's farmers and the significant public funds already spent on the project. The suit was decreed in favor of Haryana, with no order as to costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1329
Issues Involved:
1. Allegations of food adulteration against the company and its directors.
2. Validity of the nomination under Section 17(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
3. Responsibility and liability of directors under Section 17(4) of the Act.
4. Abuse of process of court and exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegations of Food Adulteration:
The accused directors of M/s. Brooke Bond Lipton India Limited, which amalgamated with Hindustan Lever Limited, faced allegations of manufacturing and distributing adulterated food products, specifically "Kissan Mixed Fruit Jam" and "Anik Ghee." The samples collected by the Food Inspector were found to contain substances exceeding permissible limits, violating the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
2. Validity of the Nomination under Section 17(1):
The company had nominated Shri Suresh Narayanan as the person responsible for the conduct of its business in Maharashtra. However, the prosecution did not launch any action against the nominee but instead targeted the directors. The defense argued that the nomination was valid under Section 17(3) of the Act at the relevant time, and thus, the directors should not be held liable.
3. Responsibility and Liability of Directors under Section 17(4):
The defense contended that the complaints lacked specific allegations that the directors were in charge of the company's business or that the offense was committed with their consent, connivance, or due to their negligence. The prosecution argued that in the absence of a proper nomination, the directors could be held responsible under Section 17(1)(a)(ii) and Section 17(4) of the Act. However, the court found that the complaints did not contain necessary averments to connect the directors with the alleged offenses.
4. Abuse of Process of Court and Exercise of Inherent Powers under Section 482:
The court emphasized that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be exercised to prevent abuse of process and miscarriage of justice. It was observed that the complaints did not make out a prima facie case against the directors, as there were no allegations of their involvement or negligence. The court cited several judgments to support its decision to quash the proceedings against the directors, highlighting that merely being a director does not automatically imply liability for the company's offenses.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the orders of issuance of process against the directors, emphasizing that the complaints did not disclose any offense against them under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The court directed the prosecution to proceed against other accused according to law and allowed the petitions/applications in the above terms.
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2002 (1) TMI 1328
Issues Involved:
1. Appointment of an Advocate-Receiver.
2. Dismissal of the suit on the grounds of limitation.
3. Entitlement to a decree for Rs. 43,79,775/- with interest.
4. Alleged creation of an equitable mortgage.
5. Conduct of the defendants in relation to the repayment of the loan.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Appointment of an Advocate-Receiver:
The plaintiff sought the appointment of an Advocate-Receiver to take charge of the property and administer the Kalyana Mandapam pending the suit. The court examined the provisions under Sections 51, 94, and Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which empower the court to appoint a receiver if it is just and convenient.
The court noted that the appointment of a receiver is an equitable remedy to preserve and retain control of the property until the rights of the parties are determined. Several precedents were cited, emphasizing that a receiver can be appointed in mortgage suits if the security is insufficient or if the conduct of the mortgagor warrants such an appointment.
In this case, the court observed that the defendants had admitted to the creation of an equitable mortgage and had borrowed amounts from the plaintiff, securing the loan with the property. The defendants' conduct, including their failure to repay the loan despite generating income from the property, justified the appointment of a receiver. The court directed the defendants to deposit Rs. 20 lakhs within six weeks to avoid the appointment of a receiver.
2. Dismissal of the Suit on the Grounds of Limitation:
The defendants argued that the suit was barred by limitation, claiming that the transaction was a loan secured by a sale agreement and not an equitable mortgage. The court, however, found that the defendants had admitted to the creation of an equitable mortgage in their communications with the Egmore Benefit Society and other documents.
The court concluded that the suit was not barred by limitation based on the defendants' own admissions and the continuous acknowledgment of the debt. The application for dismissal on the grounds of limitation was directed to be posted along with the suit.
3. Entitlement to a Decree for Rs. 43,79,775/- with Interest:
The plaintiff sought a decree for Rs. 43,79,775/- with interest at 30% per annum. The court noted that the defendants had borrowed money from the plaintiff and secured the loan with the property. The defendants' failure to repay the loan despite generating income from the property supported the plaintiff's claim.
The court's decision to appoint a receiver or require a deposit of Rs. 20 lakhs aimed to protect the plaintiff's interest and ensure the realization of the due amount.
4. Alleged Creation of an Equitable Mortgage:
The plaintiff claimed that the transaction was intended to be a mortgage by deposit of title deeds, while the defendants argued that it was a loan secured by a sale agreement. The court examined the evidence, including the defendants' admissions in their loan application to the Egmore Benefit Society, which indicated the creation of an equitable mortgage.
The court concluded that the defendants had created an equitable mortgage by depositing the title deeds with the plaintiff as collateral security for the loan.
5. Conduct of the Defendants:
The court scrutinized the defendants' conduct, noting their failure to repay the loan despite generating income from the property. The defendants' attempts to avoid repayment and their inconsistent stands in the legal proceedings were seen as attempts to defeat the plaintiff's claim.
The court emphasized that the defendants' conduct warranted the appointment of a receiver to protect the plaintiff's interest and ensure the realization of the due amount.
Conclusion:
The court directed the defendants to deposit Rs. 20 lakhs within six weeks to avoid the appointment of an Advocate-Receiver. The application for dismissal of the suit on the grounds of limitation was to be posted along with the suit, and the court found that the defendants' conduct and admissions justified the plaintiff's claims. The court's decision aimed to balance the interests of both parties and ensure justice.
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2002 (1) TMI 1327
Issues:
Contempt of court - Violation of court order regarding financial matters exceeding a certain amount.
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, where the contemnor challenged the judgment of the Allahabad High Court finding him guilty of contempt and imposing a fine of Rs. 1,000. The appellant, as the chairman of the Municipal Board, received a notice for a meeting to discuss a no-confidence motion. Despite an interim order directing him not to sanction financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000, he signed multiple cheques totaling around thirty-four lakhs between 9.6.1990 and 17.7.1990. The High Court found the appellant's defense of being misguided by legal advice unacceptable, noting his failure to take steps to comply with the order. The court emphasized that both the letter and spirit of the order must be understood, rejecting the appellant's contention that he had not sanctioned the amounts on the cheques. The High Court held the appellant guilty of wilful and deliberate disobedience of the court order.
The appellant argued that the conditional order of stay in a previous case had become infructuous due to a fresh cause of action, thus relieving him of contempt. However, the High Court rejected this argument, emphasizing the contemnor's failure to act upon learning of the order. The court also dismissed the appellant's contention that he had only approved, not sanctioned, the amounts on the cheques. The High Court considered the contemnor's plea of bona fide belief but found it insufficient to excuse the deliberate disobedience of the court order. Despite the contemnor's unconditional apology, the High Court maintained its finding of contempt.
The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the case and submissions, upheld the High Court's decision, concluding that the appellant's actions constituted wilful and deliberate disobedience of the court order. The Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the judgment, affirming the High Court's ruling of contempt. The appeal was dismissed without costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1326
Issues involved:
The judgment deals with the imposition of conditions by the Additional Sessions Judge under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code for granting anticipatory bail to the accused, which was affirmed by the High Court. The main issue is whether the condition of depositing a certain amount as security for anticipatory bail is reasonable or not.
Summary:
Issue 1: Conditions for granting anticipatory bail
The accused appealed against the condition imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court, requiring him to deposit a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs in the form of FDR as a security for the deposit amount. The accused argued that such a condition was unreasonable and arbitrary, making it difficult for him to comply with. The Court considered the arguments presented and referred to a previous decision to determine the reasonableness of the condition.
Decision:
The Supreme Court concluded that the condition of depositing Rs. 15 lakhs in the Trial Court as a security for anticipatory bail was unreasonable. The Court set aside this condition and directed the accused to execute a bond of Rs. 25,000 with two solvent sureties, make himself available for interrogation as required, surrender his passport to the concerned Magistrate, and not leave the country without court permission. By complying with these revised conditions, the accused would be entitled to the order granting him anticipatory bail.
Outcome:
The appeal was allowed, and the condition of depositing Rs. 15 lakhs as security for anticipatory bail was set aside. The Court directed the accused to fulfill the revised conditions to avail of anticipatory bail, ensuring his availability for interrogation and surrendering his passport to the concerned Magistrate.
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2002 (1) TMI 1325
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2002 (1) TMI 1325. Judges were Mr. B.N. Kirpal and Mr. Arijit Pasayat.
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2002 (1) TMI 1324
Issues Involved:
1. Default in payment of rent.
2. Sub-letting by the tenant.
3. Interpretation of Sections 20(4) and 30(2) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972.
Summary:
1. Default in Payment of Rent:
The tenant appealed against the Allahabad High Court's decision, which dismissed his writ petition challenging an eviction order based on default in rent payment. The Trial Court found the tenant in arrears but did not pass an eviction decree since the tenant paid the due amount on the first hearing date as per Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972. The Revisional Court, however, decreed eviction due to arrears and sub-letting, which the High Court upheld regarding rent default but not sub-letting.
2. Sub-letting by the Tenant:
The Trial Court did not accept the landlord's claim of sub-letting by the tenant. The Revisional Court overturned this finding, but the High Court restored the Trial Court's decision, stating that the Revisional Court wrongly substituted its own findings on sub-letting.
3. Interpretation of Sections 20(4) and 30(2) of the Act:
The main contention was whether the tenant had cleared the arrears of rent. The tenant argued that he had deposited all due amounts in court under Section 30(2) of the Act. The High Court concluded that deposits under Section 30(2) could not be adjusted under Section 20(4), which only mentions deposits under Section 30(1). The Supreme Court, however, found this interpretation incorrect. It held that the effect of deposits under Sections 30(1) and 30(2) is the same as per Section 30(6), which deems such deposits as payments to the landlord. Therefore, deposits under Section 30(2) should also be considered when determining arrears under Section 20(4).
The Supreme Court emphasized that statutory provisions should not be read in isolation but harmoniously. It criticized the High Court's interpretation as unnatural and against the statutory effect of Section 30(6). The Supreme Court also noted that the High Court's observations about time-barred arrears and the bona fides of the Section 30(2) deposit were unfounded.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and Revisional Court, and restored the Trial Court's order. No costs were awarded.
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2002 (1) TMI 1323
Issues:
Challenge to selection of respondents for Manager (Finance and Account) posts.
Analysis:
The appellant challenged the selection of respondent 4 and 5 for Manager posts. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition based on a previous Supreme Court judgment. The appellant argued that the law in the previous case was overruled in a review judgment. The posts were advertised in July 1995, and qualifications were specified. The Selection Committee chose respondent 4 for appointment and put respondent 5 on the waiting list. The appellant, who scored lower, contested the appointments. The main contention was that the 4th respondent was not qualified to apply by the cutoff date. The Supreme Court review judgment emphasized that candidates must be fully qualified on the application date, not later. The 4th respondent's appointment was made before the review judgment, following the law at that time.
The Supreme Court's majority judgment in the previous case allowed candidates who became fully qualified before the interview to be considered. However, the review judgment stated that candidates must be qualified on the application date. In this case, the 4th respondent was qualified by the examination dates and obtained higher marks. The court found no other valid points raised by the appellant. Therefore, the Writ Appeal was dismissed, as no interference was warranted based on the law applicable at the time of appointment.
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2002 (1) TMI 1322
The Gujarat High Court dismissed the appeal as no substantial question of law arose, citing previous court decisions for each question raised in the appeal memo. The appeal was summarily dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1321
Issues Involved:
1. Allegation of fraudulent transfer of shares.
2. Maintainability of the petition under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956.
3. Limitation period for filing the petition.
4. Validity of the transfer deeds and signatures.
5. Compliance with the Listing Agreement and relevant circulars.
6. Non-joinder of necessary parties.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegation of Fraudulent Transfer of Shares:
The petitioner, a shareholder of the respondent company, alleged that 500 of his shares were fraudulently transferred based on forged transfer deeds. The petitioner claimed that the transfer was executed without following proper procedures and despite his communication to stop the transfer. He requested the restoration of the shares or compensation for their value, including dividends and interest.
2. Maintainability of the Petition under Section 111:
The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition under Section 111, stating it did not apply to public limited companies. The Board, upon an oral prayer by the petitioner's counsel, treated the petition as filed under Section 111A, thereby addressing the maintainability issue.
3. Limitation Period for Filing the Petition:
The respondent argued that the petition was barred by limitation as the cause of action arose in August/September 1996, but the petition was filed after about three years. The Board held that since the petitioner alleged fraudulent transfer based on forged signatures, the period of limitation could not be strictly applied, and thus proceeded to hear the petition on merits.
4. Validity of the Transfer Deeds and Signatures:
The petitioner contended that the respondent-company acted negligently by transferring the shares without proper verification of signatures, which were allegedly forged. The respondent argued that the transfers were executed based on valid transfer deeds with signatures duly attested by a banker, as per the requirements of the Listing Agreement and the Circular dated 22-3-1993 issued by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs.
5. Compliance with the Listing Agreement and Relevant Circulars:
The respondent emphasized compliance with Clause 12A of the Listing Agreement, which mandates that if the transferor's signature is attested by an authorized person, the company should not refuse the transfer on the ground of signature difference unless fraud or forgery is suspected. The respondent-company argued that they had followed this clause and the circular, transferring the shares based on attested signatures. The Board found substance in the respondent's submission, noting that the company had issued warning notices for minor signature differences and transferred the shares as per the stipulated procedures.
6. Non-joinder of Necessary Parties:
The Board noted that the petitioner had not impleaded the transferees or the brokers involved in the transaction, which was a serious defect. Given that the shares were dematerialized and could have changed hands multiple times, the absence of these parties made it impossible to prove fraud and forgery conclusively. The Board referenced a precedent requiring all persons to whom shares were transferred to be parties to the proceedings for effective adjudication.
Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed due to the non-joinder of necessary parties and the inability to establish fraud and forgery conclusively. The Board found that the respondent-company had acted in accordance with the Listing Agreement and relevant circulars, and no effective order could be passed in the absence of the transferees and brokers involved. No order as to cost was made.
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2002 (1) TMI 1320
Issues Involved:
1. Permanent injunction against the defendants for using a similar domain name.
2. Allegations of misrepresentation and false statements by the plaintiffs.
3. Proprietorship and uniqueness of the domain name "kabadibazaar.com".
4. Descriptive vs. suggestive nature of the domain name.
5. Secondary meaning acquired by the domain name.
6. Allegations of abusive registration and cybersquatting by the defendants.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Permanent Injunction Against the Defendants for Using a Similar Domain Name:
The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from using the domain name "www.kabaribazaar.com" or any similar combination, alleging it would lead to passing off the defendants' business as that of the plaintiffs. An ex parte injunction was initially granted on 24th April 2000.
2. Allegations of Misrepresentation and False Statements by the Plaintiffs:
The defendants moved an application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC for revocation of the interim injunction, alleging that the plaintiffs obtained the injunction through misrepresentation and false statements. The court was to dispose of both the applications.
3. Proprietorship and Uniqueness of the Domain Name "kabadibazaar.com":
The plaintiffs claimed proprietorship of the domain name "www.kabadibazaar.com" and argued that it was unique and newly coined by them. However, the court found that the words "kabadi" and "bazaar" were commonly used in Hindi parlance and were not unique or newly coined by the plaintiffs. The combination was descriptive and not distinctive.
4. Descriptive vs. Suggestive Nature of the Domain Name:
The court analyzed whether the domain name "kabadibazaar" was descriptive or suggestive. It concluded that the domain name was descriptive as it directly imparted information about the nature of the business, which involved second-hand goods. The court cited precedents to support the view that descriptive words cannot be monopolized unless they acquire a secondary meaning.
5. Secondary Meaning Acquired by the Domain Name:
The plaintiffs argued that the domain name had acquired a secondary meaning due to extensive publicity and recognition. However, the court found that the material on record was insufficient to show that the domain name had acquired a secondary meaning. The plaintiffs had not demonstrated significant business activity or provided financial statements to support their claim.
6. Allegations of Abusive Registration and Cybersquatting by the Defendants:
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' registration of the domain name "www.kabaribazaar.com" was abusive and in bad faith, citing the registration of similar domain names and demands for money. The court referred to the WIPO Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy and found that the plaintiffs had not established that the defendants' registration was abusive or in bad faith. The defendants had a legitimate interest in the domain name, and there was no prohibition against booking and selling domain names under Internet Law.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the word "kabadibazaar" was a descriptive term commonly used in Hindi and could not serve as a trademark or trade name unless it had acquired a secondary meaning, which the plaintiffs failed to establish. The allegations of abusive registration and cybersquatting were not substantiated. Consequently, the court allowed the defendants' application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC, vacating the interim injunction granted on 24th April 2000, and dismissed the plaintiffs' application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC. No order as to costs was made, and the observations were not to affect the merits of the case.
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2002 (1) TMI 1319
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant could be held to be a land grabber.
2. Whether the Special Court had jurisdiction to try the case.
3. Whether the appellant had perfected his title to the land in dispute by adverse possession.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the appellant could be held to be a land grabber:
The appellant was accused of being a land grabber of land measuring 2 acres 06 guntas in Survey Nos. 9/15 Paiki, 9/16, and 9/17 of Khairathabad Village. The Special Court and the High Court upheld the claim of the first respondent (the State of Andhra Pradesh) that the appellant was a land grabber. The appellant traced his title to the land under an unregistered agreement for perpetual lease executed in 1954 and a registered perpetual lease deed in 1957. However, the Special Court found that the land in dispute was not part of the Inam land and that the appellant had no lawful entitlement to it. The court also noted that mere prima facie bona fide claim to the land could not avert being roped in within the ambit of the expression "land grabber." The appellant's possession of the land was found to be unauthorized and without any lawful entitlement, fulfilling the definition of "land grabbing" under the Act.
2. Whether the Special Court had jurisdiction to try the case:
The Special Court's jurisdiction was challenged by the appellant, but it was upheld by both the Special Court and the High Court. The Act provides that the Special Court has jurisdiction to try cases of land grabbing and determine questions of title and ownership. The Special Court is deemed to be a Civil Court with all the powers of a Civil Court and a Court of Session. The High Court concluded that the Special Court was within its jurisdiction to deal with the matter and determine the title involved. The appellant's challenge to the transfer of the suit from the Civil Court to the Special Court was dismissed as not pressed, and the validity of the transfer was not urged before the High Court in the writ petition.
3. Whether the appellant had perfected his title to the land in dispute by adverse possession:
The appellant claimed that he had perfected his title by adverse possession, having been in possession of the land since 1954. However, the Special Court found that the appellant's possession could not be ascribed to the date of the unregistered perpetual lease agreement (Ex.B-39) or the registered lease deed (Ex.B-40) due to tampering and lack of authentication. The court counted the period of possession from 1958 when the appellant obtained permission for construction and found that the statutory period of 30 years was not completed by the date of the suit in 1985. The court also noted that the appellant applied for occupancy certificate and paid siwai jamabandi, nullifying his animus to possess the land adversely. The High Court upheld the Special Court's finding that the appellant did not perfect his title by adverse possession.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the judgment and order of the High Court, affirming the findings of the Special Court. The appellant was held to be a land grabber, the Special Court had jurisdiction to try the case, and the appellant did not perfect his title by adverse possession. The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1318
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notice of ejectment.
2. Impact of subsequent events on the judgment.
3. Rights and obligations under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977.
4. Applicability of the doctrine of eviction by title paramount.
5. Consideration of subsequent events in civil litigation.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Notice of Ejectment:
The defendant-appellant contested the suit primarily on the ground that the notice of ejectment was defective. The Trial Court, by its judgment dated 11th June 1998, ruled in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, directing eviction and recovery of arrears. This decision was upheld by the First Appellate Court and the High Court.
2. Impact of Subsequent Events on the Judgment:
The appellant argued that a subsequent event had a material bearing on the judgment under appeal. Specifically, the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) had initiated proceedings for resumption of the suit premises against the plaintiff-respondent. However, the High Court extended the time for vacating the premises, and the Supreme Court granted interim relief to the appellant.
3. Rights and Obligations under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977:
The suit premises were constructed by HUDA and allotted to the plaintiff-respondent, who was required to pay installments to HUDA. Failure to pay these installments could result in cancellation of the allotment u/s 17 of the Act. The Estate Officer, HUDA, had initially recalled the allotment, but this order was set aside by the Appellate Authority, allowing the respondent an extension of time to pay the arrears.
4. Applicability of the Doctrine of Eviction by Title Paramount:
The Supreme Court referred to its decision in Vashu Dev v. Bal Kishan, stating that to constitute eviction by title paramount, three conditions must be satisfied: (i) the party evicting must have a good and present title; (ii) the tenant must have quitted or attorned to the paramount title holder against his will; (iii) the landlord must be willing or a consenting party to such attornment, or there must be a legal event that binds the landlord. The Court found that these conditions were not met in the present case.
5. Consideration of Subsequent Events in Civil Litigation:
The Court noted that while it has the power to take note of subsequent events and mold the relief accordingly, this is subject to conditions such as the relief becoming inappropriate due to subsequent events, shortening litigation, and the event being brought to the Court's notice promptly. The appellant's reliance on subsequent events was not properly brought before the Court, and the plaintiff-respondent was not given an opportunity to address these new facts.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the appellant was granted three months to vacate the premises, subject to filing an undertaking and clearing all arrears within three weeks.
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2002 (1) TMI 1317
Issues Involved:
1. Conversion of majority shareholders into a minority.
2. Change in the composition of the Board of Directors.
3. Allegations of gross mismanagement in the affairs of the company.
4. Validity of the transfer of 4 lakh shares.
5. Maintainability of the petition u/s 399 of the Companies Act, 1956.
6. Allegations of parallel proceedings.
7. Relief sought by the petitioners.
Summary:
1. Conversion of Majority Shareholders into a Minority:
The petitioners alleged that the issuance of further shares converted their group from a majority to a minority. The respondents argued that the issuance of shares was necessary for raising funds for the company and had the knowledge and consent of the petitioners. The Board found that the issuance of shares on 27-7-1997 and 1-9-1998, without proper notice to the petitioners, was an act of oppression as it reduced the petitioners' shareholding from 52.46% to 34.45%.
2. Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors:
The petitioners contended that the appointment of additional directors on 27-7-1997 was oppressive and aimed at gaining majority control on the Board. The Board found that the appointment of additional directors without proper notice to the petitioners was not bona fide and was intended to marginalize the petitioners' group.
3. Allegations of Gross Mismanagement:
The petitioners alleged financial mismanagement by the respondents, citing adverse comments in the internal audit report and misuse of banking facilities. The Board noted these allegations but did not delve into them in detail due to the relief granted.
4. Validity of the Transfer of 4 Lakh Shares:
The respondents challenged the validity of the transfer of 4 lakh shares to the 1st petitioner, citing non-compliance with Section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Board held that the 1st petitioner was the rightful owner of the shares as the company had registered the transfer, endorsed the share certificates, and communicated the same to Kero GmbH.
5. Maintainability of the Petition u/s 399:
The respondents argued that the petition was not maintainable as the petitioners did not hold the requisite percentage of shares. The Board held that the petitioners fulfilled the requirements of Section 399, considering the 4 lakh shares held by the 1st petitioner.
6. Allegations of Parallel Proceedings:
The respondents contended that the petitioners had filed a civil suit with similar allegations and sought a stay on the present proceedings. The Board found no commonality between the civil suit and the present petition and held that the petitioners were not pursuing parallel proceedings.
7. Relief Sought by the Petitioners:
The petitioners sought either the cancellation of further shares issued after 31-3-1997 or a refund of their investment. The Board directed the respondents to purchase the shares held by the petitioners and refund the share application money. The valuation of shares was to be based on the net worth of the company as on 31-3-1998, and the statutory auditors were directed to compute the fair value. The payment was to be made in installments by 30-6-2003, with the option to purchase the shares either by the 2nd respondent and his group or by the company.
Conclusion:
The Board found acts of oppression against the petitioners and directed the respondents to purchase the petitioners' shares and refund the share application money, ensuring a fair resolution of the disputes in the interest of the company and its shareholders.
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2002 (1) TMI 1316
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the suit.
2. Readiness and willingness to perform the contract.
3. Whether the contract became inoperative and unenforceable.
4. Discretionary relief of specific performance.
5. Clean hands doctrine.
6. Financial soundness of the respondent.
Summary:
1. Maintainability of the Suit:
The High Court noted that the appellants contended the suit was not maintainable as the pleadings did not conform to Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the High Court found no specific plea in the written statement regarding this issue, thus framing an issue on this point was unnecessary.
2. Readiness and Willingness to Perform the Contract:
The High Court observed that there was no specific issue framed by the Trial Court regarding the plaintiff-respondent's readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Despite this, the High Court felt the need to frame an additional issue on this point and remanded the case for further trial. The Supreme Court, however, noted that the parties and the Trial Court were aware of this issue and had adjudicated upon it, making the High Court's remand unnecessary.
3. Whether the Contract Became Inoperative and Unenforceable:
The High Court concluded that time was not the essence of the contract, thus the failure to obtain clearance under the ULCRA within the appointed time did not render the agreement inoperative and unenforceable. The Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court failed to consider the Constitution Bench decision in Chand Rani's case, which should have been applied.
4. Discretionary Relief of Specific Performance:
The High Court did not specifically address this issue in its remand order. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should have examined whether the Trial Court's findings on this issue were sustainable based on the available material.
5. Clean Hands Doctrine:
The High Court did not explicitly address this issue in its remand order. The Supreme Court implied that this issue should have been considered based on the evidence already on record.
6. Financial Soundness of the Respondent:
The High Court did not specifically address this issue in its remand order. The Supreme Court noted that the respondent's financial condition, including its status as a sick company under BIFR, was a subsequent event that could be considered by the High Court without necessitating a remand.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found the High Court's approach unsustainable in law and set aside the order of remand. The case was restored to the High Court for fresh decision, with the High Court directed to consider the subsequent events and the existing evidence without requiring a retrial. The Supreme Court emphasized that no opinion on the merits of the issues was expressed, and the High Court retained the power to require additional documents or witness examination if necessary.
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2002 (1) TMI 1315
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the petition at the pre-detention stage.
2. Territorial jurisdiction of the court.
3. Legality of the detention order under COFEPOSA.
4. Allegations of mala fide actions by DRI officials.
5. Compliance with the Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme (DEPB).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Petition at the Pre-detention Stage:
The primary objection raised by the respondents was regarding the maintainability of the petition at the pre-detention stage. The court referred to the precedent set in *Additional Secretary to Government of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia*, which established that courts should not interfere with detention orders at the pre-execution stage except under specific conditions. These conditions include situations where the detention order is not passed under the relevant act, is executed against the wrong person, is passed for a wrong purpose, is based on vague or irrelevant grounds, or is passed by an unauthorized authority. The court acknowledged these limitations but decided to examine the facts to determine if the petitioner's case fell within any of these exceptions.
2. Territorial Jurisdiction of the Court:
The respondents argued that the offence was committed in Calicut (Kerala) and thus, the Punjab and Haryana High Court lacked jurisdiction. However, the petitioner contended that part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court, as the petitioner was a resident of Ludhiana, and the premises in Ludhiana were searched by DRI officials. The court agreed with the petitioner, citing Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, which allows High Courts to exercise jurisdiction if any part of the cause of action arises within their territorial limits. The court also referenced previous judgments supporting this view, concluding that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
3. Legality of the Detention Order under COFEPOSA:
The court examined the grounds of detention, which alleged that the petitioner, through M/s Merchant Exports (India), had overvalued goods to fraudulently avail benefits under the DEPB scheme. The court scrutinized Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA, which permits detention to prevent activities prejudicial to foreign exchange conservation or smuggling. The court found no evidence that the petitioner's actions resulted in a loss of foreign exchange or amounted to smuggling as defined under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act. The court noted that the goods were not prohibited and had already been exported, thus not falling under Section 113(d) of the Customs Act. Consequently, the court held that the detention order was based on non-existent grounds and was not justified under COFEPOSA.
4. Allegations of Mala Fide Actions by DRI Officials:
The petitioner alleged that the DRI officials acted with mala fide intentions, issuing summons and arresting him to harass and victimize him. The court noted these allegations but focused on the legal grounds of the detention order. It found that the actions of the DRI officials, even if questionable, did not justify the detention under COFEPOSA.
5. Compliance with the Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme (DEPB):
The petitioner argued that the DEPB scheme had an in-built mechanism for verifying the Present Market Value (PMV) of goods and that no penal action was provided for over-declaration of PMV. The court agreed, noting that any irregularities in PMV declarations should be addressed within the DEPB scheme's framework, not through detention under COFEPOSA. The court emphasized that the petitioner's actions, even if involving false declarations, did not amount to activities prejudicial to foreign exchange conservation or smuggling.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the detention order was passed on non-existent grounds and was not justified under COFEPOSA. It found that the petitioner's case fell within the exceptions outlined in *Alka Subhash Gadia*, specifically that the order was passed for a wrong purpose and was not covered by the provisions of COFEPOSA. Consequently, the court quashed the detention order and the grounds of detention.
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