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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 78 Records
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1974 (11) TMI 88 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... C. 118 (All.). were discussed and held to be no more good law. A Bench of this Court held following the view of the Supreme Court that after conversion of black-gram and green-gram into dal they become two different commodities and thus the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) is applicable. 12.. On the aforesaid analysis, we would hold that beams, rafters, planks and railway sleepers are not timbers, though they are made of wood. By a process of manufacture in the saw mill of the assessee, the timbers were converted into different commodities known in the commercial market differently and utilised for different purposes and sold in that converted form but not in its nascent form as timber. Thus, the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Act is squarely attracted. 13.. Accordingly, we would allow these references answering the question in the affirmative in favour of the revenue against the assessee. Hearing fee Rs. 100. S.K. RAY, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 87 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h was issued on 15th February, 1965, was well within limitation. For the same reason, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the extended period of limitation under section 19(1), as it stood at the time when notice of reassessment was issued, can be applied. It is also not necessary to consider whether the changes introduced in section 19, subsequent to the relevant period of assessment, were merely procedural or affected substantive rights. 6. For the reasons stated above, I will answer the reference as follows (i) Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the limitation for initiation of proceedings under section 19(1), even ignoring the changes introduced in the section after the period of assessment, continued at least up to 31st March, 1965, and the notice of assessment was issued within limitation. (ii) In view of the answer given to question No. (1), question No. (2) becomes of no consequence and need not be answered. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 86 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inion in disagreement with the view of the learned Judge that no right to apply for revision as contemplated in section 20(3) of the Act is conferred on the revenue and accordingly the initiation of the proceeding being suo motu is not barred by limitation. As to the observations made by the learned judge against the final order of assessment, if made, we do not think that we need express any opinion. If the petitioner has any grievance sustainable in law against the order of final assessment, no liberty to move against the same is required to be given by the court. In the view we have taken the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the judgment and order under appeal are set aside and the rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs in the circumstances and all interim orders are vacated. As prayed for by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate for the opposite party, let the operation of this order be stayed for eight weeks from date. B.C. RAY, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not have retrospective operation, so as to include these goods in entry 1 of Schedule III from a date anterior to the date of issue of the notification. The argument that the word sweetmeats will even standing alone include mishri, batasa and chironji cannot be accepted for the simple reason that no one in this part of the country would consider these goods sweetmeats Jethmal Ramswaroop v. The State 1959 10 S.T.C. 270 at 277. 11.. We were referred to a number of cases of different High Courts in which it has been held that goods like mishri, batasa and chironji are included in sugar in the context of its definition as contained in the Central Excises and Salt Act. It is not necessary to refer to these cases, for this point is now firmly settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers(1). 12.. For these reasons, I agree that the questions referred to us be answered as proposed by my Lord the Chief justice. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 84 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for manufacture in the State of Punjab and the third was that the manufacture must result in goods for sale. The exemption could only be claimed if the company satisfied all the three conditions. The last condition did not appear to be fulfilled in that case. The same cannot be said of the case of the petitionercompany. All that the petitioner-company was required to see was that the Punjab State Electricity Board purchased cement for use in the generation and distribution of electrical energy and on the certificates being issued by the Board s responsible officers, no further obligation could be imposed on the petitioner-company to see that the cement was actually used for that purpose. Consequently, the answer to question No. (1) is in the negative. In view of the answer to question No. (1), no answer is required to be given to question No. (2) and it is left unanswered. The petitionercompany is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n was rightly negatived by the Division Bench. We fail to see what application that case has to the matter before us. Here the very basis upon which the validity of the certificate rests, namely, the signature of the purchasing dealer or of a person authorised by him in the prescribed manner, is lacking. By reason of this defect there is no valid certificate at all and it cannot be said that every information which the statute required the dealer to furnish has been given in the certificates in question. In the circumstances, we hold that the applicant-assessee was not entitled to claim exemption under the first proviso to section 9 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, in respect of his aggregate turnover of Rs. 7,80,007 consisting of sales alleged by the assessee to have been made to Messrs. Arun Trading Company during the assessment year 1st April, 1956, to 31st March, 1957. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the respondent-firm had given a certificate was on the department. A similar point came up for decision before the Orissa High Court in Goswami Press, Cuttack v. State of Orissa 1973 32 S.T.C. 479. Section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, is in very similar terms to the said rule 5(1)(vi). The Orissa High Court held that the burden lay on an assessee to establish his claim under section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the said Act, but when action had to be taken against an assessee under the proviso thereto, the burden lay on the department to show that there was a violation and that there was no burden on an assessee to show that there was no violation, for the negative is not to be proved by the assessee. We are in respectful agreement with what has been held by the Orissa High Court and, accordingly, we answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative
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1974 (11) TMI 81 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted by the word last . This amendment was to be operative with effect from 19th November, 1969, and was, therefore, not relevant in respect of the purchases made by the petitioner-firm. At the relevant time the purchase tax could only be levied on the first purchase within the State of Haryana by a dealer liable to pay tax under the Act. On the facts found by the Tribunal it is clear that the assessee had purchased cotton from commission agents. The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in upholding the levy of purchase tax on the assessee on the purchases of cotton which, though made in the State of Haryana, was sent out of the State of Haryana after it was ginned. The assessee was not the first purchaser and was not liable to purchase tax, as Schedule D stood at the time the purchase was made. The reference is answered accordingly. Considering the question of law involved, there is no order regarding costs in this court. MITTAL, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , these decisions are not applicable to the case before us, because in neither of these cases was any application made by the assessee before the Sales Tax Officer for time to get a reasonable opportunity to produce the necessary declarations. In the case before the Madras High Court the C forms were sought to be produced for the first time before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner at the hearing of the appeal and in the case before the Madhya Pradesh High Court the assessee failed to appear at all before the Sales Tax Officer, with the result that there was no question of his asking for any reasonable opportunity to produce the declarations in the prescribed form. In these circumstances, the question which has arisen in the case before us did not arise in those cases at all. In the result, in our view, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay the costs of this reference to the respondents. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (11) TMI 79 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ake an application for registration to such authority as may be prescribed, and if he is not a registered dealer, he is liable for prosecution. In effect, it requries that no dealer shall carry on business in inter-State sales or purchases unless he is a registered dealer. It necessarily follows that he must be entitled to apply for and get himself registered even before he enters into transactions of purchase and sale in inter-State sales. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the petitioner, in order to be entitled for registration, should have actually commenced business in the sense of already entered into a transaction of sale or purchase before he applied for registration. The result is the order of the Board of Revenue confirming those of the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside and the rule nisi is made absolute, with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ake an application for registration to such authority as may be prescribed, and if he is not a registered dealer, he is liable for prosecution. In effect, it requries that no dealer shall carry on business in inter-State sales or purchases unless he is a registered dealer. It necessarily follows that he must be entitled to apply for and get himself registered even before he enters into transactions of purchase and sale in inter-State sales. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the petitioner, in order to be entitled for registration, should have actually commenced business in the sense of already entered into a transaction of sale or purchase before he applied for registration. The result is the order of the Board of Revenue confirming those of the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside and the rule nisi is made absolute, with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder granted either by a sales tax authority or even by this court, as held by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Chandra Ram 1974 33 S.T.C. 394 1974 U.P.T.C. 15. will stop the running of the interest. In view of the above discussion question No. (1), in our opinion, does not call for any answer, because even if a stay order granted by a sales tax authority or the State Government amounts to the extension of time for payment or the amendment of the notice of demand within the meaning of section 8(4) of the Act, interest keeps on running. We answer question No. (2) in the negative by saying that the period during which an order of stay remains in operation is not liable to be excluded for purposes of computing penal interest under section 8(1-A) of the Act, because, according to the Supreme Court, the interest runs automatically and does not stop running by virtue of any stay order. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sale of cigarettes after the enactment of the West Bengal Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1958 is governed by the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and, as such, a dealer in the State of West Bengal is entitled to the benefits under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the 1941 Act in making purchases free of sales tax of raw material and other goods required for use in the manufacture of cigarettes on the strength of such exemption entered in his registration certificate?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. After a conspectus and conjoint reading of the aforesaid enactments, it seems to us clear that the 1954 Act did not repeal or obliterate the 1941 Act, but only modified it by excepting cigarettes from its operation. During the interregnum between the enactment of the 1954 Act and the 1958 Act, the operation of the 1941 Act with regard to cigarettes was in a state of mere interception, and when, as a result of the amendment made by the 1958 Act, that exception or interception was removed, the application of the 1941 Act to cigarettes revived proprio vigore. In any case, definite indications of such revival are available in the language and scheme of the 1958 Act and the Bengal Act 13 of 1959.
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1974 (11) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Shares capital – Reduction of ... ... ... ... ..... the present case that it was by virtue of the decree passed in the money suit that the capital was reduced. As pointed out by me earlier, the company withdrew the appeal against that decree because of a compromise it had entered into with the Mishra group. As pointed out earlier, there was a petition by another person for winding up of the company and the compromise arrived at was recorded in that company case. As a result of it, the appeal was not prosecuted. It was, therefore, the compromise which led to the reduction of the share capital on account of the return of the amount of Rs. 2,50,000 to the Mishra group. A compromise between the company and the creditor involving a reduction of share capital would also come within the mischief of section 100. The company could do this only in accordance with the formalities of law prescribed. In the result, I hold that the present application for rectification of the register of members cannot succeed. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1974 (11) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Memorandum of association - Act to override, Articles of association, Kinds of share capital - Two kinds of share capital, Dividend manner and time of payment of, Board’s report, Winding up - Distribution of property of company
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1974 (11) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Transfer of winding up proceedings to district court ... ... ... ... ..... is argument rests on a fundamental misconception. The District Judge had made over the liquidation case to the Additional District Judge. All subsequent proceedings arising in that case can be entertained directly by the Additional District Judge. It is not the requirement of law that every application which is made in the case transferred to the Additional District Judge must be made-to or routed through the District judge. What is transferred is the case which carries with it the power and authority to deal with all the proceedings arising in that case. (See section 446 of the Companies Act). I, therefore, agree with Mr. Jagjit Singh, then District Judge (now a judge of this court). I would dismiss all the three appeals but in the circumstances make no order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear in the court of Shri D. C. Aggarwal, Additional District Judge, Delhi, who is now said to be seized of this case on December 12, 1974. Records to be sent down immediately.
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1974 (11) TMI 43 - ITAT PATNA
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... ... ..... o were of the view that it was established that a larger number of workers were employed in the mill than those shown in the books, and that the dealers case that only the number shown in the books worked in the mill was false on the basis of the inspection report, dt. 23rd Aug., 1971 of Sri A.N. Lal, Asst. Supreinendent, Commercial Taxes to the effect that he found 25 persons working in the mill on 18th Aug., 1971, the date of inspection. 18th Aug., 1971 was a date outside the period of assessment, namely, the financial year 1969-70. Therefore, this material could not have been utilised legally. See the decision of Hon rsquo ble High Court in Laxmi Stores Case (32 STC 466). It is, therefore, not established the Book Nos. 1 and 2 contained the names of labourers who were employed in the mill but were not shown in its regular books of account. There is, therefore, no cogent material for disbelieving the books of account of the dealer. I, therefore, agree to the order proposed.
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1974 (11) TMI 41 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... for the asst. yrs. 1969-70 and 1970-71 on this point are reversed and the commission of Rs. 1,87,764 and Rs. 47,149 respectively for these two years is allowed. 13. The only other ground pertaining to the assessee s appeals for the asst. yrs. 1969-70 and 1970-71 is regarding the disallowance of interest of Rs. 15,535 and Rs. 18,868 respectively in these two years. The reasons for disallowing the interest in both the years is the same. The reason is that since the commission to the sole selling agents has not been allowed, the interest paid on the deposits out of the said commission was not to be considered as business income. Since we have held that the payment of selling agency commission was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of the assessee s business, interest paid to Nutan Distributors in both the years is allowed. 14. In the result, I.T.A. Nos. 92,93,94 and 95 of the 1972-73 are dismissed and ITA Nos. 1154 of 1973-74 and ITA No. 9 of 1974-75 are allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
SSI exemption - Valid - Article 14 of Constitution of India - Exemption - Classification between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the basis of a particular date - Matches
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1974 (11) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the entire value of the property known as ' Mayavaram Lodge ' or any portion of its value is liable to be included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased as property deemed to have passed on his death ?
Held that:- We accept the appeal, discharge the answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it and answer that question in favour of the revenue and against the accountable person. Our answer is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the entire value of the property known as " Mayavaram Lodge " is liable to be included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased as property deemed to have passed on his death.
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