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Showing 21 to 40 of 1216 Records
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2021 (11) TMI 1198
Benefit of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) - interest income received by a cooperative society from other cooperative societies - HELD THAT:- On perusal of provisions of section 80P(2)(d), it is clear that the income derived by a cooperative society from its investment held with other cooperative societies shall be exempt from the total income of a cooperative society. Therefore, what is relevant for claiming of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) is that interest income should have been derived from the investment made by the assessee cooperative society with any other cooperative society.
In the present case, the reasoning given by the lower authorities for denial of exemption u/s 80P(2)(d) is that interest was received from cooperative bank has no legs to stand as a cooperative bank is also a cooperative society. This issue was considered in the case of CIT vs. Totagars Cooperative Sale Society,[2017 (7) TMI 1049 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] wherein referring to case of Totgars Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. [2010 (2) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] held that the ratio of decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case (supra) not to be applicable in respect of interest income on investment as same falls under the provisions of section 80P(2)(d) and not u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.
From material on record it is not clear that whether the entire interest income was received from cooperative bank or other bank? - In the circumstances, we remit the matter to the file of the AO for the purpose of verifying whether entire interest income was received from other cooperative bank, if so, allow the same or otherwise restricted the exemption to the extent of income received from other cooperative banks. Grounds raised by the assessee are partly allowed for statistical purposes.
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2021 (11) TMI 1197
Validity of reopening of assessment - reassessment beyond the period of four years from the end of relevant assessment year - As decided by HC [2019 (1) TMI 122 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] AO cannot justify issuing the notice of reopening of assessment beyond the period of four years from the end of relevant assessment yea - HELD THAT:- We do not see any reason to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
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2021 (11) TMI 1196
Validity of Assessment order u/s 143 (3) r/w 144 and 147 - Violation of principle of natural justice - non considering assessee's objections/ replies or documents submitted - HELD THAT:- Respondent No.1 has not properly or correctly considered or appreciated the said objections / replies and the documents submitted by the petitioner and has proceeded to pass the impugned assessment order, which is an unreasoned and nonspeaking order without considering or appreciating the several contentions urged by the petitioner or documents produced by him or hearing the petitioner and consequently, the impugned order being violative of principles of natural justice, the same deserves to be quashed and the matter remitted back to the respondent for reconsideration afresh in accordance with law within a stipulated time frame.
Petition is hereby allowed. The impugned Assessment order passed by respondent as well as consequential Demand Notice are hereby quashed. Matter is remitted back to the respondent for reconsideration afresh in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2021 (11) TMI 1195
Miscellaneous Application - Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution - assessee submitted that no notice of hearing was received by the assessee and, therefore, there is an error in the order of the co-ordinate bench - HELD THAT:- We find that the appeal of the assessee was dismissed for non-prosecution as none appeared before the co-ordinate bench on the date of hearing. The assessee has shown a sufficient cause that no notice of hearing was received. In absence of any receipt of notice naturally the assessee could not have remained present on that date.
The order of the co-ordinate bench is also not on the merits of the issue. In view of this, we find that according to Rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, 1963, this appeal deserves to be recalled. Accordingly, we allow the Misc. application of the assessee recalling the order of the ITAT and fix the date of hearing of the appeal on 14.12.2021. No notice is required to be issued as dates are noted by the parties in the open court. Accordingly, the Miscellaneous application is allowed.
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2021 (11) TMI 1194
Classification of goods - Various types of betel nut products (Supari) - Determination of whether the products fall under Chapter 8 or Chapter 21 of the Customs Tariff - seeking advance ruling u/s 28-14 - HELD THAT:- The processes involved in obtaining Unfavoured Supari and Cutting Supari include multi-stage cutting, but no addition or mixing of any other substance.
In the case of API supari and Chikni supari, the processes include mixing of food starch. In determining the classification of these four supari items, viz. Unfavoured Supari, Cutting Supari, API supari and Chikni supari, the basic question is whether the process of cutting or slicing, and mixing of food starch change the substantive character of the betel nuts and result in products that should appropriately be considered as "preparations of betel nut" and not betel nut, albeit with certain degree of processing. In case, it is considered that the said processes and mixing of food starch are substantive enough for the products to be considered as "preparation of betel nut" that would make them classifiable under Chapter 21 by virtue of Supplementary note 2 of Chapter 21. The appropriate guideline for determining the nature and impact of these processes or act of addition of food starch is found in Note 2 to Chapter 8 of the Customs Tariff Act.
The said note prescribes that dried nuts of this Chapter may be partially rehydrated, or treated for the following purpose: (a) for additional preservation or stabilization for example, by moderate heat treatment, sulphuring, the addition of sorbic acid or potassium sorbate); (b) to improve or maintain their appearance for example, by the addition of vegetable oil or small quantities of glucose syrup), provided that they retain the character of dried fruit or dried nuts. Guided by the letter and spirit of the said Chapter Note, I find that the processes and mixing of food starch that the said four supari have been subjected to fall in the category of processes carried out on the same for cleaning, preserving and making them more attractive to certain tastes/ preferences. More specifically, these supari items retain the essential character of dried nuts.
The last betel nut product included in the application is flavoured supari. In obtaining this product, in addition to various processes, betel nuts are subjected to flavouring in large size automatic blenders with flavouring materials like spices/or mulethi etc., are mixed in automatic blenders with outsourced liquid flavours such as perfumes etc. In deciding the classification of flavoured supari, in addition to the scope of aforesaid Note 2 to Chapter 8 and Supplementary Note 2 to Chapter 21 (In this Chapter "betel nut product known as Supari" means any preparation containing betel nuts, but not containing any one or more of the following ingredients, namely: lime, katha (catechu) and tobacco whether or not containing any other ingredients, such as cardamom, copra, menthol), I need to also take into account the implications of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M/S Crane Betel Nut Powder Works, 2007 (3) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT and decision of CESTAT, Chennai in the case Azam Laminators Pvt. Ltd.2019 (3) TMI 782 - CESTAT CHENNAI relying, inter alia, on the M/s Crane Betel Nut case.
Thus, The classification of whole boiled supari remains under sub-heading 0802 80 10 as per the CESTAT, Chennai ruling. The remaining five betel nut products are classified under Chapter 8, sub-heading 0802 80, and not under Chapter 21, sub-heading 2106 90 30.
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2021 (11) TMI 1193
Grant of anticipatory bail - accepting bribe and creating forged documents - HELD THAT:- Perusing the material placed on record and taking into consideration the facts of the case, nature of allegations, gravity of offences, role attributed to the accused, without discussing the evidence in detail, at this stage, the anticipatory bail is granted to the applicant.
The applicant is ordered to be released on bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2021 (11) TMI 1192
Non speaking order of ITAT - Disallowance of payment of Income Tax paid on deemed income u/s 11(3) as a deduction or application of the income of the current year - as argued ITAT has stated that they have given thoughtful consideration to the findings of CIT(A), and thereafter without recording reasons as to why the appeal is being dismissed, the ITAT jumped to the conclusion that there is no infirmity in the order impugned before it.
HELD THAT:- Only short and cryptic reason assigned is that the present case is not a case of change of accounting system, which is not sufficient to disclose the mind of the ITAT while deciding the appeal.
Reasons are the bridge between the facts, circumstances on one side and the conclusion on the other, in absence of which, a judicial order becomes a lifeless piece of paper.
As relying on KRANTI ASSOCIATES PVT. LTD. VERSUS MASOOD AHMED KHAN [2010 (9) TMI 886 - SUPREME COURT] and the principles of natural justice, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the impugned order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, is non-speaking.
Least that is expected of an appellate judicial authority vested with such wide powers is to record reasons so that it’s mind is disclosed thereby informing the aggrieved person the exact reasons behind the conclusion and thus in the process facilitating availing of remedy before the higher forum. The impugned order passed by ITAT is set aside.
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2021 (11) TMI 1191
Revision u/s 263 by CIT - As per CIT assessee had claimed exemption of long term capital gains u/s 10(38) on sale of certain shares which according to department was a penny stock and such claim therefore accepted in the assessment without proper enquiry - as per assessee assessment proceedings in the case of the assessee was originally completed u/s 143(3)/153A and had to be confined to material found as a consequence of search, and no material was found to suggest that the long term capital gain was not genuine - HELD THAT:- Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. When AO adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of Revenue: or where two views are possible and the ITO has taken one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, unless the view taken by the ITO is unsustainable in law.
In the present case, it cannot be said due enquiry was not made. After making enquiry the decision has been taken, which also cannot be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Even in the order of 263, nothing material has been indicated to show that the order was erroneous. Assessment order is not required to give a detailed reason in respect of each and every item of exemption or deduction, etc and that if there was an inquiry, even inadequate that would not by itself give occasion to the CIT to pass orders u/s 263 merely because he has a different opinion in the matter.
In Gabriel India Ltd [1993 (4) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] as held that a consideration of the CIT as to whether an order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, must be based on materials on the record of the proceedings called for by him. If there are no materials on record on the basis of which it can be said that the CIT acting in a reasonable manner could have come to such a conclusion, the very initiation of proceedings by him will be illegal and without jurisdiction.
To invoke suo motu revisional powers to reopen a concluded assessment under s. 263, the CIT must give reasons; that a bare reiteration by him that the order of the ITO is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, will not suffice; that the reasons must be such as to show that the and must irresistibly lead to the conclusion that the order of the ITO was not only erroneous but was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The CIT cannot initiate proceedings with a view to start fishing and roving inquiries in matters or orders which are already concluded.
In the present case, complete details of purchase of shares and sale of shares is verifiable form the bank statement, and also from the borkers note. The shares are held for long period of time, and there is no material to suggest that such gain is not genuine. There is only a suspicion, and on the basis of such facts, the revisional proceedings initiated are not justified. Hence, we quash the proceedings initiated U/s 263 - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2021 (11) TMI 1190
Addition on account of cash donation collected outside the books of accounts - presumption cast against the assessee u/s 292C r.w.s. 132(4A) to explain plethora of evidence seized during the search from residence of Principal Trustee of assessee society ? - HELD THAT:- Question (i) is framed as under :- Whether in the facts and the circumstances of the case, ITAT was right in deleting the addition as added by the AO relying on documents found during the search at the residence of Principal Trustee of Respondent – Society ?
Registrar (Judicial) / Registrar, High Court, Original Side, Bombay to ensure that the original record in relation to this Appeal is summoned from the Tribunal and offered for inspection of the parties. This paper book is treated sufficient for the purpose of admission of this Appeal. However, the Registry must further ensure preparation of complete paper book in accordance with the rules. The registry in the first instance must send intimation of admission of this Appeal enclosing therewith a copy of this order so as to enable the Tribunal to act accordingly.
Assessment of trust - Violation of Section 13(1)(d) subjected to maximum marginal rate - ITAT holding that violation of conditions under Section 13(1)(d) would not result in denial of exemption on the whole income and denial be restricted to the income in violation of provisions of Section 13(1) - HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to entertain the same inasmuch as by Finance Act, 1984 – Circular No.387 dated 06/07/1984 issued by the Income Tax Department, Government of India, at 28.6, it is mentioned “In other words, where such a trust contravenes the provisions of section 13(1) or (d) of the Act, the maximum marginal rate of income-tax will apply only to that part of the income which has forfeited exemption under the said provisions”. Copy of the said circular that was tendered by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent is taken on record and marked ‘X’ for identification.
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2021 (11) TMI 1189
Grant of regular bail - Money Laundering - reverse burden of proof on the accused under Section 24 of the PML Act - allegation against this applicant is of very serious nature that the applicant being an IAS officer, misused his position and power and made unlawful gain - it was held by High Court that It would be proper to grant bail to the applicant at this stage - HELD THAT:- There are no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondent herein.
SLP dismissed.
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2021 (11) TMI 1188
Seeking quashing G.O. Ms. No. 50 which granted loan waiver to small and marginal farmers - exercise of powers of judicial review - scheme granting exemption only to 'small farmers' and 'marginal farmers' is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution - scheme is under-inclusive and over-inclusive - High Court held the grant of loan waivers only to small and marginal farmers to be arbitrary and directed the Appellant to grant the same benefit to all farmers irrespective of the extent of landholding - HELD THAT:- The application of the impugned scheme to only the small and the marginal farmers is justified for two reasons: (i) A climate crisis such as drought and flood causes large scale damages to small holdings as compared to the large holdings due to the absence of capital and technology; and (ii) The small and marginal farmers belong to the economically weaker Section of society. Therefore, the loan waiver scheme in effect targets the economically weaker Section of the rural population. The scheme is introduced with an endeavor to bring substantive equality in society by using affirmative action to uplift the socially and economically weaker sections. Due to the distinct degree of harm suffered by the small and marginal farmers as compared to other farmers, it is justifiable that the benefit of the scheme is only provided to a specified class as small and marginal farmers constitute a class in themselves. Therefore, the classification based on the extent of landholding is not arbitrary since owing to the inherent disadvantaged status of the small and marginal farmers, the impact of climate change or other external forces is unequal.
The High Court in the impugned judgment has observed that the scheme is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive since the total extent of land held by a person is calculated based on the information in the landholding register which permits discrepancies. It also held the scheme to be under-inclusive for not extending the benefit to 'other farmers' or the 'large farmers'. The meaning and ambit of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness has been discussed in an erudite exposition by Justice K.K. Mathew, writing for a Constitution Bench in State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills [1974 (3) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that Since the classification does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law, the classification might appear, at first blush, to be unreasonable. But the Court has recognised the very real difficulties under which legislatures operate -- difficulties arising out of both the nature of the legislative process and of the society which legislation attempts perennially to re-shape -- and it has refused to strike down indiscriminately all legislation embodying classificatory inequality here under consideration.
While non-classification arbitrariness is tested based on the proportionality test, where the means are required to be proportional to the object, classification arbitrariness is tested on the rational nexus test, where it is sufficient if the means share a 'nexus' with the object. The degree of proof under the test would impact the judgment of this Court on whether the law is under-inclusive or over-inclusive. A statute is 'under-inclusive' if it fails to regulate all actors who are part of the problem. It is 'over-inclusive' if it regulates actors who are not a part of the problem that the statute seeks to address. The determination of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness, and degree of deference to it is dependent on the relationship prong ('rational nexus' or 'proportional') of the test.
The Scheme in issue was introduced in pursuance of an electoral promise made by the then party in power in Tamil Nadu. The High Court seems to have been of the view that because the scheme was in pursuance of an electoral promise, it is constitutionally suspect. This view was made on an assumption that no study must have been conducted before the electoral promise was made. It is settled law that a scheme cannot be held to be constitutionally suspect merely because it was based on an electoral promise - The scheme propounded by the State of Tamil Nadu passes muster against the constitutional challenge. The High Court has erred in holding otherwise. During the pendency of the proceedings the State has granted a broader coverage, based on its assessment of the situation.
The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Madras High Court at the Madurai Bench dated 4 April 2017 is set aside.
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2021 (11) TMI 1187
Seeking permission for withdrawal of appeal - Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor failed to make repayment of its dues - Financial Creditors - Financial Debt - Non-performing asset - existence of debt and dispute or not - time limitation - it was held by NCLAT that The Admission of Section 7 Application is set aside.
HELD THAT:- The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.
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2021 (11) TMI 1186
Validity of suspension order - even after passage of more than 4 years, the departmental proceedings are not completed - It is submitted that even as per the policy of the State Government, the departmental proceeding is required to be completed within a period of six months - HELD THAT:- The petitioner was issued the charge-sheet on 20.02.2018 and he has been facing the suspension since more than 4 years. It is surprising to note that the Presenting Officer is appointed on 10.06.2021 after a period of more than 4 years from his suspension. Thus, the State authority is directed to complete the departmental proceedings latest by 31.03.2022. It is directed that, if the departmental proceedings are not over or completed, and no final order is passed before 31.03.2022, the suspension of the petitioner shall stand revoked.
Petition disposed off.
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2021 (11) TMI 1185
Second bail application filed u/s 439 CrPC - Offence(s) under Sections 132(1) (b)/(c)/(f) r/w Section 132(1)(i) - HELD THAT:- It is just and proper to enlarge the petitioner on bail for the reasons; firstly, the other co-accused persons have already been released on bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court; secondly, the maximum sentence for the alleged offence is up-to 5 years only and the petitioner remained in custody for a period of nine months; lastly, out of nine witnesses only the chief examination of one witness has been completed before the learned trial Court as such conclusion of trial likely may take long time.
Accordingly, this second bail application is allowed. Petitioner be admitted to regular bail subject to satisfaction of the trial Court.
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2021 (11) TMI 1184
Condonation of delay in filing the revocation application - requirement to comply with all the requirements of paying the taxes due - HELD THAT:- The delay in Petitioner’s invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules (OGST Rules) is condoned and it is directed that subject to the Petitioner depositing all the taxes due and complying with other formalities, the Petitioner’s application for revocation will be considered in accordance with law.
The writ petition is disposed off.
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2021 (11) TMI 1183
Application for vacating stay filed by respondent No. 5 herein granted - respondent are allowed to finalize the project of putting up a freight terminal at the risk and cost of respondent No. 5 - opportunity to file counter affidavit not allowed - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- In view of the fact that the writ appellant could not have an opportunity to file counter-affidavit to the application for vacating stay filed by private respondent No. 5 which was his valuable right to file counter-affidavit of that application opposing it and to defend the interim order granted after hearing the parties by which he has suffered prejudice, and further taking note of the fact that the writ appellant had promptly served copy of rejoinder to the respondents on 28-9-2021 and findings as noticed above have been recorded on the merits of the matter which has vital bearing on the final adjudication of writ petition as respondents No. 1 to 4 have been allowed to finalise the project of putting up a freight terminal though at the risk and cost of respondent No. 5 and subject to final adjudication of the writ petition, we are of the considered opinion that the order impugned dated 28-9-2021 cannot be termed as a pure and simple interlocutory order within the meaning of proviso to Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006 and as such, the writ appeal cannot be held to be barred in terms of paragraph 45 of the judgment of this Court in AJAY GUPTA VERSUS STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ORS [2017 (1) TMI 1827 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] and consequently, the writ appeal is held to be maintainable and the preliminary objection raised in this behalf qua the maintainability of appeal, is hereby repelled.
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2021 (11) TMI 1182
Validity of assessment - No notice u/s 143(2) as issued and served to the appellant - HELD THAT:- As return of income was filed by the assessee on 31.01.2014 declaring loss. The assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act was passed on 30.03.2015.
AO in the remand report itself before the ld. CIT (Appeals) has stated that there is no official record available with him to show issuance of notice. CIT (Appeals) based on this relying on the decisions of several High Courts as per para No. 4 quashed the order of the AO.
We concur with the order of the ld. CIT (Appeals) that where there is no issuance of notice under Section 143(2) of the Act the order passed by the ld. AO deserves to be quashed. Issuance of notice u/s 143 (2) of the act is foundation stone for the assessment order. Even before us, no proof of issuance of any notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was shown. Thus we confirm the order of the ld. CIT (Appeals) in quashing the assessment order. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2021 (11) TMI 1181
Empanelment and appointment of Respondent No. 4 as DGP (HoPF) - Whether preparation of the panel for selection of DGP (HoPF) for the State of Punjab was in contravention of a judgment of this Court in Prakash Singh v. Union of India [2006 (9) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT]? - HELD THAT:- In exercise of its power Under Articles 32 and 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court directed UPSC to constitute an empanelment committee to recommend three senior-most officers with good record of service and range of experience, and meeting other parameters, from whom the DGP shall be selected and appointed by the State Government. The incumbent DGP of the State is a member of the empanelment committee according to the Draft Guidelines issued by the UPSC. These Guidelines issued in compliance with the directions given by this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we would accept, are well-known and in public domain. Therefore, the position that Respondent No. 5, being the DGP, would be a member of the Empanelment Committee was within the knowledge of the Appellant. Ignorance of this factum when pretended must be rejected as a mere pretence.
The Article states that as per the information gathered from officials privy to the development, the UPSC meeting will be held in Delhi and would be attended by the Punjab Chief Secretary Mr. Karan Avtar Singh and the incumbent DGP Mr. Suresh Arora, i.e., Respondent No. 5. In the given facts and considering the position and status of the Appellant, we would not accept the plea that participation of Respondent No. 5 in the Empanelment Committee was unknown or a secret for the Appellants.
Whether the Appellants are estopped from challenging the recommendations made by the Empanelment Committee, given the fact that they had taken a calculated chance, and not protested till the selection panel was made public? - HELD THAT:- The judgment in Madanlal [1995 (2) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT] refers to an earlier decision of this Court in Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Ors. [1986 (3) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Petitioner who had appeared at an examination without protest was not granted any relief, as he had filed the petition when he could not succeed afterwards in the examination. This principle has been reiterated in Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar and Ors. [2010 (5) TMI 928 - SUPREME COURT] and Ramesh Chandra Shah and Ors. v. Anil Joshi and Ors. [2013 (4) TMI 896 - SUPREME COURT].
The Court in P.D. Dinakaran [2011 (7) TMI 1358 - SUPREME COURT] had requested the Chairman to nominate another distinguished jurist in place of the person in question, duly noticing that the proceedings initiated had progressed only to the stage of framing of charges and nomination of another jurist would not hamper the proceedings. The reconstituted committee would be entitled to proceed on the charges already framed.
The High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal and upholding the selection and appointment of Respondent No. 4 as DGP (HoPF), State of Punjab - appeal dismissed.
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2021 (11) TMI 1180
Maintainability of SLP - the impugned issue was whether the instant case can be termed as an appropriate case and the further proceedings against the petitioner to be an abuse of process of court, warranting interference under Section 482, despite the bar under Section 397(3) - it was held by High Court that The substantial contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel having been answered as above, there is no special circumstance in this case which compels this Court to entertain a second revision and grant relief, in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- It is not required to entertain the Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution - SLP dismissed.
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2021 (11) TMI 1179
Computing the presumptive income for the purposes of Section 44BB - service tax includable in the gross revenue for computing profits under presumptive provisions of section 44BB or not? - HELD THAT:- It is seen that the issue of excludability of service tax in the gross receipts is squarely covered by the judgment of Mitchell Drilling International Pty Limited [2015 (10) TMI 259 - DELHI HIGH COURT] as held that service tax being statutory levy should not form part of gross receipts as per provisions of section 44BB.
Further in the case of DIT International Taxation Vs M/s Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd [2019 (4) TMI 1177 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT] held that the amount reimbursed to the assessee (service provider) by the ONGC (service recipient), representing the service tax paid earlier by the assessee to the Government of India, would not form part of the aggregate amount referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section(2) of Section 44BB. As spelt that even otherwise, it is not every amount paid on account of provision of services and facilities which must be deemed to be the income of the assessee under Section 44BB. It is only such amounts, which are paid to the assessee on account of the services and facilities provided by them, in the prospecting for or extraction or production of mineral oils, which alone must be deemed to be the income of the assessee.
Thus service tax receipts donot form part of receipts for computation of income in the section 44BB - Decided against revenue.
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