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Showing 21 to 40 of 76 Records
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1974 (2) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... buoyas in the river Hoogly", and that therefore, more than what has been communicated to the detenu has influenced the detaining authority and the higher authorities in directing or affirming the detention. We see nothing now as having been relied upon by the authorities under the Act and all that is stated in paragraph 7 of the State affidavit in return has in substance been communicated to the petitioner. 7. The plea that the detenu has been undergoing incarceration for a long time since the middle of 1972 and that, unless released, his poor family will be in great distress is no contention in law under the Act but has to be made to the State Government which has always the power to review the situation with reference to a detenu. May be, the State Government may consider the position if appropriately moved. We see no ground to direct release of the petitioner on any of the contentions set up on his behalf by counsel. 8. In these circumstance we dismiss the petition.
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1974 (2) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... weigh with an officer some 7 months later in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies of foodgrains. It is not explained why there was such a long delay in passing the order. The District Magistrate appears almost to have passed an order of conviction and sentence for offences committed about 7 months earlier. The authorities concerned must have due regard to the object with which the order is passed, and if the object was to prevent disruption of supplies of foodgrains one should think that prompt action in such matters should be taken as soon as incidents like those which are referred to in the grounds have taken place. In our opinion the order of detention is invalid. 6. We have already passed orders after the conclusion of the hearing of the case that the petitioner should be released forthwith and we are now merely giving the reasons for that order.
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1974 (2) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n opportunity of making a representation against it. This was clearly in breach of the requirement of Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act and it also constituted violatton of the Constitutional guarantee embodied in Article 22, Clause (5) of the Constitution. The order of detention was, thus, vitiated by a serious infirmity and it must be held to be invalid. We are supported in this view by two decisions of this Court in Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal W.P. Nos. 1979 of 1973 etc., dec. on February 1, 1974 and Bhut Nath Made v. State of West Bangal. W.P. No 1456 of 1973, decided on February 8, 1974. 4. We, therefore, allow the petition and issue a writ of habeas corpus quashing and setting aside the order of detention made against the petitioner. We may point out that, this being our view, we direct, on the conclusion of the hearing of the petition, that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith and no futher order, therefore, now remains to be passed in that behalf.
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1974 (2) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ual against society and makes him a vengeful enemy when he ultimately emerges from the prison cell. Indeed, it is a serious injury inflicted on an individual by the State which can be justified as a measure of social defence only in extreme circumstances. But to jail a man on subjective satisfaction of possible prejudicial activity and to forget about him altar the statutory formalities have been performed is not fair to the Constitutional guarantees. It is appropriate for and democratic government not merely to confine preventive detention to serious cases but also to review periodically the need for the continuance of the Incarceration. The rule of law and public conscience must be respected to the maxi mum extent risk-taking permits, and we dismiss the present petition with the hopeful thought that the petitioner and others like him will not languish in prison cells for a day longest than the administrator drinks is absolutely necessary for the critical safety of society.
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1974 (2) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sed as a result of the misappropriation committed by him. He submitted that we at this stage, convict the respondent under section 403 I.P.C. and then impose a fine upon him instead of sending him to jail now. He also indicated that the respondent was a refugee from Pakistan who had apparently acted under the stress of straightened circumstances. We do not find all these facts mentioned in the judgments of the two Courts which were examined by us. However, in view of the fact that the offence was committed long ago, we think that a less severe sentence than we would have otherwise awarded will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the Special Court and the High Court. We convict the respondent under section 409 I.P.C. and we sentence him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₹ 2,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo six month’s further rigorous imprisonment. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... should be empowered to issue a certificate for the use of public funds in appeals to the House of Lords where issues of outstanding public importance are involved."( 1971 A.C. 1039,1048.). Maybe, a scheme for a suitor's fund to indemnify for costs as recommended by a Sub-Committee of Justice is the answer, but these are matters for the consideration of the Legislature and the Executive. We mention them to show that the law in this branch cannot be rigid. We have to make a compromise between pragmatism and equity and modify the loser-pays-all doctrine by exercise of a flexible discretion. The respondent in this case need not be a martyr for the cause of the, certainty of law under S. 87 of the Act, particularly when the appellant wins on a point of limitation. (The trial court had even held the appellant guilty of negligence). In these circumstances we direct that the parties do, bear their costs throughout. Subject to this, we allow the appeal. S.C. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether for the reason that criminal prosecutions have failed the detention order is bad?
Held that:- This Court in many weighty pronouncements over two decades has stressed that art. 22(5) vests a real, not illusory right, that communication of facts is the cornerstone of the right of representation and orders based on uncommunicated materials are unfair and illegal.
The detention in this case is illegal for denial of opportunity to make effective representation and direct that the petitioner be set free.
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1974 (2) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner is predominantly academic and the supply of foodstuffs in the manner stated above is minor, subsidiary and incidental to the principal activity and is an integral part of its academic activity. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be dubbed as a dealer within the meaning of section 2(c) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Sales Tax Officer had accordingly no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for levy of sales tax on the petitioner. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed, the order of assessment for the year 1968-69 (annexure G to the writ petition) as also the notices dated 3rd February, 1973 (annexures C-1 to C-4 to the writ petition), and the direction contained in the letter dated 14th March, 1973 (annexure F to the writ petition), are quashed, and respondent No. 2 is prohibited from continuing the assessment proceedings initiated in pursuance of the aforesaid notices and letter. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 71 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lating to work and labour and as relating to sale. When the material is peculiarly within the knowledge of the assessee and when he refuses to furnish the information it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the contract must be exclusively one for work and labour. The Tribunal, we think, has been more than fair in excluding one half of the amount of Rs. 10,489.72 from the taxable turnover. It is also doubtful whether this point has been raised before the Tribunal. There is nothing mentioned in the Tribunal s order on this point at all though a ground had been taken in the appeal memorandum before the Tribunal. We have not even an affidavit of counsel who argued the case before the Tribunal that the Tribunal failed to consider the question argued. We answer the third question also against the assessee. 6.. In the result we dismiss these tax revision cases. We direct the assessee to pay the costs of the department including counsel s fee Rs. 200. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that part from time to time by the appropriate legislatures. It was also observed in the said case that by adopting such future amendments which related to procedural matters only, the Parliament had not abdicated its essential legislative function. In view of the decision of this court in Mysore Electrical Industries Limited(2), I am of the opinion that section 15(2), which authorises the passing of an order of assessment on a dissolved firm and which has been given retrospective effect, must be deemed as being available to the assessing authority when the orders of assessment were passed. I, therefore, hold that there has been legal validation of the assessments passed in respect of the assessment years 1960-61, 1961-62 and 1962-63 which are questioned here and that they can be enforced against the petitioner without passing any fresh orders in that regard. In the result, these petitions fail and they are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s been an anterior taxable sale and that they need not prove that tax had in fact been paid on those anterior sales. To claim the benefit of tax on the ground that their sales are second sales, the petitioners need not show that their sellers have in fact paid tax and it is enough for them to show that the earlier sales are taxable sales and that the tax is really payable by their sellers. Therefore, the direction given by the Tribunal that the petitioners are to show that the tax has been paid by their sellers on the iron and steel goods sold by them to the petitioners does not appear to be correct. We, therefore, modify the direction contained in the last portion of the order of the Tribunal as follows The appellant is permitted to adduce whatever evidence it chooses to show that the dealers in question were real persons and that their sales are taxable under the Act. With this modification, the tax case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 68 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... further satisfy the requirements of the main definition which is not meant for a grower covered by explanation II. The argument, if accepted, would defeat the very purpose of enacting explanation II. The main definition does not apply to a grower who is deemed to be a dealer under explanation II for the purposes of the Act. The alternative argument therefore has to be rejected. In Writ Appeal No. 1029 of 1973, we would like to observe that if the appellant therein feels that he is entitled to an exemption under section 9 of Act 9 of 1970, he may, if so advised, file an application with the concerned authority, if it is permissible now and is in accordance with law. We have no reason to suppose that the authority concerned will not decide such an application, if filed, in accordance with law. We cannot, however, give any direction in that behalf. For the reasons given above, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Appeals dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 67 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the net amount. 11.. On the analysis given by us, we would answer the questions referred to us thus Q. (1) In the facts and circumstances of this case, the reduction granted by the petitioner is not a part of the sale price. Q. (2) In the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the declaration in form C required correction. Q. (3) Freight paid is not a part of the sale price. Q. (4) The Tribunal is wrong in saying that trade discount is one kind of cash discount. Q. (5) The impugned discount is not a cash discount. Q. (6) The Tribunal was wrong in remanding the case for an enquiry as to whether the discount is a cash discount according to the practice normally prevailing in the trade. 12.. In the result, the application is allowed with costs as indicated above. Sales tax is not exigible from the petitioner on the discount and freight and the declarations in form C were valid. Hearing fee Rs. 200. MOHANTI, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... jected holding that it was not sufficient that the goods should be intended to be transported to a destination beyond India, so that they were in the course of import into some other locality outside India and consequently the coal sold to the steamship for enabling its voyage on the sea out of the country was not export. It was said that a mere movement of the goods out of the country following a sale would not render the sale one in the course of export within article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. The existence of two termini as those between which the goods are intended to move or between which they are intended to be transported is necessary. A mere movement of goods out of the country without any intention of their being unloaded in specie in some foreign port is not enough. It would thus be plain that this decision also supports the view which we have taken. For the reasons given, we dismiss the tax revision case with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 65 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... owers of the purchase officer under this Order, is not exigible to tax. 8.. The identical view was taken in Chittar Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1970 26 S.T.C. 344 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2000., which was a decision under the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order, 1959, which is almost in the same terms as the Order. 9.. We would now sum up our conclusions thus (i) The petitioner would submit returns and produce accounts before the assessing authority and the impugned notice cannot be quashed in the writ application at this stage. (ii) When the case would go back, the assessing authority would look into the accounts and other materials on record. (iii) 50 per cent of the rice procured under the levy, which constituted compulsory acquisition, would not be exigible to tax. Purchases over and above the 50 per cent would be liable to pay purchase tax. 10.. In the result, the writ application fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee of Rs. 200. RAY, J.-I agree.
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1974 (2) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... natural justice requiring that the person likely to be affected must be informed of the step proposed to be taken against him is not a formula to be mechanically applied. As observed by the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of IndiaA.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150., the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice . After it is held that the dealer has ceased carrying on the business, there is no possible cause that he can show against cancellation of his registration having regard to the terms of section 7(6)(a) of the Act. We therefore think that the dealer in this case has not suffered any injury and there is no merit in the writ petition filed by him. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order appealed from are set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. S.K. DATTA, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 63 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n a person washes and cleans his body, hair and teeth, etc. Hair is combed and arranged and held in place by ladies by using hairpins and hairclips. It is thereafter that the cosmetics are applied in order to beautify one s person. The view taken by this court in Plastic Products Ltd.(3) is too narrow a view to be accepted. We do not find anything in the context or according to the popular meaning to restrict the words toilet requisite to cosmetics , even though some of the articles may be regarded both as articles of toilet and cosmetic. But appliances like tooth-brush, hairpins and hairclips are essentially articles of toiletry and not cosmetics, as this term is understood in common parlance. We accordingly answer the question by saying that hairpins and hairclips are toilet requisites as defined in item No. 6 of Notification No. S.T. 905/X dated 31st March, 1956. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (2) TMI 62 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be confined to the suppressions detected. On looking into the records and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that an honest attempt had been made by the assessing authority to determine the actual turnover of the assessee-both disclosed and accounted for, and undisclosed and suppressed. In Esufali s case(1), the enhancement sustained was much more than 20 times. After all, on the facts of a given case, the vulnerability of the estimate has to be considered. Here the Tribunal has pointed out two aspects (a) the suppressions are in respect of a small period out of the total period under consideration, and (b) it cannot be said that even during that period all the suppressions were detected. 7.. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, shall be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in confirming the enhancement. Parties shall bear their own costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (2) TMI 61 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the Act indicated that the Commercial Tax Officer, Central Section, did not at all apply his mind and asked the petitioner to produce books of account since the inception of the petitioner s firm. Accordingly, I hold that the impugned notice is beyond the powers under section 14(1) of the Act. Mr. Roy, appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, in his usual fairness conceded that the said omnibus notice under section 14(1) of the Act cannot be supported. In the result this rule is made absolute. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 are directed by a writ of mandamus to return within seven days from date the seized documents of the petitioner as per seizure list. The impugned notice dated 11th June, 1973, issued under section 14(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, by respondent No. 8 is also quashed. The respondents, however, will have liberty to start fresh proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 60 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e case before us. In common parlance and in commercial sense the word cement would include all varieties of cement. Unless the Legislature makes a distinction between different varieties of cement, the word cement by itself would include all kinds and varieties of cement. White cement, as we have already observed, is only a variety of cement. It was pointed out to us that under the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1973, the entry white cement has specifically been included in the cement. This does not show that white cement was not covered by that entry. The Government has clarified the position which was previously implicit, may be because of the contrary view taken by the sales tax authorities. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. There will be one set of costs only. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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