|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 132 Records
-
1977 (3) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lve them in favour Of the workmen, abandonment of service being too recondite and the amount involved too trivial for variation by this Court. Shri I.N. Shroff fairly stated that the Court may make an order regarding costs. We direct that the appellant do pay the respondents costs which we quantify at ₹ 2000/-. Out of this sum. ₹ 1000/will be paid direct to Shri Parekh who has assisted the Court on behalf of the workers and the balance of ₹ 1000/- shall be drawn by the present President of the Respondent Union. Our parting thought is that negotiating settlements should be vigorously and systematically pursued even by tribunals since litigation, escalating. from deck to deck upto this Court, defeats both, whoever wins or loses. This must be a sobering influence on Labour and Management and agencies of conflict resolutions. That is a legal beacon that can brighten the dark tunnel of industrial conflict and promote national production cheered by shared wealth.
-
1977 (3) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ust 3, 1969 which was dismissed by this Court on December 19, 1969. In February, 1970 he again moved this Court under Article 32 but, for a change, he alleged on this occasion that Order XV of the Supreme Court Rules was ultra-vires. That petition was dismissed on August 3, 1970 and one month thereafter he filed the pre sent writ petition in the High Court. 3. It may perhaps be that the appellant was misdirected in regard to the remedies which he should have adopted, but what stares one in the face is that it was for the first time in September, 1970 that the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated December 21, 1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily. 4. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that exercise of the power under Article 226 may be described as mis exercise. It is unfortunate that an election petition which probably might have been disposed of long ago is still pending because the writ petition was pending in the High Court and later on special leave having been granted these appeals have been pending in this Court. How injurious sometimes the repurcussions of entertaining writ petitions are where they should not be is illustrated by this very case. 5. In this view we hold that the High Court fell into an error in entertaining the petitions and so we allow these appeals. We need hardly say that the tribunal created by the Bar Council takes note of the fact that as considerable lapse of time has already occurred it must now move quickly to hear and dispose of the election disputes. We express no opinion on the reasoning of the High Court on the merits of the case. With these observations, we allow the appeals but the parties will bear their own costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lers. In view of the language in which the Rules are couched it seems to us that a determinative issue arises in this case--the Department taking the stand that the returns filed by the assessees are incorrect and incomplete, whereas the assessees contend that the 17--240SCI/77 returns are correct and that the accounts of the wholesale dealers which formed the basis of the information of the Sales-tax Authorities were wrong and incorrect. Such an issue can only be determined after examination of' the accounts of both the parties and after affording the asses- sees the right to cross-examine the wholesale dealers con- cerned, particularly when the assessee makes a specific prayer to this effect. For these reasons, therefore, we are convinced that the judgment passed by the High Court in all these appeals is correct in law and the High Court has rightly decided the issues involved. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... der or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Residential Order, under Article 359 of the Constitution, is operative, the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended. In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out, quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended, that an injunction or stay could be granted at all on suitable 'terms. As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had, apparently, granted the interim stay which must now be discharged. Consequently, we dismiss these appeals with costs throughout, and discharge the stay orders. Appeals dismissed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... completed. This contention cannot be accepted as these Rules are intended only to omit Sundays, other holidays and days on which the assessment of Customs Duty cannot be taken up and would not include the entire period during which the Import Trade Control formalities have not been completed. The High Court was therefore in error in holding that the importer of the goods cannot be held responsible for any delay not attributable to his own default and that demurrage under section 43A could never be imposed as long as the goods were detained for the purpose of the operation of the Import Trade Control Regulations. In the result the appeal is allowed but due to the concession made by the learned counsel for the Port Trust there will be no order directing the refund of the money that had already been deposited by the Port Trust and withdrawn by the respondents. The appellant also does not press his counter claim. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... als that the High Court has followed these salutary principles in dealing with an appeal against acquittal. We may also observe that the High Court need not have mentioned the fact that the Sessions Judge was "suspended on account of corruption charges". If we may say so, it was absolutely unnecessary to refer to this in disposing of the appeal. We are clearly of opinion that this was not a fit case where the High Court should have interfered with the acquittal of any of the appellants. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the appellants are acquitted of all the charges. The appellants, Satbir Singh, Paramjit Singh, Harbhajan Singh, Shiv Narain and M.P. Singh shall be released from detention forthwith. The remaining appellants, Ajit Singh, Darshan Singh, Arjan Singh, Baghal Singh, Tara Singh, Dial Singh, Bachan Singh and Malook Singh, who have been on bail shall be discharged from their bail bonds S.R. Appeals allowed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 4(2) and would fail squarely within s. 14 (1) read with the Explanation thereto. Thus the appellant would acquire an absolute interest when she was in possession of the properties at the time when the 1956. Act came into force and any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored. This being the position, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant Tulasamma would have only a limited interest in setting aside the alienations made by her. We are satisfied that the High Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on an erroneous view of the law. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside, the judgment of the District Judge, Nellore. is hereby restored and the plaintiffs’ suit is dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of this ease and having regard to the, serious divergence of judicial opinion of the various Courts of India, we would make no order as to costs in this Court.
-
1977 (3) TMI 155 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
... ...
... ... ..... uced by Notification No. 95/75 dated 30 4-1975, they did not apply for or worked under that scheme. They have contented that their centri-fugals stopped working on 7-4-1975 itself and all the sugar produce till then had been cleared finally by 27-5-1975 i.e. before the Notification No. 95/75 was issued and hence there was no need to apply for working under the compounded levy scheme after 1-5-1975. The explanation of the petitioners for non-application to work under the compounded levy scheme with effect from 1-5-1975 is acceptable one. Under the circumstances, Government of India allow the Revision Application.
-
1977 (3) TMI 154 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... incurred before the goods left the factory gate such charges are normally included in the wholesale cash price for articles delivered at the factory gate. These expenses are incurred before the goods leave the factory gate and before the goods of the appellants enter the first stream of wholesale trade. The whole aspect of post manufacturing expenses would come in only after the first wholesale sale at the stage of subsequent wholesale dealings or the retail dealings and if that subsequent wholesale price or retail price is not to be the for this excise levy, it is obvious that no adjustment could be made by way of any such apportionment which would make the whole price uncertain and not easily ascertainable. It would, therefore, be incorrect to say that such charges are in the nature of post manufacturing charges including freight as contemplated in the Voltas judgment. ln view of the above discussions I uphold the order of the Asstt. Collector and reject both the appeals.
-
1977 (3) TMI 153 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
... ...
... ... ..... 1972 to 9-9-1972 were rejected by the Department as time-barred under the provisions of Rule 11 read with Rule 173-J of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The petitioner during the hearing explained that it takes a few days to finalize the account and file the refund claim. Hence, the delay should be condoned. Government of India observe that the debit to the P.L.A. is in the nature of a deposit duty without which the goods cannot be removed from the factory. The actual assessment of duty is made on the RT 12 statements by a proper officer of Central Excise when the monthly statements are fixed by the assessee. Thus, in law the date of payment of duty would be the date of assessment by the proper officer of Central Excise. As the clearances of April, 1972 would have been included in the RT 12 of April, 1972 and could not have been finalized earlier than May, 1972 then refund application dated 9-4-1973 is not barred by limitation. The Revision Application, is therefore, allowed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 152 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... re wholly irrelevant for they do not determine whether packing is a process of manufacture. This interpretation finds support from the judgment in Amar Dye-Chem Limited, Bombay and another v. Union of India and others - Special Civil Application No. 2070 of 1963 decided by Chinani, C.J., and Gohala, J., of the Bombay High Court on the 15th of January, 1965. 9. In the result I hold that the goods in question were not subjected to any process of manufacture by the petitioners after the 28th of February, 1969, that on that date they were lying with the petitioners in the form of chemical fertilisers fully manufactured and that no excise duty was leviable in respect thereof. All the three petitions therefore succeed and are accepted, the impugned orders are reversed and the excise authorities are directed to refund to the petitioners the excise duties respectively paid by them in respect of the fertilisers in question. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 151 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... therefore, without jurisdiction so that the same is liable to be refunded by directions in the nature of mandamus to be issued by this court. This conclusion finds support from the judgment in Special Civil Application Nos. 909, 910 and 911 of 1971 decided by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court consisting of Mehta and Sheth J.J., on the 17th/18th March, 1972 which was followed by Ramaprasad Rao, J., in Premraj Ganpatraj and Company (P) Limited v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras and others. (WP Nos 3236 to 3251 of 1970 decided on 14-9-1972). 5. In the result, the petition succeeds in part. While the orders of the three respondents holding the application made by the petitioner to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras, for a refund of the excess duty to be time-barred are not interfered with, the respondents are directed by a writ of mandamus to refund to the company the sum of ₹ 11.952.84. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was sufficient material on the record on which to frame charges against the respondents?
Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the: basis of which a conviction can-be said reasonably to be possible. We are therefore in agreement with the view of the High Court that the material on which the prosecution proposes.to rely against the respondents is wholly inadequate to. sustain the charge that they are in any manner connected with the assault on the complainant. We would, however, like to observe that nothing in our judgment or in the judgment of the High Court should be taken as detracting from the case of the prosecution, to which we have not applied our mind, as against accused Nos. 1 to 9. The case against those accused must take its due and lawful course.
-
1977 (3) TMI 149 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ax authorities that the rubber used for retreading of tyres is an article made of rubber and, consequently, the turnover of sales of rubber used for retreading tyres is covered under entry 36 of Part II of Schedule II of the Act and, therefore, the sales tax authorities are within their bounds in levying sales tax on such sales turnover by the applicantdealer herein at the rate of 7 per cent applying the provisions of entry 36, rejecting the claim of the assessee to fall back upon the residuary entry providing for lesser rate of taxation, namely, 4 per cent. 8.. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in the affirmative and in favour of the sales tax department and against the assessee-dealer holding that the sales of rubber used for retreading of tyres are covered under entry 36 of Part 11 of Schedule II of the Act. The assessee shall pay the costs of these references. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each case, if certified. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1977 (3) TMI 148 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... evenue. The legal position was settled by the decision of the High Court. All the relevant cases will have to be decided in the light of that decision. There was no ambiguity or difficulty felt by the assessing authority. It may be that the legislature was contemplating to amend the said section of the Act in the light of the High Court s decision. What all the Deputy Commissioner wanted was to stop disposal of all these cases until the State Legislature amended the Act. He requested the Revenue Board only to direct stopping of assessments in all such cases. By no stretch of imagination could it be said a clarification issued by the Board of Revenue on any question referred to it. It has no more status than an administrative instruction to stop consideration of all these cases until the legislature amended the material provisions. Therefore, agreeing with the conclusion of the Tribunal, we dismiss this tax revision case with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 147 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... her materials, and that these articles are not sold in ordinary shops and only to be found in medical shops. In this case, glass bangles are finished articles wholly made of glass, and capable of being sold to consumers. They are also sold in ordinary shops. Merely because some merchants exclusively deal in bangles or manufacture them or that certain shops exclusively sell bangles, would not legitimately influence the ordinary popular meaning of glassware in entry No. 38 as including glass bangles. 10.. For the aforesaid reasons, we would agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal that in the facts and circumstances of the case glass bangles (glass chudies) would be covered by entry No. 38 of the taxable goods framed under the Orissa Sales Tax Act and cannot be treated as unclassified goods and, in our judgment, the answer would be in the affirmative. In the peculiar circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. MOHANTI, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1977 (3) TMI 146 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cts on the record from which such an inference could be drawn nor has the Tribunal ascertained those facts or given its finding upon them. We are, therefore, not called upon to go into these questions. For these reasons, question No. (5) must be answered in favour of the assessees, that is, the respondents. For the reasons set out above, we answer the questions submitted to us as follows Question No. (1) in the negative. Question No. (2) in the negative. Question No. (3) in the affirmative. Question No. (4) in the negative. Question No. (5) in the negative. In view of the fact that both sides have partially succeeded before us and the defect in the jurisdiction of the said Deshpande has been validated by a Validating Act after he had made the said orders of assessment and reassessment, in our opinion, a fair order for costs would be that each party should bear and pay its own costs, and we direct accordingly in each of these eight references. References answered accordingly.
-
1977 (3) TMI 145 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... information may be obtained even from the record of the original assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record, or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law. As stated by us already, the wording of the two sections is different and similarly the ambit and scope of the two sections in the light of the scheme of the Act. Therefore, the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are of no assistance while interpreting the provisions of section 22(7) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. In the result, we hold that the decision of the Supreme Court rendered subsequent to the decision of this court in the revisions is not a fact on the basis of which this court could review its earlier order under section 22(7)(a) of the Act. Consequently, we dismiss these two review petitions, but in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in both the petitions. Petitions dismissed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 144 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ly as per the law laid down by the Bench, referred to already the assesee in the present case cannot be said to have effected a sale and, therefore, cannot be said to have acquired a turnover liable to sales tax. However, we may also point out that the Tribunal has not referred to either of these two aspects in the course of its order, even though it held that the assessee had acquired the turnover of its own and was liable to tax in respect thereof. In view of the above two facts, which have been totally overlooked by the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal is erroneous and cannot be sustained. Under these circumstances, the tax revision petitions succeed and they are allowed and the order of the Tribunal holding that the turnover in question is the turnover of the assessee and it is liable to tax is set aside. The assessee-petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 (Rs. Two hundred and fifty only), one set. Petitions allowed.
........
|
