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1953 (4) TMI 19
Whether by reason of the proceedings taken by the sea Customs Authorities the appellant could be said to have been prosecuted and punished for the same offence with which he was charged in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay?
Held that:- The prosecution of Jagjit Singh therefore before the Magistrate for the offences under sections 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code is not in violation of article 20 (2) or article 21 of the Constitution and must therefore proceed.
The result therefore is that the Petition No. 170 of 1961 filed by Jagjit Singh will be allowed only to the extent that the appropriate writ of prohibition shall issue against the respondent in regard to his prosecution for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike, but his prosecution under sections 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code will not be affected by this order. The Petitions Nos. 171 of 1951 and 172 of 1951 filed by Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand respectively will be accepted and the appropriate writs of prohibition shall issue against the respondent as prayed for therein. Appeal No. 81 dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 18
Issues:
1. Refusal by Sales Tax Tribunal to refer questions of law to High Court under Section 30(1) of Saurashtra Sales Tax Ordinance, 1950.
2. Computation of the period of limitation for making an application to refer a case to the High Court under Section 30(1) of the Sales Tax Ordinance.
3. Interpretation of when an order is deemed to be passed or made for the purpose of limitation calculation.
4. Comparison of provisions in different statutes for computation of the period of limitation.
Analysis:
1. The case involves a dispute regarding the refusal of the Sales Tax Tribunal to refer questions of law to the High Court under Section 30(1) of the Saurashtra Sales Tax Ordinance, 1950. The Commissioner of Sales Tax applied to the Tribunal for a reference, but it was dismissed on the grounds of being barred by limitation. The Tribunal's decision was based on the application being made after the prescribed sixty-day period had expired. The Commissioner challenged this refusal by the Tribunal.
2. The main contention in this case was the computation of the period of limitation for making an application to refer a case to the High Court under Section 30(1) of the Sales Tax Ordinance. The dispute arose from the interpretation of when the order was deemed to be passed. The Commissioner argued that the order was communicated on 1st July, 1952, and hence the application made on 23rd August, 1952, was within the sixty-day period. On the other hand, the opponent argued that the order was pronounced on the same day as the hearing, and the Commissioner had notice of the decision.
3. The interpretation of when an order is deemed to be passed or made for the purpose of limitation calculation was crucial in this case. The learned Advocate-General relied on precedents to argue that a decision is passed when it is pronounced or published in a manner that parties affected have a reasonable opportunity to know its contents. The argument was supported by cases like Muthiah Chettiar v. Income-tax Commissioner, Madras, emphasizing that limitation should not begin until the party is aware of the adverse decision.
4. A comparison of provisions in different statutes for the computation of the period of limitation was also discussed. The opponent contended that since Section 30(1) of the Saurashtra Sales Tax Ordinance did not explicitly mention computation from the date of notice to the parties, it should not be a factor in calculating the limitation period. However, the court emphasized that the determination of when an order is deemed to be made cannot be decided by comparing provisions from other statutes.
In conclusion, the High Court allowed the application, set aside the Tribunal's order, and directed the Tribunal to consider the Commissioner's application on its merits. The decision was based on the interpretation of when the order was deemed to be passed for the purpose of calculating the limitation period, emphasizing the importance of providing parties with a reasonable opportunity to know the contents of the decision before limitation begins.
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1953 (4) TMI 17
Issues:
- Interpretation of Section 11(2)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act regarding the timeline for making an application to the High Court against the refusal of the Revising Authority to refer a case.
- Whether the time taken in filing requisite copies should be excluded in the computation of the period for making the application.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an application under Section 11(2)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, where the applicant sought a reference to the High Court after the Revising Authority's refusal. The key issue was the interpretation of the timeline for filing such an application. The applicant argued that the application was not time-barred, but to ensure compliance, also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court clarified that the application must be made within thirty days of the Revising Authority's refusal to refer the case, not from the date of service of the notice of such refusal. This interpretation was based on the clear language of Section 11(2)(b) and analogized with the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, emphasizing the date of refusal as the starting point for the timeline.
Regarding the exclusion of time taken in filing requisite copies, the court referred to a Division Bench ruling in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, which held that if the time for filing copies is excluded in the computation of the period, the application would be within time. The court upheld this ruling, stating that they were bound by it, and concluded that the application in question was within the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the court directed the issuance of notice of the application to the opposing party, ordering accordingly based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions and precedents cited.
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1953 (4) TMI 16
The petitioner failed to submit the required sales tax return and was convicted for the omission. The argument that another party included the transactions in their turnover was not accepted. The petitioner was still required to submit the return, even if the items were included in another party's turnover. The conviction was upheld, and the petition was dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 15
The Madras High Court held that the respondents are not liable to pay sales tax as dealers in groundnuts. The court found that the nature of the transactions did not constitute a sale but rather a loan and entrustment of goods for sale. The appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were not held liable to pay the tax.
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1953 (4) TMI 14
Issues:
1. Interpretation of sales tax liability for bidis sold outside the State.
2. Exclusion of sales amount received before the Act came into force.
3. Inclusion of packing charges and dharmada in taxable turnover.
4. Refund of sales tax legality and entitlement.
5. Determination of sales tax liability for goods despatched against pre-Act orders.
6. Classification of goods despatched outside the State as sales under the Act.
7. Legality of Act provisions and their conformity with State Legislature.
Analysis:
The case involves an application under Section 23(2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, seeking the Board of Revenue to state the case and refer questions of law arising from an order passed under Section 22(5) for the assessment period from June 1, 1947, to November 12, 1947. The assessee, a bidi merchant with multiple manufacturing and distribution points, contested the sales tax liability on bidis sold outside the State, especially those distributed through a branch shop in another state. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's contentions, emphasizing the location of stocks and deeming sales to have occurred within the province, as per Explanation (II) to the Sales Tax Act.
An alternative argument by the assessee to exclude sales amounting to Rs. 97,945-10-0 received before the Act's enforcement was dismissed by the Tribunal, which deemed the sales contracts to be executed during the assessment period. Additionally, the Tribunal upheld the inclusion of packing charges and dharmada in the taxable turnover, considering them integral to the sale price. The assessee raised questions on the assessability of these charges under the Act, leading to a dispute over their exclusion from the turnover.
Furthermore, the Tribunal addressed the legality and entitlement to a refund of sales tax, referencing a prior judgment that did not support the refund claim for the assessment period in question. The High Court identified crucial legal questions regarding the interpretation of sales tax liability for goods despatched against pre-Act orders and the classification of goods sent outside the State as sales under the Act. The Court emphasized the duty of the Board of Revenue to refer all questions of law arising from its orders, irrespective of their debatability, and directed the Tribunal to state the case and relevant legal questions for further consideration.
In conclusion, the High Court allowed the application, highlighting the importance of addressing unresolved legal questions and ensuring proper interpretation and application of sales tax laws. The Court's decision underscores the need for clarity on sales tax liability, inclusion of charges in taxable turnover, and adherence to legal procedures for resolving disputes under the Sales Tax Act.
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1953 (4) TMI 13
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the judgment of the High Court on a reference by the Board of Revenue under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, amounts to "a judgment, decree or final order" within Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution.
2. Whether an appeal lies against the judgment of the High Court on such a reference.
3. The interpretation of the term "judgment, decree or final order" in Articles 132 and 133 with reference to a decision under Section 23(5) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the judgment of the High Court on a reference by the Board of Revenue under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, amounts to "a judgment, decree or final order" within Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution:
The court examined whether the decision of the High Court on a reference by the Board of Revenue under Section 23 of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, qualifies as a "judgment, decree or final order" as per Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution. The court noted that the proceedings arise out of the collection of revenue and are primarily consultative, not civil in nature, and do not decide any dispute of a civil nature in the strict sense. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court does not fall within the expression "judgment, decree or final order" for the purposes of Article 133.
2. Whether an appeal lies against the judgment of the High Court on such a reference:
The court considered whether an appeal lies under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, which allows an appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree, or final order of a High Court if it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The court noted that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act is advisory and consultative. The opinion given by the High Court is binding on the Board of Revenue but does not of its own force bind or affect the rights of the parties. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court on a reference is not a "final order" as it does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.
3. The interpretation of the term "judgment, decree or final order" in Articles 132 and 133 with reference to a decision under Section 23(5) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947:
The court reviewed various precedents and legal principles to interpret the terms "judgment, decree or final order." It referred to the Federal Court's decision in Mohammad Amin Brothers, Ltd. v. Dominion of India, which held that an order must finally dispose of the rights of the parties to be considered a final order. The court also considered the explanation added to Article 132, which includes an order deciding an issue that, if decided in favor of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case. However, the court concluded that the advisory opinion given under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act does not meet this criterion, as it is not sufficient to dispose of the whole case finally.
Separate Judgments Delivered:
Hidayatullah, J.:
Hidayatullah, J., emphasized that the proceedings under Section 23 of the Sales Tax Act are consultative and do not amount to a final judgment, decree, or order. He noted that the judgment of the High Court is not appealable under Article 133 as it is not a civil proceeding and does not fall within the expression "judgment, decree or final order." He also highlighted that the advisory opinion given by the High Court is not sufficient for the final disposal of the case and therefore does not qualify as a "final order" under Article 132.
Deo, J.:
Deo, J., concurred with the view that the proceedings under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act are not civil proceedings and therefore not appealable under Article 133. However, he opined that the decision of the High Court under Section 23(5) is a "judgment" in revenue proceedings and involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Consequently, he held that the applicant is entitled to a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, allowing the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Sen, J.:
Sen, J., agreed with Deo, J., and had nothing further to add.
Conclusion:
The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed based on the interpretation that the decision under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act is a "judgment" involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, thus falling under Article 132(1).
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1953 (4) TMI 12
Issues:
Challenge to the imposition of sales tax on edible oils manufactured using electric power under the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1948. Allegations of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and contravention of the Essential Goods Act and Article 286(3) of the Constitution. Questioning the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting remedies under the Sales Tax Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Imposition of Sales Tax on Edible Oils:
The petitioners, manufacturers of edible oils, challenged the imposition of sales tax on oils manufactured using electric power under the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1948. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner contended that the exemption under the Act applied only to oils extracted using human or animal power, not electric power. The petitioners argued that their oils fell under the tax-exempt category under item 57 of the Act's Schedule.
2. Constitutional Challenges:
The petitioners raised constitutional challenges, including the ultra vires nature of the Act due to the lack of a taxation limit and the alleged illegal delegation of power to fix tax rates. They also cited Act XIX of 1952, setting a tax ceiling, as unconstitutional, contravening the Essential Goods Act and Article 286(3) of the Constitution.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court:
The Excise and Taxation Commissioner argued that the petitioners should have pursued remedies under the Sales Tax Act instead of directly approaching the High Court under Article 226. The Commissioner contended that the Act provided a comprehensive framework for tax assessment, appeals, revisions, and High Court references, similar to the Income-tax Act.
4. Precedents and Legal Remedies:
The judgment cited precedents like Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council and U.C. Rekhi v. Income-tax Officer, emphasizing the statutory obligation to follow the prescribed assessment and appeal procedures. The Court highlighted that the Sales Tax Act provided avenues for redress, including revision to the Financial Commissioner and High Court references under Sections 21 and 22.
5. Dismissal of Petitions:
The Court dismissed the petitions, emphasizing the availability of adequate legal remedies under the Sales Tax Act and the petitioners' failure to exhaust those remedies before seeking relief under Article 226. The judgment underscored the importance of following statutory procedures for tax assessment and dispute resolution. The Court also noted the absence of evidence supporting the petitioners' claim of not charging sales tax to their clients.
In conclusion, the judgment upheld the dismissal of the petitions, emphasizing the need to exhaust statutory remedies before seeking judicial intervention under Article 226. The Court highlighted the importance of following prescribed legal procedures for tax assessment and dispute resolution, in line with established legal principles and precedents.
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1953 (4) TMI 11
Issues:
Challenge against sales tax order for sales of maida, Interpretation of "wheat flour" under Punjab General Sales Tax Act, Exemption of maida from sales tax, Bias in decision-making process of Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Delay in hearing revision petition.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a dealer in wheat flour, challenged an order requiring payment of sales tax for sales of maida for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51. The issue revolved around the interpretation of the term "wheat flour" under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1941. The petitioner sought clarity on whether maida fell under the definition of "wheat flour." The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner initially exempted maida from sales tax, but later, in an appeal, held that maida was not covered under the exemption. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner issued a general instruction excluding maida from wheat flour, leading to allegations of bias in decision-making.
The Court analyzed the definition of "wheat flour" based on dictionary meanings, asserting that maida should be included within this definition. The Court disagreed with the Excise and Taxation Commissioner's interpretation, emphasizing that maida is a component of wheat flour based on the dictionary definition. The Court highlighted the inconsistency in the Commissioner's stance, as he initially exempted maida but later reversed this decision without clear justification. The petitioner followed the prescribed appeal and revision process, but the delay in hearing the revision petition raised concerns about the Commissioner's impartiality.
In light of the circumstances and the precedents cited, the Court concluded that the Excise and Taxation Commissioner's circular had compromised his ability to interpret the law objectively. The Court applied the rule from a previous case to quash the sales tax order against the petitioner, emphasizing that maida should be considered part of wheat flour. The Court allowed the petition, issuing a writ of certiorari to annul the sales tax order and awarded costs to the petitioner. The judgment was unanimous, with both judges concurring on the decision to grant relief to the petitioner.
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1953 (4) TMI 10
The judgment in the case of Messrs. D.K. Sandu Bros. v. Sales Tax Department addressed whether "Medicated Brahmi Oil" is a "toilet article" under the Sales Tax Act. The court found that the oil qualifies as a toilet article based on its complexity and intended use, upholding the department's decision. The application for revision was dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 9
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the decision of Sir Jamshedji Kanga constituted an award under the Arbitration Act.
2. Whether a compromise in a misfeasance summons can be recorded under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.
3. Validity of the sanction given by Mr. Justice Coyajee instead of Mr. Justice Tendolkar for the compromise.
4. Whether the appellant's offer of guarantee was withdrawn.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the decision of Sir Jamshedji Kanga constituted an award under the Arbitration Act:
The primary issue was whether Sir Jamshedji Kanga's decision constituted an award under the Arbitration Act. The court analyzed the nature of Kanga's role, distinguishing between an arbitrator and a valuer. The judgment emphasized that if a person is not required to hold a judicial inquiry or give a judicial decision but can rely on personal skill, knowledge, or experience, the decision does not constitute an award. The document clearly indicated that Kanga was to act as a valuer, not an arbitrator, as he was given "absolute discretion" to decide. The court noted that a judicial decision must be based on evidence and follow set rules, which was not required here. Therefore, Kanga's decision was not an award but a discretionary determination, and the learned judge below was correct in holding that it did not constitute an award.
2. Whether a compromise in a misfeasance summons can be recorded under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code:
The court examined whether Order XXIII, Rule 3, which applies to suits, could be applied to misfeasance proceedings. Under Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, the procedure for suits applies to all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction, including misfeasance proceedings. The court rejected the contention that misfeasance proceedings were criminal or quasi-criminal, clarifying that they are similar to civil suits where allegations are made, and the court passes an executable order. The judgment highlighted that compromises in misfeasance summonses are practical and often necessary to save costs and time. The court cited precedents and forms from Palmer's Company Precedents, demonstrating that compromises in misfeasance claims are recognized and recorded in practice.
3. Validity of the sanction given by Mr. Justice Coyajee instead of Mr. Justice Tendolkar for the compromise:
The appellant argued that the sanction for the compromise should have been given by Mr. Justice Tendolkar, who was handling the misfeasance summons, rather than Mr. Justice Coyajee. The court clarified that under Section 234 of the Companies Act, the sanction of "the court" is required, and any judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court constitutes the court for this purpose. The allocation of work among judges is an administrative matter, and the sanction given by Mr. Justice Coyajee was valid and sufficient under the law. The court distinguished between sanction for compromise (Section 234) and condonation of default (Section 281), affirming that the former does not require the same judge handling the misfeasance summons to give the sanction.
4. Whether the appellant's offer of guarantee was withdrawn:
The appellant contended that his offer to guarantee the liability of another director was withdrawn. Evidence was taken before Mr. Justice Tendolkar, including testimony from Sir Jamshedji Kanga. The appellant did not testify to counter Kanga's evidence. The court found that the offer of guarantee was not withdrawn and upheld the finding of the lower court. The appeal was argued based on the facts as found by the learned judge, leading to the conclusion that there was a valid and binding compromise.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court upheld the lower court's decision that Sir Jamshedji Kanga's determination was not an award, that compromises in misfeasance summonses could be recorded under Order XXIII, Rule 3, that the sanction given by Mr. Justice Coyajee was valid, and that the appellant's offer of guarantee was not withdrawn. Liberty was granted to the attorneys for the respondents to withdraw the amount deposited for security for costs.
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1953 (4) TMI 1
Whether in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of ₹ 10,895 spent in defending the criminal proceeding was an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business as contemplated by Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The deductibility of such expenses under Section 10(2)(xv) must depend on the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding in relation to the business whose profits are under computation, and cannot be affected by the final outcome of that proceeding. Income-tax assessments have to be made for every year and cannot be held up until the final result of a legal proceeding, which may pass through several courts, is announced. We allow the appeal and answer the question referred in the negative.
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9911796707
