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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 164 Records
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1992 (5) TMI 184 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o denote a vehicle propelled by an engine worked by petrol, less commonly by steam more commonly motor car and motor. The dictionary meaning of the word motor is a machine whereby some source of energy is used to give motion or perform work, especially an internal-combustion engine. Applying this meaning to the word automobile there can be no doubt that the meaning of the word automobile in the context cannot be restricted to motor cars only and it includes tractors also since it contains an internalcombustion engine and by using some source of energy, such as petrol or diesel, the machine makes motion or performs work. 6.. In the light of above discussions, we hold that tractor tyres and tubes were taxable at 10 per cent during both the impugned years 1984-85 and 1989-90 and the petitioner has been correctly assessed. Consequently, we find no merit in both the writ applications and the same are therefore dismissed. No costs. A. PASAYAT, J.-I agree. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1992 (5) TMI 183 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nate that the view of the Division Bench in Shiv Ram s case 1964 ILR 1 Punj 622 was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench dealing with the case of Deluxe Dhaba 1973 RLR 350. Had it been done so, such anomalous situation may not have arisen, as Harbans Singh, J. (as his Lordship then was) was a member of the Division Bench dealing with Shiv Ram s case ILR 1964 1 Punj 622 and Deluxe Dhaba s case 1973 RLR 350. As a result of the above discussion, with utmost respect to our brother Judges constituting the Division Benches, we are unable to agree with the view taken in Deluxe Dhaba s case 1973 RLR 350 and the same is consequently overruled. The view taken by the Division Bench in Shiv Ram s case 1964 ILR 1 Punj 622 is hereby approved. As a necessary consequence, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the department. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (5) TMI 182 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... 90 is set aside with a direction on the Commercial Tax Officer, the respondent No. 1, to initiate fresh proceedings to decide the question of the applicants liability to pay tax under section 4(2) read with section 4(5)(d) of the Act of 1941, before making any assessment for the period from April 1, 1984 to May 31, 1984 and the subsequent year ending on May 31, 1985, if any. In deciding this question, the hoardings should be treated as goods and the letting out of such hoardings should be deemed to be sale in the facts and circumstances of the case. If it is decided by the respondent No. 1 that there is liability of the applicant No. 1 to pay sales tax on this account during these periods, the assessment proceedings should be gone through otherwise, the assessment proceeding or proceedings should be dropped. The application is, accordingly, disposed of. Interim order passed by this Tribunal on May 28, 1991 is vacated. No order is made as to costs. Application partly allowed.
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1992 (5) TMI 181 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on in form ST-38 according to the sale bill issued by the selling dealer. The penalty is, therefore, quashed. In spite of the fact that order annexure P.3 was passed on November 12, 1987, the authorities under the Act have failed to implement the same. Rather the directions appear to have been flagrantly abused in continuing the practice of collecting money at the check-post in the form of penalty under section 51 of the Act without passing any quasi-judicial order as contemplated. For the reasons recorded above, this writ petition is allowed with costs. The levy of penalty like Rs. 20 per truck per trip at the check-post in the case of the petitioners is quashed with the directions to the respondents to refund the amount of such like penalties charged from the petitioners on their moving an application giving details thereof within a period of 3 months from filing of the application for refund. The costs are assessed at Rs. 2,000, in each of the case. Writ petition allowed.
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1992 (5) TMI 180 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e the same within ten days from the date of receipt of our order. (ii) The amendments to the certificate of registration as done by the Sales Tax Officer by order dated April 5, 1990 making them operative with effect from April 1, 1990, as confirmed by the Commissioner by his order dated October 5, 1990 are quashed. If the Sales Tax Officer feels that any amendment to the certificate of registration is necessary and warranted, it is open to him to do so after giving proper opportunity to the petitioner. (iii) In the absence of definite pleadings and particulars regarding the challenge that the entry 26-D is at variance with promises held out in IPR, 1986, we decline to examine the question. (iv) The assessments having been assailed in appeals, we decline to examine the correctness of the assessments. 12.. The writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1992 (5) TMI 179 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ground for making the registration effective from the date of the order. Any other view would inflict unnecessary hardship on a dealer for no fault of his, in case orders are not passed expeditiously on his application by the appropriate authority. Similar view has been taken by the Orissa High Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Ghosh v. State of Orissa reported in 1970 26 STC 211. 9.. Keeping in view the foregoing discussions, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that registration certificate of the assessee had taken effect from the date of the application, i.e., April 2, 1970, making him entitled to exemption pursuant to the notification in question. Thus both the questions referred to us are answered in the negative and against the department with a cost assessed at Rs. 500 (five hundred). 10.. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna. S.K. CHATTOPADHYAYA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1992 (5) TMI 178 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nuary 31, 1991, annexed as annexure 1, as well as the order of the Commissioner dated February 26, 1992, annexed as annexure 8, and hold that there has been no contravention of section 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act so as to attract the proceedings under section 10A of the said Act and the demand made by the sales tax authorities for the period 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89 is wholly unauthorised and without jurisdiction. Since the petitioner has already paid the amount, it is entitled to refund of the amount, as was held by this Court while rejecting the prayer for stay by order dated February 27, 1991. The amount should carry interest at the rate of 12 per cent. We, therefore, direct the opposite parties to refund the amount together with interest as stated earlier within a period of three months from the date of receipt of our order. The writ application is accordingly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. A. PASAYAT, J.-I agree. Writ Petition allowed.
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1992 (5) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was right in rejecting the appellant's application filed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and in holding that the award which was made in London on an arbitration agreement was not governed by the law of India and that it was a foreign award within the meaning of the Foreign Awards Act and beyond the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts except for the purpose of recognition and enforcement under the latter Act?
Held that:- All substantive rights arising under the agreement including that which is contained in the arbitration clause are, in our view, governed by the laws of India. In respect of the actual conduct of arbitration, the procedural law of England may be applicable to the extent that the ICC 132
Rules are insufficient or repugnant to the public policy or other mandatory provisions of the laws in force in England. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction exercisable by the English courts and the applicability of the laws of that country in procedural matters must be viewed as concurrent and consistent with the jurisdiction of the competent Indian courts and the operation of Indian laws in all matters concerning arbitration in so far as the main contract as well as that which is contained in the arbitration clause are governed by the laws of India.
The Delhi High Court was wrong in treating the award in question as a foreign award. The Foreign Awards Act, has no application to the award by reason of the specific exclusion contained in Section 9 of that Act. The award is governed by the laws in force in India, including the Arbitration Act, 1940. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court and direct that Court to consider the appellant's application on the merits in regard to which we express no views whatsoever. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
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1992 (5) TMI 176 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eld to be arbitrary and capricious. It lacks essential guidelines about time-limit and it being unreasonable is ultra vires and we strike down the same. When we declare sub-clause (d) of clause 7 of the scheme ultra vires and as the petitioner has applied for exemption on June 28, 1988 and fulfilled all the conditions for exemption under the scheme on June 28, 1988, there is no reason to deny the benefit of exemption to the petitioner from June 28, 1988. In other words, the benefit of exemption to be given to the petitioner should be extended to it with effect from June 28, 1988, i.e., from the date of application. In the result, sub-clause (d) of clause 7 of the scheme being violative of article 14 of the Constitution is held to be ultra vires. The eligibility certificate (annexure 7) is quashed and we direct the respondents to issue the eligibility certificate to the petitioner with effect from June 28, 1988. With these observations, the petition is disposed of accordingly.
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1992 (5) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under Town Planning Act, a specific power has been given to the Development Authority to impose such development fee - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used - no occasion to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court.
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1992 (5) TMI 174 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FORFEITED PROPERTY
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... ... ..... for consideration inasmuch as the same had been effected to secure the loans advanced by the bank in favour of the husband and son of the owner. In other words, the mortgagee of the three houses in favour of the bank which came into existence in 1974 shall be covered by the term transferee in good faith for adequate consideration . The mortgage in favour of the bank, therefore, cannot be treated as illegally acquired property under section 3(1)(c) of the Act. The Competent Authority has erred in forfeiting the mortgagee rights of the bank in these houses. The Competent Authority could justifiably forfeit the equity of redemption of the owner in these houses free from all encumbrances. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed and the impugned order of the Competent Authority is modified to the extent that only the equity of redemption owned by Smt. S. Krishnammal (owner) in the houses detailed above shall stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
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1992 (5) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
HUF - Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the properties inherited by Karuppan Chettiar from his divided father constituted his separate and individual properties and not the properties of the joint family consisting of himself, his wife, sons and daughters and hence the income therefrom is not assessable in the hands of the assessee-Hindu undivided family
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1992 (5) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the claim of the assessee for deduction of the tax liability amounting to Rs. 6,69,766 in computing the net wealth in four wealth-tax assessments is admissible under the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act - High Court rightly held that the amount of Rs. 6,69,766 was not admissible as deduction while computing the net wealth of the appellant
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1992 (5) TMI 171 - ITAT DELHI-D
Assessing Officer ... ... ... ... ..... officials to whom the Departmental Representative conveyed the directions of the Tribunal in not even responding to his letters is most deplorable. 8. In view of the aforesaid facts, we have absolutely no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the reopening was bad in law and which would be amply proved in case the records were to be produced before us. We are fully justified in drawing an adverse inference against the department for not complying with the directions of the Tribunal to produce the records and for which ample opportunities had been allowed for a period of full one year viz. May 1991 to May 1992. In the final analysis we quash the reassessment orders holding the reopening under section 147(a) to be bad in law. In the view that we have taken, we do not find it necessary to deal with any of the other grounds raised in these appeals including the additional ground. 9. In the result, the assessee s appeals are allowed whereas those of the revenue are dismissed
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1992 (5) TMI 170 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meetings and Proceedings – Extra Ordinary General Meeting, Removal of director ... ... ... ... ..... ir place. The holders of the majority of the stock of a corporation have the power to appoint, by election, directors of their choice and the power to regulate them by a resolution for their removal. An injunction cannot be granted to restrain the holding of a general meeting to remove a director and appoint another . Every shareholder of a company has the right, subject to statutorily prescribed procedural and numerical requirements, to call an extraordinary general meeting in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. He cannot be restrained from calling a meeting and he is not bound to disclose the reasons for the resolutions proposed to be moved at the meeting. Section 173(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, does not require the shareholder requisitioning a meeting to disclose the reasons for the resolutions which he proposes to move at the meeting . Thus, all the points are answered accordingly as above and Company Application No. 602 of 1992 is dismissed. No costs.
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1992 (5) TMI 169 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator, Application by official liquidator under section 454(2)
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1992 (5) TMI 155 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Meetings and Proceedings – Circulation of members’ resolution, Resolution for appointing or removing auditors
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1992 (5) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 1986, the appellant in Criminal Appeals Nos. 301-302 of 1987 and the petitioners in the other cases are entitled to the presence of their lawyers when they are questioned during the investigation under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973?
Held that:- Appeal allowed assuring the right Of the respondents to have their lawyer during their interrogation.
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1992 (5) TMI 140 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Natural justice - Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... or a personal hearing before the matter is disposed of as the revenue involved is very high. From the above, if follows, that the Collector has not given a personal hearing to the appellants in spite of their request and has not even considered the written submissions filed by the appellants before signing the Order. Since he signed the Order on 9-1-1992 and since the written submissions were before him, he ought to have issued a date fixing for personal hearing in the light of the written submissions although he as already written an Order on 20-12-1991. Since there is violation of principles of natural justice. We allow the appeal and set aside the Order of the Collector and remand the same to him for de novo adjudication after complying with the principles of natural justice. The appellants should also co-operate with the Collector by not asking adjournment after adjournment unless there are genuine reasons for doing so. The appeal is allowed and remanded to the Collector.
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1992 (5) TMI 135 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Modvat Credit ... ... ... ... ..... easonable time rdquo , considering various other provisions of the Excise Act and Rules framed thereunder, as also allied Tax Legislation, period of six months, has been considered as reasonable. Here the credit is availed of within the period of six months from the date of eligibility for the same, and as such, the same cannot be denied merely because the same is not taken when the inputs were received, or at the time of filing of RT-12 Return. 6. emsp The approach of the authorities below therefore, does not appear to be in conformity with the Rule position, and hence cannot be sustained. The appellants have to be permitted to avail of such higher notional credit, when otherwise, they are eligible for the same. 7. emsp In the result, the appeal is allowed, the orders of the authority below are set aside, and appellants are held as eligible to avail of higher notional credit, and demand against them on that count are sic ordered to be dropped. Consequential relief to follow.
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