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2024 (5) TMI 1550
Rectification u/s 154 - computation of capital gains - HELD THAT:- The case in hand is not the case of the apparent mistake. In the present case, the assessee initially has computed the capital gain with reference to sale of mill consisting of land, machinery and sheds separately under Long-Term Capital Gain and Short-Term Capital Gain, whereas in the revised computation, the assessee has sought to revise the computation by asserting that the sale of mill was one composite sale of unit and therefore, the order u/s 143(1) is required to be rectified.
The above said error, if any, cannot be corrected by the AO while passing the order u/s 154 as held in the case of T. S. Balaram, Income Tax vs M/S. Volkart Brothers [1971 (8) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT]. Therefore, the decisions relied upon by the assessee are not applicable to the facts of the case.
The reliance of the assessee in the case of GOETZE India [2006 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT] is also not correct as in that case, the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court/High Court was whether the assessee can claim a fresh claim at the appellate stage or not without filing the revised return or not. The case in hand is not related to filing of claim by revised return of income, rather it is the case of alleged revision of incorrect/wrong facts in the computation of income at the time of filing of the return of income and after passing of the order u/s 143(1) revising the computation of income, which in our view, cannot be rectified in the order u/s 154.
AR contended that sufficient time has been taken to file the present appeal before the Tribunal/CIT(A), therefore, assessee may be given liberty to approach any alternative forum or authority or Hon'ble High Court having jurisdiction. In view of the above, liberty is granted to the assessee to file any other petition/appeal before any forum or authority or Hon'ble High Court. Appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1549
Entitlement for grant of relief in the form of a stay on the recovery of tax, interest, and penalty assessed by the Assistant Commissioner State Tax, pending the constitution of the Goods and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal - HELD THAT:- These writ petitions are disposed of with a direction that as soon as the president or state president enters office of the Goods and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act of 2017, the petitioner would file an appeal that may be decided in accordance with law on its own merits. The statutory stay as provided under Section 112(9) of Act of 2017 would remain in operation till the decision of such appeals. If the appeal is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the state would be at liberty to proceed against the petitioners for recovery of remaining taxes, interest and penalty if any.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (5) TMI 1548
Ex-parte order passed by the CIT(E) was not served physically nor received on email - HELD THAT:- We hold that the service of the notice/orders through the portal would also be required to be served either physically or postal address or other digital mode on the email address given in the profile of the appellant in Form 35, ensuring acknowledgement of delivery of such notices/orders upon the appellant assessee.
Meaning thereby, the impugned ex-parte order of the CIT(E) would be held in violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, we consider it deem fit to restore back the matter to the file of the CIT(A) to examine and adjudicate the application of the appellant assessee file in clause (iii) to sub-section 5 to section 80G for grant of registration u/s 80G(5) of the Act afresh after granting adequate opportunity of being heard and considering the written submission filed on record. Appellant assessee shall co-operate in the fresh proceedings before the ld. CIT(E). Appeals filed by the assessee are allowed for statistical purpose.
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2024 (5) TMI 1547
Eligibility for concessional Basic Customs Duty rate of 10% in terms of S. No. 20 of N/N. 57/2017-Cus., dated 30-6-2017 - Optical Line Terminals - HELD THAT:- Board has vide its Circular No. 8/2023, dated 13-3-2023 has clarified items under said entries specifically those at (b) to (h), amongst (a) to (h), in the Notification No. 57/2017-Cus., dated 30-6-2017, for better understanding by all stakeholders for a more effective identification of products and equipment covered therein.
In a catena of Supreme Court Judgments, it is already settled that circulars are binding upon departmental authorities but the circulars contrary to the plain words of a statute, cannot bind the courts. The court independently interprets the statute in their own terms.
On going through the provision of Section 151A of the Customs Act it is evident that Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) enjoys the discretion in exercising its power in capacity of appellate functions. The Customs Authority for Advance Rulings lacks such discretionary and appellate functions.
Thus, it can be deduced that the subject goods “Optical Line Terminals” has been clearly defined by Circular No. 8/2023, dated 13-3-2023 to be falling under the Notification Description of ‘Combination of one or more of Packet Optical Transport Product or Switch (POTP or POTS)’ covered under Sr. No. 20 of Notification No. 57/2017-Cus., dated 30-6-2017 as amended. Moreover, it is further important to note that Circular No. 8/2023, dated 13-3-2023 has been issued in consultation with the Department of Telecommunication.
Conclusion - Optical Line Terminals are not eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty rate of 10% in terms of S. No. 20 of Notification No. 57/2017-Cus., dated 30-6-2017 in terms of Circular No. 8/2023, dated 13-3-2023.
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2024 (5) TMI 1546
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - assessee had not disclosed material facts with regard to External Development charges ( EDC ) and license fee which ought to have been disclosed as revenue receipts - HELD THAT:- After examining the reasons as recorded by the AO, where there is no reference to any tangible material or any other information and rather everything is borne out from the record, as is evident from the reasons itself as reproduced above, wherein, it has been mentioned “On perusal of assessment record, it has been noticed that the assessee has received External Development Charges and License Fee”, and further it has again been stated in the reasons, that “I have perused the assessment record and information filed by the assessee during the course of assessment proceedings u/s 143(3)” and this finding is contrary to the finding given in the reasons that there is failure on the part of the assessee to dislcose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and, as such, it is apparent and quite visible from the reasons, so recorded, that there was no tangible material or any information, but everything has been available in the records and on the basis of which, the Assessing Officer had framed the original assessment u/s 143(3) and, thus, in view of above facts, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no material fact, relating to escapement of income, which the assessee could be said to have not disclosed truly and fully and rather the assessee had not concealed any material fact relating to EDC and License fee etc., which has duly been disclosed in the balance sheets. Decided in favour of assessee.
Addition of the EDC and License fee - As the assessee is only collecting agency on behalf of State Govt. or Ministry of Housing & Development and they have neither any control over the fixation of the charges and nor have any independent authority to utilize the funds of their own and, as such, they have rightly treated such receipts as capital receipts by the assessee and shown as liabilities in the balance sheet as the amount shall be utilized as per guidelines of the State Govt./Ministry of Housing & Development and, thus, such charges cannot be treated as revenue receipts and the various judgements as relied upon by “Urban Development Authorities” of Hon’ble Apex Court [2022 (10) TMI 948 - SUPREME COURT] the addition as confirmed by the CIT is not sustainable and is hereby deleted. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (5) TMI 1545
Levy of surcharge - total income earned is less than Rs. 50 lakhs - HELD THAT:- As the income of the assessee did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 50 lakhs and therefore levy of surcharge is not warranted as per First schedule introduced vide Finance Act, 2021, hence the surcharge levied by the CPC and affirmed by the Ld. Commissioner is deleted. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (5) TMI 1544
Disallowance u/s. 14A r.w. Rule 8D - expenditure incurred for earning exempt income - HELD THAT:- Following consistent stand of Tribunal, we direct AO to verify whether assessee’s own funds are sufficient enough to cover the investment. If so, interest disallowance would not be justified.The indirect disallowance of 0.5% should be computed only on those investments which have yielded exempt income during the year. The grounds, in all the three years, stand allowed for statistical purposes.
Recovery of Bad-Debt written off in the books of amalgamating Companies - HELD THAT:- In latest decision in [2022 (3) TMI 1634 - ITAT CHENNAI]bench held that after amalgamation, the assessee has all the rights as well as liabilities of amalgamating company which were transferred to it. Such recoveries of bad-debts were nothing but business receipts for assessee and therefore, assessable in its hands. Respectfully, following the same, we dismiss the grounds urged by assessee, in all the three years.
Method of recognizing income on hire purchase contracts - HELD THAT:- We find that this issue is covered by the latest order of Tribunal [2022 (3) TMI 1634 - ITAT CHENNAI] wherein as considered the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Madras in assessee’s own case who directed Ld. AO to tax the interest income on EMI method or ESM method which was consistently being followed by the assessee and allow consequential relief in accordance with law. Considering the same, similar directions were issued by Tribunal.
Since facts are pari-materia the same in this year, we issue similar directions to Ld. AO in this year to recognize income on such transactions. The assessee is directed to provide the requisite details. The grounds thus raised stand allowed for statistical purpose.
Rate of depreciation on UPS - HELD THAT:- We find that this issue has been decided by Tribunal in assessee’s favor in its latest order [2022 (3) TMI 1634 - ITAT CHENNAI] as confirmed first appellate order which allowed depreciation of 60%.
Nature of Software Development expenditure - HELD THAT:- AO disallowed the revenue expenditure but inadvertently made disallowance of Rs. 152.19 Lacs instead of Rs. 2.79 Lacs - CIT(A) directed Ld. AO to allow depreciation on Rs. 152.19 Lacs. No directions have been given qua expenditure of Rs. 2.79 Lacs which is the grievance of the assessee. AR has submitted that depreciation may be allowed on the remaining amount of Rs. 2.79 Lacs also. Accepting the same, we direct Ld. AO to allow depreciation on Rs. 2.79 Lacs. The corresponding ground stand partly allowed.
Treatment of Broken Period Interest - HELD THAT:- We find that this issue is subject matter of latest Tribunal order[2022 (3) TMI 1634 - ITAT CHENNAI] as observed that Ld. CIT(A) did not appreciate the facts of the issue properly. The courts have held that if the securities are regularly purchased and sold, they could be stock-in-trade. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the file of Ld. AO for fresh examination with a direction to the assessee to place all the material before Ld. AO.
Disallowance of bad Debts - same were mainly related to the hire purchase and mortgage loan transactions - HELD THAT:- We find that this issue has been settled in assessee’s favor by coordinate bench in its order [2019 (9) TMI 974 - ITAT CHENNAI]. The coordinate bench, at para 10.3 of the order, relying upon order for AY 2001-02, dismissed revenue’s appeal. Therefore, taking consistent view in the matter, we dismiss the grounds raised by the revenue.
Indexation benefit while computing Capital Gains on government securities - holding Bonds and Debentures are distinguishable from government securities - HELD THAT:- The bench for AY 2003-04 observed that government securities are not excluded from the definition of capital assets. As per Sec. 2(42A), the expression ‘securities’ shall have the meaning as assigned in Clause-11 of Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 which includes government securities also. It was thus concluded by the bench that bonds and securities are distinguishable. The bonds are not freely tradable whereas the securities are freely tradable. The Bonds could not be equated with securities. Further, from plain reading of 3rd proviso to Sec. 48. Government securities were not excluded for indexation benefit and only bond or debentures were excluded. Accordingly, the revenue’s grounds were dismissed. Facts being pari-materia the same, we dismiss this ground.
Rate of Depreciation on Commercial vehicles - HELD THAT:- AO erred in disallowing the depreciation claimed by the appellant. The Assessing Officer is directed to allow depreciation at the higher rate of 50% for the new motor vehicles acquired between 1.1.2009 and 30.09.2009 and used for the purposes of their business. The appellant succeeds in this ground.
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2024 (5) TMI 1543
Time limitation - application for substitution of the deceased Appellant with legal heirs contested by the Respondent on the ground of delay - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal is not bound by the procedure given under CPC but that does not mean that provision of CPC cannot be applied to guide itself to take an appropriate measure to the requirements. Article 120 of the Limitation Act provides three months period for filing application and we find it appropriate to apply the said period of limitation as otherwise this Tribunal is clothed with power to regulate its own procedure. Reason for the application of Article 120 of Limitation Act is to keep the proceedings alive in the hands of one who can pursue otherwise it would be in the hands of a dead person who cannot pursue the litigation and therefore substitution of the deceased is to be made within reasonable time. It is not that application cannot be filed for substitution of deceased after reasonable period of three months but is to be supported by an application for Condonation of delay after explaining the reasons. In the instant case, no application for Condonation of Delay has been filed.
The issue raised before the Apex Court in the case of Shri Puran Singh V/s. State of Punjab [1996 (1) TMI 436 - SUPREME COURT] was similar to the issue before this Tribunal. It is as to whether order 22 of CPC can be made applicable when the Tribunal is not bound by the procedure given under CPC. It is also whether Article 120 Limitation Act can be applied. The Apex Court has decided the issue in reference to a Writ jurisdiction holding that death cannot be ignored even in those proceedings. It is necessary to substitute the deceased by the legal heirs within reasonable time and for which Article 120 of the Limitation Act was referred too. It is necessary to clarify that in the Writ Jurisdiction also, the Court is not bound by the provision of CPC but general principles of law are required to be applied by the Courts and the Tribunal.
The Counsel made oral submission to explain the cause of delay. It is reference to non-functioning of the Tribunal till August, 2022. This is not a correct statement. The Tribunal was functioning till the year 2019 and thereafter with the appointment of a Member, it was functional for some time. The oral excuse of delay is not tenable, thus we are unable to allow the application having been filed after the reasonable period given by the Apex Court.
Conclusion - i) The applications for substitution are dismissed due to excessive delay and lack of a condonation application. ii) The appeals are abated and dismissed as a result of the failure to substitute the deceased appellants within the reasonable time allowed.
The applications are accordingly dismissed and with that the Appeals are abated and dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1542
Disallowance of deduction u/s 80G - donations forming part of Corporate Social Responsibility (‘CSR’) - Revenue’s only argument is that once the impugned expenditure is not allowable u/sec. 37 the same is also not exigible to sec. 80G deduction as well - HELD THAT:- We find no substance in Revenue’s instant sole substantive grievance as the Ld. CIT(A)'s detailed discussion has considered a catena of case law of various judicial forums already accepting the very issue in assessee’s favour and against the department. We thus adopt judicial consistency herein as well to uphold the Ld. CIT(A)'s detailed discussion accepting the assessee’s sec. 80G deduction claim. Revenue appeal dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1541
Challenge to chargesheets filed - compliance with the requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or not - chargesheets provide sufficient details and evidence to substantiate the charges made against the accused or not - HELD THAT:- Subsection (1)(a) to Section 173 of the 1898 Code had stipulated that as soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in-charge of the police station shall forward to the Magistrate, a report in the form prescribed by the local government, sending forth the names of the parties, nature of the information and the names of the people who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case and state whether the accused person has been forwarded in custody or released on a bond.
In Tara Singh’s case [1951 (6) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT], the question which had arisen was whether the challan preferred by the police was complete so as to enable the court to take cognisance within the meaning of Section 190(1)(b) of the 1898 Code. It was held that a challan submitted in the said case was complete except for submission of the report of the Imperial Serologist and drawing of the sketch map of the occurrence. In this context, reference was made to Section 173(1) of the 1898 Code and that the report/challan should set forth, viz. the names of the parties, nature of the information and names of persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case. The cognisance, it was held, was proper.
In R.K. Dalmia [1962 (4) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT], again a reference was made to Section 173(1) of the 1898 Code and that the chargesheet must contain name of the parties, nature of the information and the names of persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case. These observations were made in the context of the submission made on behalf of the accused that there was a change in the stand of the prosecution, which contention was rejected on several grounds, as mentioned in paragraphs 325 and 326 of the footnoted citation.
The chargesheet is complete when it refers to material and evidence sufficient to take cognizance and for the trial. The nature and standard of evidence to be elucidated in a chargesheet should prima facie show that an offence is established if the material and evidence is proven. The chargesheet is complete where a case is not exclusively dependent on further evidence. The trial can proceed on the basis of evidence and material placed on record with the chargesheet. This standard is not overly technical or fool-proof, but a pragmatic balance to protect the innocent from harassment due to delay as well as prolonged incarceration, and yet not curtail the right of the prosecution to forward further evidence in support of the charges.
There is an inherent connect between the chargesheet submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code, cognisance which is taken under Section 190 of the Code, issue of process and summoning of the accused under Section 204 of the Code, and thereupon issue of notice under Section 251 of the Code, or the charge in terms of Chapter XVII of the Code - These provisions, however, have to be read along with the power of the police to investigate under sub-section (8) to Section 173 of the Code even when they have submitted a report under sub-section (2) to Section 173 of the Code.
The investigating officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused and what is the material evidence available on the file. Statements under Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses. The role played by the accused in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused persons.
This Court in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka and Another [2015 (1) TMI 1518 - SUPREME COURT], had referred to Section 506 which prescribes punishment for the offence of ‘criminal intimidation’ as defined in Section 503 of the IPC, to observe that the offence under Section 503 requires that there must be an act of threating another person with causing an injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. This threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do an act which he is entitled to do. Mere expression of any words without any intent to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. The material and evidence must be placed on record to show that the threat was made with an intent to cause alarm to the complainant, or to cause them to do, or omit to do an act. Considering the statutory mandate, offence under Section 506 is not shown even if we accept the allegation as correct.
Conclusion - The chargesheets must comply with the requirements of Section 173(2) and provide sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges.
The chargesheet and the summoning order quashed - appellants are discharged.
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2024 (5) TMI 1540
Disallowance u/s 14A - As argued assessee has not earned any exempt income - CIT(A) following the decision of Ballarpur Industries Ltd. [2016 (10) TMI 1039 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that in the absence of any exempt income, no disallowance u/s.14A can be made - HELD THAT:- Here in this case it is not in dispute that assessee has not earned any exempt income and yet it has offered suomoto disallowance.
AO has made additional disallowance mostly on account of interest despite assessee stating that no borrowed funds have been utilized for the purpose of strategic investments. The core contention which has been raised that now in light of amendment by the Finance Act 2022 to Section 14A in the statute w.e.f. 01/04/2022, will the newly inserted Explanation will apply prospectively or retrospectively.
We find that this precise issue has been considered of M/s. Era Infrastructure Ltd wherein after analyzing the amendment brought by the Finance Act 2022, in Section 14A by inserting a non-obstante clause and Explanation was inserted with effect from 01/04/2022.
As insertion of Explanation w.e.f. 01/04/2022 will not apply retrospective therefore, the decision of the Tribunal saying it retrospective cannot be followed. Accordingly, the order of the ld. CIT (A) is deleted and Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1539
Ex-parte order passed by CIT(A) - Addition on bogus purchase of goods (i.e., copper scrap) - books of account not been rejected as per sec 145(3) - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the order of CIT(A), it is clearly apparent that the order passed by CIT(A)was an ex- parte order, deliberating upon the appeal of the assessee against the order of AO u/s 143(3) dated 16.12.2022.
Under the settled position of law, as also held by us in various other cases, we are of the considered view that the Ld. CIT(A) was under abundant duty to dispose of the appeal of the assessee before him with adequate deliberations on the merits of the issues therein, after thoughtfully considering the material available on record, instead of disposing of the same on account of non-prosecution on the part of the assessee.
We, therefore, set aside the appeal to the files of Ld. CIT(A) to decide the issues therein on their merits considering the material available on record, after affording reasonable opportunity to being heard to the assessee.
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2024 (5) TMI 1538
Unexplained loan and interest - AO alleged that as on the date when the loan was obtained, the assessee had sufficient cash balance and, therefore, there was no necessity to obtain the loan and paying interest @ 18% thereon - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has held that the assessee has not been able to provide any supporting evidence to prove the genuineness of the transaction or the creditworthiness of the lender. Accordingly we find no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) so as to call for any interference. Decided against assessee.
Disallowance of salary expenses, out of shop expenses and telephone expenses - HELD THAT:- Additions confirmed by the Ld. CIT(A) are liable to be set aside. We find that the CIT(A) has not disputed the genuineness of the services which have been availed by the assessee and nothing on record has been brought to show that why such payment was held to be excessive. Regarding other expenses relating to telephone use and out of shop expenses, again we observe that the CIT(A) has not given any basis as to why the additions are liable to be sustained in the hands of the assessee. In the result, ground of the assessee’s appeal are allowed.
Addition of income in the hands of the assessee on account of benami concerns - HELD THAT:- As the assessee in the instant facts has not been able to prove that the respective persons were carrying out their independent business from the premises of the assessee. In the case of assessee’s wife, the assessee has himself admitted that it was effectively the assessee who was carrying on the business in the name of his wife. Even with respect to the balance parties, the assessee has only given vague explanation to contend that all these persons were carrying on separate business in their independent names. Accordingly, we find no infirmity in the order of the AO/CIT(A) so as to call for any interference. Ground of the assessee’s appeal is dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1537
Assessment u/s 153A - addition made on account of the same being devoid of any incriminating material found during the course of search, rendering the assessment order bad in law - HELD THAT:- The ratio laid down by in the case of Abhisar Buildwell .[2023 (4) TMI 1056 - SUPREME COURT] squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The impugned addition is not based on any incriminating material found relevant to the A.Ys under consideration. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the ld. CIT(A) and consequently the action of the CIT(A) in quashing the orders of the AO is confirmed.
However, it is pointed out that the CIT(A) has held that Assessing Officer was not justified in assuming jurisdiction u/s 153C whereas the correct position is that AO has passed order u/s 153A r.w.s 143(3) of the Act. To that extent, the decision of the CIT(A) is modified. Decided against revenue.
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2024 (5) TMI 1536
Addition u/s 68 - sale of shares of the penny stock companies - commission paid to the entry provider @ 35% - HELD THAT:- As decided in Kamalesh Mohandas Lakhwani [2023 (8) TMI 505 - ITAT MUMBAI] relating to transactions in shares of same company as that of assessee we find no reason to hold the assessee liable for having invested in the said share in the absence of any corroborative evidence. A.O. has also not made any enquiry as to the payments made by the assessee to the recognized broker nor has the A.O. brought on record any material evidence to show that it was a mere bogus transaction except for the information received from the DDIT (Investigation) that M/s. Vas Infrastructure Ltd. was a penny stock.mere suspicion that the assessee has invested in alleged penny stock scrip cannot be made basis of addition u/s. 69B of the Act. Appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1535
Challenge to ex parte reassessment order - whether the ex parte reassessment order is time-barred u/s 29(7) of the Punjab VAT Act, 2005, which stipulates a three-year limitation period for amending an assessment order? - HELD THAT:- As per Section 29(7), the decision has to be taken by the Designated Officer with the prior permission of the Commissioner within a period of three years from the date of original assessment order. However, the provisional assessment order was for 2012-2013, issued on 19.08.2019, which has been passed after a period of 01 month and 08 days.
It may be noticed that Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Misc. Application No. 21-2022 in Misc. Application No. 665-2021 in Suo Moto Writ Petition ( C) No. 3-2020 took cognizance in March, 2020 for the difficulties that might be faced by the litigants in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other quasi judicial proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central and/or State) due to the outbreak of the COVID 19 pandemic. On 22.03.2020, Hon’ble the Supreme Court directed extension of the period of limitation in all proceedings before Courts/Tribunals including this Court w.e.f 15.03.2020 till further orders. On 08.03.2021, the order dated 23.03.2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021 and the period of limitation would start from 15.03.2021.
Conclusion - The period has been clearly excluded in computing the total period, wherever limitation is prescribed. Accordingly, we also exclude the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for the purpose of counting three years period. Therefore, as the said period is considered to be dies non, we reject the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner that the order was bad in law. However, he may address on the other issues on the next date of hearing.
List again on 02.09.2024.
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2024 (5) TMI 1534
Money Laundering - grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) - It was held by High Court that the petitioner's request for anticipatory bail was not maintainable - HELD THAT:- Issue notice returnable on 26th July, 2024.
In the meanwhile, the petitioner shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case (PMLA) No. 11 of 2022 arising out of ECIR No. ECIR/BBZO/01/2019 dated 22.01.2019 at Bhubaneswar Sub Zonal office of Enforcement Directorate pending before the District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (PMLA), Bhubaneswar, Odisha subject to condition that the petitioner shall regularly and punctually attend the court in which the complaint is pending.
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2024 (5) TMI 1533
Professional misconduct - Role of NFRA V/s ICAI on disciplinary matters of Chartered Accountants - Retrospective V/s prospective applicability of provisions as contained in Section 132 of Companies Act, 2013 as well as NFRA Rules, 2018 - it was held by NCLAT that 'It is of utmost importance that Auditors realise their responsibilities which is necessary not only to the company but also to the public. In view thereof, giving effect to the Impugned Orders which highlights the professional misconduct and other misconduct on the part of the appellant vis-à-vis a public listed company become quintessential so as to make public aware and enable them to make informed and sound financial decisions and investments.'
HELD THAT:- There are no good ground and reason to interfere with the order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal - appeal dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 1532
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - as argued petitioner was denied the opportunity of a fair hearing, thus violating principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- As first notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act was not served in the manner provided. Second, the order u/s 148A(d) was initially not served. Later, it was served with delay of nine months. Even if it is assumed that the objections to jurisdiction (raised by the petitioner), had been rejected on 20.03.2024, there existed no justifiable situation or circumstance as may have allowed the assessing authority (whether faceless or otherwise) - to pass the re-assessment order on the next day, without issuing any further notice in terms of Section 142(1) of the Act.
By taking that course, the assessing authority has consciously allowed a wholly ex parte order to arise.
Under the new regime, though the assessing authority may remain faceless, at the same time, it cannot act mindless of the procedural law. No useful purpose may be served in keeping the present petition pending or calling for a Counter Affidavit at this stage.
The rules of natural justice are found completely broken in the present case. Hence, the impugned re-assessment must be set aside for this reason alone, at this stage itself. In facts noted above, no useful purpose may be served in keeping this petition pending or calling for a reply.
Accordingly, the reassessment order and the order dated 31.03.2023 are set aside. The matter is remitted to the stage of reply to the notice dated 22.03.2023 issued u/s 148-A(b) of the Act.
Since the petitioner is now aware of the contents of the notice dated 22.03.2023, he may furnish reply thereto within a period of three weeks from today. Considering that reply and keeping in mind the observations made above, the reassessment proceedings, if any may arise, be continued and concluded accordingly, without (the petitioner) raising any objection as to limitation.
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2024 (5) TMI 1531
Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(d) - deposit in Co-operative Banks - HELD THAT:- On considering the submissions of both the parties, we find that the grounds of appeal raised by assessee is covered by the decision of this Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2018-19 [2024 (10) TMI 640 - ITAT SURAT] held that co- operative societies are eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) in respect of gross interest received from co-operative bank without adjusting interest paid to the said bank. This combination in a series of decisions also held that interest earned by cooperative society from cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d).
Thus, we find that ground of appeal raised by assessee to the extent of interest earned from Surat District Co-operative Bank is allowable. To make more clear, the other part of deduction which include interest from other institution except co-operative societies are not eligible. Thus, the assessee is allowed relief.
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