Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1990 1990 (1) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 241 to 260 of 274 Records

• 1990 (1) TMI 34
  
  The High Court of Delhi declined to refer the first question regarding expenses incurred on a guest house but directed the Tribunal to refer the second question on the sum received for storage facility as income. No costs were awarded. (1990 (1) TMI 34 - DELHI High Court)

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 33
  
  The High Court of Delhi heard a case regarding the interpretation of contracts for supply and assembly of pump sets and butterfly valves. The court raised questions about whether the contracts should be considered as simple contracts of sale or contracts of works. The Tribunal's conclusion that the contracts were only for the sale of goods and not works contracts was challenged. The court did not award any costs in this matter.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 32
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act.
  2. Classification of firms as an association of persons.
  3. Requirement of action under section 186 of the Income-tax Act before treating firms as an association of persons.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Notices Issued Under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act:
  
  The petitioner argued that the notices under section 148 were ab initio void and without jurisdiction as they did not disclose any reason for the belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The prerequisites for proceeding under clause (a) of section 147 were absent, as the petitioner had disclosed all material facts necessary for assessment. The court emphasized that the Income-tax Officer must have reasonable belief based on either omission or failure by the assessee to disclose material facts or information in possession indicating income escapement. The court found that the facts discovered in 1986 could not relate back to previous years, and there was no material indicating failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment in the relevant years. Consequently, the notices under section 148 were deemed without jurisdiction.
  
  2. Classification of Firms as an Association of Persons:
  
  The Revenue contended that the firms were operating as an association of persons, citing common partners, similar business nature, and unidentifiable stock found during a raid. The court referred to Supreme Court rulings, stating that an association of persons requires two or more individuals joining in a common purpose to produce income, profits, or gains. The court concluded that merely having common partners and similar business activities did not constitute an association of persons. The firms were registered separately and assessed as distinct entities. The presence of unaccounted stock or cash did not automatically imply an association of persons, especially without evidence of suppressed facts or material leading to income escapement in previous years.
  
  3. Requirement of Action Under Section 186 of the Income-tax Act:
  
  The petitioner argued that before treating the firms as an association of persons, the Income-tax Officer should have canceled the registration of the firms under section 186. The court found merit in this argument, stating that section 186 requires the Income-tax Officer to cancel the registration if a genuine firm was not in existence. Since no action under section 186 was taken, the orders treating the firms as an association of persons were without jurisdiction.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court allowed all three petitions, quashing the notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act. The court held that the Revenue had no material to show that income had escaped assessment due to failure to disclose material facts. Additionally, the lack of action under section 186 rendered the orders treating the firms as an association of persons invalid. There was no order as to costs, and the security deposit, if any, was to be returned to the petitioner after verification.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 31
  
  The High Court of Kerala allowed the deduction under section 36(1)(viii) of the Income-tax Act to be calculated on the total income before deduction of the amount allowable under the said section. The court certified the cases as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. (Case citation: 1990 (1) TMI 31 - Kerala High Court)

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 30
  
  The High Court of Kerala granted leave to the Revenue to appeal to the Supreme Court of India from a judgment regarding the legality of an assessment made by the Income-tax Officer on March 6, 1976. The court found the assessment to be illegal and certified that the case involves a substantial question of law and is of great public importance. The decision was based on a sharp conflict of judicial opinion regarding the interpretation of section 139(1), (2), and (4) of the Income-tax Act. (Case citation: 1990 (1) TMI 30 - KERALA High Court)

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 29
  
  The High Court of Delhi dismissed two petitions regarding the valuation of a property at No. 34, Najafgarh Road for assessment years 1977-78 and 1978-79. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal valued the property at Rs. 51,728, contrary to the initial valuation of Rs. 4,08,212 by the Wealth-tax Officer. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the value of the property is a question of fact, and there was no merit in the petition.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 28
  
  The High Court of Kerala granted a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India in the case of Traco Cable Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1987] 166 ITR 278, as there was a substantial question of law of public importance due to conflicting judicial opinions on the issue of limitation. The application by the Revenue under section 261 of the Income-tax Act was approved.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 27
  
  The High Court of Delhi dismissed the petition seeking reference of questions of law related to cash credits in an income tax case. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal concluded that the burden of proof had been discharged by the assessee based on evidence and confirmatory certificates, despite contradictions in witness statements. The court found no legal question and dismissed the petition.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 26
  
  Issues:
  Claim of development rebate at a higher rate for the manufacture of automobile ancillaries.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved the question of whether the assessee, a registered firm engaged in manufacturing automobile ancillaries, was entitled to claim development rebate at a higher rate of thirty-five percent under section 33(1)(b)(B)(i)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee received raw materials from Enfield India Ltd., processed them using owned machinery, and supplied the finished products back to Enfield India Ltd. Initially, the Income-tax Officer allowed the development rebate as claimed, but later realized an excess had been allowed, leading to the reopening of assessments. The issue centered around whether the assessee could be considered a manufacturer of automobile ancillaries and thus eligible for the higher development rebate rate. The Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the assessee was not entitled to the higher rate, while the Tribunal found in favor of the assessee, stating that the nature of the activities and the use of owned machinery for manufacturing supported the claim.
  
  The High Court analyzed the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Act, which required the machinery to be owned by the assessee and wholly used for the business of manufacture or production. The Court emphasized that the crucial factor for claiming the higher development rebate was the use of owned machinery for manufacturing automobile ancillaries falling under the Fifth Schedule to the Act, not ownership of raw materials or finished products. The Court highlighted that the assessee had indeed manufactured automobile ancillaries using owned machinery, despite not owning the raw materials or the end products. Drawing parallels to a Supreme Court case, the Court emphasized that ownership of end products was irrelevant for the tax benefit, as the taxable event was the manufacturing process. Therefore, the Court held that the assessee, by using owned machinery for manufacturing automobile ancillaries, was entitled to the higher development rebate rate, irrespective of ownership in raw materials or finished products.
  
  In conclusion, the High Court answered the common question referred to it in the negative and in favor of the assessee, stating that the assessee was entitled to the costs of the references. The Court reiterated that the focus should be on the use of owned machinery for manufacturing automobile ancillaries, rather than ownership of raw materials or end products, in determining eligibility for the higher development rebate rate.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 25
  
  Issues:
  Interpretation of income-tax liability for penalty under Wealth-tax Act, 1957
  Validity of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
  
  Analysis:
  
  The judgment was delivered by Justice Venkataswami of the High Court of Madras. The case involved a reference by the Revenue and the assessee regarding questions of law arising from an order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The two questions referred to the court were related to the income-tax liability attributable to concealed income for the purpose of penalty under the Wealth-tax Act and the finality of the penalty levied under the Income-tax Act. The assessee did not appear before the court, leading to a focus on the first question concerning the income-tax liability.
  
  The facts of the case revolved around the assessment year 1966-67, where the assessee filed revised returns disclosing wealth, including a credit of Rs. 1,90,000 not initially included. The Wealth-tax Officer completed the assessment, including the undisclosed sum, and initiated penalty proceedings for concealment. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner upheld the penalty, considering the undisclosed amount as concealed wealth and rejecting the assessee's arguments.
  
  The assessee appealed to the Tribunal, which disagreed with the penalty amount imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal held that the penalty should be reworked based on the concealed wealth minus the income-tax attributable to it. The Revenue challenged this view, arguing that income-tax liability on undisclosed wealth crystallizes only after the assessment order.
  
  The court considered Supreme Court rulings on similar issues and concluded that the Tribunal's approach aligns with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. The court emphasized that liabilities towards income-tax, wealth-tax, and gift-tax, crystallizing on the valuation date, should be deducted in computing net wealth, even if finalized after the valuation date. The court distinguished the Revenue's cited decisions and affirmed the Tribunal's interpretation, answering the first question in favor of the assessee.
  
  The court acknowledged the assistance of the advocate representing the assessee and concluded by answering the first question in the tax case affirmatively and leaving the second question unanswered, with no costs imposed.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 24
  
  Issues:
  1. Determination of whether the assessee qualifies as an industrial company under section 2(7)(c) of the Finance Act, 1981.
  2. Decision on whether the assessee is eligible for investment allowance for a generator installation.
  
  Issue 1 - Industrial Company Qualification:
  The case involved the assessment year 1981-82, where the assessee provided technical and industrial consultancy using computers and electronic data processing. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed that the services were mainly computer-based, involving processing data through computers and generating outputs. The Tribunal upheld this decision, stating that the activity, although intellectual, involved the use of machines like computers, making it an industrial activity. The Tribunal referred to a Karnataka High Court decision defining "industrial company" as including those engaged in processing goods, where processing involves a change in the commodity. Relying on this precedent, the Tribunal affirmed that the assessee qualified as an industrial company under section 2(7)(c) of the Finance Act, 1981.
  
  Issue 2 - Investment Allowance Eligibility:
  Given the determination that the assessee was an industrial company, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee was entitled to investment allowance for the generator installation. Since the business activity was deemed industrial in nature, the investment allowance for the generator was approved. Consequently, both questions of law referred to the court were answered affirmatively and in favor of the assessee. No costs were awarded in this matter.
  
  Separate Judgment by SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.:
  Justice SUHAS CHANDRA SEN concurred with the decision and agreed with the findings of the Tribunal.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 23
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the adoption of a son by the widow of the deceased relates back to the date of the deceased's death.
  2. Whether the deceased had full power of disposition over the property left by him.
  3. Whether the property left by the deceased is includible in his estate under section 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Whether the adoption of a son by the widow of the deceased relates back to the date of the deceased's death:
  The accountable person contended that the adoption of Chidambaram by the widow, Umayal Achi, should relate back to the date of the deceased Thirunavukkarasu Chettiar's death, making the adopted son a member of the coparcenary entitled to his share. However, the court referenced Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, particularly proviso (c), which states that adoption by a widow does not divest the estate already vested in her as the heir of her deceased husband. The court also cited the decisions in Sawan Ram v. Kalawanti, AIR 1967 SC 1761, and Punithavalli Ammal v. Ramalingam, AIR 1970 SC 1730, to support this conclusion. The adoption by the widow does not affect the nature of the property or the power of disposal over it, as the properties had already vested in the widow upon the husband's death.
  
  2. Whether the deceased had full power of disposition over the property left by him:
  The court noted that at the time of his death, Thirunavukkarasu Chettiar was the sole surviving coparcener and had the power to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it was his separate property. This power of disposal is recognized under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore, the deceased had full power of disposition over the property, and this power falls within the purview of Section 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.
  
  3. Whether the property left by the deceased is includible in his estate under section 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953:
  The court held that the deceased's widow, Umayal Achi, inherited the properties as an absolute owner under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The subsequent adoption of Chidambaram did not divest the properties vested in her. Therefore, the full value of the deceased's share in the properties is includible in his estate for the purpose of estate duty under Section 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The court referenced the decisions of the Supreme Court, including Sawan Ram v. Kalawanti, AIR 1967 SC 1761, and Punithavalli Ammal v. Ramalingam, AIR 1970 SC 1730, to support this view.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the adoption by the widow does not relate back to the date of the deceased's death in a manner that would affect the vesting of the property. The deceased had full power of disposition over the property, and the value of the property left by him is includible in his estate under Section 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The question referred to the court was answered in the affirmative and against the accountable person, with the Revenue being entitled to the costs of the reference.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 22
  
  Issues Involved:
  The judgment involves determining whether the income derived by the assessee-company should be assessed under the head "Business income" or "Income from property" for the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71.
  
  Assessment of Income under Different Heads:
  The assessee-company's main object was to acquire and possess lands, buildings, or real estate, as per its memorandum of association. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that the company was not conducting any business in real estate, and the income derived was rental income from the properties owned. The Tribunal upheld this view, stating that the company had purchased properties and possessed them as an owner, leading to the income being assessed under section 22 of the Income-tax Act.
  
  Legal Arguments Presented:
  The counsel for the assessee-company argued that the properties held were part of the commercial assets to carry out business activities, thus the income should be assessed under "Business income." They cited relevant case laws to support their stance. On the contrary, the Revenue's counsel referred to specific sections of the Act and the main object of the company to assert that the income should be taxed under "Income from property." They also relied on previous court decisions to strengthen their argument.
  
  Court's Analysis and Decision:
  The court highlighted that income under different heads in the Income-tax Act should be mutually exclusive. Considering the company's main object of acquiring and possessing properties, it was established that the properties were not held as part of business assets. As the company did not conduct any real estate business, the income from the properties was rightly assessed under "Income from property." The court referred to a Supreme Court case emphasizing the distinction between owning property for business purposes versus as a landowner. Based on the company's objectives and activities, the court concluded that the income should be taxed under the appropriate head. Consequently, the common question referred was answered in favor of the Revenue, and they were awarded costs for the references.
  
  This judgment clarifies the distinction between assessing income under different heads based on the nature of activities and objectives of the assessee-company, ensuring proper taxation in accordance with the Income-tax Act.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 21
  
  Issues:
  1. Reversal of judgment by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
  2. Evidence considered by the Tribunal
  3. Upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
  4. Ignoring material considered earlier by the Tribunal
  5. Determination of ownership of property and investment
  
  Analysis:
  
  The petitioner sought reference of questions of law to the High Court regarding the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's reversal of its earlier judgment and the evidence considered. The dispute arose from the assessment year 1976-77, where the Income-tax Officer concluded that a property belonged to the respondent and not his wife. The Commissioner of Income-tax, in appeal, held the wife as the owner, leading to an appeal by the Revenue. The Tribunal recalled its earlier order, and subsequent applications were filed under section 256(1) and 256(2) for reference of the legal questions.
  
  The High Court directed the Tribunal to refer the question of law regarding whether the Tribunal erred in upholding the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) order. The petitioner's counsel argued that this question encompassed all the points in issue, leading to the disposal of the petition without costs. The judgment highlighted the procedural history of the case, including the Tribunal rehearing the appeal and passing a fresh order, which led to the filing of the application under section 256(2) for reference to the High Court.
  
  The issues raised in the judgment revolved around the Tribunal's assessment of evidence, reversal of its earlier decision, and the ownership determination of a property. The legal battle between the parties involved the interpretation of tax laws and the application of legal principles to the facts of the case. The High Court's decision to refer the question of law for consideration indicated the complexity and significance of the legal issues involved in the dispute. The judgment emphasized the importance of proper legal reasoning and adherence to procedural requirements in tax matters, ensuring fair treatment and justice for all parties involved.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 20
  
  The High Court of Kerala granted a certificate to the Revenue to appeal to the Supreme Court of India against a judgment regarding the scope and impact of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975. The court held that the Hindu joint family ceased to exist in the state by operation of law from December 1, 1976, based on previous decisions. The court considered it a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court as a similar certificate had been granted in a previous matter.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 19
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Maintainability of the suit.
  2. Cause of action for the suit.
  3. Non-joinder of parties.
  4. Sufficiency of court fee paid.
  5. Plaintiff's right, title, and interest in the suit properties.
  6. Validity and binding nature of the sale deeds dated January 3, 1984.
  7. Entitlement of the plaintiff to the decree as claimed.
  8. Reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Maintainability of the Suit:
  The trial court framed the issue of whether the suit as framed was maintainable. The judgment does not specifically address the resolution of this issue, indicating that the primary focus was on the substantive claims regarding property ownership and benami transactions.
  
  2. Cause of Action for the Suit:
  The trial court also considered whether the plaintiff had a cause of action. The plaintiff sought a declaration of title and confirmation of possession or, alternatively, recovery of possession of the disputed property. This cause of action was based on the claim that the property was initially settled in favor of the plaintiff's mother, Mariyam Bibi, and that the defendant was merely a licensee.
  
  3. Non-joinder of Parties:
  The trial court examined whether the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The judgment does not elaborate on this issue, suggesting that it was not a significant point of contention in the appeal.
  
  4. Sufficiency of Court Fee Paid:
  The sufficiency of the court fee paid was also an issue. Again, the judgment does not provide details on this matter, indicating that it was not a central issue in the appellate decision.
  
  5. Plaintiff's Right, Title, and Interest in the Suit Properties:
  The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Mariyam Bibi was the benamidar of her husband, Lalu Mian, who had the authority to execute the sale deeds in favor of the defendant. The appellate court reversed this finding, stating that the defendant failed to prove that Mariyam Bibi was a benamidar. The appellate court noted that the defendant did not raise the benami nature of the transaction in her written statement.
  
  6. Validity and Binding Nature of the Sale Deeds Dated January 3, 1984:
  The trial court found the sale deeds executed by Lalu Mian in favor of the defendant to be genuine and valid. However, the appellate court disagreed, finding that the defendant did not discharge the burden of proving that Mariyam Bibi was a benamidar. The appellate court emphasized that the defendant's failure to plead the benami nature of the transaction in her written statement was a critical omission.
  
  7. Entitlement of the Plaintiff to the Decree as Claimed:
  The appellate court found in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the defendant had not proven the benami nature of the transaction. The appellate court's decision was based on the finding that the plaintiff had a rightful claim to the property.
  
  8. Reliefs to Which the Plaintiff is Entitled:
  The appellate court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs sought, including the declaration of title and confirmation of possession. The court noted that the defendant's claim of benami was not substantiated.
  
  Separate Judgments Delivered by Judges:
  The judgment was delivered by a single judge, S.B. Sinha, and there were no separate judgments by other judges.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted to the lower appellate court for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The appellate court's failure to consider the defendant's plea of benami was a significant error, necessitating a re-evaluation of the case. The judgment underscores the importance of properly pleading and proving the benami nature of transactions and highlights the retrospective application of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 18
  
  The High Court of Delhi directed the Tribunal to refer a question of law regarding the ownership of a property in Kalkaji, New Delhi for the assessment year 1976-77. The question is whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in deleting an addition of Rs. 2,86,000 made by the Wealth-tax Officer for the property.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 17
  
  The High Court of Delhi directed the Tribunal to refer a question of law regarding the deletion of income from a property in New Delhi. Case citation: 1990 (1) TMI 17 - DELHI High Court. Judges: B. N. Kirpal, C. L. Chaudhary.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 16
  
  Issues involved: The judgment deals with the issue of whether the assessee is entitled to the benefit of carry forward and set off of losses for earlier assessment years when returns of income were furnished in response to notices under section 148 but not under section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  Facts and Tribunal's Decision:
  - The assessments for the years 1970-71, 1971-72, and 1972-73 showed losses.
  - The Income-tax Officer declined to set off these losses against the income of 1975-76, citing that returns for the earlier years were not filed under section 139 but in response to notices under section 148.
  - The Tribunal upheld this decision, stating that losses not determined in returns filed under section 139 cannot be carried forward.
  
  Legal Provisions and Interpretation:
  - Section 80 of the Income-tax Act specifies that losses must be determined in returns filed under section 139 for carry forward and set off.
  - A notice under section 148 is deemed to be a notice under section 139(2), allowing the assessee to claim losses based on the return filed.
  - The judgment emphasizes the importance of legal fictions and the consequential rights that follow.
  - The issuance of a notice under section 148 initiates assessment proceedings, and the assessee retains the right to claim losses if returns are filed within the prescribed time.
  
  Precedents and Analysis:
  - Referring to a case where the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed carry forward of losses filed in response to section 148 notices within the prescribed time.
  - In the present case, returns for 1970-71 and 1971-72 were filed after the prescribed period, leading to a negative answer for those years but a positive one for 1972-73.
  
  Conclusion:
  - The judgment rules in favor of the Revenue for 1970-71 and 1971-72, and in favor of the assessee for 1972-73.
  - The judges concur on the decision without any costs awarded.
  
  This judgment clarifies the significance of filing returns under specific sections for the carry forward and set off of losses, emphasizing the legal implications of notices under section 148 and the rights of taxpayers in such scenarios.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 15
  
  The High Court of Calcutta ruled in favor of the assessee regarding the valuation of shares of East India Commercial Co. (P.) Ltd. The Tribunal determined that the shares were freely transferable and should be valued using the yield method, not the break-up value method. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's decision, stating that there were no restrictions on transferring the shares according to the articles of association. The judgment was delivered by Judges Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee and Suhas Chandra Sen.

  ---

1 ....91011121314