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Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 324 Records
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1996 (12) TMI 64
Issues involved: Classification of imported goods under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Summary:
The appellants imported components for manufacturing electrostatic precipitators and filed two bills of entry for clearance. Customs authorities initially classified the goods under Heading 84.18(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The appellants disputed this classification, claiming that the correct classification should be under Heading 84.17(1) as parts of plant and machinery. The Tribunal examined the imported materials and concluded that the assessment under Tariff Item 84.18(2) was incorrect. The Tribunal noted that the imported goods specifically fell under Tariff Item 84.18, which was more specific and precise than the other headings suggested by the importers. Despite acknowledging that Heading 84.18(1) would have been the correct classification, the Tribunal did not direct the goods to be classified as such, instead upholding the Revenue's classification under Heading 84.18(2). The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the previous judgment, and directed the goods to be classified under Heading 84.18(1), with each party bearing their own costs.
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1996 (12) TMI 63
Issues: Classification of goods under Customs Tariff Heading 83.01/15 or 84.01/02
In this case, the issue revolved around the classification of goods under the Customs Tariff Heading 83.01/15 or 84.01/02. The appellant argued that the goods should be classified under Heading 84.01/02 as parts of auxiliary plant for steam boilers, while the Revenue contended that they fell under Heading 83.01/15 as flexible tubing and piping.
The Tribunal upheld the Revenue's contention, relying on a previous judgment and the specific mention of flexible tubing and piping in Heading 83.01/15. The appellant's counsel argued that the goods were specialized equipment and not miscellaneous articles of base metal covered under Heading 83.01/15.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellant, stating that the goods, which were flexible tubing and piping, should be classified under Heading 83.01/15. The Court noted that Chapter 83 did not provide for the requisite exclusion for these goods to be classified under Heading 84.01/02.
Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the classification of the goods under Customs Tariff Heading 83.01/15, with no order as to costs.
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1996 (12) TMI 62
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Customs Authorities to endorse exports in the DEEC Book.
2. Power of Customs Authorities to determine the value of exported goods.
3. Validity of the Customs Commissioner's order regarding the FOB value and penalty.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of Customs Authorities to Endorse Exports in the DEEC Book:
The core issue was whether customs authorities could refuse to endorse exports in the DEEC Book Part II after the export was effected. The writ petitioner argued that customs authorities were duty-bound to make the endorsement and had no jurisdiction to question the valuation of the goods. The court held that the customs authorities are required to certify the correctness of the value of the goods under the DEEC Scheme and cannot be compelled to accept the declared value as correct.
2. Power of Customs Authorities to Determine the Value of Exported Goods:
The court examined the scope of the customs authorities' power to assess the value of goods. It was argued that the power of the customs authorities to assess the value of goods is limited to Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962, which pertains to cases where duty is leviable. The court, however, concluded that the customs authorities' power to assess the value of goods is not limited to cases where the goods are assessable to duty. The customs authorities must follow the mode prescribed in Section 14(1) of the Act to ascertain the correct value of the goods.
3. Validity of the Customs Commissioner's Order Regarding the FOB Value and Penalty:
The Commissioner of Customs had determined the FOB value of the export consignment to be Rs. 92,000/- against the declared value of Rs. 48,46,850/- and imposed a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs u/s 114 of the Customs Act. The court found that the order of the Commissioner could not be sustained and should be set aside and remanded for re-adjudication after observing the principles of natural justice and in accordance with law. The Commissioner must re-determine the matter from the point of the issue of the show cause notice, providing the petitioner with a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Conclusion:
The court set aside the interim order dated 24th March 1995 and the order of the Commissioner of Customs. The matter was remanded back to the Commissioner for re-determination. The writ petition was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. The judgment emphasized that customs authorities have the jurisdiction to determine the value of exported goods under the DEEC Scheme and must follow the procedure prescribed in Section 14(1) of the Customs Act.
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1996 (12) TMI 61
Notification dated 16-10-1980 being Notification No. 205/T-No. 355/141/80-Cus. I. (hereinafter referred to as "Notification No. 205") issued in supersession of an earlier Notification dated 15-3-1979 being Notification No. 66 Cus., dated 15-3-1979 G.S.R.hereinafter referred to as "Notification No. 66" challenged
Held that:- The appellants in the present case have not disclosed any facts which could show the existence of better equity in their favour. All that they have alleged is that they would not have imported the PVC resin without the exemption (sic) as that would have been "unviable" & "uneconomical" and further that many persons took full advantage of the exemption; moreover, the exemption accorded preferential treatment to some persons, but not to the appellants. The facts of the economic situation explained in the judgment of Kasinka [1994 (10) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] have not been controverted. Nor is it alleged by the appellants that public interest did not call for supersession of the Notification No. 66.
Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity, the principle should be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. The Government is competent to resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided, of course, no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. However, in the present case, there is a supervening public interest and hence it shouId not be mandatory for the Government to give a notice before withdrawing the exemption. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (12) TMI 60
The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that Phenol USP Grade qualifies as a pharmaceutical chemical for customs exemption under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appeals were dismissed with no costs.
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1996 (12) TMI 59
The appellants challenged a judgment regarding tie-bars falling under Tariff Item 26AA(i)(a) as forged products. The Tribunal found that the tie-bars were not manufactured by forging. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (12) TMI 58
Entitlement to exemption notification issued on 3rd April, 1986 - Held that;- Necessary to modify the judgment and order of the High Court and hold that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the said notification and, consequentially, to refund of the additional duty that had been paid on the inputs aforementioned used in the manufacture of the final products aforementioned, the precise quantum thereof to be determined by the Excise authorities. In favour of assessee
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1996 (12) TMI 57
The Supreme Court held that the demand for differential duty from 16-11-1981 was justified, following the decision in Ballarpur Industries Ltd. v. Asstt. Collector of Customs & Central Excise. The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the order of Collector (Appeals) was restored. No costs were awarded. (Citation: 1996 (12) TMI 57 - SC Order)
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1996 (12) TMI 56
Issues:
1. Classification of imported manganese ore under Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
2. Interpretation of relevant provisions of the Tariff.
3. Applicability of different headings under the Tariff for classification.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of classifying imported manganese ore under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Revenue sought to levy Customs duty under Heading 25.01/32(3), while the appellants contended that it fell under Heading 26.01(1). The Tribunal concluded that the manganese ore was natural battery grade manganese dioxide classifiable under Heading 25.02/32(3). The Court examined the provisions of the Tariff, noting that Chapter 25 applies to goods in a crude state or washed but not subjected to specific processes. Heading 25.01/32(3) pertains to mineral substances, including battery grade manganese dioxide. Chapter 26 defines metallic ores used in the metallurgical industry. The Court referred to a previous judgment involving similar goods and classifications to analyze the present case.
The Court referenced a previous judgment where imported goods were classified based on their form and purification process. The judgment clarified that if goods were not in a crude form but purified or upgraded, they would fall under a different heading. In the current case, the Court emphasized that the manganese ore could not be classified under Heading 25.01/32(3) due to its nature and form. The Revenue's argument that the ore belonged to that heading was rejected. The Court highlighted that the most appropriate classification for the manganese ore was under Heading 26.01(1) based on its minerological species and metallic content.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Tribunal's judgments and orders. The manganese ore was to be classified under Heading 26.01(1) as per the appellants' suggestion. No costs were awarded in this matter. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the Tariff provisions, previous case law, and the specific nature of the imported manganese ore to determine its correct classification under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
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1996 (12) TMI 55
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal that the contract in question was not a firm contract due to alterations in price, shipment period, and Letter of credit deadline. The appeal was dismissed with no costs.
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1996 (12) TMI 54
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by fish meal plant operators claiming exemption from excise duty on fish oil, stating that the exemption only applies to goods manufactured in an oil mill, not a fish meal plant. The Court also found that the operators did not meet the requirements to avoid excise duty recovery after the standard 6-month period. The Court confirmed that fish oil plants are not subject to central excise duty in states other than Kerala. The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.
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1996 (12) TMI 53
Issues involved: Classification of stencil skin for excise duty - applicability of Tariff Advice and Trade Notice.
In the judgment, the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal classified stencil skin under the residuary Tariff Item 68 for excise duty, not under Item 17(2) covering paper and paper board. The Tribunal relied on a Tariff Advice stating coated paper for making stencil paper was not excisable as it was an intermediate product not bought or sold. A Trade Notice from 1976 treated stencil paper as stationery, excluding it from Item 17.
The Revenue argued, citing a previous Supreme Court judgment, that Trade Notices and Tariff Advices were not binding in interpreting Tariff Schedule items. The Revenue contended that regardless of these documents, the classification of stencil skin should be decided based on whether it fell under Item 68 as per the Tribunal or under Item 17(2) as argued by the Revenue.
The Court emphasized that Tariff Advices and Trade Notices do not bind the Tribunal or Courts, and while an assessee can challenge their correctness, the Revenue cannot argue against their terms. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals based on this ground alone.
Judgment: The Supreme Court upheld the classification of stencil skin under the residuary Tariff Item 68 for excise duty, as decided by the Tribunal, and dismissed the appeals. No costs were awarded in the case.
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1996 (12) TMI 52
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the notice for excise duty was issued after the permissible period of six months, without alleging intent to evade payment. No costs were awarded. (1996 (12) TMI 52 - SC Order)
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1996 (12) TMI 51
Whether a Diagnostic Centre is entitled to seek for issuance of a certificate to enable it to import equipments without payment of customs duty?
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case more particularly in the absence of any denial of the allegations made by the appellant it is possible for the Court to come to the conclusion that there has been a discriminatory treatment between appellant and person similarly situated, and if so, whether there is any nexus for the same?
Whether the appellant had complied with all the pre-conditions stipulated in the exemption notification for being entitled to the issuance of a certificate by the Respondent No. 2 for import of the equipment in question without payment of customs duty?
Held that:- It is true that no importer can claim absolute exemption from payment of customs duty as a right. In the context of the dispute between the parties and on reading the exemption notification as a whole it appears that the Government intended to exempt such hospitals from payment of customs duty on import of equipments which are certified by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to the effect that it provides medical, surgical or diagnostic treatment. Thus a Diagnostic Centre run by a private individual purely on commercial basis may not be entitled to the exemption under the notification issued by the Central Government. The conclusion of the Central Government as well as that of the High Court on this score, therefore, may not be held to be incorrect and the appellant may not be entitled to seek for issuance of mandamus to Respondent No. 2 on this ground.
On facts alleged it cannot be disputed that the appellant intended to import latest equipment for Cardio Vascular Imaging System. When Respondent No. 2 has already granted certificates in favour of several such Diagnostic Centres, as alleged in the Special Leave Application, refusal on his part to grant such certificate to the appellant without any justifiable reason tantamounts to a discriminatory treatment metted out to the appellant which on the face of it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In view of our conclusion, as aforesaid. We have no doubt in our mind that the order of Respondent No. 2 refusing to grant certificate to the appellant is liable to be struck down and the High Court also committed serious error in rejecting the Writ Petition filed by the appellant.
As the appellant also had given necessary undertaking as required under the notification and, therefore, is otherwise entitled to avail of the benefit of the notification in question. Appeal allowed.The impugned order of Respondent No. 2 as well as that of the High Court are set aside and Respondent No. 2 is directed to re-consider the matter and issue necessary certificate to the appellant within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order. Since the appellant has already imported the equipment on furnishing bank guarantee, on production of the necessary certificate issued by Respondent No. 2 enabling the appellant exemption from payment of customs duty the bank guarantee would stand discharged.
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1996 (12) TMI 50
Refund claims - jurisdiction of civil courts
Held that:- The jurisdiction of civil courts is not barred in entirety regarding the attack against the levy and/or claim for refund
The procedure to obtain refund is made exclusive as per Section 11B(3) of the Act. The application, therefore, shall be made under Section 11B(1) and dealt with by the concerned authority under Section 11B(2) of the Act. These provisions mandate amongst other things that the person claiming refund should substantiate that the incidence of duty has not been passed on by him to any other person. The application should also be filed within the time prescribed in the said sub-section. Section 11B(2) and Section 11B(3) go together. Under Section 11B(2), in certain specified cases, the duty paid will be refunded to the applicant. One such case is, the duty of excise paid by the manufacturer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty to any other person and substantiates the same. In cases not falling within the proviso to Section 11B(2) of the Act the duty collected will be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund and the said Fund will be utilised as per Section 12D of the Act.
As stated, Section 11B(2) and Section 11B(3) go together. The applications for refund made before the commencement of the Amendment Act, 1991, shall be deemed to have been made under Section 11B(1) of the Act as amended and it shall be dealt with in accordance with Section 11B(2) of the Act. The Section contemplates disposal of the applications pending on the date of the Amendment Act as also fresh applications filed after the Amendment Act, 1991, as per the amended provisions. Counsel for the assessees urged that the provisions relating to refund and, in particular, Section 11B(2) and (3) as amended in 1991 cannot apply to `Refund' made or due as per orders passed by Courts, in a suit1. or in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which have become final.
Refunds ordered by the statutory authority concerned which have become final. It need hardly be stated, that Section 11B(1), the proviso(I) thereto, Section 11B(2) and Section 11B(3) read together will apply, only to (1) refund applications made under the statute and filed before the Amendment of the Act and still pending on the date of commencement of Amendment Act, 1991 and (2) applications contemplated under law to obtain refund and filed after the commencement of the Amendment Act, 1991.
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1996 (12) TMI 49
Whether the said rings [punched from asbestos boards and two types of asbestos fabrics, namely, special fabrics in a coil of continuous length and M.R. Grey in rolls] fell under Item 22F of the Central Excise Tariff which, so far as is relevant?
Held that:- The Revenue sought to make the said rings dutiable as asbestos articles. The affidavit evidence of a dealer in asbestos was of some relevance. So was the affidavit evidence that explained the character and use of the said rings. It was wrong of the Tribunal to find that the deponents of these affidavits were "not the right persons to give opinion on the type of the products" with which it was concerned.
Regretably, the Tribunal's order under appeal shows that it was not fully conscious of the dispassionate judicial function it was expected to perform, and it must be quashed.
The appeal is allowed and the order under appeal is quashed.
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1996 (12) TMI 48
Whether the assessable value of machinery made to specifications and not purchased off the shelf can only be determined by the best judgment method and no other as reasoned by Tribunal?
Held that:- The Tribunal, apparently, failed to take notice of the fact that this was not a case where the invoices produced by the appellant had been rejected or, indeed, the agreement aforementioned. It was the case of the Revenue that to the value mentioned in those invoice 3% should be added by reason of the terms of the agreement. A best judgment assessment, therefore, was not called for and had not been made.
As the agreement provides by which General was appointed the purchasing agent of the appellants in respect of such items of equipment for the tyre plant that the appellants opted to purchase through the agency of General. The provisions under it make it clear that the appellants would see the quotations submitted to General by the various suppliers and would approve the same. They provide that the purchases from the suppliers would be made by the appellants. They provide that what the appellants would pay to General was a commission or remuneration to be computed on the basis of 3% of the value of each of the items of equipment. These provisions show beyond any doubt that the value of the items of equipment was not enhanced thereby. We, therefore, cannot accept the reasoning of the Tribunal.
Appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set aside and the order of the Central Board of Excise and Customs is restored.
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1996 (12) TMI 47
Whether the value of the software, such as discs, floppies, C.D. rhoms and the like, that may sell along with the computer is not to be taken into account in the valuation thereof for the purposes of excise duty?
Held that:- In the first place, the Tribunal confused a computer system with a computer; what was being charged to excise duty was the computer.
Secondly, that a computer and its software are distinct and separate is clear, both as a matter of commercial parlance as also upon the material on record. A computer may not be capable of effective functioning unless loaded with software such as discs, floppies and C.D. rhoms, but that is not to say that these are part of the computer or to hold that, if they are sold along with the computer, their value must form part of the assessable value of the computer for the purposes of excise duty. To give an example, a cassette recorder will not function unless a cassette is inserted in it; but the two are well known and recognised to be different and distinct articles. The value of the cassette, if sold along with the cassette recorder, cannot be included in the assessable value of the cassette recorder. Just so, the value of software, if sold along with the computer, cannot be included in the assessable value of the computer for the purposes of excise duty. In favour of assessee.
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1996 (12) TMI 46
The High Court of Allahabad ruled that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in holding that two separate assessments should not be made for a partnership firm that was reconstituted, as it was a case of mere reconstitution and not dissolution. The court cited a previous case to support this decision. The judgment was in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1996 (12) TMI 45
The High Court of Allahabad held that the predecessor firm dissolved on the death of a partner and a new firm was constituted, leading to separate assessments. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in ruling that the income of the two periods could not be clubbed. The decision favored the assessee.
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