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1993 (2) TMI 25
Issues:
1. Whether the ground challenging the Income-tax Officer's order refusing to record partition of Hindu undivided family could be raised in the appeal where the quantum of the assessee's total income had also been disputed?
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a case where the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal referred a question to the High Court regarding the challenge to the Income-tax Officer's order refusing to record a partition of a Hindu undivided family in an appeal where the total income of the assessee was disputed. The assessee, Chhaganlal, had his assessment completed as an individual despite claiming to be a Hindu undivided family. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim of Hindu undivided family status based on various factors, leading to the computation of income and tax liability as an individual. The assessee then appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, arguing that the business belonged to the Hindu undivided family, but the appeal was dismissed for not separately challenging the order under section 171 regarding partition. Subsequently, the Tribunal found in favor of the assessee, determining that the business indeed belonged to the Hindu undivided family. However, the Tribunal upheld the rejection of the partition claim due to the lack of a separate appeal challenging the Income-tax Officer's decision on partition.
The High Court considered whether a composite appeal, challenging both the assessment order and the partition issue, was maintainable. The assessee contended that the rejection of the partition challenge due to the absence of a separate appeal was a hyper-technical approach, citing precedents that supported the admissibility of composite appeals. The Revenue argued that different procedures apply to appeals against assessment orders and partition orders, necessitating separate appeals. The High Court emphasized that unless the law explicitly prohibits composite appeals, they should not be dismissed as incompetent. In this case, both the assessment and partition orders were challenged within the stipulated time through a composite appeal, justifying the consideration of the partition issue in the appeal. The rejection of the Hindu undivided family status led to the dismissal of the partition claim, indicating their interdependence.
The High Court concluded that the composite appeal should have been entertained, and the rejection of the partition challenge solely due to the absence of a separate appeal was unjustified. As the claim for partition was linked to the Hindu undivided family status, both aspects should have been considered together. Therefore, the High Court answered the referred question in favor of the assessee, disposing of the reference without costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 24
Issues:
1. Reasonableness of the initiation of revisional proceedings under section 34 of the Act.
2. Barred nature of the revisional proceedings due to delay.
3. Interpretation of statutory provisions regarding the time limit for initiating revisional proceedings.
4. Application of the principle of reopening assessments beyond the statutory period.
5. Consideration of cogent reasons for initiating revisional proceedings after the prescribed time limit.
Analysis:
The judgment delivered by the High Court of Kerala pertains to a batch of eight revisions involving identical issues. The cases revolve around the assessment revisions for the years 1981-82 to 1984-85 initiated by the Deputy Commissioner, Agricultural Income-tax and Sales tax, Alappuzha. The primary contention raised was the delay in initiating the revisional proceedings, which the Deputy Commissioner justified by citing a previous decision. The court outlined the statutory provisions specifying the time limits for initiating revisional proceedings under sections 35 and 36 of the Act.
In analyzing the reasonableness of the delay, the court referred to the precedent set in Nelliampathy Tea and Produce Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Agrl. LT., emphasizing that assessments can only be revised under section 34 of the Act beyond the statutory period with cogent and sufficient reasons. The court highlighted the necessity for the Revenue to demonstrate exceptional circumstances or difficulties justifying the delay in initiating revisional proceedings.
The court concluded that the revisional proceedings against the two brothers for the years 1981-82 to 1984-85 were vitiated due to inordinate delay, rendering them unreasonable and irrational. Citing the decision in Nelliampathy Tea and Produce Co. Ltd.'s case, the court set aside the common revisional order dated March 30, 1991, based on the grounds of delay in initiating the proceedings. Consequently, the tax revision cases were allowed on this basis, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory time limits and demonstrating valid reasons for exceeding them.
In summary, the judgment focused on the timeliness and reasonableness of initiating revisional proceedings under section 34 of the Act, highlighting the significance of adhering to statutory time limits and providing cogent justifications for any delays. The court's decision was guided by the principle that assessments can only be revised beyond the prescribed period with valid reasons, as outlined in relevant statutory provisions and previous judicial interpretations.
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1993 (2) TMI 23
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 regarding the computation of capital based on dividends declared from general reserves.
2. Determining whether dividends declared after the first day of the previous year should be excluded from general reserves for surtax assessment purposes.
Analysis:
1. Income-tax Reference No. 233 of 1978:
The case involved the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The issue was whether dividends recommended by directors after the first day of the previous year could be deducted from general reserves for capital computation. The Tribunal held that there was no liability to pay dividends on the first day of the previous year, thereby rejecting the assessee's contention. The Court agreed with the Tribunal, stating that dividends declared from general reserves post the first day of the previous year are includible in computing the capital for surtax purposes.
2. Income-tax Reference No. 335 of 1978:
This reference pertained to the assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72. The Tribunal held that dividends declared from general reserves on the first day of the accounting period should reduce the general reserves. The question referred was whether proposed dividends should be excluded from general reserves for surtax assessments. The Court, concurring with the Tribunal, answered in the affirmative, stating that dividends declared from general reserves should be deducted for capital computation.
3. Income-tax Reference No. 230 of 1978:
In this reference, the assessment years were 1971-72, 1972-73, and 1973-74. The Tribunal reduced general reserves by dividends declared subsequently, holding that such dividends should be excluded from the capital computation. The Court referred to precedents like Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. and Indian Tube Co. P. Ltd. to determine the nature of reserves and provisions. It emphasized that even dividends declared after the first day of the previous year should impact capital computation, aligning with the Supreme Court's rulings.
4. Precedents and Legal Interpretations:
The Court referred to various cases, including Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. and Indian Tube Co. P. Ltd., to distinguish between reserves and provisions. It highlighted that dividends declared after the first day of the relevant year can impact capital computation under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, aligning with Supreme Court decisions. The Court emphasized that the intention and purpose behind setting apart sums for dividends impact whether they are considered reserves or provisions.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decisions across all references, emphasizing that dividends declared from general reserves, even post the first day of the previous year, should be considered for capital computation under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The judgments were in favor of the Revenue, with no order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 22
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves three main issues:
1. Allowance of expenses for food, tiffin, salary paid to guest house staff, and depreciation on assets used in guest houses.
2. Treatment of contribution to Molasses Storage and Maintenance Reserve as revenue expenditure.
3. Entitlement to deduction under section 80G for donation to Vishwa Mangal Trust.
Issue 1:
The assessee claimed deduction for expenses related to food, tea, tiffin, etc., provided to visitors and customers in its guest houses. The Income-tax Officer disallowed these expenses, along with depreciation claimed on fixed assets used in the guest house. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) deleted the disallowances, but the Revenue contended that sub-section (4) of section 37 prohibited such allowances. The High Court agreed with the Revenue, stating that no allowance was intended for expenses incurred after February 28, 1970, on maintaining guest houses. The Tribunal's decision to allow the expenses was deemed incorrect as the expenses were for guest house maintenance, and the disallowances were upheld.
Issue 2:
The Income-tax Officer disallowed the assessee's deduction claim for contribution to the Molasses Storage Fund. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the deletion of this addition, following a previous decision. The High Court, in line with the precedent, affirmed the Tribunal's decision, stating that the deletion of the addition was correct.
Issue 3:
Regarding the donation of Rs. 2,57,000 to Vishwa Mangal Trust, the Income-tax Officer initially disallowed the deduction under section 80G. However, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the relief, which was further upheld by the Tribunal. The High Court disagreed with the Tribunal, citing a previous case where it was found that the trust's purpose included religious activities, which did not qualify for deduction under section 80G. Consequently, the High Court ruled in favor of the Revenue, disallowing the deduction for the donation.
The judgment concludes with the High Court answering each question as follows:
1. Question No. 1: Answered in the negative and in favor of the Revenue.
2. Question No. 2: Answered in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee.
3. Question No. 3: Answered in the negative and in favor of the Revenue.
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1993 (2) TMI 21
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in treating certain shares as unquoted shares under rule 1A(1) of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957.
2. Whether rule 1D of the Wealth-tax Rules must prevail over section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act in valuing unquoted equity shares.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Treatment of Shares as Unquoted Shares
The core issue is whether the shares of Messrs. Moheema Ltd., Messrs. Sonai River Tea Co. Ltd., and Messrs. Numburnadi Tea Co. Ltd. should be treated as unquoted shares under rule 1A(1) of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957. The relevant valuation date is December 31, 1976. The assessee claimed that these shares were quoted on the Calcutta Stock Exchange and valued them based on the quoted prices. However, the Wealth-tax Officer found that there were no transactions in these shares within a reasonable period before the valuation date. Specifically, the last transactions for Moheema Ltd., Sonai River Tea Co. Ltd., and Numburnadi Tea Co. Ltd. were on April 24, 1974, April 30, 1976, and December 3, 1976, respectively.
The Tribunal held that the shares were not "regularly quoted" due to the absence of regular transactions, thus classifying them as "unquoted shares." The court agreed with the Tribunal, emphasizing that "regularly quoted" implies regular transactions within a reasonably proximate time to the valuation date. The court cited previous judgments, including CWT v. Mahadeo Jalan and Smt. Nirmala Birla v. WTO, to support this interpretation. Therefore, the court answered this question in favor of the Revenue, affirming that the shares should be treated as unquoted shares.
Issue 2: Prevalence of Rule 1D over Section 7(1)
The second issue concerns whether rule 1D of the Wealth-tax Rules, which prescribes a method for valuing unquoted equity shares, should prevail over section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act. Rule 1D mandates a specific method for determining the market value of unquoted equity shares, essentially a modified break-up method. The assessee argued that this rule conflicts with section 7(1) of the Act, which requires the valuation to reflect the price the asset would fetch if sold in the open market.
The court examined various High Court decisions and noted a split in judicial opinion. High Courts in Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, and Madras held rule 1D to be directory, while High Courts in Allahabad, Calcutta, and Kerala considered it mandatory. The court leaned towards the latter view, emphasizing that section 7(1) is "subject to any rules made in this behalf," thus giving rule 1D the same status as the statutory provision. The court cited the Supreme Court's interpretation in Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, which supports the idea that rules made under a statute should be treated as part of the statute itself.
The court concluded that rule 1D is mandatory and must be followed by the Wealth-tax Officer. It rejected the argument that rule 1D conflicts with section 7(1), stating that the rule should be regarded as part of section 7(1) and both provisions must be harmoniously construed. Therefore, the court answered this question in favor of the Revenue, affirming that rule 1D prevails and is mandatory.
Conclusion:
Both questions were answered in favor of the Revenue. The shares in question were correctly treated as unquoted shares, and rule 1D of the Wealth-tax Rules is mandatory, prevailing over section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act. The judgment emphasizes the importance of regular transactions for shares to be considered "regularly quoted" and upholds the mandatory nature of rule 1D for valuing unquoted equity shares.
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1993 (2) TMI 20
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of a public charitable trust in a case involving donations received as fixed deposit receipts. The court held that the trust did not violate provisions of section 13(2)(a) or 13(2)(h) as the income or property was not lent to specified persons. The judgment is in line with a previous interpretation of section 13(2)(h) in a related case. The court answered the referred question in favor of the assessee with no costs awarded.
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1993 (2) TMI 19
The petitioner challenged the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's order for stay denial. The court dismissed the petition, stating that invoking extraordinary jurisdiction for stay matters is not proper. The court also dismissed the petition summarily without notice. (High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 1993)
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1993 (2) TMI 18
Issues involved:
Interpretation of section 13(2)(h) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding taxation of trust income from shares in a company where the settlor has substantial interest.
Facts in Income-tax Reference No. 298 of 1978:
The assessee, a public charitable trust, received shares as donations from the settlor in a company where the settlor had substantial interest. The trust held these shares but did not actively invest trust funds in acquiring them.
Legal Provisions:
- Section 11: Exempts income from property held for charitable purposes.
- Section 12: Deems voluntary contributions as income for charitable trusts.
- Section 13: Specifies cases where sections 11 and 12 do not apply, including investments in companies with substantial interest by persons related to the trust.
Interpretation:
- The term "funds" refers to money invested for financial returns.
- Trust funds must be actively invested in shares to trigger section 13(2)(h).
- Previous court decisions support that mere receipt of shares as donations does not attract section 13(2)(h).
Court's Decision:
- Section 13(2)(h) is not applicable if trust funds are not actively invested in shares of a company with substantial interest by related persons.
- Trusts merely receiving shares as donations without actively investing trust funds are not subject to taxation under section 13(2)(h).
- Similar decisions apply to all references before the court.
- Judgment in favor of the assessee in all references, with no costs awarded.
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1993 (2) TMI 17
Issues:
1. Dispute over expenditure allowed by Tribunal in connection with dealings with State Trading Corporation of India.
2. Claim for deduction of godown rent, insurance charges, etc., by the assessee.
3. Appeal by Revenue against Tribunal's decision to allow deduction.
4. Interpretation of liability in dispute for deduction purposes.
5. Comparison with relevant legal precedents for deduction eligibility.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute over certain expenditure allowed by the Tribunal in connection with the assessee's dealings with the State Trading Corporation of India. The Revenue contested the deduction of godown rent, insurance charges, etc., issued by the State Trading Corporation of India to the assessee for the relevant assessment years.
2. The assessee, a company engaged in the export of various fabrics, had entered into an agreement with the State Trading Corporation of India for importing machinery from Japan. Due to the Corporation's inability to fulfill certain benefits assured to purchasers, the imported machines were stored in a warehouse, leading to a dispute over liability for expenses.
3. The Income-tax Officer initially disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessee, citing disputes with the State Trading Corporation of India. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal upheld the deduction based on previous orders and legal principles regarding ascertained liabilities.
4. The main issue revolved around whether the liabilities in dispute could be considered as ascertained liabilities for deduction purposes. The Tribunal, supported by legal precedents like the Kedarnath Jute case, allowed the deduction, emphasizing that once liabilities were ascertained, they should be allowed irrespective of disputes.
5. The court considered the decisions in the Kedarnath Jute case and the Phalton Sugar Works case to support the assessee's claim for deduction. It noted that the Revenue failed to provide evidence of the nature of the dispute with the State Trading Corporation of India, leading to a favorable judgment in favor of the assessee.
6. The court criticized the Revenue for not providing essential documents during the hearing, emphasizing the importance of presenting all relevant material for a fair judgment. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the assessee, allowing the deduction of the disputed amounts without awarding costs to either party.
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1993 (2) TMI 16
Issues:
Interpretation of royalty payments as capital or revenue expenditure.
Analysis:
The case involved a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, regarding the classification of royalty payments made to foreign concerns as capital or revenue expenditure. The Tribunal referred the question of law regarding the justification of holding the royalty payments as not capital expenditure. The assessee-company had made payments to foreign collaborators in the relevant assessment years. The Income-tax Officer disallowed a portion or the entire royalty payment as capital expenditure for each foreign concern.
Upon reviewing the facts and relevant collaboration agreements, the High Court analyzed the nature of the payments. The Court considered the case law precedent set by the Supreme Court in Alembic Chemical Works Ltd. v. CIT [1989] 177 ITR 377. The Court concluded that the royalty payments made to the foreign concerns were revenue expenditure, not capital in nature. The judgment emphasized that the principles established by the Supreme Court applied to the present case, leading to the decision that the Tribunal's holding of the payments as revenue expenditure was correct.
In light of the analysis, the High Court answered the question in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue. The judgment did not award any costs in this matter. The ruling clarified the classification of royalty payments as revenue expenditure based on the specific circumstances and legal principles applied to the case.
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1993 (2) TMI 15
Issues:
Assessment of agricultural income from tea under the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1957 based on the order of assessment made under the Income-tax Act, rectification of assessment order due to alteration in relevant records, refusal of Agricultural Income-tax Officer to rectify assessment order, interpretation of Rule 6 of the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1957, exercise of power under section 37 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a case where the petitioner derived agricultural income from tea and was assessed under the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1957. The petitioner had filed its return along with the order of assessment made under the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1978-79. Despite an appeal pending against the Income-tax assessment order, the assessing authority proceeded with the assessment under the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act, citing no statutory bar due to the conclusion of the Income-tax assessment.
The Commissioner of Income-tax later reduced the total tea income, which was communicated to the petitioner after the assessment under the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act. The petitioner sought rectification of the assessment order based on the reduced income, but the Agricultural Income-tax Officer rejected the application, stating the remedy was to challenge the assessment through an appeal. This decision was upheld by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal.
The court emphasized that agricultural income from tea should be computed based on the estimate of income made under the Income-tax Act. Rule 6 of the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1957 specifically governs this situation, stating that unassessed agricultural income from tea should be assessed under the State Act after deductions provided for in the State Act. The assessing authority failed to consider the altered income determined by the Commissioner of Income-tax, which necessitated rectification of the assessment order in line with Rule 6.
The court held that the assessing authority erred in refusing to rectify the assessment order and should have exercised the power under section 37 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. Consequently, the revision petition was allowed, the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) and the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal were set aside, and the assessing authority was directed to rectify the assessment order based on the petitioner's application and the court's observations.
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1993 (2) TMI 14
Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding unexplained investment.
2. Constitutional validity of section 69 of the Act in light of taxation principles.
Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Patna involved a case where the assessee, an individual, claimed to have invested a sum of Rs. 1,62,000 in the construction of a house during the assessment year 1973-74. The source of Rs. 78,000 out of this investment was attributed to a loan from the Hindu undivided family fund of the assessee's husband, a medical practitioner. However, discrepancies arose during the assessment process when the Income-tax Officer found inconsistencies in the explanation provided by the assessee and her husband regarding the source of the loan. The Income-tax Officer added the sum of Rs. 78,000 in the hands of the assessee under section 69 of the Act as unexplained investment, a decision upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal.
The crux of the matter revolved around the interpretation of section 69 of the Income-tax Act, which deals with unexplained investments. Section 69 allows for deeming unexplained investments as the income of the assessee if satisfactory explanations are not provided. In this case, the Tribunal found the explanation regarding the source of Rs. 78,000 unsatisfactory, leading to the amount being deemed as the income of the assessee for the relevant financial year. The Tribunal's decision was based on the factual circumstances and materials available on record, affirming the addition of the sum in the hands of the assessee.
The legal challenge in this case pertained to the constitutional validity of section 69 of the Act. The petitioner contended that taxing deemed or fictional income, as allowed under section 69, was beyond the legislative power granted by the Constitution. The argument was based on the premise that taxation should only apply to actual or real income, not fictional income created by legislative provisions. However, the court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the legislative power to levy taxes must be read broadly to prevent tax evasion. The court held that the provision under section 69 was a measure to prevent tax evasion by ensuring that unexplained investments are not used to avoid taxation.
In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the writ application challenging the constitutional validity of section 69 of the Act. The court answered all three questions posed in the reference application in favor of the Department, affirming the addition of the sum of Rs. 78,000 in the hands of the assessee as unexplained investment. The judgment underscored the importance of preventing tax evasion through legislative measures like section 69 of the Income-tax Act.
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1993 (2) TMI 13
Issues:
Claim for weighted deduction of expenses under section 35B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Bombay addressed the issue of the assessee's claim for weighted deduction of expenses incurred during the assessment year 1969-70. The relevant expenses in question included guarantee charges, interest, commission, and miscellaneous expenses. The primary contention was whether these expenses qualified for relief under section 35B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Regarding the guarantee charges of Rs. 5,98,228 paid to the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India, the Income-tax Officer initially disallowed the claim, citing that the payment was made in India. However, both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that the expenditure fell under section 35B(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Corporation provided information related to markets outside India, supporting the assessee's claim for weighted deduction. The High Court agreed with this finding, allowing the deduction for guarantee charges.
Concerning the interest payment of Rs. 6,36,605 made to banks for advances related to exported goods, the Tribunal granted weighted deduction based on the banks' alleged services outside India. However, the High Court, after considering relevant precedents and lack of evidence supporting the services being rendered outside India, reversed the Tribunal's decision, disallowing the deduction for interest payment.
The commission payment of Rs. 3,75,000 to an Iranian party was upheld for weighted deduction by the Tribunal, supported by previous High Court decisions. The High Court, following the precedents, confirmed the deduction for commission payment.
Lastly, the miscellaneous expenses totaling Rs. 2,22,429 were partially granted weighted deduction by the Income-tax Officer on an ad hoc basis. The Tribunal disagreed with the Officer's approach and allowed the deduction for the entire amount. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, granting weighted deduction for the miscellaneous expenses.
In conclusion, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee for weighted deduction under section 35B of the Act for guarantee charges, commission, and miscellaneous expenses, but denied the deduction for interest payment.
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1993 (2) TMI 12
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the amounts received by the assessee-society in terms of clause 6A of the regulation relating to lease were capital receipts not assessable to tax under either of the heads 'Income from business' or 'Income from other sources'.
Summary:
Issue 1: Nature of Amount Received by the Society
The assessee, a co-operative society, received amounts from its members whenever they transferred their leasehold rights. The Tribunal held these amounts as capital receipts, not taxable as income. The court examined whether these receipts were capital or income.
Examination of Receipts:
The court noted that the amounts were received under a lease term, not as windfalls or voluntary payments. The society's rights as lessor remained unaffected by the transfers. The receipts were not for parting with any rights in the land or building but were due to the exploitation of its capital.
Legal Precedents:
The court referred to various cases, including Durga Das Khanna v. CIT [1969] 72 ITR 796 (SC), where premiums for creating leases were considered capital receipts. However, these precedents were distinguished as the society did not receive premiums for parting with capital assets.
Commercial Perspective:
From a commercial viewpoint, the society received payments whenever leases changed hands, making it a source of income. The court emphasized that the nature of the receipt in the hands of the receiver is crucial. The society received these amounts due to a contractual term, not for transferring any capital assets.
Argument on Capital Gains:
The assessee argued that the excess amount received by members was capital gains and should retain this character when transferred to the society. The court rejected this, stating that the society received the amount due to the lease contract, not for transferring capital assets.
Regularity and Certainty:
The court dismissed the argument that irregular and uncertain receipts could not be considered income. It stated that even occasional payments under a contractual obligation could be income.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the amounts received by the assessee-society were not capital receipts but assessable as income. The question of whether this income was from business or other sources was left for the Tribunal to decide.
Final Judgment:
The amounts received by the assessee-society were assessable to tax as income, not as capital receipts. The questions in all references were answered accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 11
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee, a Hindu individual who had thrown his share in a partnership into the common pool of his Hindu undivided family. The court held that the share in the partnership could be considered joint family property, overturning the Commissioner of Income-tax's decision. The Tribunal was correct in restoring the Income-tax Officer's assessment orders for the relevant years.
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1993 (2) TMI 10
Karta, partner in firm - Whether Tribunal was right in holding that the salary received by Shri Brij Mohan was to the extent of Rs. 12,000 assessable in the hands of the assessee family - held that the sum of Rs. 1,400 per month as an allowance to Brij Mohan was for the services rendered by him and that no part of it can reasonably be said to be related to the investment of the family - appeal is allowed and the question referred shall be answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of assessee
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1993 (2) TMI 9
Tribunal hold that the royalty amounts should be assessed on cash basis for 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 assessment if the books and balance-sheet of such receipts were found to be maintained on cash basis and in directing fresh assessment on such basis - held that method of accounting is not relevant in this case - held that credit entry amounts to receipt of income - Non-resident is liable to tax
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1993 (2) TMI 8
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee i.e., Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd., is entitled to exemption under section 81(i)(c) in respect of their income arising out of procurement of paddy and other agricultural produce - Held, no
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1993 (2) TMI 7
Held that the provision made by the assessee in its books for meeting the anticipated liability of tax (under section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) was indeed a provision and not a reserve - High Court was right in holding it to be a provision and not a reserve - hence should not be included in capital computation of assessee under rule I of the Second Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963
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1993 (2) TMI 6
Tribunal recorded the finding that the assessee has failed to establish that the said expenditure was in fact incurred. In view of this finding, the questions of law sought to be raised by the assessee do not arise - it cannot be said that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the application under section 256(2).
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