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Showing 261 to 280 of 1437 Records
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2015 (3) TMI 1183
Personal Penalty on employee - Penalty imposed on the basis of statement of co-noticee without independent corroboration - No statement of the appellant recorded - High Court held that as the appellant has not been able to show that the findings of Tribunal that appellant had knowledge about the non receipt of goods in the factory, was fully involved in the affairs of the company and his role could not be ruled out in causing loss of duty to the customs are illegal, perverse or erroneous in any manner, no substantial question of law arises reported in [2014 (6) TMI 125 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] - Apex Court dismissed the appeal on merits
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2015 (3) TMI 1182
Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) - Held that:- No valid basis in making a claim for bank interest i.e., to the extent covered by section 43B. That is to say that the assessee could not substantiate its claim of it being based either on any material or even as arising on account of a bona fide mistake, validating the charge of penalty in terms of Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c). Income to that extent, but for its’ scrutiny by the Revenue, would have escaped assessment. The decision in the case of Price Waterhouse Coopers (P.) Ltd. ( 2012 (9) TMI 775 - SUPREME COURT ) is inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. We, accordingly, confirm the penalty thereon, levied at the minimum rate of 100% of the corresponding tax sought to be evaded, to that extent, so that no penalty could be levied on the interest attributable to the cash credit account, which the A.O. shall verify to his satisfaction, excluding also the interest paid, if any, on the term loan up to the due date of the filing the return, which again the A.O. shall verify. - Decided partly in favour of assessee.
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2015 (3) TMI 1181
Misappropriation of government money - Seeking direction to release on bail in the event of arrest - Neither paid dues towards service tax nor provided requisite details to the department - Appellant did not joined the investigation also - Respondent submitted that the application is pre-mature as even no order for arrest of the applicant has been passed by the competent authority and if that being so, there is no apprehension of arrest of the applicant.
Held that:- as per circular number 974/08/2000-CX, the power to arrest a person needs to be exercised with utmost caution. Before arresting a person requisite permission from the competent authority is required. In the instant case so far no such permission has been granted by the competent authority. That being so, the applicant has no apprehension of arrest, as such, the application is premature. Moreover, no direction for issuing notice to the applicant in case of his arrest can be given in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India v Padam Narayan etc. [2008 (10) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT]. Also this view was reiterated in Union of India and another v Ashwani Aggarwal and followed by this Court in Department of Customs v Arvinder Singh [2007 (5) TMI 558 - DELHI HIGH COURT]. Therefore, the application being premature is dismissed and the interim protection granted to the applicant stands vacated. - Application disposed of
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2015 (3) TMI 1180
Seeking direction for condonation of delay of 18 days - beyond statutory period conferred power under him - Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 - petitioner was under a dilemma as to whether an appeal is to be filed against the Bill of Entry or a refund application is enough for the differential amount and that they were under the bona fide impression.
Held that:- it is not in dispute that the bill of entry is dated 1.5.2014 and the application to file an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) should be within sixty days, i.e. on or before 2.7.2014. However, it has been filed on 13.8.2014. It is to be noted that the proviso to Section 128 (1) enables the Commissioner (Appeals) to permit the filing of the appeal beyond the sixty days provided that he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the sixty days prescribed. In fact, while exercising such discretionary power, the authority has condoned the delay in respect of other four items, wherein, the appeals were filed though after expiry of 60 days, however, since they were within the condonable period of 90 days. The present appeal was beyond the statutory period of 90 days and the authority has rightly rejected the same, since he cannot be expected to exercise his discretionary power beyond the permissible period that was prescribed by the statute.
The Customs Act, 1962 itself is a complete Code. Reading various chapters and various sections thereof, it is very clear that it is an Act independent of other provisions. It provides for search, seizure, arrest, confiscation of goods, conveyance, imposition of penalties, settlement of cases, appeals including the appeal to the Supreme Court and hearing before the Supreme Court, period of limitation, offences and prosecution. Thus, it is an independent Act. Therefore, the Customs Act, 1962 is a complete code and the provisions of Section 128 (1) clearly indicate that the provisions of the Limitation Act were to apply only to the extent and during the extended period of 30 days and not beyond. Delay could be condoned by the Commissioner (Appeals) within the extended period of 30 days and thereafter he had no power left in him to entertain any application for condensation of delay or to entertain the appeal itself.
Therefore, having regard to the categoric pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases, holding that when the scheme of the special law which herein in this case is the Customs Act and the nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself, which alone should govern the several matters provided by it, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act, this Court is of the view that the delay which is beyond the statutory period of limitation, cannot be condoned. the order passed by the commissioner (Appeals) are unassailable in law. - Decided against the petitioner
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2015 (3) TMI 1179
Rejection of books of accounts - estimation of net profit - Held that:- As already noted that assessee did not file even the return unless the same was detected during search made in the case of M/s Talwar Group. Anyway the most relevant factor in the case before us was that assessee is engaged in the business of construction of house for private parties. It is a common knowledge that rate of profit in construction of a private houses is much higher than in comparison to the mass construction contracts for government or other government authorities. This is so because the construction of a private house involves superior quality of work, fancy items for which generally the contractor charges higher rate of margin. Further, it is to be noted that assessee had huge amount of sundry creditors amounting to ₹ 75,69,505/- for which no confirmation has been filed. Even the names of the sundry debtors are not disclosed in the balance sheet. Normally, the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal has estimated the rate of profit in the case of construction firms at 8%. But considering the above facts, we are of the opinion that estimate of profit at the rate of 9% would meet the ends of justice in this case and, therefore, we set aside the order of Ld. CIT(A) and estimate the net profit at 9%.
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2015 (3) TMI 1178
Import of Active Dry Yeast - does not meet the labelling requirement under Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 hence, samples could not be drawn - both 'Expiry Date' and 'Best Before Date' are mentioned as one and the same in wholesale package which should be different and clearly specified as per the guidelines issued by the FSSAI - Petitioner contended that as per Regulations, 2011 it is sufficient that the date of manufacture and the best before date is given and that the said regulation was complied with and hence, refusing to draw the samples is arbitrary.
Held that:- since there is a distinction between 'best before date' and 'expiry date', the manufacturer cannot be allowed to mention with same date. As regards the contention of the petitioner there is no regulation or provision mandates that the 'best before date' and 'expiry date' should be different and hence, there shall not be any objection in declaring the expiry date same as that of 'best before date', is concerned, the said contention is misconceived and untenable since merely because there is no specific provision or regulation prescribing requirement of mentioning both dates differently, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage of it for the purpose of mentioning the dates as per his whims and fancies in order to get the maximum marketable period, i.e. till the date of expiry by mentioning that the product will be best till its expiry.
It is settled law that while interpreting a statute, we should not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. Any dificiency in the provision of the Act or regulations itself does not give a right to the party to invoke the same to suit his claim or his puprose which, on its result, would have a considerable negative impact on others. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Badsha versus Urmila Badshah Godse and another [2013 (10) TMI 1409 - SUPREME COURT]. Purpose of labelling is not to be ascertained by any one for diluting the rigorous of the regulations and importing the concept of substantial compliance therewith. It is not that validity of any provision is in issue. Strict compliance principle seems to be the requirements of the regulations dictated by public interest that must prevail over any private interest of an importer. So, the Authorized Officer was fully justified in not taking samples of the articles of food for the NOC purpose on the ground that the label on the product did not fulfil requirement of the Regulations, 2011. In fact, there is no impediment under the Regulations, 2011 for the petitioner either to mention best before date or expiry date, however, when he prefers to mention both, he has to fulfill the requirement that both dates should be different and mentioned specifically. - Decided against the petitioner
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2015 (3) TMI 1177
Seeking release of vehicle on suitable condition forthwith - so-called purchase of the goods was dummy by non-genuine person - truck in which the goods were transported, was detained, but no arrangements were made to seize the goods and unload the goods by the authority, so that the goods can be kept in the Government godown and release the truck - Petitioner contended that there is no power to seize the transport vehicle and the goods can be seized and may be kept by them at any place, wherever the respondents desirous to keep.
Held that:- the authority has power to detain the vehicle, but ultimate power is to seize the goods and receipt is to be given to the person, from whose possession the goods are seized. With a view to have the seizure of the goods, vehicle can be detained, but there is no power to seize the vehicle. The power given to detain the vehicle is to facilitate the seizure of the goods and it cannot be termed as the detention for indefinite period. The reasonable interpretation would mean that once the goods are found in any vehicle and upon inquiry if it is found unsatisfactory, the authority may seize the goods after detaining of the vehicle and after the seizure of the goods, the goods may be kept by the authority at any place wherever it is permissible, but the vehicle is required to be released thereafter. In the present case, nothing has been done and the vehicle with the goods is lying at the Bhilad Check Post and the said aspect is undisputed.
Also the vehicle has been detained since 28th December, 2014 and no action is taken for seizure of the goods or for release of the vehicle. Therefore, the appropriate direction deserves to be issued to the respondents to take the vehicle – truck up to the nearest Government godown. It may be open to the respondents to seize the goods by unloading the same in the Government godown within 48 hours from today, copy of the seizure memo should be given to the truck driver or the owner, as the case may be and the truck be released thereafter immediately. - Petition disposed of
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2015 (3) TMI 1176
Seeking permission to continue to conduct the toddy shops - Suspension and cancellation of licenses - auction sale of privilege for vending toddy in different toddy shops - Revokation of provisional allotment granted in favour of the petitioners - Entitled to get preferential right in terms of Rule 5(1)(a) of Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 - Held that:- as per Ext.P2 this Court granted only an interim order staying all further proceedings including suspension/cancellation of the licences of toddy shops concerned and the specific direction sought for as above was not granted. Per contra, the 4th respondent submitted that even in the absence of a specific direction to give preferential claim for the allotment/renewal/extension of toddy shops the order of stay in respect of suspension and cancellation of licences of toddy shops would have the impact of protection of his preferential right otherwise available under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules in favour of the 4th respondent. In otherwords, the stay of the suspension and cancellation of licences when once stayed it would enable the 4th respondent to continue to run the shop, based on the licence issued in his favour and in such circumstances, on the strength of such licence the 4th respondent therein is entitled to claim for preference by virtue of the provisions under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules. According to the 4th respondent therein a separate direction though sought for, such a direction was uncalled for as even in the absence of such a direction preference by virtue of the Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules ought to be available owing to the stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the registration including suspension and cancellation of the licence of the shops concerned was carried out. Therefore, it will only be appropriate to refer to Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules.
When this Court issued a direction to the Excise Commissioner to consider the availability of preferential right under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules claimed by the 4th respondent with notice to the petitioner, the first respondent should have taken a decision after addressing the said issues in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as a matter of fact yet another contention which was taken up by the petitioner that the 4th respondent in the said writ petition had actually failed to apply and obtain the preferential certificate and did not participate in the auction was also not considered by the Excise Commissioner. Evidently, the said contention was pointedly posed for consideration, going by the argument note submitted at the hearing conferred to the petitioner by virtue of the directions in the common judgment. However, it was also not considered.
Suspension of licence - auction was conducted - Impugned order came to be passed subsequent to the direction in the common judgment in various writ petitions whereby this Court directed the first respondent to consider the claim of the petitioner for preferential right under rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules and then to pass orders invoking the power under Rule 5(15) of the Rules - Petitioner submitted that though the 4th respondent participated in the auction, at that point of time the challenge against the prosecution proceedings launched against him was not there. In such circumstances, the disqualification by virtue of the registration had to be adversely affected the 4th respondent and subsequent discharge as per would be inconsequential.
Held that:- a fresh decision shall be taken by the first respondent after bestowing consideration and to enable the first respondent to consider those points the parties are permitted to take up their respective contentions on the points mentioned hereinbefore, appropriately, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. To enable such consideration Ext.P7 impugned order is set aside. There will be a direction to the first respondent to consider all such contentions if taken up appropriately by both the parties, on merits and to take appropriate decisions, in accordance with law, and also in terms of the common judgment dated 2.4.2014 after affording an opportunity of being heard to both the parties. It shall be done expeditiously, and at any rate, within six weeks from the date of receipt of the respective petitions carrying such contentions from the petitioner and the 4th respondent.
Suspension of licence - This Court directed the first respondent to consider the claim of the 4th respondent for preferential right under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules and subject to the said decision to pass an order invoking the power under Rule 5(15) of the Rules - Petitioner contended that since this Court granted stay only in respect of further investigation and the arrest of the 4th respondent it could not efface the consequence of the registration of the crime against the petitioner in the light of the provisions under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules - Also submitted that one of the employees of the shops concerned run by the 4th respondent approached this Court challenging Ext.R4(d) which is Ext.P2 in this writ petition, and the said writ petition is still pending. In the said circumstances, he is entitled to the preferential right which is otherwise available under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules.
Held that:- in the light of the common judgment of this Court in various writ petitions, the first respondent was bound to consider that question before proceedings to pass order invoking the power under Rule 5(15) of the Rules. However, the impugned order would reveal that the aforesaid points were not actually considered in accordance with law. To enable such a consideration in the light of the provisions as also the decisions on the point the impugned Ext.P5 order is set aside. Consequently, this writ petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner and the 4th respondent to take up the aforesaid questions and points appropriately before the first respondents within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and with a direction to the first respondent to consider those questions and points taking note of the observations in this judgment as also the common judgment dated 2.4.2014 and any other authorities if cited by the concerned parties and in accordance with law. - Petition disposed of
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2015 (3) TMI 1175
Rectification of mistake - Disallowance of interest claimed on the loans borrowed from the banks and other institutions - Held that:- The Appellate Commissioner has considered the appeal filed by the assessee against the disallowance of interest claimed on the loans borrowed from the banks and other institutions and allowed the interest as claimed by the assessee after assigning reasons. With regard to the appeal filed under section 154 of the Act no reasons are assigned by the Appellate Commissioner. On this issue, the appeal was allowed with an observation that in view of the finding given in the main appellate order it becomes consequential in nature and, accordingly, the appeal as regards section 154 of the Act succeeds, against which appeals were filed by the Revenue before the Tribunal including the grounds of appeal on the issue of section 154 of the Act. Cross-objections were filed by the assessee on this issue.
The Tribunal proceeded on a misconception that no challenge was made by the Revenue as regards the order of the Appellate Commissioner on the issue of section 154 of the Act ignoring the ground of appeal filed by the Revenue. Thus, it is manifest that the Appellate Commissioner and the Tribunal failed to adjudicate the matter in a right perspective. The order impugned is passed without the application of mind. The finding given on the proceedings under section 154 of the Act is perverse and not sustainable. We deem it proper to remand the matter back to the Appellate Commissioner to adjudicate on the issue of section 154
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2015 (3) TMI 1174
Liability for non payment of selling dealer - Respondent submitted that petitioner has got alternative remedy to agitate the issue - Held that:- the writ petition has to be allowed and the alternative remedy is not a bar for entertaining the writ petition. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. - Decided in favour of petitioner
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2015 (3) TMI 1173
Reversal of Input Tax Credit - Claim made for the purchases from said seller - Violation of principles of natural justice - held that:- since the impugned assessment order is only with regard to the reversal of Input Tax Credit, that too, solely based upon the verification with regard to the vendor, the same could not have been done. therefore, by referring the decision of this court in the case of Althaf Shoes (P) Ltd., Vs. Assistant Commissioner (CT) [2011 (10) TMI 567 - Madras High Court] and for other reasons, the petitioner is entitled to succeed and accordingly, the impugned order is quashed. No costs. - Decided in favour of petitioner
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2015 (3) TMI 1172
Issues:
1. Disallowance under section 14A of the Income Tax Act
2. Calculation of disallowance under Rule 8D of Income Tax Rules
3. Charging of interest under section 234B of the Income Tax Act
Issue 1: Disallowance under section 14A of the Income Tax Act
The appellant filed an appeal against the order of the Ld. CIT(A) regarding the disallowance of a sum under section 14A of the Act. The appellant argued that no exempt income was earned and cited a judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in support. The appellant contended that the A.O. had calculated the disallowance under Rule 8D without identifying any expenditure related to exempt income. The Tribunal noted that there was no exempt income earned by the assessee, as confirmed by the Ld. CIT(A) as well. The Tribunal referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in a similar case, where it was held that disallowance under section 14A cannot be made if no exempt income was earned. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed grounds 1 & 2 of the appeal, as disallowance under section 14A was not justified.
Issue 2: Calculation of disallowance under Rule 8D of Income Tax Rules
The Tribunal found that the A.O. had not identified any income earned by the assessee that was exempt, and the Ld. CIT(A) did not establish any specific exempt income. The Tribunal agreed with the appellant's claim that there was no exempt income. Referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, the Tribunal held that the disallowance under section 14A could not be upheld without any exempt income being earned. The Tribunal emphasized that the appellant did not have any exempt income, and therefore, the disallowance under Rule 8D was unwarranted.
Issue 3: Charging of interest under section 234B of the Income Tax Act
The Tribunal did not delve into this issue as it was considered consequential and did not require adjudication. Consequently, this issue was not addressed in the judgment.
In conclusion, the appeal of the assessee was allowed based on the absence of any exempt income earned during the year, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. The Tribunal found that the disallowance under section 14A and Rule 8D was not justified in the absence of exempt income. The order was pronounced on 25th March 2015.
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2015 (3) TMI 1171
Eligibility of notice - Held that:- Interference at the show cause notice stage should be rare and not in a routine manner. Mere assertion by the petitioner that notice was without jurisdiction would not suffice and it should be prima facie established to be so. Further, where only factual adjudication is necessary, interference should not be done by the Courts. In the case on hand, it is only a show cause notice. It may or may not be correct that for breach of the provisions of the sellers, action should be initiated only against those persons or against the petitioner. But it is for the petitioner to submit his explanation before the authority concerned to the show cause notices and if the same is established, the authority will have to consider the case of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders. Since factual adjudication is required in the case of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the show cause notices. However, it is open to the petitioner to submit his explanation/objections within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and if the respondent is not satisfied with the explanations, the petitioner shall be given an opportunity of being personally heard and put forth his submissions to clarify the same.
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2015 (3) TMI 1170
Demand of Service tax alongwith interest - Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 - Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services - Act of harvesting of sugarcane and transporting the same from the fields of the concerned farmers to the sugar factories' site - Held that:- there is no supply of labour to the sugar factory concerned. The respondents have undertaken the activities of harvesting of sugarcane and transporting the same to the sugar factory for which labour is employed. Having regard to the nature of contract between the respondents and sugar factory and the scope of definitions, it appears that the Appellate Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that the respondent's work, though provided services to the sugar factory, did not come within the mischief of the term “Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency”. Therefore, it is clear that no manpower has been supplied by the respondents to the sugar factory to constitute supply of manpower. - Decided against the revenue
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2015 (3) TMI 1169
Penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) - Held that:- Although the assessee has shown income from the profession of consultancy to the tune of ₹ 14,62,000/- however, as per AIR information income under this head was found to be ₹ 15,65,336 /- which shows that there was deliberately and intentional concealment on the part of the asessee and similarly, the interest income received by the assessee as per AIR was ₹ 75,190/- which was not offered for taxation although it was the assessee himself who has kept the deposits in his bank, it cannot be held that there was bonafide mistake on the part of the assessee. The CIT(A) also while deciding the issue has categorically mentioned that there is no doubt that the assessee did not disclose different sources of income which come to the notice of AO through AIR information and in the facts of the present case the asessee had not brought any facts or explanation before us in order to show that there was some bonafide mistake on the part of the assesse to conceal the said income. Since, the assessee failed to discharge his basic onus to prove before us or before the revenue authorities that the mistake on the part of assessee was bonafide and therefore not reflected the said income in the return of income. Therefore, the CIT(A) has rightly upheld the order imposing penalty u/s 271(1)(c) passed by AO. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (3) TMI 1168
Whether the goods transported by the petitioner were liable to be assessed to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Petitioner had been granted permission to set up a unit at the CSEZ for manufacture and export of PVC Free Foam Sheets - Held that:- the Special Economic Zone is treated to be a foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations, duties and tariffs. Units like that of the petitioner are permitted to import capital goods without paying Customs Duty to the Special Economic Zone for the purpose of manufacture of their products. Such capital goods are also permitted to be transferred to other units located in similar Special Economic Zones with the permission of the fifth respondent. The petitioner has obtained permission from the fifth respondent permitting such transfer. Ext.P5 is the agreement pursuant to which, the goods were being transported. Therefore, the goods that were exported to the Special Economic Zone which is to be treated as a foreign territory for the purposes of trade and tariffs, had not crossed the customs frontiers of India. It was for the said reason that they were retained in warehoused condition by the Department of Customs and Central Excise under bond.
The goods would become exigible to tax under either the CST Act or the KGST Act only after they cross the customs frontiers of India. In other words the goods would become taxable under the domestic enactments only after they are released for home consumption by the Customs authorities after payment of Customs Duty. As the said eventuality not having taken place yet, it is held that the goods have not become liable to tax under the Act that is relied upon. It is also worth noticing that the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 is given an overriding effect over other enactments. In view of the provisions of law as well as the terms of the Export - Import Policy, there cannot be any doubt regarding the fact that the goods are not liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act of our country. Also the said taxable event of the goods clearing the customs barriers has not occurred in the case of the capital goods of the petitioner, in this case. Therefore the goods have not come into the territory of India. For the said reason they are not liable to be taxed under the CST Act. - Decided in favour of petitioner
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2015 (3) TMI 1167
Imposition of penalty - whether non-payment by the appellant was on account of any mala fide or was a result of inadvertent mistake - Held that:- The nonpayment/short-payment was intimated by the appellant themselves to the Revenue with a request to file revised ER-1 returns, which request was not accepted by the department. Thereafter, they deposited the duty along with interest. Levy of interest, by itself, can be considered to be a penal action against the assessee. When the appellant was having sufficient balance in their Cenvat credit, no assessee would like not to pay first and then to pay subsequently along with interest thus, causing interest burden upon him. As such it can be safely concluded that it was an inadvertent mistake on the part of the appellant. Accordingly, find no reason to impose penalty and set aside the same. Duty plus interest is confirmed as not contested
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2015 (3) TMI 1166
Denial of credit on MS Channels, MS Angles, MS Plates etc. after the amendment of definition of Rule 2(k) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - Held that:- Taking into consideration the judicial pronouncements in all fairness, the appeal should be remanded to the adjudicating authority. Accordingly, the appeal is remanded to the adjudicating authority who shall hear the case afresh after examining the ratio laid down in Commissioner Vs. Jawahar Mills Ltd. (2001 (7) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ) and CCE, Belgaum Vs. Doodhaganga Krishna Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamit (2012 (9) TMI 709 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ). It is needless to say that the adjudicating authority shall afford an opportunity to appellant of being heard before deciding the case. Appeal is allowed by remand
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2015 (3) TMI 1165
Application for amendment in the memo of appeal - Held that:- The amendment application appears to have been made bonafidely and through it the appellant wants to bring on record the subsequent developments. Through the proposed amendment, no new cause has been set up by the appellant and is in continuation of the facts which were placed earlier. The subsequent developments are being placed before the Tribunal, so that they may be duly considered at the time of the final disposal of the appeal. The application, therefore, deserves to be allowed.
The application for amendment in the memo of appeal is allowed. The amendment be incorporated within 10 days of the receipt of the copy of the order. Reply/written statement, if any may be filed by the respondent within 15 days thereafter. List on 26-5-2015 for hearing.
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2015 (3) TMI 1164
stay of recovery extended - Held that:- We further extend the stay of impugned demands subject to further payment of ₹ 50,000/- per month till disposal of assessee’s appeals for A.Y. 2007-08 to 2009-10 respectively or on expiry of six months, whichever is earlier.
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