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Showing 261 to 280 of 1389 Records
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2014 (7) TMI 1131
Interest charged under section 220(2) - CIT(A) deleted interest levy - Held that:- In the present case, the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act was completed on March 31, 1999 and the demand notice was issued. The said demand reached finality consequent to the order passed by the Tribunal on January 29, 2009, though the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had granted greater relief in his order under section 250 of the Act.
Considering the facts of the present case, in view of the provisions of section 220(2) of the Act, the notice of demand must relate back to the original notice of demand. At no stage when the appeals were pending before the different forums, had the same lost its force. The moment there is finality of proceedings, the original notice of demand comes to the surface and for any default on the part of the assessee, the claim of interest can be levied. The contention raised by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in the instant case does not have merit on the basis of the original notice of demand. On finality of proceedings, the Assessing Officer can claim interest. We find that the stand taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is contrary to the provisions of section 220(2) and being so, we are inclined to reverse the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on this issue and restore that of the Assessing Officer. - Decided in favour of revenue.
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2014 (7) TMI 1130
Unexplained cash - deficit cash balance - Held that:- Since the books of account were audited and deficit cash was identified on the basis of entries in the books of account, explanation that accountant did not enter the entries of cash receipt properly cannot be accepted as a bona fide explanation. Even though the Assessing Officer did not verify the statements/affidavits filed by partners, the affirmations made there in itself confirms that cash was available with the assessee outside books of account as discussed above. In view of this, we agree with the Assessing Officer and the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) findings that the explanation of the assessee is an afterthought and there was no proper explanation for the cash deficit in the books of account. Since the amounts were spent without there being any explained source of the amount, addition of the above amount is called for and accordingly, the same is confirmed. - Decided against assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1129
Maintainability of appeal - Monetary limit of appeal to High court - Held that:- Benefit to which the assessee is entitled to should not be dependent on the date of the decision, over which neither the assessee nor revenue has no control. In this context, the circular would be discriminatory, if it is held to be prospective only. We have also noticed that the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of CCE v. IOCL and Others [2015 (5) TMI 443 - CESTAT BANGALORE] in relation to appeals of 2007 dismissed the appeal on the ground that duty and penalty involved is less than ₹ 5 lakhs. The Tribunal held that even where appeals were filed prior to issue of the circular by the Board prescribing monetary limits for filing the appeals by the Revenue, in the light of the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Ranka & Ranka (2011 (11) TMI 449 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT). - Decided against Revenue.
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2014 (7) TMI 1128
Deduction u/s 80HHC of the receipt of DEPB entitlement - Legality of revision of order of Tribunal u/s 254 on ground of retrospective overruling - whether the issue involved in the present case is now covered by the decision of CIT v. Kalpataru Colours and Chemicals [2010 (6) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] OR the ratio laid down by Topman Exports v. CIT [2012 (2) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] which has reversed the decision of Kalpataru Colours and Chemicals and held that the face value of the DEPB will fall under clause (iiib) of section 28 - Rectification of mistake - Held that:- Subsequent decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court operates retrospectively and, therefore, it had to be regarded as it existed when the impugned order was passed by the Tribunal and, thus, a mistake has crept on the face of the record which could not be allowed to remain. We further note that the limitation for correcting mistake, that is imposed by the provisions of section 254(2), is only with respect to time and since the miscellaneous application in hand for rectification had been made within the prescribed time limitation, the order of tribunal deserves to be rectified and we proceed to rectify the same by respectfully following decision of the hon'ble apex court in the case of Topman Exports v. CIT [supra] and decision Lakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Asst. CIT (2012 (6) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT) as follows. - Decided in favour of assesse.
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2014 (7) TMI 1127
Entitlement to exemption under section 10B - whether deemed exports are also exports for the purpose of computation of deduction under section 10B and the usage 'export of goods' cannot be construed as 'export out of India'? - Held that:- In the absence of any decision to the contrary brought to our notice, respectfully following the binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Ram Babu and Sons [1996 (5) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD High Court] which squarely covers the issue against the assessee and clearly holds that for the purpose of the Income-tax Act, the law neither contemplates nor recognises such "deemed exports", we find no infirmity in the impugned order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), in sustaining the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer, out of the exemption under section 10B of the Act claimed by the assessee. We accordingly uphold the same, rejecting the grounds of the assessee on this aspect. also see Commissioner of Income-Tax Versus Silver And Arts Palace [2002 (12) TMI 12 - SUPREME Court] - Decided against assesse.
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2014 (7) TMI 1126
Higher rate of depreciation on lorries - 30% as claimed by assesse 0R 15% as per AO - Held that:- As already noticed that the assessee is not engaged in the business of running the vehicles on hire. The facts prevailing in the decision rendered by the hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Kailash Chand Bagaria v. CIT [2001 (4) TMI 80 - MADHYA PRADESH High Court] is identical to the facts prevailing in the instant case. Hence, we do not find any infirmity in the decision rendered by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in holding that the assessee is not entitled for a higher rate of depreciation on the vehicles used in his own business. Accordingly, we confirm his order. - Decided against assesse.
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2014 (7) TMI 1125
Interpretation on the computation of relief u/s 80HHC - 90 per cent. of the receipts on the sale of scrap and conversion charges were to be excluded as per ITAT - whether the "conversion charges" earned by the applicant can be deducted from the "profits and gains of the business" to arrive at the "profits of the business" - Held that:- The view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Bangalore Clothing Co.'s case (2003 (1) TMI 89 - BOMBAY High Court) holds the field in which the assessee not only carried out the activity of manufacture and export of its own but also took up the job work of other manufactures. The question arose as to whether the charges levied for job work can be treated on par with the items mentioned in the clause. The answer was in the negative.
If the amount has anything to do with the activity of manufacturing though not of export goods, deduction thereof cannot be made. Otherwise, the proportion of the profit earned through export to the total profit gets disturbed. Amounts that can be treated as falling in the category of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges occurring in the clause are only those items, which are unrelated to, and other than the amounts forming part of the total turnover of the business carried on by the assessee occurring in sub-section (3) of section 80HHC of the Act. Since the "conversion charges" are earned through the activity of manufacturing though for the benefit of other customers, the question of deducting the same from the general profits, in the context of arriving at profits from business under the clause does not arise. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1124
Block assessments - Tribunal deleted the addition on unaccounted cash credit made in block assessment - Held that:- In the instant case, the Tribunal recorded a categorical finding to the effect that all the items of cash credits alleged against the respondents were reflected in the books of account referable to the concerned assessment years. That being the case, the very justification for making the block assessment and thereby the passing of assessment order becomes shaky. The Tribunal has taken a correct view in the matter and based its conclusions on the relevant precedents. Therefore, we do not find any basis to interfere with the order under appeal. - Decided against revenue.
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2014 (7) TMI 1123
Demand of Customs duty - Violation of principle of natural justice - Held that:- STPI after recording the way the export obligations were calculated, in unnumbered paragraph No. 4 has specifically stated that the unit met its export obligations while in the next unnumbered paragraph No. 5, they have stated that the appellant should pay the applicable duty on imported capital goods inputs, etc. There seems to be inherent contradiction in the letter issued by the STPI unless there definite conclusion by the authority whether the appellant has met with the export/ obligation or not in our considered view assessee appellant cannot be saddled with duty liability and consequences. We gainfully refer to the Circular No. 21/95-Cus., dated 10-3-1995 wherein Board has clarified specifically that the demand of duty should be confirmed only, after definite conclusion has been arrived at by the Development Commissioner. In the case in hand, STPI is the final authority to come to a conclusion as to whether the appellant fulfilled the export obligation or not. - unless the STPI comes to a definite conclusion, the impugned order passed by the adjudicating authority seems to be premature. - adjudicating authority is directed to reconsider the issue afresh after following the principles of natural justice and also seeking definite conclusion from the STPI as to whether the appellant has fulfilled with the export obligation as was committed, when they undertook the activities in STPI or not. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1122
Applicability of section 194C to the facts of the case - process of getting the bus bodies built by the fabricators - work or works contract on the one hand or a sale - liability to deduct TDS - Held that:- Once a finished product of a definite description and shape was brought into existence with the material and expertise of the agency or per son, who undertook the activity, and a fixed price is paid thereon, the activity tends to be close to sale. Once it is a sale, it ceases to be a work or works contract, from the point of view of section 194C of the Act.
Tribunal correctly reversed the order of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer, as confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) & held that section 194C of the Act has no application to the facts of the case. - Decided against revenue.
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2014 (7) TMI 1121
Rectification of mistake - Benefit of Notification No. 29/2010-Cus. - Held that:- Bill of Entry filed by the applicants for clearance of the goods it was specifically mentioned that the goods are “aluminium profile, hardware for furniture fittings” meaning thereby that the goods in question are for fabrication/manufacture of furniture. In these circumstances a finding is arrived at that the goods are not for retail sale. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. Ashok Textiles reported in [1960 (12) TMI 14 - SUPREME Court] held that if a statutory provision is capable of two interpretation, taking one such interpretation cannot give rise to an error apparent from the record even if one is of the view that the other interpretation is more correct in the context. - it cannot be considered as a mistake apparent on record which is obvious and self-evident - Rectification denied.
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2014 (7) TMI 1120
One-time lump sum payment made for acquiring technical know-how for a period of six years - capital or revenue expenditure - Held that:- The payment made by the assessee is on account of licence fee. By making such payment, the assessee has got a permission to use the technology. The money paid is irrecoverable. In case, the business of the assessee for some reason or the other is stopped, no benefit from such payment is likely to accrue to the assessee. The licence is not transferable. Therefore, it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that there has been an accretion to the capital asset of the assessee. In case, the assessee continues to do business and continues to exploit the technology for the agreed period of time, the assessee will be entitled to take the benefit thereof. But in case it does not do so, the payment made is irrecoverable. It is in this sense that the matter was looked into by the High Court of Madras and was endorsed by the apex court in the case of CIT v. I. A. E. C. (Pumps) Ltd. (1997 (4) TMI 14 - SUPREME Court ). The point as a matter of fact is covered by the aforesaid judgment wherein concluded that the entire payment constitutes revenue expenditure . Nothing really is left for us to do in the matter. - Decided in favour of the assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1119
Revision u/s 263 - Unexplained sales and unexplained purchases - Held that:- The Tribunal had accepted that there was no unexplained income on account of either sales or purchases. The addition was sought to be made by the Income-tax Department on the basis of statement made by Shri Harmesh Arora before the Central excise authorities in the context of levy of excise duty on unaccounted production. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the Revenue that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the Central Excise Department had deleted the addition of excise duty levied which has been upheld by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (in short "the CESTAT"). A copy of order dated April 28, 2014, passed by the CESTAT has been produced by learned counsel for the Revenue wherein it has been held that there was no evidence to show that there was clandestine manufacture and clearance of the ingots in question. The Income-tax Department had not collected any independent material to arrive at the conclusion that there was unexplained sales or purchases made by the assessee. It was only on the basis of the statement of Shri Harmesh Arora before the excise authorities in which the Tribunal had noticed various contradictions and gaps. In the facts and circumstances, on the basis of the statement made by Shri Harmesh Arora alone before the excise authorities which did not find corroboration from any other material, no addition could have been validly made
Tribunal had rightly come to the conclusion that there was no unexplained income on account of sales or purchases of material. - Decided in favour of the assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1118
Applicability of rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 in arriving at a valuation of the fringe benefits under Chapter XII-H - ITAT rejected the contention of the assessee on applicability of rule 8 - Held that:- Taking assistance of the illustration given in Commr. of Income Tax, Dibrugarh Versus Doom Dooma India Ltd. & Assam Co. Ltd. [2009 (2) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT] to resolve the issue the other expenses in illustration A amounting to ₹ 300 include ₹ 100 spent by the employer on account of fringe benefits made available to its employees. In that case, 40 per cent. of the aforesaid sum of ₹ 100 would also be includible in illustration B. Therefore, the question posed before us has really been answered by the illustration given by the apex court in the aforesaid judgment. It cannot be disputed that the amount of expenditure incurred by the assessee in extending fringe benefits to its employees was not solely for the purpose of business. The expenditure incurred is both for the purpose of business and for the purpose of agriculture. The submission made by Mrs. Gutgutia that the expenditure on account of fringe benefits has already been taken into account is not correct. The net profit and loss of the business has to be arrived at after deducting all the expenses as indicated in illustration A in the case of Doom Dooma (supra). Once that is done 40 per cent. of the net profit and loss has to be worked out which shall be chargeable to tax. Once this is done the expenditure on account of fringe benefits would automatically stand reduced to 40 per cent. as would appear from illustration B in the case of Doom Dooma (supra). The Revenue is interested in contending as would appear from the impugned orders that the expenditure on account of fringe benefit cannot be reduced to 40 per cent. for the purpose of computing fringe benefit tax. If that is done, the result would be that the agricultural income itself would become liable to tax, which is not permissible under sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Income-tax Act. The provisions contained in Chapter XII-H of the Income-tax Act have to be read subject to section 10 of the Income-tax Act.
For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1117
Exemption from the excise duty under Notification No. 6/2002-C.E. or Notification No. 6/2006-C.E. - held that:- As regards the demand of duty on BHGO and naphtha for the period prior to 1-7-2001, this Tribunal considered this question in the Chennai Petroleum case (2008 (6) TMI 29 - CESTAT, CHENNAI) and it was held that no duty would be leviable on any quantity of fuel/oil/LSHS used for generating steam required for refining of crude petroleum in the appellant’s refinery in view of the provisions of Rule 43(a) of the Central Excise Rules as the refinery was a bonded warehouse and the use of fuel/oil/LSHS without payment of duty was permitted for the conduct of further manufacturing process within the refinery. - This is also in conformity with the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chennai Petroleum (2007 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) wherein it was held that exemption on goods arising in the manufacture of electricity, which in turn was used in the manufacture of petroleum products, would be available as the activity was undertaken within the refinery, which was deemed as a warehouse. Following the ratio of the said decision, in the present case also it has to be held that the demand for the period prior to 1-7-2001 in respect of BHGO and naphtha used within the refinery for the manufacture of electricity, which was further used in the manufacture of goods dutiable or otherwise will not sustain in law.
If the appellant has undertaken the credit reversal as claimed by them, benefit of Notification No. 67/95 cannot be denied to the appellant provided the reversal has been correctly done and whenever there is a delay in reversal, interest liability has been discharged on the quantum of credit reversed from the due date to reversal till the actual date of reversal. Finance Act, 2010 retrospectively amended the Cenvat Credit Rules as it stood at various points of time so as to provide for reversal of credit attributable to inputs used in the manufacture of exempted final products subject to the appellant reversing the credit and the credit so reversed is certified by a Chartered Accountant/Cost Accountant and interest liability is discharged at the rate of 24% per annum for the period of delay in reversal. - benefit of this retrospective amendment ought to be given to the appellant, if these conditions are complied with. However, this is a matter of verification which has to be undertaken by the adjudicating authority and the appellant has to lead the necessary evidence that they have discharged the credit liability as provided for under the Finance Act, 2010 along with appropriate interest liability. Subject to submission of such evidence, the adjudicating authority has to consider the matter afresh and extend the benefit of Notification No. 67/95.
Excise duty would be leviable on naphtha used in the generation of electricity, which, in turn, were consumed for lighting of roads/yards, administrative building, cafeteria etc. Following the ratio of the said decision in the present case also, it has to be held that the appellant would be liable to pay Excise duty on BHGO and naphtha used in the manufacture of electricity, which, in turn, has been used in administrative/canteen building etc. The quantum of such BHGO and naphtha needs to be worked out and the duty demand needs to be quantified. - Matter remanded back - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1116
Demand of differential duty - Demand of interest - Held that:- The SLP filed by the Revenue and the review application filed thereafter have been dismissed. Therefore he submits that in view of the fact that the revision of price in both the cases namely in the BHEL case [2010 (4) TMI 439 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ] and in the appellant's case arose because of the sum received, the decision in the case of BHEL is required to be followed by the Tribunal. - As regards Presscom Products decision [2011 (3) TMI 726 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ], the learned counsel submitted that the same was rendered before the SLP filed by the Revenue in BHEL decision was dismissed. As regards the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of International Auto Ltd., I find that the facts are not similar and in view of the fact that in the case of BHEL and the appellant's case facts are identical, it would be more appropriate to follow the decision in the case of BHEL - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1115
Refusal to admit winding up petition - Carrier did not adhere to the terms and billed at a rate far above the settled rate - Rates were not approved - Non reply of statutory notice - Presumption of insolvency - Bona find dispute - Held that:- On a combined reading of these three decisions - M/S Madhusudan Gordhandas and Co. [1971 (10) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] , Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Limited [1966 (3) TMI 19 - SUPREME Court] , Bangasri Ice and cold Storage Limited [1962 (5) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] , we would find, although the winding up process is not a normal alternative for debt collection, it is also used as a forum of “equitable execution.” The Division Bench of our Court in a recent decision in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited [2012 (11) TMI 827 - CALCUTTA, HIGH COURT ], dealt with all the relevant cases on the issue as to what would mean as presumption of insolvency and bona fide dispute.
We thus conclude, an unsecured creditor would maintain a winding up proceeding with a just claim upon service of statutory notice of demand that either remains unreplied or is dealt with without any plausible defence. For the company, once it faces a winding up proceeding followed by a statutory notice of demand it has to rebut the presumption of insolvency that would arise on service of the statutory notice. The presumption could only be rebutted on raising a bona fide dispute. Merely raising a dispute having no support from reality, would be moonshine, sham, colourable and would not be regarded as a good defence to resist a winding up proceeding. In this regard, we would be failing in our duty if we do not mention and rely upon a decision in the case of M/s Mechalec Engineers and Manufacturers [1976 (11) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT] which quoted the celebrated decision of this Court in the case of Kiranmoyee Dassi, five criteria stipulated therein, to deal with summary proceeding that would also be available for consideration by a Company Judge dealing with a winding up proceeding, would be apt in the present case.
On the other way, we find, as many as four letters would remain unreplied. It is not a fact, the company was silent. The letters would show, there had been at least two meetings on the issue yet, the company did not confront the creditor by replying to their letters. Those four letters were followed by the statutory notice of demand that would also remain unreplied. Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Learned Senior Counsel could not give any plausible explanation why the letters were not dealt with. This would definitely lead to statutory presumption of insolvency. To rebut such statutory presumption, the company would have to raise a bone fide dispute that they failed to raise prior to the initiation of the winding up proceeding by replying to the letters as referred to above. They came out with their defence for the first time in the affidavit in opposition. The defence is not clear to us. It is somewhat confusing.
At the same time, we could not find a definite stand from the appellant to support their claim being just and proper and strictly as per the approved rate. We can not overlook the circular that the appellant annexed in their winding up proceeding mentioning about D.P. Jajodia settling the rate. Four emails referred to by Mr. Mookherjee were for the period of February 2013, March 2013 and May 2013. The first two e-mails would relate to a period that the appellant did not make an issue in the winding up proceeding as we find from the Statement of Account. The next two e-mails could not be used as a support to the entire claim. Moreover, we do not find any co-relation at least, not shown to us to dispel the doubt in our mind. Hence, considering the state of fact that we discuss herein before, we can not convincingly come to a conclusion as to the exact amount of debt. At the same time, we cannot leave the respondent scot-free as their defence is doubtful.
- Decided that the company admitted ₹ 1,84 crores. We permit the company to pay the same along with interest in case of default in payment within specified period.For the balance claim the parties are relegated the suit subject to the respondent disposing the balance sum with the Registrar Original Side, by September 15, 2014. In case the above sum is deposited, the Registrar would invest the said sum in any nationalized Bank of his choice and keep the same renewed till the disposal of the suit. - In default of deposit, the balance sum would immediately become due and payable and the appellant would proceed with the winding up proceeding. - In default of filing any suit by the appellant within six weeks from the date of communication of such deposit, the respondent would be entitled to refund of the same.
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2014 (7) TMI 1114
Disallowance of depreciation of Wind Mills - Validity of reopening of assessment - Held that:- After perusing the facts as detailed in order of the Ld. CIT(A) and the principles governing issue of reopening the assessment and allowance of depreciation at 80% on the wind mills and the provisions of law, we do not see any reason to interfere with the detailed order of the Ld. CIT(A) on these two issues. Revenue has no basis either for reopening the assessment or for disallowing the claim of depreciation allowed in original assessment, which was in fact claimed in earlier years also - No merit in appeal - Decided against Revenue.
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2014 (7) TMI 1113
Disallowance u/s.14A - Held that:- The disallowance, it may be appreciated, is of the expenditure incurred, and which may not have any direct bearing on the income arising. Further, where and to the extent the A.O. is not in agreement with the assessee’s claims – for which though we do not see any reason in-as-much as the financial position, properly analyzed, should be able to identify the financing of each asset, either directly with reference to a source of funds, or from the common pool of funds, he shall state his reasons. - transgressed the scope of the appeals in-as-much as our purview, as the second appellate authority, is limited to answer the grounds raised before us. This is not so, as, firstly, the identification of interest allowable, or not so, u/s. 57(iii) is necessarily required to identify and quantify the interest subject to the disallowance u/s.14A. The said section is in fact a complete code in itself, widening the scope of apportionment, as explained in the case of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (2010 (8) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT). Reference in this context may also be made to the decision in the case of Kapurchand Shrimal v. CIT [1981 (8) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court] - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (7) TMI 1112
Disallowance of brokerage commission - assessee failed to furnish details whatsoever about the recipients of the commission - Held that:- local people have created a problem in the land for which agreement was entered into by the assessee . It is stated that local people have buried a dead body in the land and they wanted to use the land as burial ground andas the company has already paid ₹ 50,00,000/- as advance and to get back the advance money without any loss and to avoid any criminal action, compromise through local politicians and brokers was arrived at and in the process commission was paid to R.Santhakumar and A.Y.Nasser. These facts were not placed before the Assessing Officer in the course of assessment proceedings and for the first time, the assessee made these submissions before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The genuineness and the necessity of the payment of such higher brokerage commission is not established beyond doubt. - Matter remanded back.
Disallowance made under section 40(a)(ia) on the brokerage commission paid - Assessing Officer held that TDS deducted on commission which is paid into Government account from Baskaran’s TAN number cannot be treated as TDS payment made from the assessee company - Held that:- TDS was deducted on behalf of the company by the Managing Director in his individual capacity and Mr. M. Baskaran also filed indemnity bond dated 29.12.2010 wherein it is stated that TDS has been deducted on behalf of the company M/s.Baskara Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and also that he has not claimed any TDS nor he will make such claim in future. Therefore, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) accepted that payments are not to be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. - TDS deducted by Mr. Baskaran, Managing Director in his individual capacity on behalf of the company can be treated as compliance of deducting TDS by the company for the purpose of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. Thus, disallowance cannot be made on this ground especially when the Managing Director has given an indemnity bond stating that TDS was made on behalf of the company and he has not claimed any credit for such TDS nor he will make any such claim in future. - Decided partly in favour of Revenue.
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