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Showing 281 to 300 of 2046 Records
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2018 (10) TMI 1770
Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r 8D - assessee contended that the AO has applied the provisions Rule 8D without recording satisfaction against the correctness of the disallowance made by the AO - HELD THAT:- The undisputed facts remain that the assessee is a trader in shares and securities and the assessee has held its entire securities as “stock in trade” only. The assessee did not hold any security as its investment.
In the instant case, we notice that the assessing officer did not record any dissatisfaction over the amount of disallowance determined by the assessee u/s 14A of the Act, having regard to the accounts of the assessee. Further, we notice that the AO has proceeded on the erroneous presumption that the application of Rule 8D is mandatory in nature.
AO has proceeded to invoke the provisions of Rule 8D of the I.T rules, without showing that he was not satisfied with the workings given by the assessee having regard to the accounts of the assessee. Further, the understanding of AO with regard to the disallowance u/s 14A of the Act is inconsistent with the principles laid down by the Hon’ble High Courts and Supreme Court.
We are of the view that the Ld CIT(A) was justified in holding that the AO was not justified in invoking Rule 8D to compute disallowance u/s 14A, without showing that he was not satisfied with the amount of disallowance worked out by the assessee. Accordingly we uphold the order passed by Ld CIT(A) on this issue.
Ld CIT(A) that the assessing officer was not correct in law in applying the provisions of Rule 8D in both the years, since the AO has failed to show/record, having regard to the accounts of the assessee, that he was not satisfied with the disallowance computed by the assessee.
We have upheld the order passed by Ld CIT(A) in setting aside the disallowance worked out by the AO. We have also noticed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the Maxopp Investment Ltd [2018 (3) TMI 805 - SUPREME COURT] that the disallowance u/s 14A shall be triggered if exempt income ie. earned, even if the shares are held as stock in trade. Under these set of facts, the disallowance worked out by the assessee should be considered as meeting the requirements of sec.14A of the Act. - Decided against revenue
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2018 (10) TMI 1769
Status Holder Incentive Scheme - exemption granted to specified capital goods imported from various ports across the Country - grievances of the writ petitioner is that almost majority of the ports across the Country are named in the notification. However, the Port at ICD, Arakkonam, has not been included in the list of Ports. Thus, the benefit of incentives introduced by the Government of India had not been extended to the writ petitioner, while importing capital goods.
HELD THAT:- When the importers of other ports and ICD, are availing the benefit of incentive scheme, importers of particular port cannot be denied such a benefit. Such a discrimination, if at all must be substantiated by the respondents. However,the learned counsel appearing for the respondents is unable to provide any convincing reasons for the purpose of exclusion of ICD Arakkonam, from the list of ports incorporated in the scheme.
This apart, the case of the writ petitioner was considered favorably by the authorities competent from the year 2014 onwards. As of now, the writ petitioner is availing the benefit of scheme and there was no objection at all. Thus, the five import transactions already done also deserve to be considered favorably based on the representation submitted by the writ petitioner. In view of the fact that the respondents have not furnished any candid reason for the purpose of non-inclusion of the ICD, Arakkonam in the list of scheme, the case of the writ petitioner deserves consideration on the hands of the respondents themselves.
The writ petitioner is directed to submit a fresh representation setting out all the facts, details and documents within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - impugned order set aside - petition allowed.
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2018 (10) TMI 1768
Condonation of delay of 2059 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal - appeals to the Appellate Tribunal - Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 - sufficient explanation for condonation of delay given or not - HELD THAT:- In the present case, all that the appellant had stated, as explanation for the inordinate delay of five years in preferring the appeal, is that the Managing Director had sent a copy of the order to the advocate for filing the appeal, but the advocate had not filed the appeal in time. No explanation is furnished by the appellant as to why no follow up action was taken by the Managing Director of the appellant. The explanation furnished by the appellant, that the matter could not be followed up with the advocate because of difference in management, is vague and the Tribunal found it unacceptable.
The present appeal is preferred against the order of the Tribunal refusing to exercise discretion to condone the delay - As we are satisfied that such exercise of discretion does not suffer from any error, much less an error which gives rise to a substantial question of law, we see no reason to exercise discretion to interfere - It would be wholly inappropriate for us, for the first time in proceedings under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, to examine the appeal on its merits, when the Tribunal has refused to entertain the appeal on the ground of inordinate delay, in filing the appeal, of around five years.
Appeal dismissed.
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2018 (10) TMI 1767
Time Limitation - imposition of penalty - Whether CESTAT was right in dismissing the appeal preferred by Commissioner of Customs (Export) holding that the SCN for imposition of penalty was barred by limitation? - HELD THAT:- The decision in Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P. Union Ltd. [2007 (10) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT] is clear that wherever power is conferred upon any statutory authority which can potentially result in infliction of penalty or such adverse orders, the jurisdiction is to be invoked within reasonable time atleast from obtaining the information preferably within five years. In this case the jurisdiction to invoke penalty clause was invoked atleast eight years after receipt of information.
The principle in Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P. Union Ltd. squarely applies - the question of law framed in this case is answered against the Revenue/appellant and in favour of the assessee - Appeal dismissed.
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2018 (10) TMI 1766
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor failed to make repayment - Whether the petitioner served the demand notice to the respondent under Section 8 of the Code before filing the petition? - challenge to the evidence of the petitioner is over the name of sender on the postal receipt of Page 22 of the paper book. It is addressed to the respondent-corporate debtor but the same purports to be sent by Blue Apple Trad - HELD THAT:- The respondent cannot take advantage of the aforesaid discrepancy because the tracking report of the delivery of the postal article to the respondent on 12.04.2018 carries the presumption of correctness. The demand notice is addressed by the operational creditor to respondent-corporate debtor as is evident from the document Annexure A-1 (colly) and there is no reason to doubt the aforesaid contention of the petitioner. It is pertinent to mention that the documents which the respondent received as per tracking report at Page 23 of the paper book has not been placed on record by the respondent to controvert the allegation of the petitioner and to say that it contained different notice than what is relied upon by the petitioner - The instant petition has been filed on 01.05.2018 i.e. after the expiry of 10 days period. Therefore, the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent-corporate debtor.
Whether there is existence of dispute between the parties? - HELD THAT:- For the dishonour of the cheques the respondent-corporate debtor and its responsible persons are already facing the case in the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The present thus, is a case in which there is no hesitation for us to hold that it is a case of non-existence of any dispute between the parties at the time the demand notice was issued The subsequent record relied upon by the respondent cannot give rise to the ‘existence of dispute’ between the parties to oust the petitioner for an order of admission.
Whether the petition is barred by limitation? - HELD THAT:- Since on the third issue, the last payment made by the petitioner was admittedly for an amount of ₹2 lacs on 18.05.2017. the instant petition filed on 01.05.2018 is clearly within time. Thus, this issue is also held against the respondent.
The application is complete in all respect - All the ingredients of sub-section 5(i) of Section 9 of the Code have been fulfilled - The instant petition is admitted - Moratorium declared.
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2018 (10) TMI 1765
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate debtor defaulted in making repayment - existence of debt and default or not - HELD THAT:- There are several clauses in the agreement in question, and the respondent, on the contrary made claim against the petitioner. Ultimately, the parties in the first instance have to reconcile their own statement of accounts before approaching the Tribunal to invoke provisions of IBC, 2016. The Petitioner, instead of finalising the disputed amounts, has filed the instant Company Petition on untenable grounds. The question of excess payment, and set-off as claimed by the respondent has to be examined in an appropriate proceeding in a case filed in accordance with the law, and the issue cannot be adjudicated in the instant Company Petition.
There is a dispute with regard to debt in question, and thus it is not a fit case to admit - Application rejected.
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2018 (10) TMI 1764
The National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh heard a case with Justice R.P. Nagrath and Pradeep R. Sethi as members. Mr. Kewal Krishan Saini represented the petitioner, and Mr. Sudhir K. Makkar with Ms. Saumya Gupta represented the respondent. The respondent sought time to file a reply and requested the complete paper book. The matter was listed for 13.12.2018, with deadlines set for filing replies and objections.
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2018 (10) TMI 1763
Constitutional validity under Section 23 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 - period 2011-2012 - HELD THAT:- Ms. Chavan, learned Counsel on instructions gives undertaking to this Court that the demand notice consequent to the assessment year dated 7th December, 2017 will not be given effect nor enforced till such time as the Hon'ble Supreme Court renders a specific decision in the appeal filed by the petitioners before it challenging the order dated 25th April, 2017 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2119 of 2016 and MVAT Appeal No. 68 of 2016. The undertaking is accepted by us.
Petition disposed off.
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2018 (10) TMI 1762
CENVAT credit - taking of belated credit - While receiving the duty paid goods in the factory, the appellant did not avail the CENVAT Credit of the duty amount indicated in the invoices immediately and had availed such credit after a lapse of 1½ years from the date of receipt of duty paid goods in the factory - Rule 4 (1) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Rule 16 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 - HELD THAT:- Rule 16 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 permits a manufacturer to take CENVAT Credit of Central Excise duty paid on the goods, which are received in the factory for the purpose of remade, refined, reconditioning or for any other reason. Further, Rule 4 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 provides that the CENVAT Credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory by the manufacturer. In this case, the fact is not in dispute that the duty paid goods initially removed from the factory were received back for the purpose of carrying out some process and after completion of such process/activities; the same were removed from the factory on payment of Central Excise duty. Thus, under the provisions of Rule 16 of the Rules, the appellant was entitled to take CENVAT Credit of Central Excise duty paid on excisable goods, which were subsequently returned back to the factory.
On examination of the provisions between the C.P.C. vis-à-vis, Cenvat statute, it transpires that the later provisions were designed in such manner that the authorities should take liberal view in extending the benefit of credit, appreciating the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the statutory provisions cannot be strictly applied for denying the benefit of legitimate claim of the Cenvat amount. Due to reasonable cause, the appellant did not avail the credit immediately on receipt of the goods, for which the substantive right conferred in the Cenvat statute cannot be denied.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2018 (10) TMI 1761
Recovery of CENVAT Credit - imposition of penalty u/s 11AC of Central Excise Act, 1944 read with rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- In AJINKYA ENTERPRISES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PUNE-III [2013 (6) TMI 610 - CESTAT MUMBAI] the Tribunal has examined various judicial rulings to arrive at the conclusion that the duty paid by the appellants has been accepted by the department which is admittedly more than the CENVAT Credit availed by the appellants. Therefore, the appellants are not required to reverse the credit - Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2018 (10) TMI 1760
Refund of accumulated CENVAT Credit - service provided outside India - input services - Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services - Tele-communication Service - Legal Consultancy Service - Works Contract Service - Renting of Immovable Property Service - Courier agency service - period from April’ 2013 to June’ 2015 - denial on account of nexus.
Mmanpower recruitment or supply agency service - tele-communication service - refund benefit has been denied on the ground that the invoices issued by the service provider had mentioned the address of the appellants’ Head Office instead of the address appearing in the registration certificate - HELD THAT:- The fact is not in dispute that the input services were consumed by the appellant in its Airoli Unit, for use/utilization in the output services exported by it. Thus, mere mentioning of address of the Head Office instead of such unit in the invoices will bear the character of a technical lapse and the original authority is competent to condone such lapses in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules - matter remanded to the original authority for verification of the invoices and other particulars and thereafter to extend the refund benefit, if the services were used in the Airoli Unit for providing output service.
Works Contract Service - HELD THAT:- There is no specific finding by either of the authorities that the works contract service was availed by the appellant for the interior works or for other activities in respect of construction of buildings - For ascertaining the eligibility of input service since the fact has to be verified, the matter is also remanded to the original authority to find out the activities undertaken by the appellant with regard to such service.
Renting of immovable property Service - the department has accepted the refund claim by the appellant but denied the claim on maintenance charges claimed by these service providers - HELD THAT:- Since the maintenance charges collected by the service providers were in context with the property which was rented out by him, such maintenance charges should also be considered as part and parcel of renting of immovable property for the purpose of levy of service tax and also claim of the refund benefit. Thus, denial of benefit on such service is not proper and justified.
Other services - Legal Consultancy Services, Courier Agency services, Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Services etc. - denial on the ground that invoices were not submitted by the appellant - HELD THAT:- In view of the fact that the documentary verification has to be done at the original level, the matter is remanded to the original authority for verification of the documentary evidences to be produced by the appellant.
Time Limitation - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact on record that the refund applications were initially filed through on-line and subsequently filed in manual form along with requisite enclosures. Since the claims were lodged on-line, which was accepted in the departmental web-site, the claim applications cannot be considered as barred by limitation of time.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2018 (10) TMI 1759
Deduction u/s 10AA denied - Bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- We are inclined to concur with the view taken by the Tribunal, which is based on the facts proved by statement of Shri Praveen Jain. The appellant despite being provided opportunity failed to prove the genuineness of the transactions and failed to produce the parties along with their books of accounts from whom such transactions were made to verify the same.
Relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. M/s. Kelvinator of India Limited [2010 (1) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] does not offer any assistance to the appellant in the present case. It cannot be said that the Assessing Officer in the subsequent assessment order has arrived at a view that it has taken only on the basis of whatever material was available with him at the time of framing of initial assessment order. Indisputably, the Assessing Officer at the subsequent stage has relied upon the statement of Shri Praveen Jain recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act. It is on that basis that he called upon the appellant to prove the genuineness of the transactions.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer has rightly disallowed the deduction under Section 10AA of the Act.
As regards the argument of the appellant for not providing him opportunity of cross examine Shri Praveen Jain, in the first place, the Assessing Officer himself required the appellant to produce representative of the concerned parties along with their books of accounts and he failed to produce them. Secondly, no such prayer was ever made by the appellant before the Assessing Officer to summon Shri Praveen Jain for his cross-examination. No substantial question of law
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2018 (10) TMI 1758
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - HELD THAT:- “Change of Opinion” expressly refers to the factual position and particularly, the show cause notice sent by the AO dated 26th December, 2013. In this show cause notice, the transaction of purchase and sale of shares of ‘M/S Nivyah Infrastructure and Telecom Services Ltd.’ (erstwhile ‘M/S S.V. Electricals Ltd.’) was expressly referred and inquiry was sought to be made by seeking an explanation.
The assessee replied to this letter on 6th January, 2014 and claims to have given complete details of this transaction.
Prima facie, therefore, and in the absence of any reasons set out in the affidavit in reply, we do not think that we should allow the AO to go ahead with the implementation of the impugned notice issued under Section 148 and order rejecting the objections of the assessee dated 20th August, 2018. Hence, there will be an adinterim order in terms of prayer clause (d) of the Writ Petition.
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2018 (10) TMI 1757
Penalty u/s. 271AAA - admit, specify and substantiate the undisclosed income - HELD THAT:- In vigilant and careful reading and analysis of the questions posed to Shri Jerambhai Patel by the statement recording authority, it is clear that there was no occasion for Shri Jerambhai Patel to state and make averments in the exact format as stipulated and required under clauses (i) & (ii) of sub s. (2) of s. 271AAA of the Act and in this scenario and considering the environment in which statement u/s. 132(4) of the Act is recorded it is not practically possible and correct to expect from the assessee, whether educated or uneducated, to specify and to point out the facts complying with the requirement of conditions stipulated in the clauses (i) & (ii) of sub s. (2) of s. 271AAA
We reach to a logical conclusion that the ld. CIT(A) was right in granting relief to the assessee by following ratio of the decision of Mahendra C. Shah [2008 (2) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] which has been referred by Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in its subsequent judgments in the cases of PCIT v. Emirates Technologies Pvt. ltd. [2017 (8) TMI 387 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and PCIT vs. Swapna Enterprises [2018 (2) TMI 57 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT]
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2018 (10) TMI 1756
Lawful Trustees/Board of Trustees of the Public Trust or not - Whether the proceedings before the learned Single Judge was initiated in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the proceedings in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?
HELD THAT:- The true nature and substance of the order of the learned Single Judge was to exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There is no indication of the Court having exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such. Indeed, the learned Single Judge has opined in the judgment by fairly noting the fact that the writ petition filed by the respondent was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge in the entire order reiterating the pleadings, issues and both oral and documentary evidence adjudicated before the learned District Judge has proceeded to pass the impugned order which clearly depicts that the learned Single Judge has exercised the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
It is clear that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the present appeal filed under Section 4 of the High Court Act, is not maintainable.
The writ appeal filed under the provisions of Section 4 of the High Court Act, against the order passed by the learned Single Judge exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable - Appeal dismissed.
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2018 (10) TMI 1755
Refund of service tax - refund rejected on the ground that the appellant has not paid service tax with the Service Tax Department - HELD THAT:- The issue has already been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in terms of Section 11(B) of the Act, a person who has suffered the duty can get the refund.
Admittedly, the appellant has borned the service tax paid by the contractor, therefore in terms of Section 11B of the Act, the appellant is entitle to claim the refund of service tax paid by the contractor.
Thus, the appellant is entitled to claim the refund of service tax paid by them to the contractor who in turn paid to the department - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2018 (10) TMI 1754
Taxability of the interest received on enhanced compensation u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - income from other sources - year of taxability of the interest income - assessee treated the interest on the enhanced compensation as part of the compensation liable to be taxed under section 45(5) of the income Tax Act and the transferred land being rural agricultural land exempt from capital Gains tax u/s 10(37) - enhanced compensation alongwith interest thereupon u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was received by the assessee - assessee treated the interest on the enhanced compensation as part of the compensation liable to be taxed under section 45(5) of the income and the transferred land being rural agricultural land exempt from capital Gains tax u/s 10(37) - HELD THAT:- As decided in Manjeet Singh(HUF) [2015 (12) TMI 1123 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] which had dealt with the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ghanshyam, HUF [2009 (7) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT] holding the same to be in the nature of compensation taxable as such.
The law of the land and has to be followed by all lower authorities. In view of the above, we hold that the interest received by the assessee during the impugned year on the compulsory acquisition of its land u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, is in the nature of compensation and not interest which is taxable under the head income from other sources u/s 56 of the Act as held by the authorities below. The compensation being exempt u/s 10(37) of the Act is not disputed. In view of the same the order passed by the CIT(Appeals) upholding the addition made by the AO on account of interest on enhanced compensation is, not sustainable - Decided in favour of assessee
Revision u/s 263 - Since the adjudication relied on the judgments of the highest Court of the Country and also the judgments of jurisdictional High Courts the the action proposed by the CIT(Panchkula) under Section 263 is hereby quashed as at this juncture the order of the Assessing Officer cannot be termed as erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
Regarding the taxes already paid no directions are being passed with reference to the issue of refund to the assessee. The Revenue may consider for appropriate relief in accordance with the provisions of Income Tax Act,1961 on receipt of application from the assessee in this regard.
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2018 (10) TMI 1753
Maintainability of petition - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor defaulted in making repayment - existence of dispute or not - section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 r/w rule 4 of Insolvency & Bankruptcy (Application to "Adjudicating Authority") Rules, 2016 - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal observes that there are disputes between the petitioners and the Respondent and there are proceedings against them in various forums in matters relating to the present petition - the Tribunal observes that, in the statements of accounts, the M/S. Colorhomes, the sole proprietorship concern and M/S. Colorhome Developers Pvt Ltd, the Respondent herein is used interchangeably. There is no segregation of the amounts paid by both the undertakings from which the liability can be drawn clearly.
The Tribunal observes that the petition is liable to be dismissed under Section 5(6) and Section 5(6)(a) of the IBC, 2016 as there is a civil suit pending and there exists a dispute in the amount of debt between both the parties and also under section 7(5)(b) of the IBC, 2016 for being incomplete in details.
Petition dismissed.
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2018 (10) TMI 1752
TP Adjustment - adjustment to ALP of AMP expenditure - selection of comparables for determination of ALP of AMP expenditure - Entire AMP expenditure has been incurred and paid only to third parties and not to AEs - assessee pleaded that the same had been incurred for the purpose of its business and for its products and hence the same are not eligible to be compensated by the AEs.
HELD THAT:- We find that the revenue had only assumed that the assessee had promoted the brand of the AE by incurring AMP expenditure in India thereby warranting any compensation. In this regard, we find lot of force in the arguments of the ld AR that the assessee had not paid any royalty or trademark fee to its AEs and had been benefitted by the excess premium return in the sale price of goods. The AMP expenditure is duly factored into the said pricing fixed by the AEs. In the instant case, we find that the international transactions with AEs of purchase of raw materials, purchase of finished goods, sale of finished goods and recovery of expenses have been duly accepted to be at Arm’s Length. Then the AMP expenditure also is required to be accepted at Arm’s length as it is already factored in the pricing.
We also find that the ld TPO and ld DRP had sought to include the selling expenses incurred in SLE REPS PROMO – PRINT and EDUINFOSPEAKER HO/ as part of AMP expenditure and the same has been included to bench mark the ALP of AMP expenditure.
In this regard, we find that these expenditures are purely related to products of the assessee and not for any brand. We also find that the assessee while incurring the total expenditure towards AMP and Selling Expenses, had duly bifurcated the same by identifying at the time of incurrence itself whether the said expenditure constitutes AMP expenditure or Selling Expenses. This bifurcation of expenditure had been ignored by the revenue in the instant case. We find that if these two items are excluded, then the AMP expenditure incurred by the assessee is at Arm’s length even after the mark up of 5%. Hence no separate discussion is required herein with regard to the validity of mark up of 5%. Hence in any case, there cannot be any adjustment to ALP of AMP expenditure in the instant case.
Addition on account of ‘Scientific Session Charges’ - HELD THAT:- In the draft assessment order, the ld AO had proposed the disallowance of entire scientific session charges and journals as not incurred for the purpose of business and whereas the ld DRP held that the expenditure is for the purpose of business. AO in the final assessment order pursuant to the directions of the ld DRP, changed his stand and observed that part of the expenditure does not relate to the year under consideration. Hence it could be seen that there is a shift in stand by the ld AO and the assessee was not given any opportunity to make its submissions in this regard. In these facts and circumstances, we deem it fit and appropriate, to remand this issue to the file of ld AO for verification of the same as to whether the said expenditure was claimed as deduction in Asst Year 2011-12 by the assessee. If it is found to have been claimed, then the assessee should not be given deduction in Asst Year 2012-13. If not, then the assessee should be granted deduction for the same as there is no change in tax rates in both the years and incurrence of the said expenditure for the purpose of business is not in dispute.
Addition under the head ‘Finance cost’ towards ‘Interest on Service Tax’ - HELD THAT:- We find that the Service Tax Provisions as amended by Finance Act 2012 contains Section 75 and Section 76 thereon. The interest is charged on the assessee for delayed payment of service tax as per section 75 thereon. The penalty is charged on the assessee under section 76 thereon for failure to pay service tax, interest under section 75 thereon. We find that the amount under dispute in the sum of ₹ 1,257/- represents interest paid under section 75 of the Act which is purely compensatory in nature and hence allowable as deduction. It is not penalty paid under section 76 of the service Tax Rules so as to make it penal in nature.
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2018 (10) TMI 1751
Addition u/s 14A r.w.r 8D - HELD THAT:- There is no whisper about rejection of assessee’s contention of expenses disallowed suo moto in relation to earning of exempt income. Hence, according to us there is no satisfaction recorded by the AO for rejection of the assessee’s disallowance and accordingly, we delete the disallowance.
Disallowance of expenses relatable to exempt income under section 14A while computing the book profit under section 115JB - HELD THAT:- Tribunal in the case of Vireet Investments (P.) Ltd. [2017 (6) TMI 1124 - ITAT DELHI] wherein the Tribunal has clearly held that no disallowance under section 14A of the Act r.w.r 8D of the Rules can be made while computing book profit under section 115JB of the Act. The learned Sr. DR could not controvert the above proposition. Accordingly, we are of the view that this issue is covered by the special bench decision of this Tribunal in the case of Vireet Investments (P.) Ltd. (supra). Respectfully following the same, we delete the disallowance and allow this issue of assessee’s appeal.
Depreciation on computer accessories and printers at 60% - BSES YAMUNA POWERS LLD. / BSES RAJDHANI POWERS LTD. [2010 (8) TMI 58 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Interest receipt are business income because the assessee, for a very short period investing in FD’s and Mutual Funds and earned interest income which is incidental
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