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Showing 281 to 300 of 1054 Records
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2011 (2) TMI 1355
Issues:
Delay in filing appeals, condonation of delay, shortage of Cenvat credit availed inputs, waiver of pre-deposit of balance amounts of interest and penalty.
Delay in Filing Appeals - Condonation of Delay:
The judgment addresses the issue of condonation of delay in filing appeals by the assessee. The delay of 160 days was explained by the deponent in the affidavit as being due to family disputes, which led to the appeals being filed only after the factory was taken over. The Tribunal considered the reasons provided and found that the applicants had made out a case for condoning the delay. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the delay and accepted the appeals and stay petitions for record.
Shortage of Cenvat Credit Availed Inputs:
The judgment discusses the issue of shortage of Cenvat credit availed inputs. The responsible officers of the company admitted the shortage, and legal submissions by the counsel were to be considered at the final disposal of the appeals. The Tribunal noted that the applicants did not establish a prima facie case for complete waiver of the amounts adjudged by the adjudicating authority. The appellant was directed to deposit the balance amount of duty adjudged within 8 weeks, with compliance to be reported by a specified date. Upon compliance, the applications for waiver of pre-deposit of balance amounts of interest and penalty were granted, and recovery stayed until the disposal of the appeals. Non-compliance would result in dismissal of both appeals without further notice.
This comprehensive analysis of the judgment covers the issues of delay in filing appeals, condonation of delay, shortage of Cenvat credit availed inputs, and waiver of pre-deposit of balance amounts of interest and penalty, providing a detailed overview of the Tribunal's decision and reasoning for each issue.
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2011 (2) TMI 1354
Issues involved: Confiscation of undeclared diesel, amendment of Import General Manifest (IGM), confiscation of vessel, imposition of fines and penalties.
Confiscation of undeclared diesel:
The vessel arrived at the port with excess diesel not declared in the IGM. The Tindel admitted to the excess quantity, leading to seizure and subsequent provisional release for export purposes. The appellant argued that the amendment of the IGM indicated no offense was committed, citing Customs Act provisions and a Calcutta High Court decision. However, the Commissioner found the amendment necessary for export facilitation and did not negate the offense. The Tindel's detailed statement on diesel usage contradicted claims of illiteracy, and the discrepancy in declared quantity supported the department's case. The Tribunal upheld the confiscation of the diesel and vessel, along with imposed fines and penalties.
Amendment of IGM and Confiscation of Vessel:
The appellant contended that the Tindel's illiteracy led to the diesel misdeclaration in the IGM. However, the Tribunal found no evidence supporting the illiteracy claim and upheld the confiscation of the vessel and diesel. The owner's involvement in diesel loading indicated awareness, contradicting claims of ignorance. The Customs Act provision regarding conveyance use in smuggling supported the vessel's confiscation, as the owner failed to prove lack of knowledge. The fine imposed on the vessel was deemed nominal considering its value and the diesel quantity involved.
Penalties Imposed:
The Tindel's penalty was upheld due to his awareness of the excess diesel. The owner's penalty was also sustained, as her involvement in the vessel's operations indicated knowledge of the misdeclaration. The Tribunal rejected the appeal, except for setting aside the fine related to 5000 liters of diesel confiscation under Section 119 of the Customs Act.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal upheld the impugned order, rejecting the appeal except for the fine related to 5000 liters of diesel confiscation. The judgment highlighted the importance of accurate declarations in the IGM, knowledge of vessel operations by the owner, and penalties for non-compliance with customs regulations.
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2011 (2) TMI 1353
The appeal was filed against an administrative letter dated 1-9-2003 by the Commissioner of Central Excise. The Tribunal found the letter to be a clarification sought by the assessee and not an order-in-original, so the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.
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2011 (2) TMI 1352
Issues:
1. Dispute over compensation for land acquisition at Sanguem, Goa.
2. Dispute regarding apportionment of compensation.
3. Liability of the State to pay interest on compensation.
4. Interpretation of Sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The dispute arose from a notification for land acquisition for a sports complex in Goa. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation at Rs. 45 per sq. meter. The landowners filed reference petitions, leading to an award upholding the compensation rate, along with additional benefits totaling Rs. 8,80,372. Funds were released by the Director of Sports and Youth Affairs for payment. After the death of a claimant, a dispute arose regarding the distribution of compensation among legal representatives.
2. The issue of apportionment of compensation was raised during an execution application. The District Judge directed payment to certain claimants, leading to the issuance of fresh cheques. A subsequent order highlighted a dispute over apportionment, citing the liability of the respondents to pay interest until the amount was deposited in court. The judgment referenced the case of Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd., emphasizing the need for interest payment until the compensation was deposited in court.
3. The High Court considered the State's liability to pay interest on compensation. The respondents argued that they had tendered the amount to claimants directly, while the appellants contended that interest could only be paid in court as per the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court set aside the District Court's order, stating that the amount was paid to the appellants but remained uncollected. The appellants challenged this decision, leading to the present appeal.
4. The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the CPC. Referring to the case of Prem Nath Kapur, the Court emphasized that interest must be deposited in court, rejecting the argument that the State could directly pay claimants. The Court held that the State's failure to deposit the amount in court and utilizing it was contrary to the Act. The judgment of the High Court was deemed erroneous, and interest was ordered to be paid to the parties as per the District Judge's order.
Overall, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing the requirement for interest to be deposited in court as per the Land Acquisition Act, setting aside the High Court's decision and ordering interest payment within a specified period.
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2011 (2) TMI 1351
Deduction u/s 080 HHC - inclusion of sales-tax and excise duty - HELD THAT:- section 145A as such will not affect the working of profits of business and, therefore, sales-tax, excise duty if not included by the assessee in its accounting method cannot be forced to be included for computing deduction under section 080 HHC. Therefore, the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in Laxmi Machine Works [2007 (4) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT] would be applicable even in Asst. Years subsequent to Asst. Year 1999-2000 onwards. As a result, this ground of assessee is allowed.
Deduction u/s 080 HHC - inclusion of service charges in the total turnover - HELD THAT:- services charges would be excluded from the total turnover. following the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Nahar Export Ltd. [2008 (3) TMI 697 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT]. we decide the issue in favour of the assessee. As a result, this ground of assessee is allowed.
Deduction u/s 080 HHC - on sale of scrap - HELD THAT:- Relying on the decision in CIT vs. Ashok Leyland Ltd.[2007 (2) TMI 151 - HIGH COURT, MADRAS] held that if scrap has formed part of gross receipts of the assessee and it is coming out of manufacturing process and profit therefrom is included in the trading cum manufacturing account then scrap would form part of turnover. Accordingly, this issue is decided against the assessee. This ground of assessee is rejected.
Exclusion of 90% of sale and scrap - deduction u/s 080 HHC - HELD THAT:- Here in the present case the scrap is business income generated from manufacturing activities and is, therefore, part of business profit but as it is not akin to commission, brokerage, interest, rent etc. any part thereof cannot be excluded from the business profit. Therefore, this ground of assessee is rejected.
HELD THAT:- Once interest income is treated as income from other sources, therefore, excluded 90% thereof as per explanation (baa) to section 80 HHC would not arise. Accordingly, this ground of assessee is also rejected.
challenged the computation of assessed income as a whole - HELD THAT:- The only argument of the ld. AR which requires consideration is that wherever additions are sustained then they should be taken into account while computing business profit for the purpose of deduction u/s 80 HHC. We agree with the above submission and direct the AO to recomputed the deduction u/s 80 HHC by considering the additions sustained in appeal while computing business profits. This ground is disposed of accordingly.
charging of interest u/s 234D - HELD THAT:- It laid down the proposition that if the amount refunded u/s143 exceeds the amount refundable on regular assessment then assessee would pay simple interest at the prescribed rate on the whole or excess amount so refunded. This provision of charging of interest will apply to all cases of refund granted but interest could be levied only w.e.f. 1.6.2003.As a result this ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.
claim of bad debts - HELD THAT:- In our considered view there is no case for interference in the order of ld. CIT(A). It is admitted position that assessee has actually written off the amounts. Once it is so then matter is squarely covered by the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of TRF Ltd. vs. CIT [2010 (2) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it is held that w.e.f. 1.4.1989 in order to obtain a deduction in relation to bad debts it is not necessary for the assessee to establish that the debt in fact has become irrecoverable. It is enough if the bad debt is written off and the bad debt is irrecoverable in the account of assessee. Following the decision, we confirm the order of ld. CIT(A) and dismiss this ground of Revenue.
acquisition of computer software - intangible asset - claim of depreciation - disallowance of software expenses - claimed as revenue expenditure - HELD THAT:- Once it is found that the system software are integral part to the computer hardware system then they will also be entitled for same rate of depreciation as computer hardware. Since no specific rate is prescribed in the rule for computer software they have to be held as part of computer system and hence they are eligible for same rate of depreciation. We accordingly allow depreciation @ 60% on system software also as claimed by the assessee. So far as claim of ₹ 5,08,728/- is concerned the AO has not shown that they are system software but in fact they are only application software. The assessee does not get any right over them. They are to be modified from time to time, what assessee gets is licence to use them and they are not integral to computer system. Accordingly they are revenue expenditure and has to be allowed. Similar view has been taken in CIT vs. Varinder Agro Chemicals Ltd.[2008 (10) TMI 100 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT]. Therefore,we allow the claim of the assessee that application software is Revenue in nature and expenditure thereon is deductible.
disallowance proportionate interest - HELD THAT:- In the present case we notice that loan funds have decreased this year as compared to earlier years. Even though investments have increased from ₹ 940.32 lacs to ₹ 1008.51 lacs but such increase in investment cannot be linked to any borrowed funds this year as assessee has in fact not borrowed any additional fund this year. Since assessee had sufficient profits generated this year and it had mixed funds and no nexus is established by the AO as to whether investment was made out of interest bearing funds, disallowance of interest cannot be made. Similarly no disallowance out of administrative expenditure can be made as there is no direct nexus. As a result, this ground is allowed.
disallowance of claim of accrued interest - HELD THAT:- the AO's action is legally correct in disallowing the claim of the assessee in this regard. In the case of CIT vs. Ashwin Vanaspati Industrial [2005 (3) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], held that "Disputed liability towards damages claimed by customer from assessee for the latter's failure to supply part of the contracted goods which was pending for adjudication before the sole arbitrator and was not discharged during the relevant year was not allowable as deduction." Since the facts of the case under consideration are identical and both the lower authorities have followed their earlier orders. In view of that we find that the ITAT has decided the issue in favour of the revenue. In view of that, we also set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore that of the AO. we decide the issue in favour of the Revenue.
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2011 (2) TMI 1350
Issues:
1. Application of Section 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.
2. Burden of proof regarding the culpable mental state of the accused.
3. Presumption of knowledge in cases involving transportation of narcotics.
4. Validity of the judgment based on lack of evidence against the appellant.
Analysis:
1. The judgment revolves around the application of Section 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, which deals with the presumption of culpable mental state in cases requiring such proof. The appellant was charged under Sections 15 and 25 of the Act based on his alleged involvement as a co-owner of a truck used for smuggling poppy husk. The High Court had drawn a presumption against the appellant under Section 35 due to discrepancies in his residential address, which was deemed as evidence of his culpability.
2. The defense argued that there was no concrete evidence linking the appellant to the smuggling operation other than his association with the truck and the incorrect address provided during the truck's purchase. The defense contended that the prosecution failed to establish the appellant's knowledge or involvement in the illegal activity, which are essential elements for the application of Section 25 of the Act.
3. The Supreme Court analyzed the burden of proof regarding the appellant's culpable mental state in light of the presumption under Section 35. The Court emphasized that the prosecution must first prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had knowledge of the illegal use of the vehicle for transporting narcotics. Without concrete evidence demonstrating the appellant's awareness or complicity in the smuggling operation, the presumption under Section 35 cannot be invoked.
4. Ultimately, the Court found that the prosecution's case against the appellant lacked substantial evidence to prove his culpable mental state or active participation in the smuggling activity. The Court highlighted that the mere discrepancy in the appellant's residential address was insufficient to establish his knowledge or intention regarding the illegal use of the truck. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturned the lower courts' judgments, and acquitted the appellant due to the lack of evidence linking him to the offense. The appellant's bail bonds were discharged as a result of the acquittal.
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2011 (2) TMI 1349
Issues:
1. Appeal seeking reference of substantial questions of law regarding job charges under Section 40A(2)(b).
2. Appeal seeking reference of substantial questions of law regarding disallowance of hire charges paid to Blue Blend Finance Limited.
Analysis:
1. The first issue revolves around the Appellate Tribunal reversing the order passed by the CIT [Appeals] and deleting job charges under Section 40A(2)(b). The Tribunal's decision was based on the previous year's decision, which the Revenue argued was not applicable due to different facts. However, the assessee claimed that the issue in both years arose from identical facts, with limited benefits claimed in the present year. The High Court found that while the Tribunal erred in referring to the previous year's order, the issue was common in both years, and the material was substantially similar. The CIT [A] and Tribunal had previously ruled in favor of the Assessee in the earlier year, and considering the totality of the facts, the High Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose, leading to the dismissal of the Tax Appeal.
2. The second issue pertains to the Appellate Tribunal reversing the order passed by the CIT [Appeals] and deleting the disallowance of hire charges paid to Blue Blend Finance Limited. The Revenue pointed out that the issue had been remanded to the Assessing Officer, and since the Tribunal's decision only resulted in a remand, the High Court saw no reason to interfere. Therefore, the High Court did not find any grounds to question the Tribunal's decision on this issue, leading to the dismissal of the Tax Appeal.
In summary, the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal seeking reference of substantial questions of law on both issues related to job charges under Section 40A(2)(b) and disallowance of hire charges paid to Blue Blend Finance Limited, based on detailed analysis and findings regarding the facts and previous rulings in the case.
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2011 (2) TMI 1348
Issues involved: Petition for writ of mandamus to reconsider assessment orders for specific years, legality of assessment orders, limitation for reassessment, double taxation grievance.
Reconsideration of Assessment Orders: The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to reconsider assessment orders for the years 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, and 2003-2004. The petitioner argued that previous court directions had quashed an assessment order and instructed a re-do of the assessment due to the similarity between rice bran and rice bran oil. The petitioner contended that the commodity had been mechanically subjected to tax without proper consideration, which was deemed illegal.
Limitation for Reassessment: The Government Pleader raised the issue of limitation, stating that the petitioner's request for rectification of the order from 1998 was beyond the prescribed time limit. However, the petitioner argued that the reassessment had not been adequately conducted, and their repeated pleas for reconsideration fell within the prescribed limitation period.
Double Taxation Grievance: The petitioner highlighted the grievance of double taxation on the product, emphasizing that the respondent-authority had not properly considered this aspect before passing the impugned order and initiating recovery proceedings. This action was deemed to be legally flawed.
Judgment: The petitions were allowed, directing the petitioner to approach the respondent-authority for reassessment. The respondent authority was instructed to entertain the appeal after condoning the delay and to pass orders within one month in accordance with the law. The Government Pleader was granted four weeks to file a memo of appearance.
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2011 (2) TMI 1347
Exemption of Central Excise duty under Notification No. 63/95-C.E., dated 16-3-1995 - notification exempts the goods when they are supplied directly to the Ministry of Defence by the companies named therein and in the notification, the appellant’s name was not included in the names of the companies.
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2011 (2) TMI 1346
Issues: Challenge to CESTAT Final Order on the determination of the applicable rate of duty for customs assessment.
Analysis:
The Madras High Court rejected the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Customs (Imports) against the CESTAT Final Order 407/2009, dated 8-4-2009, which was reported in 2009 (241) E.L.T. 280 (Tri. - Chennai). The Court, comprising Mr. Justice F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and Mr. Justice N. Kirubakaran, examined the issue raised by the appellant regarding the determination of the rate of duty applicable to a case. The respondent imported goods on 28-10-1992, sold them on 18-1-1993 while in the Customs Bonded Warehouse, and cleared them on 2-9-1994. The appellant argued that the duty rate should be as of the expiry of the bonding period, whereas the respondent asserted it should be as of the actual removal date from the warehouse. The Tribunal, applying Section 68 of the Customs Act, held that the duty rate applicable in such cases is the one in force on the date of actual removal from the warehouse, not the expiry of the warehousing period.
The Court analyzed the statutory provision under Section 130-E(b) of the Customs Act, which deals with the jurisdiction of the Court to examine questions related to the rate of duty or goods' value for assessment. The appellant contended that the issue was not about the rate of duty but the date of removal from the bonded warehouse. However, considering the facts and the Tribunal's conclusion, the Court determined that the issue indeed primarily concerned the applicable rate of duty. Consequently, the Court held that the remedy available to the appellant was not before them, as the issue fell within the purview of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, as per Section 130-E(b) of the Customs Act.
Therefore, in light of the statutory provisions, the Court sustained the preliminary objection raised by the respondent and rejected the appeal. The Court concluded that the appeal could not be entertained based on the jurisdictional limitations specified under Section 130-E(b) of the Customs Act. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with no costs, and the connected Miscellaneous Petition was closed.
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2011 (2) TMI 1345
Whether the Tribunal is correct in extending Modvat credit under Rule 57Q on capital goods used outside the factory of the manufacturer which is an unregistered premises, ignoring the stipulation under Rule 57S(1)(i) that the capital goods should be used within the factory of manufacture of final product and ordering refund of duty paid at the time of removal of capital goods from their factory?
Held that:- The salient points noted in the report of the Commissioner established beyond doubt that the capital goods were used in the factory of the respondent for the purpose of manufacture of final products. When the above said conclusion was inevitable, as held by the Tribunal, the respondent was entitled to avail Modvat credit duty paid on the capital goods concerned. Consequently, the order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted. The question of law is therefore, answered in the negative and the appeal stands dismissed
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2011 (2) TMI 1344
Whether penalty imposed under Rule 96ZQ(3) of erstwhile Central Excise Rules, 1944, can be reduced where a mandatory penalty equal to the duty is stipulated as per law?
Held that:- The controversy involved in the present case is no longer res integra inasmuch as, the same stands concluded by the decision in the case of Union of India v. Dharamendra Textiles Processors and Others (2008 (9) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT), holding the levy of penalty under Rules 96ZQ and 96ZO of the Rules is mandatory, and that the plea that Rules 96ZQ and 96ZO have a concept of discretion inbuilt cannot be sustained, thus the Tribunal was not justified in reducing the penalty to ₹ 5,000/-. Appeal allowed.
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2011 (2) TMI 1343
Central excise registration denied - Held that:- In case the Central Excise authorities were prevented from proceeding further pursuant to the attachment by any other reason, viz., by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction staying further proceedings, etc., the matter would stand on a different footing. But properties cannot be simply attached for years together without taking any further action. More so, in a case like the present one, where the Central Excise have permitted third party interests to be created. In the circumstances, the respondent No.1 was not justified in refusing to grant registration to the petitioners on the ground of attachment made under section 142 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Merely because the defaulter unit, though it had ceased to carry on business on the premises in question, had failed to apply for de-registration, the same should not, in any manner, come in the way of the petitioners in obtaining central excise registration in respect of the premises in question. The stand adopted by the respondent authority that in respect of the same premises, two persons cannot be registered being contrary to the provisions of law, cannot be accepted.
Grounds for refusing to grant registration to the petitioners under section 6 of the Central Excise Act are held to be invalid. The petition, therefore, succeeds. The respondent No.1 shall consider the application dated 04th May, 2010 made by the petitioner No.1 company for registration under rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made hereinabove. Appeal allowed.
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2011 (2) TMI 1342
Imposition of penalty under Section 16(9) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 - Held that:- It is an admitted position that even before the Assessing Officer could do the assessment proceeding for the period in question, the Petitioner had deposited the entire admitted amount of tax. There is no finding in the order of the Assessing Authority that the delay in deposit of the tax by the Petitioner could be attributable to any deliberate, wilful or contumacious conduct of the Petitioner. A mere delay in deposit of tax in given circumstances cannot be an item of suspicion that it was backed by a deliberate intention of the Assessee to avoid tax. The accompanying circumstances governing the present case does not in the least comes within such category of cases. The reasons attributed by the Assessing Authority for imposition of penalty as also noted in this judgment, do not satisfy the pre-requisites to the imposition of penalty as envisaged under the provisions of Section 16(9) of the Act of 1981 and/or in the judgment of this Court and the Supreme Court on the issue.
Thus imposition of penalty is quashed and set aside. Any deposit made by the Petitioner in pursuance of the order(s) aforesaid shall be refunded and/or adjusted towards the current/future liability of the Petitioner
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2011 (2) TMI 1341
When the statute imposes the liability to pay purchase tax by the assessee, whether the assessee is entitled to levy and collect sales tax on the ground that he has not paid the purchase tax and whether it contravenes section 18 of the Act?
Held that:- The observation of the Tribunal that the law does not prohibit any person from collecting the tax from the customers even if the same is to be paid at the point of purchase is contrary to the aforesaid statutory provisions. Similarly, the observation that though he was liable to pay tax at the stage of purchase and he has paid tax at the stage of sale and therefore there is no contravention, also runs counter to the aforesaid statutory provisions. Therefore the error committed by the Tribunal is patently illegal and cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal is hereby set aside. Hence, Revision is allowed.
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2011 (2) TMI 1340
Cancellation of VAT registration granted earlier to the petitioner - Held that:- The statutory prescription of section 19(2) of the Act is that the dealer should first be put on notice, be given an opportunity of being heard, and only thereafter is the prescribed authority entitled to cancel registration, that too only if he is satisfied that there are good and sufficient reasons to do so. Admittedly, the show-cause notice dated May 19, 2010 was not even served on the petitioner before the certificate of registration was cancelled. As the petitioner was neither put on notice nor given an opportunity of being heard, the impugned order of cancellation of registration dated July 26, 2010 falls foul of the statutory requirement of section 19(2) of the Act and is therefore, quashed.
We have taken a lenient view considering the fact that the first respondent is more than 57 years of age, and she is on the verge of retirement from service. For her attempts to show the petitioner in poor light, only with a view to escape blame for her illegal acts, we consider it appropriate to impose exemplary costs quantified as ₹ 5,000 which the first respondent shall pay from her pocket to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today. Writ petition is allowed with exemplary costs
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2011 (2) TMI 1339
Denial of benefit of reduced rate of CST - Held that:- It is not disputed that rate of tax applicable at the relevant time was one per cent, as stated by the respondent. There was no requirement to produce declaration form C, as held by the Tribunal. In these circumstances, the respondent could not be denied the benefit of reduced rate as notified by the State Government. No substantial question of law arises. The appeals are dismissed.
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2011 (2) TMI 1338
Assessment of taxes on aluminium plain sheet at eight per cent as unclassified item instead of four per cent tax as already deposited by the petitioners-assessee treating the same to be covered by entry 45(b) of the Second Schedule
Held that:- aving regard to the successive notification prescribing the situs of aluminium plain sheets and in absence of any overwhelming evidence that the same on the basis of the inputs available can be decisively held to be a finished product emanating from the primary metal aluminium, this court is of the view that for the intervening period February 1, 2000 to February 18, 2002 it ought to be regarded as included in entry 45(b) of Schedule II and taxable at four per cent.
Following the decision rendered by this court in Steel Stores [2010 (6) TMI 720 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT] the impugned assessment order dated December 28, 2003 (annexure I to the writ petition) and the impugned demand notice dated February 17, 2003 (annexure J to the writ petition) issued by the Revenue, Senior Superintendent of Taxes, Unit A, Guwahati, respondent No. 2, are hereby set aside and quashed. In favour of assessee.
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2011 (2) TMI 1337
Input-tax credit disallowed - whether in the absence of the allocation of the area by issue of a direction under section 61(1) of the Act, the revisional authority had no jurisdiction to make the reassessment?
Whether in the absence of any fresh evidence being available, the question of passing a second reassessment order as contemplated under section 39(2) of the Act is without jurisdiction
Held that:- The learned counsel for the State has produced before the court, the order passed by the Commissioner bearing No. 4: 2005-06 dated June 7, 2005 where under the Act, the various courts have been re-designated and also their jurisdiction has been redefined. In view of the aforesaid Government orders, we do not see any substance in the first contention.
In so far as the second contention as the order discloses the main grounds on which the input tax have been disallowed is the documents on which reliance is placed do not indicate payment of tax or the genuineness of the document is doubtful and the assessing authority has not properly applied his mind. All these may be a good ground to set aside the assessment order. But after setting aside the order as the matter was remitted back to the assessing authority on other aspects, the revisional authority should have directed the assessing authority to reappreciate the material on record in this regard also and pass appropriate orders. Therefore to that extent probably the order passed by the revisional authority cannot be sustained. Appeal partly allowed.
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2011 (2) TMI 1336
Benefit of tax concession of ₹ 888.15 lacs given to the petitioner under rule 28C of the Rules has been cancelled on the ground that the petitioner did not have the requisite registration with the Department of Industries, which was a condition precedent for grant of benefit by treating the unit to be "unit in pipeline"
Held that:- Cancellation of tax concession was not justified. In any case, the HLSC was required to reconsider the matter in the light of stand of the Central Government that the petitioner had applied to the SIA prior to April 30, 2000.
Learned counsel for the State of Haryana fairly states that the matter may have to be reconsidered. Thus , we set aside the impugned order dated June 7, 2007 and remand the matter to the Higher Level Screening Committee for passing a fresh order in accordance with law.
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