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Showing 281 to 300 of 1471 Records
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2021 (3) TMI 1191
Exemption u/s 11 - cancellation of registration under section 12AA(3)/(4) - effective date of cancellation of registration - Authority to cancel the registration under section 12AA(3)/(4) - Whether power of cancellation of registration vests in the authority who has the jurisdiction to grant registration? - Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax-17 cancelling the registration of the Appellant - HELD THAT:- Commissioner had the duty, much more than the power, to cancel the registration under section 12A upon the fact of admitted violation of section 13(1) coming to his notice, and that such cancellation had to effective from the date on which the disability for exemption under section 11 is attracted (which is not ascertained on the facts of this case), the date of this fact coming to the notice of the Commissioner (i.e.11th March 2015), from the date on which the first show-cause notice was issued (i.e. 13th March 2015), or,at the minimum, from the date on which hearing in this regard was concluded and the order thereon was reserved (i.e. 20th March 2015).
We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate bench in the case of Navajbai Ratan Tata Trust vs PCIT[2021 (3) TMI 1146 - ITAT MUMBAI]. These observations will apply mutatis mutandis in the present case as well. Respectfully following the same, we hold that the impugned order cancelling registration granted to the assessee trust will have effect from the date on which hearing, on the first show cause notice requiring the assessee to show cause as to why registration under section 12A not be cancelled, and the assessee formally acquiesced to the said notice 10.03.2015, i.e on 20th March 2015.
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2021 (3) TMI 1190
Valuation of imported goods - Laptops - rejection of declared value - value rejected merely based on NIDB data - HELD THAT:- It clearly transpires that not only is the order passed by the adjudicating authority a very cryptic order but even otherwise opportunity was not provided to the appellant to file a detailed reply. The appellant had expressed inability to file a detailed reply because the documents, on the basis of which the declared value indicated in the 14 bills of entry was rejected, was not provided.
It is, therefore, a fit care case which should be recommended to the adjudicating authority for passing a fresh order. The relevant documents shall be provided to the appellant within three weeks from today. The appellant shall file a reply within three weeks thereafter and the adjudicating authority shall pass a reasoned order within three weeks thereafter - Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2021 (3) TMI 1189
Unexplained deposits in bank accounts - HELD THAT:- The addition was sustained by the ld. CIT(A) for the reason that compliance was not made during the original assessment proceedings and at remand stage. This cannot be a ground of making addition for the reasons that the Assessing Officer had made the addition on the ground that the deposits in bank accounts are not explained. Without a copy of the bank account, the Assessing Officer cannot come to a conclusion that the deposits made in a bank account are unexplained. All details including copies of bank accounts were furnished by the assessee.
The evidence given by the assessee is not disputed by the revenue. The addition was confirmed in a summary manner, without reference to the facts. In view of the above discussion and finding of the Assessing Officer in the remand report extracted above, the addition in question, is hereby deleted.
Disallowance of commission and development charges - HELD THAT:- When the land is converted into plots by laying roads, building drains, developing common areas etc., as per the norms of the Urban Development Authority, and when plots are sold only after such development expenditure is bound to be incurred. It cannot be said that dry land of 10.69 acres can be sub-divided into house plots after development and sold as house plots without incurring any expenditure. The evidence in the form of development agreement dt. 15/06/2003, and payments made through account payee cheques and the fact of the development of the land into plots is sufficient evidence to prove the incurring of expenditure. Except for disbelieving the claim of the assessee, there is no adverse material collected by the assessing authorities. Confirmation letters from Shivaji Estates & Constructions by Smt. Dantuluri Gita Kumari, wherein she had stated that the amount in question was offered to tax in her Income Tax Return and confirmation letters from one Mr. U. Prabhakar Rao, on the commission of ₹ 47,400/-, received/receivable by him, support of the contentions of the assessee. Thus, we uphold the contention of the assessee and allow the claim of the assessee of having been incurred development expenditure - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2021 (3) TMI 1188
Seeking issuance of Form ‘F’ for first and second quarter - rectification of erroneous particulars were referred in column R 11.3 of Form DVAT-16 - stock transfer - HELD THAT:- The issue decided in the case of RITIKA PVT LTD VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF TRADE & TAXES & ANR. [2018 (11) TMI 1801 - DELHI HIGH COURT] where the respondents are hereby directed to release the concerned F-forms within two weeks to enable appropriate correction in the relevant quarter. The petitioner shall however, furnish the surety bond to secure the amounts.
The present writ petition is disposed of with the direction to the respondent to release Form ‘F’ to the petitioner within two weeks to enable appropriate corrections to be carried out qua the relevant quarters.
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2021 (3) TMI 1187
Suo motu revisional power - Levy of sales tax on turnover - local sales or interstate sales - the appellate authority concluded that the transaction effected by the petitioner cannot be treated as interstate sale and they are only local sales and After more than 18 months, the revisional authority issued show cause notice - HELD THAT:- The show cause notice was solely based upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Co-operative Sugars (Chittur) Ltd. [1993 (4) TMI 270 - SUPREME COURT] wherein, it was held that when the movement of goods was an incident of sale/purchase, it amounted to interstate sales/purchase. The first respondent has not mentioned in the show cause notice as to how the said decision would apply to the case of the petitioner especially when, the first appellate authority has examined the factual position and granted relief to the appellant. In the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the facts were that the appellant therein had it sugar factory in Kerala State and pursuant to a Government Order issued by the Tamil Nadu Government, specifically permitting them to open office in Coimbatore and Pollachi Taluks only with a view to and exclusively for the purpose of transporting to their factory in Kerala, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such sale was an interstate sale.
As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the facts dealt with in the said decision were peculiar and the first respondent was not justified in issuing show cause to exercise his suo motu power solely based on the said decision, which dealt with on different factual position - The first appellate authority after examining the invoices and the delivery challan, has recorded a finding of fact that a sale was completed in Tamil Nadu and any transportation, which had taken place after the sale at the instance of the buyer from Tamil Nadu to any other State, cannot bring it under the purview of interstate sale in the hands of the petitioner.
One more important aspect which has been appealed is whether the revisional authority while exercising suo motu revisional powers can order for restoration of the original assessment orders on the grounds, which were not contained therein. The answer to the said question should be against the Revenue, because in the original assessment order, there is no reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and seeking to revise the order passed by the first appellate authority by referring to a decision, which was not subject matter of the original assessment order is impermissible. The Revenue was clearly barred from directing the original assessment order to be restored on grounds, which were not contained in the original assessment order.
The first respondent could not have exercised his suo motu revisional powers to interfere with the order passed by the first appellate authority dated 20.01.1997 - Petition allowed.
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2021 (3) TMI 1186
Refund of amount paid in excess - rejection on the ground of time limitation - assessee was entitled to seek refund in the year 2006, but the assessee had chosen to seek refund only in the year 2019 - explanation B (ea) to Section 11 B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- There are no hesitations in holding that the appellant’s rightful request for refund dated 21.12.2006 which is very much on the record of the Revenue has not at all had been acted upon or rather ignored deliberately and nowhere do I find any denial by the Revenue as to its existence. Hence, I do not subscribe to the reasons given in the impugned order which has only upheld the Order-in-Original for rejecting the refund claim. I also find that the above refund claim of the appellant is very much in order, within the prescribed time and therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2021 (3) TMI 1185
Reopening of wealth tax assessment - assessee has not filed any wealth tax return as on the basis of cash in hand - HELD THAT:- As notice u/s.17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, was issued by the Assessing Officer after verification of balance-sheet filed by the assessee along with return of income pertaining to income-tax assessment, the Assessing Officer has noticed that assessee has shown cash in hand to the amount of ₹ 85 lakhs in the balance-sheet.
Assessee has neither paid wealth tax nor filed any wealth-tax return. Therefore, the Assessing Officer has reopened the wealth tax assessment after recording due reasons and obtaining necessary approval. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any infirmity in justifying the reopening of wealth-tax assessment and further on the basis of notices issued to the assessee, we consider that sufficient opportunities were provided to the assessee at the time of wealth-tax assessment. In view of the above, Ground Nos.1 to 3 of the assessee’s appeal are rejected.
Treating disclosed cash in hand as part of total wealth-tax of the assessee - At the time of wealth-tax assessment, assessee has claimed that aforesaid cash was actually represented outstanding amount as a receivable and incorrectly shown as cash in hand in the balance-sheet. In this regard, it is noticed that assessee has not shown any debtor or any other receivable to substantiate his claim that actually the cash in hand was receivable.
As gone through the paper-book filed by the assessee and noticed that assessee has failed to produce any material to authenticate his contention that the cash in hand in his account was actually receivable and pertained to the sales. In the light of above facts and circumstances, it is clear that assessee has not rendered any cogent explanation or documentary evidence to support his contention before the authorities below or before us at the time of appellate proceedings. Even the assessee has not given the basic details of list of debtors from whom the aforesaid amount was receivable. Therefore, no merit in the ground of assessee’s appeal.
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2021 (3) TMI 1184
Refusal to issue Form-C - natural gas purchased by petiitoner in the course of inter- state trade or commerce and used by it for the generation of electricity - whether after the amendment of the CST Act, the petitioner is entitled to be issued ‘C' Forms in respect of the natural gas purchased by it in the course of inter-state sales and used by it for the generation of electricity? - HELD THAT:- Considering the consistent view of nine High Courts, including dismissal of special leave petitions by different Bench of this Court, and being satisfied about the exposition on the matters in issue by the High Court of Madras vide impugned judgment and order being a possible view, we decline to interfere in these special leave petitions.
Notably, after the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court even the Union of India has chosen to act upon the said decision by issuing Office Memorandum dated 1st November, 2018 and directing all the States/Union Territories to follow the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
SLP dismissed.
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2021 (3) TMI 1183
Maintainability of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, pending adjudication in the High Court - Validity of appointment of Special Officer as Administrator over the Financial Creditor, only to hold elections - time limitation - account of the Corporate Debtor had been declared NPA on 31st March, 2013 whereas the application under Section 7 of IBC had been filed on 27th August, 2018, after almost five years and five months from the date of accrual of the cause of action - HELD THAT:- There is no rationale for the view that the proceedings initiated by a secured creditor against a borrower under the SARFAESI Act for taking possession of its secured assets, were intended to be excluded from the category of civil proceedings - Even though Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act enables a secured creditor to enforce security interest created in its favour, without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal, the SARFAESI Act does not exclude the intervention of Courts and/or Tribunals altogether.
Condonation of delay - Period of limitation under IBC - exclusion of period after the initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT:- Section 14 excludes the time spent in proceeding in a wrong forum, which is unable to entertain the proceedings for want of jurisdiction, or other such cause. Where such proceedings have ended, the outer limit to claim exclusion under Section 14 would be the date on which the proceedings ended - In the instant case, even if it is assumed that the right to sue accrued on 31.3.2013 when the account of Corporate Debtor was declared NPA, the financial creditor initiated proceedings under SARFAESI Act on 18th January 2014, that is the date on which notice under Section 13(2) was issued, proceeded with the same, and even took possession of the assets, until the entire proceedings were stayed by the High Court by its order dated 24th July 2017. The proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC were initiated on 10th July 2018 - since the proceedings in the High Court were still pending on the date of filing of the application under Section 7 of the IBC in the NCLT, the entire period after the initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act could be excluded. If the period from the date of institution of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act till the date of filing of the application under Section 7 of the IBC in the NCLT is excluded, the application in the NCLT is well within the limitation of three years. Even if the period between the date of the notice under Section 13(2) and date of the interim order of the High Court staying the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, on the prima facie ground of want of jurisdiction is excluded, the proceedings under Section 7 of IBC are still within limitation of three years.
The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be, exercising powers under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, functions as a Civil Court/Executing Court. Proceedings under the SARFAESI Act would, therefore, be deemed to be civil proceedings in a Court. Moreover, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act under Section 13(4) are appealable to the DRT under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Mr. Dave’s argument that proceedings under the SARFAESI Act would not qualify for exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, because those proceedings were not conducted in a Civil Court, cannot be sustained.
Keeping in mind the scope and ambit of proceedings under the IBC before the NCLT/NCLAT, the expression ‘Court’ in Section 14(2) would be deemed to be any forum for a civil proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act - Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not mutually exclusive. Even in a case where Section 14 does not strictly apply, the principles of Section 14 can be invoked to grant relief to an applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by purposively construing ‘sufficient cause’. It is well settled that omission to refer to the correct section of a statute does not vitiate an order. At the cost of repetition it is reiterated that delay can be condoned irrespective of whether there is any formal application, if there are sufficient materials on record disclosing sufficient cause for the delay.
The NCLAT rightly refused to stay the proceedings before the NCLT. The judgment and order of the NCLT does not warrant interference - Appeal dismissed.
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2021 (3) TMI 1182
Disallowance u/s 14A - correctness of claim of the Respondent in respect of such expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act - HELD THAT:- Issues as covered by the judgement of the coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in Joint Investments (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax [2015 (3) TMI 155 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Nature of expenditure - license fee paid to the Department of telecommunication by the assessee - revenue or capital expenditure - HELD THAT:- This issue covered by the judgement of the coordinate Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Bharti Hexacom Ltd., [2013 (12) TMI 1115 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Exemption under section 10A - whether to be computed after excluding telecommunication expenses and foreign currency expenditure from the export turnover? - HELD THAT:- Issue covered by the judgement of the Supreme Court rendered in Commissioner of Income-tax, Central - III vs. HCL Technologies Ltd. [2018 (5) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT]
Disallowance of unrealized foreign exchange loss on account of reinstatement of assets and liabilities - whether this is a notional loss and not allowable to be set off against the taxable income in view of the CBDT’s instruction no. 3 of 2010 dated 23.03.2010? - HELD THAT:- the power invested in this Court under Section 260A of the Act is to adjudicate upon the substantial question(s) of law. The revenue, having not laid an edifice concerning the purported non-fulfilment of any of the conditions, stipulated by the Supreme Court in Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. [2009 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT] cannot, for the first time, without even taking a ground in the instant appeal, argue before us that the loss which accrued to the assessee on account of the foreign currency fluctuation cannot be claimed by it as a business loss.
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2021 (3) TMI 1181
Oppression and Mismanagement - Validity of proceedings of the sixth meeting of the Board of Directors of TATA Sons Limited held on 24.10.2016 in so far as it relates to the removal of Shri Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (CPM) - seeking restoration of position of CPM as the Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited and consequently as a Director of the Tata Companies for the rest of the tenure - seeking to declare as illegal the appointment of someone else in the place of CPM as Executive Chairman - seeking restraint on Shri Ratan N. Tata (RNT) and the nominees of Tata Trust from taking any decision in advance - seeking restraint on the Company, its Board of Directors and Shareholders from exercising the power under Article 75 of the Articles of Association against the minority members except in exceptional circumstances and in the interest of the Company - seeking to declare as illegal, the decision of the Registrar of Companies for changing the status of Tata Sons Limited from being a public company into a private company - sections 241 and 242, Companies Act, 2013.
Whether the formation of opinion by the Appellate Tribunal that the company’s affairs have been or are being conducted in a manner prejudicial and oppressive to some members and that the facts otherwise justify the winding up of the company on just and equitable ground, is in tune with the well settled principles and parameters, especially in the light of the fact that the findings of NCLT on facts were not individually and specifically overturned by the Appellate Tribunal? - HELD THAT:- For invoking the just and equitable standard, the underlying principle is that the Court should be satisfied either that the partners cannot carry on together or that one of them cannot certainly carry on with the other, The advantage that the English courts have is that irretrievable breakdown of relationship is recognised as a ground for separation both in a matrimonial relationship and in commercial relationship, while it is not so in India - In the case in hand there was never and there could never have been a relationship in the nature of quasi partnership between the Tata Group and S.P. Group. S.P. Group boarded the train halfway through the journey of Tata Sons. Functional dead lock is not even pleaded nor proved.
Tata Sons is a principal investment holding Company, of which the majority shareholding is with philanthropic Trusts. The majority shareholders are not individuals or corporate entities having deep pockets into which the dividends find their way if the Company does well and declares dividends. The dividends that the Trusts get are to find their way eventually to the fulfilment of charitable purposes. Therefore, NCLAT should have raised the most fundamental question whether it would be equitable to wind up the Company and thereby starve to death those charitable Trusts, especially on the basis of uncharitable allegations of oppressive and prejudicial conduct. Therefore, the finding of NCLAT that the facts otherwise justify the winding up of the Company under the just and equitable clause, is completely flawed.
Whether the reliefs granted and the directions issued by the Appellate Tribunal, including the reinstatement of CPM into the Board of Tata Sons and other Tata companies, are in consonance with the pleadings made, the reliefs sought and the powers available under Subsection (2) of Section 242? - HELD THAT:- Fundamentally, the object for the achievement of which, the Tribunal is entitled to pass an Order under Section 242(1) of the 2013 Act, remains just the same, as in the 1956 Act. The words “the Tribunal may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit”, found in the last limb of Subsection (2) of Section 397 of the 1956 Act, is also repeated in the last limb of Subsection (1) of Section 242 of the 2013 Act. These words also found a place in the last limb of Subsection (4) of Section 153C of the 1913 Act - Even Section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948 used the very same words namely “the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit”. Though the English Law made a paradigm shift from ‘oppressive conduct’ to ‘unfairly prejudicial conduct’ under the Companies Act, 1985, the object to be kept in mind by the Court while passing an order under Section 461 of the English Companies Act, 1985 continued to be almost similar. Section 461(1) enabled the Court to make “such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of”. Section 996 of the English Companies Act, 2006 retained the very same wordings.
The purpose of an order both under the English Law and under the Indian Law, irrespective of whether the regime is one of “oppressive conduct” or “unfairly prejudicial conduct” or a mere “prejudicial conduct”, is to bring to an end the matters complained of by providing a solution. The object cannot be to provide a remedy worse than the disease. The object should be to put an end to the matters complained of and not to put an end to the company itself, forsaking the interests of other stakeholders. It is relevant to point out that once upon a time, the provisions for relief against oppression and mismanagement were construed as weapons in the armoury of the shareholders, which when brandished in terrorem, were more potent than when actually used to strike with. While such a position is certainly not desirable, they cannot today be taken to the other extreme where the tail can wag the dog.
The Tribunal should always keep in mind the purpose for which remedies are made available under these provisions, before granting relief or issuing directions. It is on the touchstone of the objective behind these provisions that the correctness of the four reliefs granted by the Tribunal should be tested. If so done, it will be clear that NCLAT could not have granted the reliefs of (i) reinstatement of CPM (ii) restriction on the right to invoke Article 75 (iii) restraining RNT and the Nominee Directors from taking decisions in advance and (iv) setting aside the conversion of Tata Sons into a private company.
Whether the Appellate Tribunal could have, in law, muted the power of the Company under Article 75 of the Articles of Association, to demand any member to transfer his ordinary shares, by simply injuncting the company from exercising such a right without setting aside the Article? - HELD THAT:- It is no doubt true that the Tribunal has the power under Section 242 to set aside any amendment to the Articles that takes away recognised proprietary rights of shareholders. But this is on the premise that the bringing up of amendment itself was a conduct that was oppressive or prejudicial.
It was contended that Article 75 was repugnant to Sections 235 and 236 of the Companies Act, 2013. We do not know how these provisions would apply. Section 235 deals with a scheme or contract involving transfer of shares in a Company called the transferor company, to another called the transferee company. Similarly, Section 236 deals with a case where an acquirer acquired or a person acting in concert with such acquirer becomes the registered holder of 90% of the equity share capital of the Company, by virtue of amalgamation, share exchange, conversion of securities etc. These provisions have no relevance to the case on hand - Even the contention revolving around Section 58(2) is wholly unsustainable, as Section 58(2) deals with securities or other interests of any member of a Public Company.
Therefore, the order of NCLAT tinkering with the power available under Article 75 of the Articles of Association is wholly unsustainable. It is needless to point out that if the relief granted by NCLAT itself is contrary to law.
Whether the characterisation by the Tribunal, of the affirmative voting rights available under Article 121 to the Directors nominated by the Trusts in terms of Article 104B, as oppressive and prejudicial, is justified especially after the challenge to these Articles have been given up expressly and whether the Tribunal could have granted a direction to RNT and the Nominee Directors virtually nullifying the effect of these Articles? - HELD THAT:-
Whether the reconversion of Tata Sons from a public company into a private company, required the necessary approval under section 14 of the Companies Act, 2013 or at least an action under section 43A(4) of the Companies Act, 1956 during the period from 2000 (when Act 53 of 2000 came into force) to 2013 (when the 2013 Act was enacted) as held by NCLAT? - HELD THAT:- The right to claim proportionate representation is not available for the S.P. group even contractually, in terms of the Articles of Association. Neither S.P. Group nor CPM can request the Tribunal to rewrite the contract, by seeking an amendment of the Articles of Association. The Articles of Association, as they exist today, are binding upon S.P. Group and CPM by virtue of Section 10(1) of the Act - Realising the fact that they have no right, statutorily or contractually or otherwise to demand proportionate representation on the Board, S.P. Group has come up with a very novel idea, namely the claim of existence of a quasipartnership between the Tata group and SP group. It is contended by S.P. Group that there existed a personal relationship between those in management of the S.P. Group and those in management of Tata Sons for over several decades and that the relationship was one of trust and mutual confidence. According to S.P. Group, they acted as the guardian of the Tata Group when the Tata Trust had no voting rights. Therefore, it is claimed that there is a right and a legitimate expectation to have a representation on the Board of Tata Sons.
But we do not think that there ever existed a relationship in the nature of quasi partnership. As we have pointed out elsewhere, the company was incorporated in the year 1917 and S.P. Group became a shareholder in 1965, namely after 50 years. A berth on the Board of Tata Sons was granted only in the year 1980 to CPM’s father. Therefore, there is nothing on record in the form of pleadings or proof, to show that there was either (i) a preexisting relationship before the incorporation of the company or (ii) a living in relationship picked up half way through, by entering into an agreement in the nature of a partnership - In fact, CPM’s father was inducted into the Board in 1980, after 15 years of acquisition of shares and such induction was not in recognition of any statutory or contractual right. After his father’s exit in 2004, CPM was inducted in 2006, neither in recognition of a contractual right nor in recognition of a hereditary or statutory right.
Placing reliance upon section 163 of the Companies Act, 2013, it was contended that proportionate representation is statutorily recognised. But this argument is completely misconceived. Section 163 of the 2013 Act corresponds to section 265 of the 1956 Act. It enables a company to provide in their Articles of Association, for the appointment of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Directors in accordance with the principle of proportionate representation by means of a single transferable vote. First of all, proportionate representation by means of a single transferable vote, is not the same as representation on the Board for a group of minority shareholders, in proportion to the percentage of shareholding they have. It is a system where the voters exercise their franchise by ranking several candidates of their choice, with first preference, second preference etc. Moreover, it is only an enabling provision and it is upto the company to make a provision for the same in their Articles, if they so choose. There is no statutory compulsion to incorporate such a provision.
The fourth question of law is also to be answered in favour of the Tata group and the claim in the cross appeal relating to affirmative voting rights and proportionate representation are liable to be rejected.
Whether the reconversion of Tata Sons from a public company into a private company, required the necessary approval under section 14 of the Companies Act, 2013 or at least an action under section 43A(4) of the Companies Act, 1956 during the period from 2000 (when Act 53 of 2000 came into force) to 2013 (when the 2013 Act was enacted) as held by NCLAT? - HELD THAT:-
Once the company had become a deemed public company with effect from 121975, the privileges of a private company stood withdrawn and the company was entitled in law to allow renunciation of shares under rights issue. In any case, the validity of what was done in 1995 was not in question. That they accepted deposits from public till September 2002, is the reason why they were not reconverted as a private company at that time. Once a new definition of the expression “private company” came into force with effect from 12092013 under section 2(68) of the 2013 Act, the only test to be applied is to find out if the company fits into the scheme under the new Act or not. We need not go to the circulars issued by the department or the RBI when statutory provisions show the path with clarity. The description of the company in the forms filed under Rule 10, reflected the true position that prevailed then and they would not act as estoppel when the company was entitled to take advantage of the law. That the ability of the company to raise funds has now gone and that the company will have to repay the investments made by insurance companies, are all matters which the shareholders and the Directors are to take care. The question before the court is whether the reconversion is in accordance with law or not. The question is not whether it is good for the company or not.
The real reason why SP group and CPM are aggrieved by the conversion is, that most of their arguments are traceable to provisions which apply only to public and listed public companies. If reconversion goes, they may perhaps stand on a better footing. But that would tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. One may be entitled to a collateral benefit arising out of a substantial argument. But one cannot seek to succeed on a collateral issue so as to make the substantial argument sustainable - the question is answered in favour of Tata Sons and as a consequence, all the observations made against the appellants and the Registrar of companies of the impugned judgment are set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2021 (3) TMI 1180
Concession Agreement - Operation of rapid metro link - 'debt due' as per the financing documents in terms of their respective Concession Agreements - whether the consequences envisaged in the consent order of the High Court dated 20 September 2019 can stand obviated? - HELD THAT:- At the very outset, it is important to note that the FIR in respect of IL&FS group of companies was lodged on 6 December 2018. The termination notices of June and August 2019, and the institution of the writ proceedings, took place thereafter. Evidently the appellants on the one hand, as well as HSVP/HMRTC on the other, were conscious of the developments which were taking place in respect of the IL&FS group of companies in the proceedings before Justice D K Jain on 19 August 2019. When the consent order was passed before the High Court, HSVP was represented by counsel as well as the Chief Administrator of HSVP and Managing Director of HMRTC who were also present. The financial institutions including Andhra Bank were also in appearance. The consent order before the High Court on 20 September 2019 was also preceded by mutual discussions between the parties and the exchange of written proposals. which have been referred to expressly by the High Court.
Clause (ii) of the order dated 20 September 2019 makes it abundantly clear that the basic purpose underlying the entrustment of the reference to the CAG was the determination of the debt due “as defined under the Concession Contract”. The High Court, it must be emphasized, was seized of a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, and its writ jurisdiction had been invoked to challenge the notices of termination issued by RMGL and RMGSL, and for ensuring that the consequence which would emanate on the expiry of the notice period of 90 days by the cessation of the metro operations could be prevented by the judicial intervention in the course of the public law jurisdiction - there was an evident interface between this element of public interest on the one hand and the contractual rights of the parties to the Concession Agreements on the other. However, when HMRTC and HSVP moved the High Court under Article 226, they did so in view of the impending threat which was looming large on the horizon of the rapid metro operations being brought to a standstill as a result of the proximate expiry of the notice of 90 days preceding termination.
In the present case, the High Court was evidently concerned over a fundamental issue of public interest, which was the hardship that would be caused to commuters who use the rapid metro as a vehicle for mass transport in Gurgaon. As such, the High Court’s exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present case was justified since non-interference, which would have inevitably led to the disruption of rapid metro lines for Gurgaon, would have had disastrous consequences for the general public. However, as a measure of abundant caution, we clarify that ordinarily the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 would decline to entertain a dispute which is arbitrable - It is also important to note that the termination of the Concession Agreements had consequences in terms of the provisions contained in the Agreement requiring a deposit of 80 per cent of the debt due under Article 24.4. The contesting parties agreed to an independent third-party determination of this amount by a neutral entity, namely the CAG. The primary function of CAG was to appoint a team of auditors for conducting a financial audit of the debt due and in that process of also examine the scope of the audit.
HMRTC and HSVP are themselves to blame if they did not submit their responses. CAG has specifically rebutted the objections to the audit report submitted by HMRTC on the ground that as a constitutional authority, CAG decided upon the scope of the audit of the debt in terms of the Concession Agreements, which it submitted to the High Court. Moreover, it has clarified that this was a financial audit of the debt due and the auditors reported their findings in terms of the Concession Agreements - The Escrow Account Agreement has been entered into in pursuance of the Concession Agreement, and to effectuate the funding of the Project No 2. As on 31 July 2019, the lenders of RMGSL have an outstanding of ₹ 1651 crores approx. Hence, the Projects which have been executed by RMGL and RMGSL, involved an outlay of funds from Andhra Bank and Canara Bank, who have a vital stake in the financials of the Projects.
The intervention of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution was sought having regard to the manner in which the proceedings before the High Court were being derailed. On 12 October 2020, after HMRTC filed its affidavit, the High Court noted the appellant’s submission that “the matter does not brook any delay” and yet adjourned the matter to 16 October 2020. Thereafter, when the proceedings came up on 16 December 2020, and the response filed by CAG was taken on the record, the hearing of the writ petitions was again deferred to 8 April 2021. This course of events indicates that the whole object and purpose behind setting down the timelines in the order dated 20 September 2019 stood the risk of being defeated. This Court has been constrained to intervene in the process in order to ensure that the sanctity of the understanding that was arrived at before the High Court on 20 September 2019 is duly maintained.
The invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by HMRTC and HSVP was to challenge the termination notices dated 17 June 2019, and to obviate the consequence of the cessation of the rapid metro operations, which would have ensued on the expiry of the notice period. The arbitration clause of the Concession Agreements provides sufficient recourse to remedies which can be availed of. That apart, the order of the High Court dated 4 October 2019 has also clarified that the rest of the dispute that remains after the deposit of 80 per cent of the debt due, either arising out of the CAG report, the validity of the termination notices issued by both the parties and any past or future inter se claims and liabilities shall be agitated and decided in the arbitration proceedings.
Appeal disposed off.
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2021 (3) TMI 1179
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Action against corporate person (being a corporate debtor) concerning guarantee offered by it in respect of a loan account of the principal borrower (a proprietorship firm), who had committed default - application under Section 7 of the Code filed after three years from the date of declaration of the loan account as NPA, being the date of default - time barred or not.
Action against corporate person (being a corporate debtor) concerning guarantee offered by it in respect of a loan account of the principal borrower, who had committed default - HELD THAT:- In law, the status of the guarantor, who is a corporate person, metamorphoses into corporate debtor, the moment principal borrower (regardless of not being a corporate person) commits default in payment of debt which had become due and payable. Thus, action under Section 7 of the Code could be legitimately invoked even against a (corporate) guarantor being a corporate debtor. The definition of “corporate guarantor” in Section 5(5A) of the Code needs to be so understood - there are no substance in the argument that since the loan was offered to a proprietary firm (not a corporate person), action under Section 7 of the Code cannot be initiated against the corporate person even though it had offered guarantee in respect of that transaction. Whereas, upon default committed by the principal borrower, the liability of the company (corporate person), being the guarantor, instantly triggers the right of the financial creditor to proceed against the corporate person (being a corporate debtor) - first question stands answered against the appellant.
Whether an application under Section 7 of the Code filed after three years from the date of declaration of the loan account as NPA, being the date of default, is not barred by limitation? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the NCLT as well as the NCLAT have adverted to the acknowledgments by the principal borrower as well as the corporate guarantor corporate debtor after declaration of NPA from time to time and lastly on 08.12.2018. The fact that acknowledgment within the limitation period was only by the principal borrower and not the guarantor, would not absolve the guarantor of its liability flowing from the letter of guarantee and memorandum of mortgage. The liability of the guarantor being coextensive with the principal borrower under Section 128 of the Contract Act, it triggers the moment principal borrower commits default in paying the acknowledged debt. This is a legal fiction. Such liability of the guarantor would flow from the guarantee deed and memorandum of mortgage, unless it expressly provides to the contrary.
The fact that the principal borrower had availed of credit/loan and committed default and that the (corporate) guarantor/corporate debtor had offered guarantee in respect of the loan account is not disputed. What is urged by the appellant is that the acknowledgment of liability to pay the amount in question was by the principal borrower and that acknowledgment cannot be the basis to proceed against the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor). Section 18 of the Limitation Act, however, posits that a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the party against whom the right is claimed acknowledges its liability. The financial creditor has not only the right to recover the outstanding dues by filing a suit, but also has a right to initiate resolution process against the corporate person (being a corporate debtor) whose liability is coextensive with that of the principal borrower and more so when it activates from the written acknowledgment of liability and failure of both to discharge that liability.
A fresh period of limitation is required to be computed from the date of acknowledgment of debt by the principal borrower from time to time and in particular the (corporate) guarantor/corporate debtor vide last communication dated 08.12.2018. Thus, the application under Section 7 of the Code filed on 13.02.2019 is within limitation.
Appeal disposed off.
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2021 (3) TMI 1178
Seeking appointment of Arbitrator so as to to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon the disputes that have arisen between the petitioner and the respondent - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the arbitration agreement indicates that the arbitration shall be held at Mumbai and be conducted by three arbitrators. For the purpose of appointment KIVF I, KEIT and KIVL are to jointly appoint one arbitrator and the promoters of Indus Biotech Private Limited, to appoint their arbitrator. In the second agreement dated 20.07.2007, ‘KMIL’ as the Investor is on the other side. In the third agreement dated 20.07.2007, ‘KIVFI’ as the Investor is on the other side and in the fourth agreement dated 09.01.2008 it has the same clause as in the first agreement. The two arbitrators who are thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall be the Chairperson.
Since Indus Biotech Private Limited had nominated Mr. Justice V.N. Khare, former Chief Justice of India through their letter dated 15.10.2019 the said learned Arbitrator is treated as having been proposed jointly by the Company and the promoters. Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha, former Chief Justice of India is appointed as the second arbitrator since the respondents had failed to nominate. The said learned arbitrators shall mutually nominate a third arbitrator to be the Chairperson of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Arbitration petition allowed.
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2021 (3) TMI 1177
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - validity of sanction-order passed u/s 151 - whether it was a fit case in which sanction should be accorded for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act and, thus, triggering the process of reassessment under Section 147? - HELD THAT:- There is no explanation by the revenue as to why approval of ACIT was taken in the instant case. Even if we were to assume for the moment that the approval of the ACIT was rightly taken, a bare perusal of the endorsement would show that there is no application of mind as to whether the information received by the AO had any nexus with the formation of honest belief that the assessee's taxable income had escaped. What is glaring is that the ACIT notes that income to the tune of ₹ 27,60,838/- had escaped taxation whereas, in the order recording reasons, the taxable income has been quantified as ₹ 26,93,500/-. As noted above, based on the arguments of Mr. Singh that the escaped income should be related to unsecured loans, there is in play a third figure which is ₹ 25,95,277/-.
In the instant case, because of the failure on the part of respondent no.1 to correlate the information received with the ostensible formation of belief by him, respondent no.2 attempted to connect, via her counter-affidavit, that the escaped income with the “suspicious” unsecured loan entries reflected in the assessee's returns for AY 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. As correctly argued by Mr. Kochar, the counter-affidavit and the submissions made across the bar cannot be used to sustain the impugned actions. The order recording reasons and the order granting sanction should speak for themselves. See GORDHANDAS BHANJI. [1951 (11) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT] and MOHINDER SINGH GILL & ANR. [1977 (12) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT]
Notice issued under Section 148 was barred by limitation - This submission advanced on behalf of the assessee is not sustainable. As noticed above, the limitation provided under Section 149 of the Act for issuance of notice commences from the date when the notice is issued and not when the notice served. The record presently, before us shows that the notice was issued on 31.03.2018. Therefore, this submission made on behalf of the petitioner is rejected.
Notice under Section 148 was issued by an AO Ward No.22(4) while the order recording reasons was issued by another officer is not borne out from the record.
Huge time lag between the issuance of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act and the date when the order recoding reasons was furnished to the authorized representatives of the petitioner - While the assessee is, in our view, right in contending that if the time lag is huge, it does point in the direction that the order was ante-dated, a final view on this aspect could have only been taken if the original record was examined by us. Since the revenue has denied the allegation levelled against it and Mr. Kochar did not press this issue during the hearing, we can't reach a definitive view on this aspect of the matter based on the record available before us Therefore, this submission, made on behalf of the assessee, cannot be accepted.
Since respondent no.1 was unable to link the information received with the formation of belief, a jurisdictional error did occur, which, this Court, is empowered to correct, by exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (See: Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, Companies District I Calcutta and Another [1960 (11) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT]
Relegating a party to an alternative remedy is a selfimposed limitation which, however, does not denude the court of its powers under Article 226. The Court is duty-bound to exercise its powers under Article 226 where ever it finds that a statutory authority has exercised its jurisdiction either irregularly or acted in a matter in which it had no jurisdiction or committed a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion - We are inclined to quash the impugned notice dated 31.03.2018 issued under Section 148 of the Act as well as the order granting sanction issued by respondent no.2.
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2021 (3) TMI 1176
Exemption u/s 11- details as regards the registration of Trust under Section 12A / 12AA not furnished - HELD THAT:- We are at one with Revenue that in the absence of the registration number, to be mentioned in the course of E-filing of the return, the benefit of exemption under Section 11 of the Act cannot be granted, but, at the same time, we find it difficult to accept the stance of the department that as the record is not available with the Trust as well as with the department, it should be presumed that at no point of time, the certificate of registration under Section 12A of the Act was granted.
We take notice of the fact that there is contemporaneous record available with the Trust, which should be looked into minutely by the department so as to satisfy itself that the Trust had been issued a registration certificate under Section 12A and had been availing the benefit of exemption over a period of time under Section 11 of the Act. The department is expected to undertake some homework in this regard seriously. The Trust should not be denied the benefit of exemption under Section 11 of the Act only on account of its disability to produce the necessary records, which got destroyed during the floods of 1978. We do not find anything doubtful or fishy as regards the Trust.
We are of the view that whatever record is available with the Trust, as on date, should be produced before the department and the department should look into the records minutely and also give an opportunity of hearing to the Trust or its legal representative and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law.
We dispose of this writ application with a direction that the writ applicant – Trust shall produce the entire record available with it as on date before the department and the department shall look into the entire record closely and threadbare and ascertain whether the Trust being a registered charitable Trust had been issued the registration certificate under Section 12A.
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2021 (3) TMI 1175
Concessional rate of duty - issuance of C-forms - purchase of High Speed Diesel from suppliers in other States - HELD THAT:- Issue is covered by a decision of this Court in M/S. THE RAMCO CEMENTS LTD. VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (CT) [2018 (10) TMI 1529 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] where it was held that respondents are directed to permit these petitioners to download 'C ' forms, as has been done in the past for the purpose of purchasing petroleum products against the issuance of 'C' declaration forms.
Petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2021 (3) TMI 1174
Reopening of assessment u/ 147 - surrender value of pension plan claimed as exempted from tax u/s 10(10D) - as per revenue interest/bonus on premature of surrender of pension plan / annuity plan is not exempted as per the provisions of Section 80CCC(2) or under any other sections of the I.T. Act. - tangible material necessary to reopen an assessment made without scrutiny under Section 143(1) - HELD THAT:- From the reasons assigned by the Revenue it is not clear as to how the basic conditions are not fulfilled so as to even prima facie suggest that the benefit of Section 10(10D) of the Act is not available to the assessee. The only thing, which seems to have weighed heavily with the Revenue, is that the assessee has not offered the amount being the excess sum received over and above the premium paid for tax. In view of this, this amount is nothing, but, bonus, which is otherwise covered under Section 10(10D) of the Act. However, for this amount to be taxable, the Revenue has to prima facie indicate as to which of the conditions of Section 10(10D) of the Act are not fulfilled. In other words, how the amount in question is not exempted under Section 10(10D)
The reference to Section 80CCC(2) is thoroughly misconceived for two reasons: first, Section 80CCC deals with annuity plans whereas we are concerned with life insurance policy; secondly, Section 80CCC(2) of the Act makes any sum received by the assessee from the insurer towards contract for any annuity plan, taxable provided premium paid for such plan is claimed as allowable deduction under Section 80CCC(1) of the Act. In the facts of the present case, there is no such averment or findings that the amount of premium paid has been claimed and allowed as deduction under Section 80CCC(1) of the Act.
Where the original assessment is without scrutiny i.e. under Section 143(1), even in such cases tangible material is necessary to reopen the assessment.Explanation 2 to Section 147 is more elaborate and cover those cases where the assessments have been completed (called as the scrutiny cases) as well as those cases where no assessments have been completed (called as the nonscrutiny cases). As per the aforesaid Explanation 2, no distinction has been made between the cases where assessment has been made after scrutiny and those cases where no assessment has been made viz. cases where assessment has been made under Section 143(1) only. From the aforesaid Circular of the CBDT, it is quite evident that no distinction under Section 147 is contemplated between the assessment under Section 143(3) called as the scrutiny assessment and the assessment accepted under Section 143(1) called as the nonscrutiny assessment. Therefore, a tangible material is necessary to reopen even an assessment made without scrutiny under Section 143(1) of the Act.
Even where the proceedings under Section 147 of the Act are sought to be initiated with reference to an intimation under Section 143(1), the ingredients of Section 147 are required to be fulfilled. Therefore, even in such a case there should exist “reason to believe” that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Hence, in the absence of any tangible material in possession of the Assessing Officer, subsequent to the intimation under Section 143(1), the reopening will not be sustainable. In other words, even an assessment under Section 143(1), in the form of an intimation, cannot be reopened under Section 147 unless some new / fresh tangible material comes into possession of the Assessing Officer, subsequent to the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2021 (3) TMI 1173
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - no valid service of notice on the assessee strictly in terms of Section 148 read with Section 282(1) - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, the pivotal question is whether Section 148 notice was actually served upon the writ applicant or not. The Revenue itself has conceded that it was not served upon the writ applicant at any point of time. In such circumstances, this decision in the case of Rajesh Sunderdas Vaswani [2016 (6) TMI 701 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] is hardly of any avail.
In the case on hand, the assessee has no PAN. As noted above, this is a case of NonPAN. The picture is now abundantly clear. The Revenue may be justified in taking cognizance of the sale transaction of the agricultural land, which, at one point of time, was owned by the assessee herein. This agricultural land we are talking about is situated at Kalol, District : Gandhinagar. The only mistake that the department committed was to dispatch the notice under Section 148 of the Act to the address at Kalol, Gandhinagar and not to the residential address of the writ applicant at village : Khorsam, Taluka : Chanasma, District : Patan. In such circumstances, it is obvious that the writ applicant could never be said to have receive such notice. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2021 (3) TMI 1172
Assessment u/s 153A - Time limit for authorizations for search under Section 132 or for requisition under Section 132A - whether the provisions of Section 132(9A) are mandatory or directory? - HELD THAT:- The provisions of Section 153B set out the limitation by when an order of assessment under Section 15A is to be passed as being twenty-one months from the end of the month when the last of the authorizations for search under Section 132 or for requisition under Section 132A was executed. The period set out under Section 132(9A) is a measure to enable the respective parties to adhere to the process in an orderly fashion facilitating the completion of the assessment in time. It is relevant to note that there is no time stipulated for the issuance of notice under Section 153A and instances are rife when notices are issued long after the seized material is handed over to the AO. The integrity of the assessment process would thus be dependent upon the principles of natural justice being observed and proper sequence of procedure being followed. Time limits set out under Section 132 (9A) are not only for the purposes of Section 132 (8) & (9) but also to facilitate reasonable time to the AO to complete the assessment where the identity of the IO and AO is different.
The undisputed position in this case is that the IO and AO are not one and the same. The last of the authorisations in this case is on 04.09.2018 and the seized materials ought to have been handed over, in terms of Section 132(9A) on or before 03.11.2018. Admittedly, the handing over has been only on 20.08.2019, more than nine months beyond the stipulated date. Though this constitutes a gross procedural irregularity, it does not, in my considered view, vitiate the notices issued, as assuming a situation where the handover had been within time, the notices might still have been issued only on 01.11.2019. Thus, the jurisdiction assumed cannot be faulted on this score.
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