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Showing 281 to 300 of 410 Records
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1996 (4) TMI 131
Issues:
Petition seeking quashing of an order for recovery of central excise dues and mandamus for deciding stay/waiver application.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a Private Limited Co. registered as SSI Unit, engaged in manufacturing excisable articles, filed a petition seeking to quash an order for recovery of central excise dues and a mandamus to decide a stay/waiver application. The petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal against the imposition of excise duty and penalty, along with an application to waive the pre-deposit of excise duty and penalty. The petitioner contended that despite filing the waiver application along with the appeal, the appellate authority had not decided on it, leading to the initiation of recovery proceedings by the concerned authority. The petitioner relied on legal precedents emphasizing the obligation of the appellate authority to decide on such applications promptly. The court noted the inaction of the appellate authority in not disposing of the waiver application within a reasonable time, allowing the recovery proceedings to continue, and deemed it an abuse of the legal process. Consequently, the court directed the appellate authority to decide on the petitioner's application to waive the pre-deposit of excise duty and penalty within a fortnight, keeping the recovery proceedings in abeyance until then. The court disposed of the writ petition with these directions, emphasizing the importance of timely disposal of such applications to prevent undue hardship on appellants.
This judgment highlights the importance of timely disposal of waiver applications filed along with statutory appeals, especially in matters concerning pre-deposit of excise duty and penalty. It underscores the obligation of appellate authorities to act promptly in such cases to prevent undue hardship and abuse of legal processes. The court's decision to direct the disposal of the waiver application within a specified timeframe serves as a reminder of the judiciary's role in ensuring procedural fairness and efficiency in administrative processes related to tax matters. The reliance on legal precedents to support the petitioner's contention further strengthens the court's reasoning in emphasizing the necessity of timely action by the appellate authorities. Overall, the judgment sets a precedent for ensuring expeditious resolution of waiver applications to safeguard the rights of appellants and prevent unnecessary delays in legal proceedings related to tax disputes.
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1996 (4) TMI 130
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad allowed the writ petition filed by U.P. State Cement Corporation, granting full exemption for losses of cement clinker from excise duty during transport from Balla and Churk factories to Chunar factory. The judgment was based on previous decisions and held the losses as natural losses. The orders of the Assistant Collector, Collector (Appeals), and Joint Secretary to the Government of India were quashed.
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1996 (4) TMI 129
Issues Involved:
1. Seizure and confiscation of goods by Customs Authorities.
2. Allegation of misdeclaration and unauthorized importation.
3. Right to re-ship or mutilate goods.
4. Imposition of penalty and confiscation.
5. Tribunal's findings and implications.
6. Appellant's right to clear goods after mutilation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Seizure and Confiscation of Goods by Customs Authorities:
The appellants exported goods to India in July 1988, claiming they were copper scraps. The goods were sent in two consignments to two importers, who failed to retire the documents, leading to the goods remaining at the Port of Calcutta. In August 1988, the goods were seized by Customs Authorities. The appellants sought permission to re-ship the goods, which was refused.
2. Allegation of Misdeclaration and Unauthorized Importation:
Customs Authorities issued two Show Cause Notices to the importers on 23rd February 1989, alleging misdeclaration of 40% of the goods as copper scraps instead of copper wires, and unauthorized importation without a valid license. No Show Cause Notice was issued to the appellants, nor did the notices contain any allegations against them.
3. Right to Re-ship or Mutilate Goods:
The appellants responded to the Show Cause Notices, claiming the goods were sent pursuant to orders from the importers and sought permission to re-ship the goods if no buyer was available. The Customs Authorities held that the importers attempted to import the goods unauthorizedly and undervalued them, leading to confiscation under Section 111(m) and penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.
4. Imposition of Penalty and Confiscation:
The Adjudicating Authority found the importers guilty of attempting unauthorized importation and undervaluation, leading to confiscation and penalty. The Tribunal, however, found no contract between the appellants and importers and held that there was no misdeclaration as no Bill of Entry was filed. The Tribunal set aside the penalty on importers, granting them the benefit of doubt.
5. Tribunal's Findings and Implications:
The Tribunal's findings led the appellants to file a writ application, challenging the Adjudicating Authority's order and seeking re-shipment or release of goods after mutilation. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ, accepting the respondents' submission that the appellants attempted to smuggle and evade duty. The appellants contested this, stating there were no allegations against them and the Tribunal found no offense by the importers.
6. Appellant's Right to Clear Goods After Mutilation:
The Court found no basis for holding the appellants guilty of smuggling or duty evasion. The show cause notice and adjudication were against the importers, not the appellants. The Tribunal's finding that no offense was established invalidated the penalty and confiscation. The Court held that the Adjudicating Authority erred in not granting the appellants' prayer for re-shipment or mutilation. Under Section 24 of the Customs Act, mutilation should be allowed, and the Customs Appraising Manual supports clearance after mutilation if no mala fide intention is suspected.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the appellants to import the goods subject to conditions:
(i) Mutilation of 40% of the goods claimed to be copper wire,
(ii) Submission of a bill of entry and payment of duty as copper scrap,
(iii) Return of original shipment documents after mutilation. The order of the Adjudicating Authority was set aside, and no costs were imposed.
Separate Judgments:
Sujit Kumar Sinha, J. concurred with the judgment.
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1996 (4) TMI 128
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Applicant (Assistant Directorate of Revenue Intelligence) can be added as a Party-Respondent in the Writ Proceedings.
2. Whether the Applicant has a direct interest or locus standi in the subject matter of the Writ Proceedings.
3. Legal principles governing the addition of parties to judicial proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Addition of the Applicant as a Party-Respondent:
The Applicant sought to be added as a Party-Respondent to the Writ Proceedings, arguing that he has a direct interest in the subject matter of the goods in question, which were attempted to be exported by the Petitioner. The Applicant contended that an examination of the goods under Section 106A of the Customs Act, 1962, would reveal discrepancies in the declaration made by the Petitioner, making the goods liable for confiscation.
The Court referred to Rule 53 of the Rules under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows the addition of parties necessary for a complete adjudication of the issues involved. However, the Court concluded that the Applicant did not meet the criteria for being a necessary or proper party, as established in the leading cases of Moser v. Mars, Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, and Udit Narain Singh v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar. The Applicant's presence was not deemed necessary for effectually and completely adjudicating the questions involved in the Suit/Proceedings.
2. Direct Interest or Locus Standi of the Applicant:
The Court examined whether the Applicant had a direct interest or locus standi in the subject matter of the Writ Proceedings. The Petitioner opposed the application, arguing that the Applicant is neither a proper nor a necessary party and lacks locus standi.
The Court noted that the Writ Petition was primarily directed against the Customs Authorities and did not raise any issues requiring the presence of the Department of Revenue Intelligence (D.R.I.). No relief was sought against the D.R.I., and the Applicant's involvement appeared to be limited to prosecuting his own course of action. The Court emphasized that the Applicant's interest was not direct or legal but rather indirect and commercial, which does not satisfy the criteria for being added as a party.
3. Legal Principles Governing Addition of Parties:
The Court reiterated the legal principles governing the addition of parties to judicial proceedings. According to Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person can be added as a party if their presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the questions involved in the proceeding.
The Court cited several precedents, including the Supreme Court's decisions in Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, Udit Narain Singh v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, and Ramesh Hira Chand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, to emphasize that a person must have a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation to be added as a party. The Court also referred to the decision in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. C.S. Patel, where the Supreme Court held that a party without a direct interest in the subject matter could not be aggrieved by the order.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the Applicant does not qualify as a proper or necessary party in the Writ Proceedings. The Applicant's interest was neither direct nor legal, and his presence was not required for a complete adjudication of the issues involved. The application for adding the Applicant as a Party-Respondent was rejected, along with the other prayers made therein. The Court also noted that the order would not prevent the concerned authorities from taking any steps in accordance with the law.
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1996 (4) TMI 127
Issues Involved:
Challenge to circular/order issued u/s 37B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 by the Central Board of Excise and Customs.
Judgment Summary:
Issue 1: Validity of Circular
The petitioners challenged the circular issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs under Section 37B of the Act, which directed that the addition of chemicals to pesticidal chemicals in highly concentrated form amounts to "manufacture." The petitioners contended that the process of diluting pesticides does not result in a new product with different properties. The Tribunal had previously held that such processing does not amount to 'manufacture.' The Court was not deciding whether the process amounted to 'manufacture' but the validity of the circular in light of the Tribunal's decision.
Issue 2: Authority of Central Board
Section 37B of the Act empowers the Board to issue orders for uniformity in the classification of excisable goods or levy of excise duties. However, the Board cannot issue directions contrary to the Tribunal's decision. The Court held that once a decision becomes final, the Board cannot render it nugatory by issuing circulars. The circular in question was quashed and set aside.
In conclusion, the Court quashed the circular issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs and ruled in favor of the petitioners.
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1996 (4) TMI 126
The petitioner's stay/waiver application was not properly considered by the Tribunal. The High Court directed the Tribunal to reconsider the application dated 26-2-1996 within 4 weeks. The earlier order on stay/waiver application will remain in abeyance.
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1996 (4) TMI 125
The petitioner's appeal is pending since March 25, 1996. An application for waiver of tax deposit is filed. Appellate authority has not decided on stay application under Section 35F of Excise Act. Court directs waiver application to be decided within 15 days. Petition is disposed of. Certified copy to be issued to petitioner's counsel in two days.
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1996 (4) TMI 124
Issues:
1. Admissibility of Modvat credit on ramming mass, Oxygen/Acytelene gas, and packing material used in relation to the manufacture of final products under Rule 57A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
Detailed Analysis:
The applicant, Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Indore, sought a direction to the Tribunal regarding the admissibility of Modvat credit on ramming mass, Oxygen/Acytelene gas, and packing material used in furnace and cutting tools, respectively. The dispute arose when the Assistant Collector disallowed Modvat credits claimed by the non-applicant, a manufacturer of continuous cast Billets, on the grounds that ramming mass was not an input. The subsequent appeal to the Collector (Appeal) also ruled against the applicant. The Tribunal considered various Tribunal decisions and the High Court judgment in the Singh Alloys & Steel Ltd. case. The Tribunal dismissed the reference application, stating that the issue of Oxygen/Acytelene gas had been held eligible for Modvat credit, but the matter concerning ramming mass and packaging materials was already covered by the High Court judgment. The Tribunal emphasized that the mere filing of an appeal by the department did not change the legal position, leading to the dismissal of the reference application.
The High Court directed a show-cause notice against admission, and both counsels presented their arguments. The applicant's counsel argued that the Tribunal's order was based on a decision challenged before the Division Bench, warranting a reference. On the other hand, the non-applicant's counsel contended that once a matter is decided by the Court, no referable question of law remains. Citing precedents, the Court highlighted that the pendency of the same issue before the Division Bench did not create a referable question of law. The Court noted that the Full Bench of the Tribunal had a similar view to the High Court of Calcutta, indicating no referable question of law existed. Ultimately, the Court found the application meritless and declined admission, dismissing the application without costs but fixing counsel fees for each side.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed the admissibility of Modvat credit on specific items used in manufacturing processes, analyzing previous decisions and the application of relevant legal principles to determine the outcome of the case. The Court's decision was based on settled law and precedents, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the application seeking a reference on the admissibility of Modvat credit.
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1996 (4) TMI 123
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh heard an application seeking to quash Circular No. 84/90 and a show cause notice. The court directed the petitioners to file their case before the authorities concerned within four weeks for adjudication. The writ petition was disposed of with no costs, and any security deposit was to be refunded to the petitioner after verification.
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1996 (4) TMI 122
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the letter/order dated 23rd September 1987 issued by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise.
2. Applicability of Rule 57F(2) of the Central Excise [Valuation] Rules, 1975.
3. Compliance with Rule 57G(4) of the Central Excise Rules.
4. Eligibility of inputs and final products under Rule 57A read with Notification No. 177/86.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the letter/order dated 23rd September 1987 issued by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise:
The petitioners challenged the letter/order dated 23rd September 1987, which directed them to follow Rule 57F procedures for clearing inputs and final products. The court found that the petitioners had been following a systematic procedure from procuring aluminium ingots to manufacturing the final product, paying excise duty, and availing Modvat credit at each stage. The court concluded that there was no justification for the issuance of the letter dated 23rd September 1987, as the petitioners had complied with the necessary rules and procedures.
2. Applicability of Rule 57F(2) of the Central Excise [Valuation] Rules, 1975:
The petitioners contended that Rule 57F(2) applies only to inputs brought into the factory, which was not the case here as the inputs were directly delivered to job workers. The court agreed, stating that Rule 57F(2) is a facility that manufacturers can opt for and is not mandatory. The court emphasized that the procedure under Rule 57F(2) is not compulsory for availing Modvat credit under Rule 57A, and the petitioners cannot be compelled to follow it.
3. Compliance with Rule 57G(4) of the Central Excise Rules:
The respondents argued that compliance with Rule 57F(2) is necessary to ensure proper Modvat credit and safeguard revenue interests. However, the petitioners demonstrated that they had complied with Rule 57G(4), which requires monthly returns indicating inputs received and duty taken as credit. The court noted that the petitioners had followed the required procedures, including the submission of monthly returns and payment of duty at each stage of manufacture.
4. Eligibility of inputs and final products under Rule 57A read with Notification No. 177/86:
The petitioners argued that all inputs and final products fall under Chapter 76 or Chapter 83 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, making them eligible under Rule 57A. The court reviewed the flow chart and confirmed that the inputs and final products at each stage of manufacture fell under the specified tariff headings. The court found that the petitioners were eligible for Modvat credit as per Rule 57A read with Notification No. 177/86.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the procedure under Rule 57F(2) is optional and not mandatory for availing Modvat credit under Rule 57A. The petitioners had complied with the necessary rules and procedures, and the impugned letter dated 23rd September 1987 was quashed and set aside. The petitioners were entitled to succeed, and the rule was made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 121
Whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners?
Held that:- We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4-4-1987 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (4) TMI 120
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case an appeal is maintainable against an order dropping the proceeding for contempt?
Held that:- So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the learned Judges having passed an order directing that a complaint be lodged against the respondents, thought it proper not to pursue the proceeding for contempt against them. No appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act is maintainable. In the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that such an order requires to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136. The appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 119
Whether the rice shelling plant was a part of a 100% export oriented unit is wholly immaterial while considering in the present case whether Oswal Agro could export non-basmati rice?
Whether the industrial licence could be amended so as to incorporate a specific condition requiring the export of edible rice bran oil?
Held that:- Oswal Agro is under an obligation to pay the difference between the actual export price and the minimum export price, fixed by the Appellant in respect of non-basmati rice exported by it in view of the interim orders which had been passed by the High Court and this court permitting such export. According to the appellant taking into consideration the total quantity of rice exported by Oswal Agro between April, 1991 and March, 1992 when the minimum export price was fixed at the rate of US $ 231 per MT and between April, 1992 and March, 1993 when the minimum export price fixed was US $ 270 per M.T. the total amount payable by Oswal Agro would come to US $ 24,54,644 at the current foreign exchange rate. We, accordingly, direct this amount to be paid by Oswal Agro to the appellant within a period of four weeks from the date of this judgment.
The perusal of the Notification in question indicates that the effective rate of excise duty on clearance of goods from 100% export oriented unit to domestic tariff area would stand reduced if the goods so manufactured are "allowed to be sold in India". Oswal Agro never took permission of the authorities concerned to sell the rice bran oil in India. It is only by virtue of interim orders which were passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in 1991, after being opposed by the authorities, that the oil was removed from the bonded warehouse and sold in the domestic tariff area. The conditional order passed by the High Court permitting the sale of the oil in the domestic tariff area cannot be regarded as Oswal Agro having been allowed to sell goods in the domestic tariff area as contemplated by the said Notification dated 7-10-1991. In that view of the matter, full amount of basic duty and auxiliary duty was payable by it. Taking into consideration the different quantities of oil cleared during different periods and keeping in view the current rate of duty, the total amount of basic and auxiliary duty payable by Oswal Agro would come to the aforesaid figure of ₹ 19,75,15,192.97/- as calculated by the appellant. In addition thereto, Oswal Agro is also liable to pay interest @ 18% as calculated by the appellant herein which comes to ₹ 12,55,09,088.00/-. It is hereby directed that Oswal Agro shall pay this amount of duty and interest within eight weeks from the date of this judgment and it shall also pay to the appellant herein, as well as to the Union of India, one set of costs which are quantified at ₹ 50,000/-.
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1996 (4) TMI 118
The petitioner challenged an order to pay Rs. 1,43,901 towards customs duty for Ophthalmic Lenses. The High Court directed the respondents not to insist on payment until the appeal judgment is pronounced. The petition was disposed of with no costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 117
Whether ITAT is right in upholding the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the transaction recorded in the document dated February 11, 1965, is only a partition and not a gift to the extent of the shares allotted to the two sons of the assessee ?
Held that:- The clear finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner whose decision was affirmed by the Tribunal is that it was by means of a partition of the family property in Malayalam Era 1095, corresponding to 1919 A.D. that the assessee came into possession of most of the properties in question and the earnings from the family properties provided the nucleus for acquisition of the other properties which were then included in the family properties and which were the subject-matter of the partition made between the assessee and his children. It was clearly held that this partition made in the year 1919 A.D. between the assessee and his brothers was of coparcenary property and the entire corpus covered by the partition deed on February 11, 1965, is the coparcenary property of the assessee's family. This finding of fact was not challenged before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's judgment of affirmance must be construed as based on this finding as well. Even in the High Court, this finding remained unassailed and the High Court without adverting to this finding of fact relating to the personal law applicable to the assessee's family, has reversed the decision of the Tribunal. It may also be mentioned that the decision against the assessee has been rendered on the basis that the assessee has failed to discharge the burden of proof---the applicability of the rule of survivorship to his family. It is sufficient to observe that the above clear finding on this question in favour of the assessee discharges that burden, if any, on the assessee to prove this fact. There being no evidence to the contrary, this clear finding of fact in the assessee's favour is sufficient to decide the above-quoted question in favour of the assessee
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1996 (4) TMI 116
Whether a particular sale is benami or not?
Held that:- The presumption is that possession would follow title. That presumption is stronger in this case as we noted that the property remained as a bare land. No particular act of possession could normally be pointed to establish possession. Non-consideration of the question of possession in such a situation is inconsequential though we are in agreement with the finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish his possession on the land. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 115
The petition was filed under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, regarding depreciation allowance. The Tribunal initially declined the petition. However, the High Court directed the Tribunal to refer the question of law to the court for opinion.
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1996 (4) TMI 114
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 199 of the Income-tax Act regarding the credit for tax deducted at source.
2. Validity of withdrawing interest originally allowed under section 214 and charging interest under section 215.
Interpretation of Section 199 - Credit for Tax Deducted at Source:
The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of Section 199 of the Income-tax Act concerning the credit for tax deducted at source. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal initially held that the credit for tax deducted at source should be given for the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the tax was deducted. However, upon appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax set aside this decision, stating that the tax in question was rightly allowed in the original assessment order for the assessment year 1977-78. The Tribunal further analyzed sections 194A, 200, and 199 of the Income-tax Act, emphasizing the timing of tax deduction and deposit by the payer. The Tribunal found that the tax in question was deducted in December 1976 and February 1977, but it was required to be deposited within two months after the close of the accounting year, falling within the year 1978-79. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to claim the deduction in the assessment year 1977-78.
Validity of Interest Withdrawal under Section 214 and Charging under Section 215:
The dispute also involved the validity of withdrawing interest originally allowed under section 214 and charging interest under section 215. The Income-tax Officer had withdrawn the interest originally allowed under section 214 and charged interest under section 215, a decision that was upheld by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. However, upon further review, the High Court found that the Tribunal's decision was not in accordance with the law. The High Court referred to the provisions of section 154 and the case law of CIT v. Tanjore Permanent Bank Ltd., emphasizing that the tax credit should be given only when the tax is paid on the income for which deduction was made at source and offered for assessment. The High Court concluded that the Tribunal was not justified in confirming the Income-tax Officer's decision to withdraw interest under section 214 and charge interest under section 215.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue, stating that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's interpretation of Section 199 was incorrect. The High Court held that the credit for tax deducted at source should be given for the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the tax was deducted. Additionally, the High Court found that the decision to withdraw interest originally allowed under section 214 and charge interest under section 215 was not justified. Therefore, the reference was answered in favor of the assessee, with no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 113
Issues:
Challenging income tax orders and seeking release of seized jewellery.
Analysis:
The petitioner challenged income tax orders and sought the release of seized jewellery, claiming ownership of 603.5 grams of jewellery acquired before marriage, declared under the voluntary disclosure scheme. The Income-tax Department conducted a search at her father-in-law's residence, seizing 405.03 grams of jewellery. The petitioner filed an affidavit claiming ownership of the seized jewellery. The Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax passed orders without hearing the petitioner, violating principles of natural justice.
The petitioner's counsel argued that the jewellery belonged to her, as she resided with her father-in-law and husband at the time of the raid. The respondents contended that the jewellery belonged to the father-in-law and was seized to meet his liabilities under the Income-tax Act. They cited a Supreme Court decision to support their position.
The court found a violation of natural justice as the petitioner was not heard before the orders were passed. The petitioner, being an affected party, should have been given an opportunity to present her case. The Commissioner of Income-tax failed to dispose of her application under section 132(11) of the Income-tax Act. The court quashed the order dated February 28, 1989, related to the seized jewellery and directed the second respondent to decide the petitioner's application within six weeks after providing her with a hearing. The court emphasized the importance of hearing parties before passing adverse orders and upheld the petitioner's right to be heard in the matter.
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1996 (4) TMI 112
The High Court of Patna considered a case where the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal canceled a penalty imposed on an assessee for filing a revised return. The Tribunal justified its decision based on the fact that the assessment was initially completed under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, and a revised return was filed later. The Court ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the revised return could be considered valid under section 139(5) of the Act.
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