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2011 (8) TMI 1105
Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition after condoning the delay. (Citation: 2011 (8) TMI 1105 - SC)
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2011 (8) TMI 1104
Issues involved:
The issue involves the interpretation of deduction u/s 54 of the IT Act, 1961 for the purchase of two separate flats by the assessee, leading to a dispute regarding whether both flats can be considered as a single residential unit for the purpose of claiming the deduction.
Details of the Judgment:
Issue 1: Interpretation of deduction u/s 54 for purchase of two flats:
The assessee claimed a deduction u/s 54 for the purchase of two separate flats in Mayfair Apartment, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. The Assessing Officer contended that the deduction u/s 54 should only be allowed for one flat. An ITI Inspector's report confirmed that the two flats were distinct and separate, with separate kitchens and no passage connecting them. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee based on the Karnataka High Court judgment in the case of CIT Vs. D. Ananda Basappa, which emphasized that the intention of the assessee to purchase two flats as one unit should be considered for granting the exemption u/s 54.
Issue 2: Precedents supporting the assessee's claim:
The Tribunal cited various judgments to support the assessee's claim that even when flats are located on different floors, they can be considered a single residential unit if they can be combined. Judgments such as K.G. Vyas Vs ITO, ITO Vs. P.C. Ramakrishna HUF, and Pre Prakesh Bhutani Vs. ACIT emphasized that the exemption u/s 54 should be granted as long as the property is of a residential nature, irrespective of whether it consists of multiple independent units.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that the judgments relied upon by the department were not applicable to the present case, as the facts differed significantly. Therefore, the appeal of the revenue was dismissed, and the grounds taken by the revenue were also dismissed. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) to allow the deduction u/s 54 for both flats purchased by the assessee, considering them as a single residential unit.
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2011 (8) TMI 1103
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Customs Department to deny DEPB credit.
2. Demand of duty from exporters under Section 28 of the Customs Act.
3. Compliance with Notification 45/2002-Cus dated 22-04-2002.
4. Allegation of overvaluation of export goods.
5. Liability of goods for confiscation post-export.
6. Imposition of penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act.
7. Penalty imposition when no duty is payable.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Customs Department to Deny DEPB Credit:
The appellants argued that the Customs Department lacks jurisdiction to deny DEPB credit, asserting that this authority lies with the Licensing Authority (DGFT). They cited several decisions to support this claim. However, the judgment clarified that Customs Authorities assess the value of export goods, which forms the basis for DGFT to allow DEPB credit. The Customs Authorities have the jurisdiction to investigate overvaluation, and based on such investigations, DGFT can take further action. In this case, DGFT had already canceled the DEPB credit based on the Customs' investigation.
2. Demand of Duty from Exporters Under Section 28 of the Customs Act:
The appellants contended that duty can only be demanded from importers, not exporters. The judgment examined Section 28 of the Customs Act, which allows duty to be demanded from the "person chargeable with the duty," not specifically the importer. The court noted that exporters who fraudulently obtained DEPB licenses and sold them, resulting in duty evasion, could be held liable. The Gujarat High Court's decision in Suresh Dhansiram Agarwal vs. UOI supported this interpretation, allowing recovery of revenue lost due to fraudulent DEPB licenses from exporters.
3. Compliance with Notification 45/2002-Cus dated 22-04-2002:
The appellants argued that they had fulfilled all requirements of Notification 45/2002-Cus. However, the judgment noted that the DGFT had canceled the licenses, indicating non-compliance. The requirement that licenses be obtained by proper means is an implied condition, and the cancellation by DGFT invalidated the appellants' claim of compliance.
4. Allegation of Overvaluation of Export Goods:
The judgment found substantial evidence of overvaluation, including the appellants' admission of overvaluation by 10-15%, the use of bogus bank accounts, and transactions with hawala operators. However, the quantification of overvaluation and the basis for denying DEPB credit were found to be inconsistent and unclear. The judgment highlighted discrepancies in the findings and directed the adjudicating authority to re-examine and clearly quantify the extent of overvaluation.
5. Liability of Goods for Confiscation Post-Export:
The judgment clarified that goods can be held liable to confiscation even after actual export if they do not correspond to the information furnished at the time of export, as per Section 113(i) of the Customs Act. The court noted that while goods need to be available for physical confiscation, the liability for confiscation can still be determined post-export.
6. Imposition of Penalty Under Section 114A of the Customs Act:
The judgment upheld the imposition of penalties under Section 114A, stating that when goods are liable to confiscation, penalties can be imposed on the persons responsible for the fraudulent actions leading to such liability.
7. Penalty Imposition When No Duty is Payable:
The appellants argued that no penalty can be imposed if no duty is payable. The judgment rejected this argument, stating that penalties can be imposed for fraudulent actions even if the duty itself is not directly payable by the appellants.
Conclusion:
The judgment set aside the consequences ordered against the appellants and remanded the matter for de-novo adjudication. The adjudicating authority was directed to clearly identify shipping bills with non-realized export proceeds, quantify overvaluation reasonably, and ensure that only the ineligible credit utilized for customs duty payment is recovered. The judgment emphasized the need for a thorough and clear re-examination of the case.
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2011 (8) TMI 1102
Issues involved: Appeal against penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act for excess cash detected and unexplained investment in stock for the assessment year 2003-04.
Summary:
The appellant's appeal was against the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer (A.O.) for two additions: excess cash detected and unexplained investment in stock. The A.O. had levied a penalty of Rs. 4,98,500, which was confirmed by the CIT(A). The appellant's main grievance was regarding this penalty. The Tribunal had previously allowed partial relief to the appellant in the quantum appeal for both additions. For the excess stock addition, the Tribunal confirmed an amount lower than what was initially added by the A.O. The appellant argued that the penalty was not justified, citing previous tribunal decisions and a judgment of the Gujarat High Court emphasizing the need for a clear finding of concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The appellant contended that the A.O. had not provided a clear finding in this regard in the penalty order.
The Departmental Representative supported the lower authorities' orders. Upon review, the Tribunal found that the A.O. had failed to provide a clear finding regarding whether the appellant had concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars. Citing a judgment of the Gujarat High Court, the Tribunal held that without a clear finding, the penalty could not be sustained. The Tribunal referenced previous cases where penalties were cancelled due to the absence of a clear finding on concealment of income or inaccurate particulars. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the appellant's appeal, ruling that the penalty order could not be sustained due to the lack of a clear finding by the A.O.
In conclusion, the appellant's appeal against the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) for excess cash detected and unexplained investment in stock for the assessment year 2003-04 was allowed by the Tribunal.
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2011 (8) TMI 1101
Bogus purchases - Held that:- There was evidence on record to suggest that though purchases may not have been made from M/s. Shreenathji Industries as initially suggested by the assessee in the books of account, nevertheless the factum of actual purchases was placed for verification by the assessee before the authorities. In fact, assessee's assertion appears to have been that purchases had to be made from other parties who were not reflecting such sales in their account for saving taxes such as incometax, sales tax etc.
Be that as it may, we see no material distinction in facts involved in the present case and in case of Sanjay Oilcake Industries (2008 (3) TMI 323 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT). It is true that the Delhi High Court treated the issue somewhat differently. However, when the decision of our Court lays down certain ratio, in the absence of any special reason to differ, we would have to follow the same.
Other issues are consequent in nature. As already recorded, CIT (Appeals) had addressed the issue of applicability of section 40A(3) of the Act. Under the circumstances, though it is true that the Tribunal did not separately discus this issue, only for that reason, we see no reasons to interfere.
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2011 (8) TMI 1100
Whether the qualifications prescribed in the Rajasthan Transport Subordinate Service Rules, 1963 (for short, "the Rules") for the post of Motor Vehicle Sub-Inspector are mandatory?
Whether the petitioners, who were appointed as Motor Vehicle Sub-Inspectors in compliance of the direction given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court are entitled to continue in service despite reversal of the order of the learned Single judge by the Division Bench?
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2011 (8) TMI 1099
Issues involved: Appeal against two different orders of the ld. CIT(A) for assessment years 2003-04 & 2004-05, involving disallowance of guest house expenses, gifts and presents in business promotion expenses, Employers P.F. Contribution, Employees P.F. Contribution, expenses incurred for issue of Bonds, and provision for contractual obligation.
Assessment Year 2003-04:
1. Disallowance of Guest House Expenses:
- AO disallowed expenses not incurred wholly and exclusively for business.
- CIT(A) deleted disallowance citing removal of Section 37(4) u/s 1998-99.
- Tribunal upheld CIT(A)'s decision due to removal of Section 37(4).
2. Disallowance of Gifts and Presents:
- AO disallowed based on past disallowances.
- CIT(A) deleted citing omission of Rule 6B.
- Tribunal upheld CIT(A) as no evidence gifts were not for business purpose.
3. Employers P.F. Contribution and Employees P.F. Contribution:
- Tribunal referred to previous decisions against revenue.
- Held in line with previous rulings, contributions paid before due date not to be disallowed.
Assessment Year 2004-05:
1. Disallowance of Guest House Expenses:
- Tribunal upheld deletion of disallowance based on previous year's decision.
2. Disallowance of Gifts and Presents:
- Tribunal upheld deletion of disallowance based on previous year's decision.
3. Employers P.F. Contribution and Employees P.F. Contribution:
- Tribunal upheld deletion of both disallowances based on previous year's decision.
Cross Objections (C.O.) for Assessment Year 2003-04:
1. Expenses for Issue of Bonds:
- AO treated as capital expenditure, disallowed.
- CIT(A) confirmed AO's decision.
- Tribunal allowed deduction u/s 37 based on High Court ruling.
2. Provision for Contractual Obligation:
- Disallowance confirmed by CIT(A) based on pending High Court appeal.
- Tribunal held in favor of assessee based on earlier Tribunal decision.
Cross Objections (C.O.) for Assessment Year 2004-05:
1. Expenses for Issue of Bonds:
- Tribunal allowed as revenue expenditure based on previous year's decision.
2. Provision for Contractual Obligation:
- Tribunal held AO not justified in disallowing based on previous year's decision.
In conclusion, the appeals of the revenue were dismissed, and the cross objections of the assessee were allowed.
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2011 (8) TMI 1098
Refund claim - SAD - N/N. 102/2007-Cus. dated 14.09.2007 - denial on the ground that the applicant, while issuing the invoice for sale of the imported goods, did not specifically indicate in the invoice that no credit of additional duty of customs levied under sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the CTA was admissible - Held that: - the applicant is not a registered dealer for the purpose of passing of credits. Further, the invoices produced for our perusal, which have been relied upon by the Commissioner (Appeals), do not indicate any amount of Customs Duty separately and, therefore, the basis of fear that these documents could have been used for taking credit does not exist - petition dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2011 (8) TMI 1097
The appellate tribunal dismissed the appeal against the prohibition order issued by the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, preventing the appellant, a Customs House Agent (CHA), from working at Kandla M.P and SEZ, Mundra under the Customs House Agents License Regulation, 2004. The tribunal found that the prohibition order was an administrative action, and no provision for appeal against it was brought to their notice. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as non-maintainable.
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2011 (8) TMI 1096
The High Court of Gauhati dismissed writ petitions seeking refund of Education Cess, ruling that it is not exempted under Notification No.32/99-CE dated 8-7-1999. CENVAT credit on Education Cess can only be used for payment of Education Cess under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
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2011 (8) TMI 1095
Whether the title and ownership of the goods had already passed to the Petitioner?
Whether when the entire quantity of coal was delivered to the Respondent No.2 for the purpose of transmission of the same to the Petitioner without reserving the right of disposal of the goods, the lien on the goods stood terminated in view of the provisions of Section 49(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Sale of Goods Act, 1930?
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2011 (8) TMI 1094
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 58(3) and 58(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Re-organisation Act, 2000.
2. Amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
3. Jurisdiction under Article 131 of the Constitution of India.
4. Delay and laches in filing the amendment application.
5. Impact of the proposed amendment on the nature and character of the original suit.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 58(3) and 58(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Re-organisation Act, 2000:
The plaintiff-State of Madhya Pradesh challenged the constitutionality of Sections 58(3) and 58(4) of the MPR Act, claiming these sections provide unguided powers to the Central Government for apportioning assets, rights, and liabilities between the successor states without any guidelines, thus violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The plaintiff argued that this lack of guidelines resulted in arbitrary and unjust decisions, leading to an unequal division of generating capacity and financial disparities.
2. Amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
The plaintiff filed I.A. No. 4 of 2009 seeking to amend the plaint to include a challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 58(3) and 58(4) of the MPR Act. Order VI Rule 17 allows for amendments to pleadings at any stage of the proceedings to determine the real questions in controversy. The Court highlighted that amendments should be allowed if they are necessary for resolving the real controversy, provided they do not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side.
3. Jurisdiction under Article 131 of the Constitution of India:
The second defendant, State of Chhattisgarh, contended that the validity of a Central law cannot be challenged under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 131. Normally, such questions should be raised under the writ jurisdictions of Articles 32 and 226. The Court noted that Article 131A, which provided exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court for questions of constitutionality of Central laws, was omitted by the 43rd Amendment, allowing these questions to be raised in High Courts and the Supreme Court under writ jurisdictions.
4. Delay and laches in filing the amendment application:
The second defendant argued that the amendment application was filed belatedly, as the suit had been pending since 2004 and the issues were framed in 2007. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiff did not provide reasons for the delay in seeking the amendment. It was noted that the pleadings were complete, evidence by way of affidavits had been filed, and the suit was ready for final hearing, making the timing of the amendment application questionable.
5. Impact of the proposed amendment on the nature and character of the original suit:
The Court observed that the original suit challenged the manner of exercise of power by the Central Government under Sections 58(3) and 58(4) of the MPR Act, not the constitutionality of these sections. Allowing the amendment to challenge the vires of the provisions would fundamentally alter the nature of the suit and render the original claims infructuous. The Court emphasized that amendments introducing a totally different, new, and inconsistent case or challenging the fundamental character of the suit should be refused.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the plaintiff-State of Madhya Pradesh could not amend the plaint to challenge the constitutionality of Sections 58(3) and 58(4) of the MPR Act at this stage, as it would fundamentally alter the nature of the original suit. However, the plaintiff was permitted to raise objections regarding the lack of guidelines and the arbitrary nature of the Central Government's actions during the trial. I.A. No. 4 of 2009 was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2011 (8) TMI 1093
Issues involved: Recovery of wrongly availed CENVAT credit u/s Rule 11(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and imposition of penalty.
The judgment by the Appellate Tribunal CESTAT CHENNAI dealt with the case where the assessees availed exemption u/s Notification No. 8/2003-CE and MODVAT credit without paying duty on finished goods and inputs, leading to a show-cause notice for recovery of wrongly availed CENVAT credit and penalty. The lower appellate authority had earlier set aside the demand and penalty, citing a decision by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal. The Revenue appealed this decision.
The Tribunal, after hearing both sides, referred to the apex court's decision in Albert David Ltd. vs Commissioner, which upheld that CENVAT credit shall not be allowed on inputs used in the manufacture of wholly exempted goods. The Tribunal reproduced relevant extracts from its order, emphasizing that CENVAT credit is not permissible for inputs used in the manufacture of exempted goods. The Tribunal also distinguished a previous decision and highlighted the provision for recovery of wrongly utilized CENVAT credit u/s Rule 57 AD.
The Tribunal further noted that the apex court's decision in Albert David has been followed in other cases, emphasizing the need to adhere to this precedent. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in relation to duty demand. However, the Tribunal found that no penalty was warranted in this case, as the issue primarily revolved around the interpretation of MODVAT rules.
In conclusion, the appeal was partly allowed by the Tribunal, pronouncing the decision on 18-08-2011.
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2011 (8) TMI 1092
Issues:
1. Deletion of addition on account of delayed payment of PF of employees' contribution.
2. Relief granted on staff welfare expenditure under sec. 40A(9).
3. Deletion of disallowance of bond issue expenses.
Issue 1 - Delayed Payment of PF Contribution:
The revenue challenged the deletion of an addition of Rs. 1,82,77,138 due to delayed payment of PF of employees' contribution for the A.Y. 2006-07. The ITAT Mumbai found that the assessee made payments beyond the due date but before filing the income tax return, with some payments within the grace period. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. Aloum Extrusion Ltd., the ITAT concluded that the issue was in favor of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the issue was also addressed in a similar case by the ITAT 'C' Bench Mumbai, following the Supreme Court's decision. Consequently, the ITAT upheld the findings of the Ld. CIT (A) and allowed ground no.1.
Issue 2 - Relief on Staff Welfare Expenditure:
The second issue involved relief granted on staff welfare expenditure of Rs. 4 lakhs under sec. 40A(9). The Tax Audit Report highlighted that certain payments were not allowed under sec. 40A(9), including amounts for Officer's club and Staff club. The assessee explained that the expenditure was for sports and cultural activities on various occasions, which the AO disallowed. However, the Ld. CIT (A) allowed the claim, noting its acceptance in the assessee's case for the A.Y. 2004-05. The ITAT, finding no reason to interfere, confirmed the Ld. CIT (A)'s order.
Issue 3 - Deletion of Bond Issue Expenses Disallowance:
Regarding the disallowance of Rs. 10,00,300 for bond issue expenses, the AO treated it as capital expenditure, resulting in a full disallowance. The Ld. CIT (A) overturned this decision, citing precedents from the assessee's previous cases. The ITAT noted that the expenditure was for bond registration charges related to guarantees against borrowings, which the AO disallowed. However, the ITAT considered this as a revenue expenditure under sec. 37(i), in line with the Government of India's guarantee on borrowings. Consequently, the ITAT dismissed the revenue's appeal and confirmed the Ld. CIT (A)'s order.
In conclusion, the ITAT Mumbai upheld the decisions of the Ld. CIT (A) on all three issues, dismissing the revenue's appeal in its entirety.
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2011 (8) TMI 1091
Whether the liability for payment of an amount equal to 8 % of the value of the exempted goods u/r 6(3)(b) of CCR 2002/2004 can be fulfilled by mere reversal of credit involved in the inputs contained in the exempted product? - Held that: - Rule 6(3)(b) of the CCR 2004 provides that if the exempted goods are other than those described in condition (a), the manufacturer shall pay an amount equal to ten percent of the total price, excluding sales tax and other taxes if any, paid on such goods, of the exempted final product charged by the manufacturer for the sale of such goods at the time of their clearance from the factory -
We do not find substance in the contention of the department-appellant that the Company cannot reverse the credit until separate accounts were maintained, for which no finding has been recorded by the Tribunal - Rule 6(3)(b) is not attracted in the present case.
Appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2011 (8) TMI 1090
Whether total non-compliance with the provisions sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is impermissible but delayed compliance with a satisfactory explanation for the delay can, however, be countenanced?
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2011 (8) TMI 1089
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of PHED in granting land.
2. Validity of the order dated 23.04.1969.
3. Application of the principle of res judicata.
4. Legitimacy of Civil Court's jurisdiction under the Land Revenue Act.
5. Public interest concerning land within the catchment area.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of PHED in Granting Land:
The core issue revolves around the grant of 460.15 bighas of land by the PHED to the respondents on 23.04.1969. The State contended that the PHED lacked jurisdiction to allot the land, as the authority to grant land resided solely with the Land Revenue Department under the Land Revenue Act. The Supreme Court upheld this view, noting that the PHED was not empowered to transfer such a significant portion of land, making the allotment ex facie without jurisdiction.
2. Validity of the Order Dated 23.04.1969:
The validity of the order dated 23.04.1969 was a significant point of contention. The State argued that the order was invalid as it was based on a flawed premise, given the land's earlier cancellation in 1942 and the subsequent compensation paid in 1949. The Supreme Court found that the order had not been adjudicated on merits by any appellate or revisional forum and directed the State Government to re-examine the validity of the order, ensuring due process and an opportunity for the respondents to present their case.
3. Application of the Principle of Res Judicata:
The respondents argued that the principle of res judicata applied, preventing the re-litigation of the matter. However, the Supreme Court clarified that res judicata does not apply when a decree is a nullity due to the court's lack of jurisdiction. The Court cited precedents, including *Sabitri Dei and Others vs. Sarat Chandra Rout and Others* and *Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra*, to emphasize that a decree passed without jurisdiction is void ab initio and does not bind the parties.
4. Legitimacy of Civil Court's Jurisdiction under the Land Revenue Act:
The Supreme Court highlighted that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was ousted by Section 259 of the Land Revenue Act. Any decree passed contrary to this provision is null and void. The Court noted that the Munsif Magistrate's decree dated 30.06.1982, which restrained the State Government from altering the contract, did not address the merits of the allotment's validity and was thus a nullity.
5. Public Interest Concerning Land within the Catchment Area:
The Court recognized the public interest implications, noting that the land in question was part of the catchment area for a canal, and any obstruction to the water flow was against public interest. The Court accepted the intervenor's statement that no land should be allotted if it obstructs water flow, reiterating this principle in several orders. The Court directed the State Government to consider this public interest aspect while re-examining the matter.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order dated 14.10.2003 and directed the Revenue Department of the State of Rajasthan to decide the matter afresh within four months. The Court emphasized the need for proper adjudication on the merits of the land allotment, considering jurisdictional authority, public interest, and ensuring due process. Both appeals were allowed, with no order as to costs.
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2011 (8) TMI 1088
Legal judgment by Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Anil R. Dave, JJ. Citation: 2011 (8) TMI 1088 - SC. Delay condoned. Special leave petitions dismissed.
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2011 (8) TMI 1087
Duty demand - Clandestine removal of goods - Assessee had indulged in the activity of manufacturing, transporting, depositing or in any other manner indulge in manufacturing and removing of excisable goods namely impregnated diamond scalves in contravention of provisions of rules and thereby rendered themselves liable for penal action under Rules 173Q(1) and 209A of the Central Excise Rules.
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2011 (8) TMI 1086
Whether the Committee so constituted may not be justified in submitting the report stating that the entire uniform system of education be scrapped and the text books already provided for be discarded?
Whether the Expert Committee has mis-directed itself as it ought to have proceeded primarily to examine the ways and means of implementing the uniform system of education, curiously the Committee, in its final report concluded that no text book can be used for the academic year 2011-12.?
Whether the Committee members were not of the unanimous opinion that the uniform syllabus and common text books have to be discarded from the current year?
Whether the High Court directed the Government to notify the approved text books after conducting the study with a view to comply with the direction issued earlier on 30.4.2010. This direction was issued to enable the schools to choose from the multiple text books?
Whether the State has exceeded its power in bringing the Amending Act to postpone an enactment which has already come into force?
Whether if the law was passed only ostensibly but was in truth and substance, one for accomplishing an unauthorized object, the court would be entitled to lift the veil and judicially review the case.
Whether the State has sought to achieve indirectly what could not be achieved directly as it was prevented from doing so in view of the judgment of the Division Bench which upheld the validity of the Parent Act 2010?
Whether the Amendment Act 2011 is an arbitrary piece of legislation and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the Amendment Act 2011 was merely a pretence to do away with the uniform system of education under the guise of putting on hold the implementation of the Parent Act, which the State was not empowered to do so?
Whether if the impugned Amending Act has to be given effect to, it would result in unsettling various issues and the larger interest of children would be jeopardized?
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