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Showing 301 to 320 of 1557 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 1258
Levy of service tax - services provided by the Asansol Durgapur Development Authority (ADDA), a government agency - the agency was performing statutory functions - quantification of the service tax demand - time limitation.
HELD THAT:- The ADDA has been created under a specific statute and it performs all acts on behalf of the State Govt of West Bengal. Their accounts, income and expenditure etc. are all controlled by and are answerable to the State Government. Therefore, there are no hesitation to come to a conclusion that ADDA is performing sovereign functions on behalf of the State Government of West Bengal.
The Bangalore Bench of CESTAT in the case of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. CCT, Bangalore (North), [2020 (6) TMI 227 - CESTAT, BANGALORE], the coordinate Bench of Bangalore has held that 'the appellant is a statutory body discharging the statutory function as per the statute KIAD Act, 1966 and hence are not liable to pay service tax in view of the ratios of the various decisions cited supra.'
Thus, the assessee would be exempted from payment of Service Tax when they are performing sovereign functions. But it is also required to check if all the considerations received by ADDA would be in the course of sovereign function alone are if some of the services are commercial in nature.
In the present case, though it stands established that ADDA is a statutorily created body, also recognized as such by ITAT for Income Tax purposes, and is seen to be performing some sovereign functions like collecting licensing fee and other fee on account the land development [which is required to be verified], the other services provided by them like that of Renting of Immovable property, Renting of Advertisement space, Leasing of Tangible goods like road roller are not eligible for Service Tax exemption - ADDA would be required to pay the Service Tax, since these services are not in any way on account of performing of any sovereign function.
Quantification of the service tax demand - HELD THAT:- The Licensing Fee, Land Development fee would be in the nature of compulsory fee / mandatory fee, being collected as part of sovereign function and hence would be exempted. But no bifurcation has been carried out in the Annexure B to SCN, wherein the quantification is done.
In respect of 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12, even the above perfunctory work has not been undertaken. Simply the value shown in the Balance Sheet / Bank Statement have been taken to quantify the demand. Therefore, there are considerable force in the argument of the appellant that quantification of demand is neither scientific nor is properly backed by any concrete documentary evidence - there are no hesitation in holding that Service Tax demand for the 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 cannot be legally be sustained - the quantification adopted by the Revenue while issuing the SCN, even the confirmed demand of Rs. 2,95,48,401/- cannot be legally sustained.
Time limitation - HELD THAT:- The ADDA a body created by statute and is undertaking various functions assigned to them by the State Govt. and is also rendering various taxable services. But it is an admitted fact that all their income and expenditure are subject to the control of the State Govt. Hence, it would be difficult to adduce any ulterior motive to ADDA to the effect that they have suppressed the facts with an intent to evade the Service Tax payment. It is also seen that the figures taken for quantification of demand have been derived the Income and Expenditure statement and Balance Sheet of ADDA, which shows that all the details have been disclosed in the records. Further, their reliance on ITAT order, and vehement argument about their being statutory body carrying out sovereign functions, shows that they may have carried bona fide belief that they are not required to the Service Tax. Hence, the SCN issued on 12.10.2012 for the 2007-2008 to 2011-12 is partly time barred. Accordingly, the confirmed duty for the extended period is legally not sustainable.
Conclusion - i) ADDA is performing sovereign functions on behalf of the State Government of West Bengal. ii) The quantification of demand is neither scientific nor is properly backed by any concrete documentary evidence. iii) The proceedings were partly time-barred.
Appeal filed by the appellant [ADDA] is allowed fully on merits. The Appeal filed by the appellant [ADDA] is allowed on time bar in respect of the confirmed demand for the extended period.
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2025 (1) TMI 1257
Recovery of Central Excise Duty with interest and penalty - Clandestine Removal - opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was not provided - denial of access to necessary documents - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is true that the CESTAT has remanded the matter to the respondent No. 2 to supply the documents sought for by the petitioner as well as to provide the opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses in compliance with the provisions of section 9D of the Central Excise Act,1944. The respondent No. 2, pursuant to the order of remand made by the Tribunal, issued the notice to 10 witnesses to remain present on 21.08.2024, however, on 21.08.2024, none of the ten witnesses remained present nor any request was made for adjournment, or any submissions were made by any of the witnesses. The respondent No. 2 therefore, recording the statement made by learned advocates appearing for the petitioner for hearing, proceeded to adjudicate the show-cause notice.
It appears that the respondent No. 2 has taken into consideration all the grievances of the petitioner with regard to the violation of principle of natural justice which are again reiterated in this petition. Be that as it may, it is not required to entertain this petition on the ground of breach of principle of natural justice in view of the above observation made by respondent No. 2 which may be considered by the CESTAT in the appeal which may be filed by the petitioner under section 35E of the Central excise Act,1944.
Conclusion - i) The petitioner's grievances regarding natural justice and document access should be addressed by the CESTAT. ii) The petition is not entertained though it may be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with liberty to the petitioner to approach CESTAT challenging the impugned Order-in-original. iii) It is also observed that the time spent by the petitioner before this Court to be considered as bona fide by the CESTAT, if the petitioner file appeal before the Tribunal in accordance with law within four weeks from today without raising issue of delay.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1256
Entitlement to interest on the refund of a pre-deposit amount made in 2012, which was refunded following a favorable appellate decision in 2018 - interpretation and application of Sections 35F and 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as they existed prior to and after the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2014 - HELD THAT:- From the perusal of the section 35F it is evident that the amounts deposited in terms of this section are noting but duty. The use of phrase in this section “pending the appeal, deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded.” Further from the perusal of Section 35 FF it is evident that in case the appeal is finally decided in favour of the appellant hen the amount, so deposited under Section 35 F shall be refunded along with interest for period after expiry of period of three months from the date of communication of order of Appellate Authority at the rates specified as per section 11BB.
It is observed that while making the above substitution w.e.f. 06.08.2014 specifically by proviso to Section 35F and Section 35FF, it has been stated that the amount deposited under Section 35F of the Act, prior to commencement of Finance Act, 2014, will be governed by provision of Section 35F as it existed before the commencement. In view of the specific provision made in the Act, the refund claim of the deposit made will have to be considered in terms of Section 35FF as it existed on the date of deposit and the interest will be paid at the rate specified in Section 11BB after expiry of three months from the date of communication of the order of the Appellate Authority till the date.
Reliance placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandvik Asia [2006 (1) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT]. Interpreting the above decision of Hon’ble Supreme various benches of tribunal have concluded in the favour of the grant of interest form the date of deposit and at the rate of 12% (though not provided by the statute or any Notification issued in terms of Section 11BB or Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944). However it may also be noted that these decisions were in respect of the deposits made when there was no separate provision for refund of deposits along with interest. In that situation courts and tribunals were allowing interest from the date of deposit till the date of refund and were also prescribing the rate of interest as deemed fit.
Conclusion - The appellant was not entitled to interest on the refunded amount as the refund was made within the statutory period, and the applicable legal provisions did not support the appellant's claim for interest from the date of deposit.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1255
Confiscation of seized goods - provisional release on payment of redemption fine - penalty under Rule 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 - HELD THAT:- Since the main appellant has settled the issue under SVLDR Scheme, penalty imposed on co-noticees being the CEO and Managing Director of the main noticee is unsustainable.
Similar issue decided in decision of the Tribunal in the matter of V K Agarwal Vs. CC, New Delhi [2023 (9) TMI 178 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] wherein it is held that 'without considering the directions given in the remand order and allowing cross examination, Commissioner has imposed penalties on the appellant, just for reason that the appellant did not settle the issue along with others under SVLDRS. Such approach of Commissioner cannot be justified. Even if the appellant has not approached under SVLDRS, Commissioner should have adjudicated as directed by Tribunal. No justification for imposition of penalty on reconsideration as per order of Tribunal is forthcoming.'
Conclusion - When a demand is settled under the SVLDR Scheme, penalties on co-noticees should not be sustained.
Since the issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the matter of VK Agarwal, there are no reason to differ - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1254
Refund of Excise duty paid under protest - appellant's activity of fabricating transmission towers amounting to manufacture or not - time limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act - HELD THAT:- The amount collected by way of Central excise duty was illegal as the activity itself did not involve any manufacture and the same cannot be allowed to be retained by the Government. On the principle that tax can be collected only by authority of law, the observations of the Tribunal in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, DELHI VERSUS POLYGLASS ACRYLIC MFG. CO. P. LTD. [2011 (6) TMI 305 - CESTAT, DELHI] that when Central excise duty is collected illegally the same cannot be retained by the Government supports the case of the appellant. Such is the mandate of Article 265 of the Constitution of India.
Once it is held that the Government is not entitled to retain the amount deposited by the appellant, the next issue is regarding the time limit for reversing the said amount to the assessee. The Madras High Court in M/S. NATRAJ AND VENKAT ASSOCIATES VERSUS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, SERVICE TAX [2009 (10) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., NEW DELHI [2010 (4) TMI 625 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] held that once the tax was not payable at all, time limit does not apply for filing the refund of the said amount.
The other issue that ‘under protest’ was not made in the prescribed format, is irrelevant. It is a settled principle that on mere procedural technicalities, the relief cannot be denied, which otherwise is available to a party. For the period prior to the introduction of Rule 233B (01.06.1981), there was no specific provision prescribing any specific mode of endorsing ‘under protest’ and, therefore, the appellant cannot be non-suited for not making proper endorsement.
The refund claim cannot be rejected for non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 233B. The endorsement ‘under protest’ on the gate passes by the appellant is sufficient to say that the appellant paid the duty ‘under protest’ and hence, cannot be denied the refund of the amount illegally collected by the Department.
The Apex Court in SANDVIK ASIA LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX AND OTHERS [2006 (1) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT] with reference to the provisions of the Income Tax Act has observed that in view of the express provisions of the Act the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest on the delay in the payment of amounts lawfully due to the appellant which were wrongly withheld by the Department for an inordinate long period. The Act itself recognised in principle, the liability of the Department to pay interest where the amount deposited by the assessee is unduly retained.
Conclusion - i) Duty was collected by the Department under mistake of law for which no time limit applies and, therefore, the refund claim on the ground of delay has been wrongly rejected. ii) The endorsement on the gate passes, ‘under protest’ is sufficient to indicate that the appellant has paid the duty ‘under protest’ and hence, the refund claim cannot be rejected as time barred. iii) The retention of the amount which is in the nature of revenue deposit would be wholly unjustified being violative of Article 265 of the Constitution. iv) The appellant is entitled to the refund claim along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of refund claim was rejected.
The impugned order is set aside and the Department is directed to release the refund along with interest to the appellant - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1253
Recovery of Central excise Duty with interest and penalty - duty on intermediate product PPFMY which arises during the course of manufacture of the finished products - confirmation of duty with interest and penalty - HELD THAT:- As the Tribunal has in Appellant’s own case M/S ASMA TRADERS VERSUS CCE&ST, KANPUR [2018 (1) TMI 1535 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD] held that PPMFY arises during the continuous manufacturing process of Narrow Woven Fabric is not marketable and hence no goods/excisable goods comes into existence. The claim of the Appellant in the present proceedings that they were paying duty on the intermediate product goes contrary to this order as Appellant can pay duty only on the goods/ excisable goods which come into existence and are subject to duty.
Undisputedly the Appellant has taken a cenvat credit on inputs used in the manufacture of finished goods. In terms of the condition of Exemption N/N. 30/2004-Central Excise the benefit of said Notification would not be available to them, and they are required to pay central excise duty on the finished goods - the demand has been confirmed against the Appellant without allowing the benefit of the duty already paid by them by treating PPMFY as excisable goods. The quantum demand confirmed needs to be worked out after making adjustment for the duty already paid.
Conclusion - The demand for excise duty on the final product, Narrow Woven Fabric, due to the appellant's availing of CENVAT credit on inputs upheld. The penalty imposed under Section 11AC(1)(a) was set aside.
Matter is remanded for re-quantification of the demand of duty, giving credit of the duty already paid - appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1252
Penalties u/r 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 - denial of certain Cenvat credit on the ground that the said credit was taken against the material which were never received by them or used by them for production of the finished goods - HELD THAT:- Rule 26(2) was introduced by Notification No.8/2007-CE(NT) dated 01.03.2007. From the plain reading of the said notification it appears that Rule 26 as is existed prior to the said amendment was reframed at 26(1) and 26 (2) provided for imposition of penalties under the said Rule the provisions specified therein. The said rule being a separate new rule inserted could not have been said to be in respect of the persons covered by Rule 26 (1) which apparently was rule 26 prior to the existence, prior to the date of insertion. The provisions of said rule 26 (2) could not have been invoked for the imposition of penalties on the persons whose offences were specified in terms of Rule 26.
There is not even iota of allegation or evidence to show that appellants were concern with handling, removing of any goods which were liable for confiscation. On the contrary, the case against the appellants is that there were paying duties, credit of which was being taken by M/s Accurate Meters Ltd.
In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHANDIGARH VERSUS SURYA ISPAT UDYOG [2017 (4) TMI 1298 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] has held that 'penalty provision for facilitating others in taking credit or issuance of invoice without actual supply of material has been inserted w.e.f. 1-3-2007 by inserting sub-rule (2) of Rule 26 of Central Excise Rules with the issue of Notification No. 8/2007-C.E. (N.T.), dt. 1-3-2007 and during the relevant period there was no provision under law for imposition of penalty for issuance of invoices without actual supply of material.'
Conclusion - Penal provisions cannot be applied retrospectively unless explicitly stated in the statute. Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, cannot be applied to conduct predating its enactment. Rule 25 requires specific involvement with goods liable for confiscation, which was not demonstrated in this case.
The duty paid goods could not have been held liable for confiscation as the basic ingredient for invoking Rule 25 are missing in the cases against the appellant. The penalties imposed under Rule 25 also set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1251
True and proper construction of Section 51 (7) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 - mere filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20 (1) r/w. Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002, is sufficient without filing application for refund as per law to claim refund when it is mandatory to file refund application on portal within stipulated limitation - mandate to submit E-form-501, within stipulated period of limitation to claim refund despite filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20 (1) r/w. Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002 - correctness in directing Assessing Authority to process application of refund when it was neither filed as per law nor within limitation - applicability of decision in Mahalaxmi Cotton and Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries v/s. The State of Maharashtra [2012 (5) TMI 152 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] - limitation with respect to claim of refund ought to be considered in view of the provisions of u/s. 23 of the MVAT Act or not.
HELD THAT:- The Appellant/Assessee before the Tribunal, being a dealer registered under the MVAT Act, had filed returns for the period 2010-2011 showing a refund of Rs. 4,56,216/-. However, the said refund was not granted to the Assessee. Hence, a letter was written to the Nodal Officer. The Commissioner of State Tax (D-901), Nodal Division-5, vide Order dated 19th May, 2018, rejected the Assessee’s request for refund on the ground that the Assessee had failed to apply for grant of refund within the prescribed time. It was mentioned that the application for refund in respect of Assessment Year 2010-2011 was time barred under the provisions of Section 23 of the MVAT Act.
The Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers), after relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vichare and Co. Pvt. Ltd., v/s. State of Maharashtra & Others [2015 (3) TMI 1403 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], came to the conclusion that the Department had misconstrued the legal provisions and the right to get a refund under Section 51 (1) to (7) of the Act. The Tribunal held that if the dealer has paid an excess amount than what it is liable to pay, then the excess is not the property of the Department, or of the Government, but it is the property of the dealer, who is entitled to get a refund after scrutiny of the returns. In these circumstances, the Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers) allowed the Appeal and directed the Assessing Authority to scrutinize/ assess the returns submitted by the Appellant [i.e. Om Shree Developers], in accordance with law, at the earliest.
Conclusion - The self-assessment returns are sufficient for refund claims and that the Department must process the Assessee's refund application. The appeal was disposed of with a directive for the Department to scrutinize the returns and process any due refund within six months.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1250
Challenge to summoning order - Dishonour of Cheque - determination of criminal liability of a Director, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed - HELD THAT:- From the entire averments made in the Petition, what emerges is that the Petitioner herein was admittedly the Director in the year 1998 at the time when the parties started negotiating initially - There is not an iota of averment made against the Petitioner that he continued to be the Director or was responsible for day-to-day conduct of business at the time in 2017, when the impugned Cheque was issued.
Section 141 of the N.I. Act mandates that those Directors/Officials who are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company are responsible for any dishonour of the Cheque issued for and on behalf of the Company.
In the present case, there is not a single averment to show that the Petitioner was in any way responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company on the date of issuance of Cheque and cannot be summoned in a Complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act, on the basis of his personal liability. Moreover, the Legal Notice dated 06.09.2017 is addressed only to the Respondent No. 2/Company/M/s Selco International Ltd. and Respondent No. 3/Dr. Venkata Rama Krishna Govindraju a.k.a. Dr. G.V. Rama Krishna; it is not addressed to the Petitioner - He is neither a signatory to the Cheque nor is a Director in the accused-Company and there is no Legal Notice served upon him; therefore, he is entitled to be discharged.
Conclusion - i) Only directors responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs at the time of the offense can be held liable under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. ii) A guarantor's liability is civil and does not extend to criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. iii) The absence of a legal notice to the petitioner and lack of evidence of his involvement warranted setting aside the summoning order.
The impugned Order dated 18.05.2018 summoning the Petitioner Sh. N. Vijaya Kumar, is hereby set aside - Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1249
Recovery of dues - Interpretation of Statute - Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the GST Act - HELD THAT:- The High Court after assigning cogent reasons took the view that the respondent – herein was merely an employee of the Company and he could not have been fastened with the liability of Rs. 3731 Crore.
There are no good reason to interfere with the common impugned Orders passed by the High Court - SLP dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1248
Availment of excess amount of Input Tax Credit in GSTR-3B than the amount of Input Tax Credit available as per GSTR-2A -petitioner contended that merely because data of purchase is not reflected in GSTR-2A, it is not a valid ground for denial of Input Tax Credit - HELD THAT:- The fact that the petitioner had uploaded documents along with the appeal filed before the Joint Commissioner can be seen from Serial No.18 of Form GST APL-01 along with ‘brief facts’ and also mentioning several ‘grounds of appeal’. The said documents include online reply ASMT-11 to the ASMT-10 notice. Therefore, the stand of the respondents that no reply was given to ASMT-10 notice is factually incorrect. Therefore, the order of the 2nd Respondent is vitiated on account of non-consideration of the same.
Under Section 107(8) of the Act, it is duty of the Appellate Authority to give an opportunity to the appellant of being heard. There is no evidence that such opportunity of hearing was provided to the appellant by the Joint Commissioner - Moreover, under Section 107(12) of the Act, the order of the Appellate Authority disposing of the appeal shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision.
Conclusion - Since the order (Annexure-3) passed by the Appellate Authority is in blatant violation of the above provisions of the Jharkhand Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, on account of non-compliance with Sections 107 (8) and 107 (12) thereof , the said order as well as the order of the Primary Authority (Annexure-1) are both set aside; the matter is remitted to the Primary Authority (Respondent 2) to issue notice of hearing to the petitioner, consider the documents, such as, ASMT-11 filed online by the petitioner to ASMT-10 notice and then pass a reasoned order in accordance with law.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1247
Territorial Jurisdiction to adjudicate the SCN issued to the petitioners - levy of penalty on the petitioners under section 122 (1) (i) (x) (xvii) (xviii) and (xix) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 - invocation of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the SCNs - alleged evasion of tax by the three concerns - unaccounted production and clandestine supplies/clearances of pan masala and scented tobacco/jarda - HELD THAT:- It appears that the petitioners have tried to raise the contentions with regard to the jurisdiction of adjudication of the show cause notices by Additional Commissioner, Kanpur heavily relying upon para no. 7.1 which is inserted by Circular No. 169 of 2022 in Circular No. 31 of 2018 which provides for powers of adjudication of the show cause notice issued by DGGI where the principal place of business of noticee/s fall under jurisdiction of multiple Central Tax Commissionerate or where multiple show cause notices are issued on the same issue on different noticee/s, such show cause notices may be adjudicated irrespective of amount involved in the show cause notices by one of the Additional/Joint Commissioners of Central Tax empowered with All India jurisdiction as per Notification No. 2 of 2022. Therefore, reliance is placed on Notification No. 2 of 2022 which refers to Principal Commissioners/ Commissioners of the Central Tax which includes the Principal Commissioner of Lucknow only.
The petitioners have therefore, referred to Notification No. 2 of 2017 which provides for notified officers having jurisdiction and as per Entry no. 12, Principal Commissioner of Lucknow falls within the Principal Chief Commissioner, Lucknow whereas Commissioner, Kanpur also would be under the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Lucknow. It was therefore, contended that as per para no. 7.1 of the Circular no. 169/2022, Principal Commissioner, Kanpur would not have All India jurisdiction as per Notification No. 2 of 2022 and as such, Additional Commissioner, Kanpur shall not have any power to adjudicate the impugned show cause notices qua the petitioners.
It appears that petitioners have been swayed away by the territorial jurisdiction prescribed in Notification No. 2 of 2017 whereas the impugned show cause notices are issued by DGGI, Ahmedabad and as per Notification No. 31 of 2018, proper officer under sections 73 and 74 under the GST Act and IGST Act would be Additional or Joint Commissioner of Central Tax who is required to determine the liability of tax and interest in the hands of the main noticee/s.
Conclusion - It would not be proper to entertain the writ petitions while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that allegations made in the show cause notices are required to be examined in the adjudication proceedings before one adjudicating authority only, it is opined that no interference is called for in the impugned show cause notices at this stage and the petitioners may raise all the contentions which are raised in these petitions before the adjudicating authority including the issue of jurisdiction as all the questions raised by the petitioners herein are left open to be adjudicated by the adjudicating authority.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1246
Seeking grant of regular bail - passing on unauthorized Input Tax Credit (ITC) to various firms through non-existent firms - HELD THAT:- Taking into account the fact that complaint has already been field against the applicant/accused and the further investigation is going on, moreover, the applicant is in jail since 22.11.2024, conclusion of the trial may takes some more time. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the present applicant is entitled to be released on bail in this case.
Let the Applicant, Rohit Singla, be released on bail on furnishing personal bond with two local sureties in the like sum to the satisfaction of the Court concerned with the conditions imposed.
Bail application allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1245
Maintainability of petition - appellant was relegated to file an appeal as provided under Section 107 of the GST Act - Challenge to an order of adjudication passed under Section 73 of the CGST/WBGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- The learned Single Bench was right in relegating the appellant to file the statutory appeal.
It is no doubt true that such a prayer cannot be made to the appellate authority - Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1244
Refund the differential GST amount paid by the petitioner for the works executed by the petitioner - HELD THAT:- In the case of SHRI M.G. ARUNKUMAR VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, THE UNION OF INDIA [2023 (8) TMI 1531 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] it was held that 'The respondent is hereby directed to reimburse GST amount as indicated in the representation dated 15.04.2023 vide Annexure-E.'.
Conclusion - The respondents are hereby directed to reimburse GST amount as indicated in the representation dated 21.11.2024.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1243
Inaction on the part of the respondents in not refunding the amount of GST collected from the petitioner in the course of the execution of the contract that was awarded to the petitioner - grievance of the petitioner is that inspite of repeated approach being made to the respondents, there is a total inaction on the part of the respondents so far as refund of GST is concerned - HELD THAT:- The writ petition as of now stands disposed of directing the State Authorities to immediately process the claim of the petitioner so far as refund of GST is concerned, after due verification of facts and also the entitlement part of the petitioner is concerned. Let an appropriate decision be taken keeping in view the earlier order of the State Government dated 10.10.2018 in this regard and all subsequent orders also passed in this regard by the State. The State Authorities shall also keep in mind the contention of the petitioner that in many of the similar cases, the govt. itself has refunded the GST.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1242
Block assessment u/s 158BC - penalty levied u/s 158BFA - offences allegedly committed u/s 276C and 277 r.w.s. 278B - Delay in filling SLP - as decided by HC [2023 (8) TMI 162 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] since, the Revenue has failed to produce the satisfaction note we have to and we hereby hold that the search action u/s 132(1) and, consequently, the block assessment order passed u/s 158BC, order levying penalty u/s 158BFA cannot survive as they are all predicated on the existence of a valid search - HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 404 days in filing the Special Leave Petitions which has not been satisfactorily explained by the Revenue.
Even otherwise, we see no reason to interfere with the common impugned orders passed by the High Court.Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits.
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2025 (1) TMI 1241
Proceedings u/s 153C - period of limitation - issuance of the notice was preceded by the drawl of a Satisfaction Note by the jurisdictional AO - Distinction between Section 153A and Section 153C - Delay filing SLP -
As decided by HC abatement of the six AYs’ or the “relevant assessment year” u/s 153C would follow the formation of opinion and satisfaction being reached that the material received is likely to impact the computation of income for a particular AY or AYs’ that may form part of the block of ten AYs’.
Invocation of Section 153C in respect of AYs’ for which no incriminating material had been gathered or obtained. Satisfaction Notes also fail to record any reasons as to how the material discovered and pertaining to a particular AY is likely to “have a bearing on the determination of the total income” for the year which is sought to be abated or reopened in terms of the impugned notices.
HELD THAT:- There is a delay of 162 and 145 days respectively in filing the Special Leave Petitions which has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners - Revenue.
Even otherwise, we see no reason to interfere with the common impugned orders passed by the High Court.
Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2025 (1) TMI 1240
Assessment order issued u/s 143 (3) r.w.s. 144B made by the second Respondent - Petitioner contended that since this was a clear case of breach of principles of natural justice, the rule for the exhaustion of alternate remedies should not be applied, and this Court should entertain this Petition.
HELD THAT:- Show-cause notice clearly informed the Petitioner that the sales figures could not be relied upon. The methodology by which the correct figures were proposed to be assessed was also clearly indicated in the notice itself. Thus, it is clear that the notice referred to a tentative assessment. Still, the Petitioner was clearly put on guard regarding the tentative opinion that the sales figures were unreliable. An assessment exercise was to be carried out according to the methodology indicated.
Therefore, at least prima facie, this is not a clear case of the impugned assessment order travelling beyond the show cause notice or a case where it could be ex-facie concluded that the Petitioner was prejudiced on account of the variation in the tentative figures suggested in the show cause notice and the final determination.
Finally, this is also not a case in which the Petitioner, in response to the show-cause notice and the further submissions, clearly and categorically requested a personal hearing. In the response dated 20 December 2022, in the last three lines, the Petitioner stated that it hoped the reply would satisfy the authorities, and if any further clarification is required in the matter, a video conferencing opportunity may please be given to clarify the stand.
Since the AO may not have required any further clarification, no video conferencing opportunity was granted to the Petitioner. Again, based on this material, we cannot hold that this is a case of patent violation of natural justice based on which the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies ought to be bypassed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1239
Transfer of the assessee’s case from Mumbai to Kochi - petitioner, submits that without furnishing a copy of the transfer proposal and the comments on the petitioner’s objections, the petitioner was disabled from showing appropriate cause why the proceedings should not be transferred - HELD THAT:- This does appear to be a case of denial of fair opportunity and, consequently, a violation of the principles of natural justice. On this ground, we set aside the impugned orders and remand the matter to PCIT to decide on the proposal for transfer from Mumbai to Kochi afresh.
The copy of the transfer proposal and response/comments on the petitioner’s objections have already been furnished/made known to the petitioner. Therefore, there is no question of granting any further documents to the petitioner.
The petitioner may, if it so chooses, file a fresh response or additional response within 15 days from today to the PCIT.
PCIT should then grant the petitioner an opportunity for a personal hearing and dispose of the proposal for transfer in accordance with law and on its own merits. A reasoned order must be made and communicated to the petitioner.
This exercise must be completed on or before 28 February 2025.
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