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Showing 301 to 320 of 712 Records
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2008 (3) TMI 482
Refund of excess amount paid against outstanding dues, along with interest at such rate as may be determined by this court - Held that:- It is premature at this stage to state that any excess amount is paid to respondent No. 1 bank. Respondent No. 1 bank has got a valid decree from the Debts Recovery Tribunal in its favour. The decree specifically states the amount with interest at the rate of 23.25 per cent. The secured creditors and workers have been paid. The official liquidator is not in a position to state that any amount is to be paid to any other secured creditor or the workman. Even if the amount is to be recovered from respondent No. 1 bank, that is to be paid as per the provisions contained in section 530 of the Companies Act, 1956.Since the Debts Recovery Tribunal has passed the decree it is presumed that the decree was passed after proper adjudication. So long as the decree remains in existence this court cannot take the view that it is an ex-parte decree or it is passed without any adjudication.
The court, therefore, at this stage does not issue any direction to respondent No. 1 bank to refund the excess amount. It is, however, open for the official liquidator to approach the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal challenging the decree in question
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2008 (3) TMI 481
Winding up - whether some of the claims of the appellant for payment of interest would be barred by limitation and some other claims would be within limitation?
Held that:- A perusal of the documents makes it clear that the fixed lease rentals were payable in 20 quarterly instalments covering a period of five years. There is also a stipulation that in the event of a default in the payment of the instalment, either by short payment or delayed payment, the appellant was entitled to recover from the respondent interest at 2 per cent per month, after 30 days from the respective due date of payment until payment and short fall in the lease rental with interest at 2 per cent per month till the date of payment. On going through the records we also find that the finding of the learned Company Judge that the cause of action for default of each instalment arose separately is justified. The period of limitation for any recovery is three years commencing from the date on which the instalment becomes due. The learned Company Judge was therefore justified in holding that since the appellant has filed the company petition only on 17-3-2005, therefore, the parties would go back three years from the said date with reference to the date when the instalment was belatedly paid by BHEL. So far as acknowledgements pointed out by the appellant in the letters dated 17-4-2001 and 11-10-2002, are concerned, in our considered opinion, the same could not be interpreted and construed to be any acknowledgement in any manner. The aforesaid letters only indicate that what was communicated was only a statement that the claim of the appellant would be looked into. No merit in appeal
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2008 (3) TMI 480
Jurisdiction of court - Held that:- Appeal allowed. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the State Jharkhand & only because the head office of the appellant-company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.
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2008 (3) TMI 479
Amalgamation - seeking directions from the Court for convening, holding and conducting separate meetings of the shareholders, secured and unsecured creditors - Held that:- The applicant/Transferor-company has 7 shareholders and applicant/Transferee-company has 2 shareholders. All the shareholders of the each company have given their consent in writing to the scheme of amalgamation, which have been filed on record. Since the consents to the scheme of amalgamation have been filed on behalf of the respective shareholders of the each company, thus it is just and appropriate to dispense with convening the meeting of the equity shareholders to consider the scheme of arrangement.
The applicant/transferor-company has no secured creditors and applicant/Transferee-company has 7 secured creditors. Thus, it is just and appropriate to dispense with convening the meeting of the secured creditors of the each company to consider the scheme of arrangement.
The applicant/Transferor-company has 213 unsecured creditors in all. The applicant has sought the holding of the meeting of its unsecured creditors for considering and if thought fit approving the scheme. Considering the facts and circumstances, the meeting of the unsecured creditors of the Transferor-company, be held on 19-4-2008 at 11.00 am, at Mother Dairy, Patparganj, Delhi-110092 as directed and required.
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2008 (3) TMI 478
Charge - Right of mortgagor - applicants have sought an order directing that the action on the part of the Court receiver in taking physical possession of the property in dispute is contrary to an order dated 13-4-2006 passed by this cou
Held that:- Considering the view taken namely that even assuming that the said sales were valid they are subject to and do not affect the plaintiffs rights under the said mortgage we do not consider it necessary to deal with these submissions. Suffice if to state that the said submissions were strangle urged by Mrs. Srikrishna both during the hearing as well as in the written submissions tendered by her.
In the circumstances the Chamber Summons is dismissed. It is however clarified that in the event of this suit being dismissed or in the event of the plaintiff’s mortgage not being enforced for any reason whatsoever the rights, if any, of the applicants are kept open both in respect of the sale proceeds if any as well as in respect of the property. Further the applicant is at liberty to redeem the mortgage as permissible in law. For this purpose although the sale in favour of the said auction purchaser is confirmed the order shall come into effect only on 16-7-2008. This order is itself also stayed till 16-7-2008.
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2008 (3) TMI 477
Amalgamation - rights of employees - Held that:- While substantially dismissing the appeal and confirming the order of the learned Company Judge granting sanction to the scheme of amalgamation of Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. (IPCL) with Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL), we direct that the persons who were in employment with Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. as on the date of the judgment of the learned Company Judge i.e., 16-8-2007 shall be given an option within one month from today informing them that those employees who do not wish to continue with Reliance Industries Ltd. shall be entitled to exercise within two months from today, the option not to continue with Reliance Industries Ltd. and upon exercise of such option they shall be entitled to receive compensation under the provisions of section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 i.e., the workmen who had been in continuous service for not less than one year as on 16-8-2007 with IPCL shall be entitled to compensation for services rendered to IPCL for the period up to 16-8-2007, in accordance with the provisions of section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It shall also be mentioned in the notice that those who continue with Reliance Industries Ltd. will not be entitled to such compensation.
In view of pendency of these proceedings for almost one year and also in view of the fact that the period of notice to be given under this order for fresh option shall also be for at least one month, there will be no need to give any notice or wages in lieu of one month’s notice as contemplated by section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.The notice as per this order shall be given by communicating the same to all the associations of employees/unions of workmen of erstwhile IPCL and by putting up the notice on the notice boards within the premises of all the units of erstwhile IPCL.
We also direct that the statement made by Mr. K.S. Nanavati as recorded in para 36 hereinabove shall be treated as added to sub-clause (a) in clause 8 (8.1) of the Scheme as sanctioned by the learned Company Judge.Subject to the directions contained and clarification made in the preceding para, the appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (3) TMI 476
Winding up - Custody of company’s property - Held that:- There is no substance in the contention that the applicants are ready and willing to purchase the property in question at market value. When the possession is sought to be taken from the applicants, it is not just and proper on their part to put forward such a contention especially when the applicants are not legally inducted tenants in the premises. Property which is in the possession of a tenant is the property of the Company, and on the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator or the Liquidator under the authority of the Court, the Liquidator is entitled to take into his hands all the properties which belongs to or which appear to belong to the Company.
The Official Liquidator is in the process of liquidating the undisputed assets of the Company and now the disputed assets are taken on hand. So at this stage, the Court will not allow the applicants to raise such contention. Even otherwise, there is no merits or substance in this contention and hence, it is rejected. Section 468 empowers the Court to make an order at any time after making a winding up order on any contributory, Trustee, Receiver, Banker, Agent, Officer or other employee of the Company, to pay, deliver, surrender or transfer forthwith or even such time as the Court directs, to the Liquidator, any money, property or books and papers in his custody or under his control, to which the Company is prima facie entitled. Thus none of the applicants of this group deserve any relief from this Court. All these applications are, therefore, rejected. T
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2008 (3) TMI 475
Winding up - whether the petitioner has made out a case under section 433(e) of the Act for ordering publication of petition ? - whether the first respondent-holding company is liable to discharge debt of the second respondent-subsidiary company; and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether holding company is also liable to be wound up upon failure of subsidiary company to discharge debt ?
Held that:- The chronology of events would show that Walnut gave three notices—in 2001, 2003 and 2004—even while exploring possibilities to get money by way of mediation and negotiations. Walnut even went to the extent of retaining unused material informing second respondent that material would be returned only on payment of amount. All these practices were intended only to bring pressure on second respondent. Ultimately, when second respondent failed to pay disputed debt, petitioner issued final notice on 23-7-2004, to holding company and subsidiary company on the premise that the holding company is also liable to discharge alleged debt of subsidiary company. This attitude of Walnut certainly amounts to pressurising debtor to part with the money. Therefore, this court is of considered opinion that this is not a fit case to admit and order publication of petition.
When admittedly Walnut was engaged by subsidiary company, which had supplied material, when admittedly unused material was sent back to subsidiary company, when admittedly first two notices were issued to subsidiary company, mere issue of final notice under section 434 of the Act to holding company, cannot and should not lead to an inference that it is liable to pay the debt of subsidiary company. The principle of lifting veil cannot be applied for ordering winding up of a holding company when creditor is unable to receive money from subsidiary company.
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2008 (3) TMI 474
Mismanagement and oppression by the majority shareholders - Held that:- Learned Company Law Board noticed that the second petitioner, who is the managing director of the first petitioner was active in the management of APAKSH either as vice-chairman of the board or the member of project monitoring committee, that he signed as many as nine cheques, that he himself opposed the audit of previous year accounts by M/s. S. R. Batliboi and Associates and that the petitioners failed to bring in the final call money even after the learned Company Law Board passed orders on March 20, 2003, to that effect. These are matters which are questions of fact and were proved before the Company Law Board by necessary material. It is not, therefore, proper for this court to go into these matters, which are not contentious.
The learned Company Law Board considered all the material for appreciating the facts, applied law and recorded findings correctly. The question of law, therefore, does not arise out of the said order. The company appeal is misconceived. Appeal dismissed.
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2008 (3) TMI 473
Amalgamation - Held that:- There is no legal impediment to sanction of the Scheme of Amalgamation which is annexed to the petition. Consequently, sanction is hereby granted to the Scheme of Amalgamation under sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The transferee company will comply with the statutory requirements in accordance with law. Certified copies of this order be filed with the Registrar of Companies within five weeks.
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2008 (3) TMI 472
Winding up - Circumstances in which company may be wound up by Tribunal - Held that:- Since the respondent company has lost its financial substratum and failed to discharge its liabilities towards the creditors, the companies is hereby ordered to be wound up. The official liquidator attached to this court is appointed as the liquidator of the company. He is directed to take charge of the assets, if any, of the company in liquidation. He is further directed to call for the details from the secured creditors, more particularly, from Bank of India and Dena Bank with regard to the amount realized from the sale of the assets of the company and amount paid to the workers till this date.
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2008 (3) TMI 471
Whether an order of winding up will serve the interest of the company or subvert the same?
Held that:- Once the Company Law Board gives a finding that acts of oppression have been established, winding up of the company on just and equitable grounds becomes automatic.
We, in the facts and circumstances of this case, are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where we should interfere with impugned judgment in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fees assessed at Rs. 50,000.
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2008 (3) TMI 470
Winding up – resuming the property of the company is illegal and invalid - Held that:- Order dated May 16, 2005, passed by the Estate Officer, PUDA-respondent No. 3 resuming the property of the company is illegal and invalid having been passed without leave of the company court and shall be deemed to be void ab initio and non-est in the eyes of law. Respondent No. 3 cannot be permitted to implement the aforesaid order which has no legal existence.
As a consequence of the above,direct respondent No. 2 to execute the necessary conveyance deed in favour of the applicant on the basis of the order dated April 20, 2006, passed by the company court. Since the official liquidator has categorically stated in his reply that the property is free hold property and it was only due to inadvertent mistake that it was notified as leasehold property, conveyance shall convey free hold and unencumbered rights to the applicant.
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2008 (3) TMI 469
Special Court - Jurisdiction and powers in civil matters - Held that:- After taking into account the decretal amount as amended, together with interest as directed by the Special Judge in his order dated 8-6-1995 in M.P. 43/1995, the appellant is directed to pay the balance decretal amount within 30-6-2008, in three equal instalments commencing from the month of April, 2008. The first of such instalments shall be paid by 15-4-2008, and the next two instalments by 15-5-2008 and 30-6-2008. The last instalment shall include any broken amount left over after payment of the first two instalments. The hearing of the garnishee notices before the Special Court, Mumbai, shall remain stayed till the said date, and in case of default of such payment being made, this order will cease to be operative and the order appealed against will stand revived.
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2008 (3) TMI 468
Whether amortisation cost of toolings was includible in the sale price of auto components as in the case of excise duty under the Central Excise Act, 1944?
Whether the department was right in equating sales tax to excise duty?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. In the present case, moulds were manufactured by the buyer/customer so that the auto components could be manufactured by the appellant in terms of the specifications given by the buyer. Therefore, the cost of manufacture of these moulds was incurred by the buyer/customer and not by the appellant. The High Court had erred in holding that the amortisation cost calculated in terms of rule 6 of the Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 is includible in the sale price of auto components sold by the appellant herein to its customer, M/s. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd.
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2008 (3) TMI 466
Whether the Cantonment Board has any power to levy entry tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. What is permissible according to Act is imposing tax within the parameters of section 137 for vehicles, horses and other animals for being kept in the ordinary course within municipality and is used in the ordinary course within it than levying entry tax by the Cantonment Board. The Cantonment Board did not have any authority or competence to levy tax on the entry of vehicles in the Cantonment area under section 60 of the Cantonment Act, 1924. The conclusions arrived at by the impugned judgment of the Division Bench are quite justified and no interference is called for.
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2008 (3) TMI 462
Whether the respondent herein was entitled to addition of colour monitors in the eligibility certificate dated February 23, 1995 entitling it to sales tax exemption under rule 28A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 for the manufacture of monochrome monitors and black and white TV sets?
Whether the respondent was entitled to claim addition of a new item (colour monitor) in the eligibility certificate given to it, which certificate was restricted to the manufacture of monochrome monitors and black-and-white TV sets?
Held that:- Department appeal allowed. remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
The High Court had erred in relying upon the fact that modified eligibility certificate stood granted as it was granted pursuant to the impugned judgment of the Tribunal. Similarly, the High Court has relied upon its earlier judgment in Bharti Teletech Ltd. C.W.P. No. 11884 of 2003, in which the writ petition filed by the Department stood dismissed on the ground of laches. Therefore, in our view, both the above circumstances were irrelevant. As stated above, the High Court should have considered the matter on interpretation of rule 28A of 1975 Rules. It has not considered the said rule. It has not considered the above arguments.
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2008 (3) TMI 460
Low-density polyethylene (LDPE) granules being used in the manufacture of cable-sheathing compound - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court has in its order observed that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the respondent processed LDPE granules for a certain purpose, but granules remain LDPE granules and it is not a new product, is a finding of fact and the Tribunal being the final fact-finding authority under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and there being no evidence on record to show that a new product had come into being which was marketable and known to the commercial world, no interference with the order of the Tribunal was called for.
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2008 (3) TMI 454
Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction, from gross turnover, the purchase value of the raw material which the assessee bought from exempted units?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is important to note that rule 29(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, 1955 used the words "goods which had suffered tax at the rates prescribed under section 5". Therefore, section 5 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 dealt with only the rate of tax. Therefore, section 5 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 contemplated only rate fix- ation and not to the stage of taxation whereas in the present case, we are concerned with section 5(1A) of 1948 Act which refers to the stage at which the tax has to be levied, namely, first stage of sale.
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2008 (3) TMI 452
Whether the ornaments and other articles of gold purchased by the assessee fall within the description of 'bullion and specie' given in entry 56 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The relevant period in the present appeals is from November 1, 1994 to March 31, 1995. Hence, the appellant cannot take any benefit of omission of the word "gold" in bracket for the period in question as the G.O. Ms. No. 625 dated July 31, 1996 is to take effect from August 1, 1996.
It is a well-established principle that exemption notifications are to be construed strictly as if the intention of the Legislature is clear and unambiguous, then it is not open to the courts to add words in the exemption notification to extend the benefit to other items which do not find mention in the notification. In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the expression used in the G.O. The intention of the State Government is clear that only gold bullion and specie is entitled to the concessional rate of tax. Under the circumstances, the same cannot be extended to silver as claimed by the assessee.
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9911796707
