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Showing 301 to 320 of 2041 Records
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2017 (9) TMI 1745
Income recognition - Accrual of income - Addition on account of interest accrued on non performing assets - year of taxation - Held that:- As decided in assessee's own case the argument of the learned D.R. that the assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting is also dismissed since this aspect has been dealt with by various High Courts referred to above wherein they have categorically held that even following the mercantile system of accounting the interest on NPA account cannot be said to have accrued in the impugned year since the recovery of the same was impossible and even otherwise for the purpose of Income Recognition the RBI Directions, 1998, had to be followed in view of section 45Q of the RBI Act.
Applying the "Real Income Theory", the prescribed Accounting Standard issued by ICAI on Revenue Recognition, AS-9, the accounting practise of the asseessee relating to interest on sticky loans and the RBI guidelines relating to accounting for interest on NPA's, it was held that such income was taxable in the year of receipt only, when its realisation becomes reasonably certain. No infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) holding the interest on NPA's as taxable in the year of receipt, so as to warrant interference.
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2017 (9) TMI 1744
Winding up of the respondent company u/s 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act - Held that:- This is a case where the respondent has failed and neglected to pay the amount which is, prima facie, due to the petitioner. It was made clear during the submissions that the petitioners have not sought winding up on the ground of deemed commercial insolvency but have restricted their case to failure and neglect to pay amount which is not in dispute that having been said. It is stated across the bar that the petitioner have also filed a Commercial Summary Suit. It will be open to the petitioner to pursue the said claim. The facts of the case before us is of the view that the respondent should be put to terms and therefore pass the following order:-
(i) The respondent shall deposit a sum of ₹ 1,45,79,032/- Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court within a period of 8 weeks from today.
(ii) In the event deposit is made and if a suit is filed by the Petitioner, the amounts so deposited will be transferred to the suit account and thereafter the company petition will stand dismissed.
(iii) If the amount is not so deposited, the petition shall revive and shall stand admitted, returnable within six weeks from the date of default and be advertised in two local newspapers i.e. Free Press Journal (in English) and Navshakti (in Marathi) and in the Maharashtra Government Gazette. Delay in publication of the advertisement in the Maharashtra Government Gazette shall not invalidate the advertisement and shall not constitute non-compliance of this direction or of the Company (Court) Rules, 1959.
(iv) The Petitioner shall deposit an amount of ₹ 10,000/- with the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court towards publication charges, within two weeks from the date of default, with intimation to the Company Registrar failing which the Petition shall stand dismissed for non prosecution.
(v) The learned Counsel for the Respondent Company waives service of the Petition under Rule 28 of the Companies Court Rules, 1959.
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2017 (9) TMI 1743
Charges collected by the appellant from the allottees of land - taxability - substantial part of the demand against the appellant in various proceedings, relate to their service tax liability on lump-sum premium amount, received by them from the allottees on allotment of land on long term basis - Held that:- There will be a stay of the impugned judgment and order dated 12-5-2017 passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi.
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2017 (9) TMI 1742
Rejection of Refund claim - whether the appellant can take, utilise Cenvat Credit during the month subsequent to the months in which these were available when the appellants are availing exemption benefit under N/N. 32/99-CE?
Held that:- On plain reading of Para 2B of N/N. 32/99-CE, it is clear that the manufacturer would utilise the whole of Cenvat Credit first and thereafter will pay the amount by cash which would be refunded - In the present case, the appellant had not utilised the credit first which was retained by them. Hence, the order of the Adjudicating Authority for recovery of the said amount is justified.
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2017 (9) TMI 1741
Section 40(a)(ia) disallowance - assessee had not deducted any TDS on rent / lease rent/godown rent, machinery hire, vehicle hire, consultancy, shuttering work, lamination, site office expenses, steel transport, road work and legal / professional charges - Held that:- We first proceed to deal with Revenue’s arguments in support of its grievance that the Assessing Officer had rightly disallowed assessee’s expenses to the tune of ₹ 5,48,450/- since it had deducted less than the prescribed TDS deduction in chapter XVIIB of the Act. We find that judgment in CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal [2012 (12) TMI 873 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] holds that Section 40(a)(ia) disallowance does not apply in case of short deduction of TDS. DR thereafter seeks to invoke proportionate disallowance of expenses to the extent of short deduction of TDS only. We find no merit in the instant alternative plea as well since there is no such course of action prescribed in the Act. The Revenue therefore fails in first substantive ground.
Section 36(1)(iii) interest disallowance - Held that:- The assessee’s advances in question of ₹ 63.08 crores are much less than its interest free funds of ₹ 29.90 crores. Relevant parties have also been found to be the same as in the said earlier assessment year. All these clinching facts have gone unrebutted in the course of hearing. We therefore affirm the CIT(A)’s findings deleting the impugned disallowance. The Revenue fails in its second substantive ground
Section 80IA deduction - assessee’s BOT road project cannot be treated as an instance of infrastructure development rendering profits derived therefrom in the form of toll collection as eligible for the impugned Section 80IA deduction - Held that:- The relevant items are Director’s remuneration, audit fees, consultancy charges, postage / telegram expenses, general expenses, telephone expenses, board meeting sitting fees expenses and depreciation etc. Learned counsel appearing at assessee’s behest is fair enough in not pressing for the impugned challenge made to all above heads of allocation except depreciation. We therefore uphold both the lower authorities’ action allocating the impugned expenses other than depreciation pertaining to building, air conditioner, computers, office equipments, furniture/fitting and vehicles.
We find no merit in learned Departmental Representative’s vehement contentions supporting both the lower authorities’ action allocating assessee’s depreciation claim in this regard since the same is applicable qua the relevant block of assets as defined in Section 2(11) r.w. Section 32 of the Act prescribing block wise depreciation qua buildings, machinery, plant or furniture in tangible assets category followed by intangible one specifying knowhow, patent, copyright etc. The Revenue fails to quote any case law that the impugned depreciation is not allowable once a particular asset stands included in the corresponding block hereinabove. We therefore reverse both the lower authorities’ action allocating assessee’s depreciation claim. The consequential disallowance arising therefrom for the purpose of assessee’s deduction claim u/s. 80IA of the Act is directed to be deleted.
Correctness of Section 14A r.w. Rule 8D disallowance - Held that:- Hon’ble Delhi high court’s judgment in Joint Investments Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (2015 (3) TMI 155 - DELHI HIGH COURT) that such a disallowance cannot exceed the exempt income amount itself. The Revenue is unable to rebut application of the above judicial precedent. We therefore direct the Assessing Officer to restrict the impugned disallowance to the extent of ₹ 46,643/- only. The assessee partly succeeds in the instant substantive ground.
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2017 (9) TMI 1740
Validity and veracity of Income Tax Settlement Commission order - Whether the writ petitions filed by the petitioners before this High Court are tenable or not or it should have been filed before the High Court of Kolkata? - Held that:- The writ petition which was filed before the Kolkata High Court by the assessees got dismissed. Since the impugned order under Section 245 D (4) is an independent order passed in exercise of its statutory powers conferred upon the Settlement Commission and where the challenge is on the merits of the order, the Income Tax Department had an option of either approaching the Kolkata High Court or they could have filed it in the High Court of Chhattisgarh which they have done at high Court of Chhattisgarh and which in the opinion of this Court cannot be said to be in any manner bad in law or without jurisdiction. Thus, the objection pertaining to the jurisdiction of this High Court does not have much force and the same deserves to be and is accordingly rejected.
Whether the impugned order passed by the Settlement Commissioner particularly on the basis of the observation in the impugned order of it being practicably not possible to scrutinize the documents on record, can be said to be proper, legal and justified? - Held that:- Once when the Settlement commission itself reaches to the conclusion that it is not practicable for it to examine the record and investigate the case, it ought to have laid its hand off and could have either intimated the Kolkata High Court regarding paucity of time to examine and investigate or could have asked the Department to move an appropriate application for grant of extension of time from the Kolkata High Court.
In the absence of either of the steps, closing of a matter and passing an order without examination of the records or without proper investigation would naturally vitiate the entire proceedings which otherwise has a force of law and where the principles of fairness, reasonableness and a judicious approach were mandatorily required. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned order would not stand the test of reasonableness. Once when the decision making process itself is found to be in contravention to the statutory provision, it is but natural that the decision would not be a justified order in the eye of law.
For the aforesaid reasons this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order as it stands is not sustainable and the same deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Settlement Commission to decide the application of the assesses afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties in accordance with law
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2017 (9) TMI 1739
CENVAT Credit - benefit of N/N. 94/96-Cus. Dated 16.12.1996 - DEPB Scheme - goods went out of India when came back to India being found to be defective - recovery of excise duty lost - Held that:- It does not appeal to common sense why additional duty of customs payable by the appellant shall be allowed towards cenvat credit when the goods earlier manufactured in India and exported duty free, came back, shall be treated in par with domestic goods insofar as leviability of excise duty is concerned - appellant is not entitled to cenvat credit of the additional duty of customs paid since excise duty has already been lost by Revenue while the goods under DEPB declaration left India duty free.
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2017 (9) TMI 1738
Additional evidence rejected by AO without giving an appropriate and proper opportunity to the assessee - Held that:- The assessee filed the details of the reconciliation of cash book and balances. AO in the remand report stated that the new cash book produced by the assessee as additional evidence is a recasted and fabricated document and is not acceptable. It is undisputed that AO submitted remand report without giving an opportunity to the assessee to explain and present its case. CIT (Appeals) accepted the remand report and confirmed the addition made by the Assessing Officer. Thus the additional evidence has been rejected by the Assessing Officer without giving an appropriate and proper opportunity to the assessee to explain its case. Accordingly, we set aside the matter to the record of the Assessing Officer for deciding the issue afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee - Appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose.
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2017 (9) TMI 1737
TPA - interest charged on loans advanced to its foreign subsidiary companies u/s 92CA(3) - LIBOR rate adoption - Held that:- In the instant case the assessee had advanced the sums on of it’s 100% foreign subsidiary for increasing the business and to improve the brand image of the company. The loans were for purely business purpose. Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Cotton Naturals [2015 (3) TMI 1031 - DELHI HIGH COURT]held that LIBOR should be adopted in outbound loans. The assessee has established the fact that the loans were given for the purpose of carrying on the business and to build the brand image globally and there is no intention of earning interest. Therefore, we hold that the interest charged by the assessee @ 2% which is more than LIBOR rate is reasonable and at arms length. Accordingly, we uphold the order of Ld. CIT(A) and dismiss the appeal of the revenue.
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2017 (9) TMI 1736
Delay of 1731 days in fling appeal - Limitation Act - no satisfactory reason given for condonation of delay - case of appellant is that it came to know about the dismissal of its appeal on account of non-compliance only when other appeals were decided by the Tribunal - Held that:- No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the assessee for such an inordinately long delay. Learned counsel for the assessee has also not been able to justify such a long delay in filing the appeal in this Court.
The question regarding whether there is sufficient cause or not, depends upon each case and primarily is a question of fact to be considered taking into totality of events which had taken place in a particular case - According to the assessee, it came to know about the dismissal of its appeal on account of non-compliance only when other appeals were decided by the Tribunal. This is not a sufficient ground for condoning the delay.
Delay cannot be condoned - Application for condonation of delay is dismissed
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2017 (9) TMI 1735
Appealable Order - Section 46 of the Act 2002 and Entry Tax Act of 1976 - the petitioner has circumvented the statutory stipulation contained under section 46 of the Act of 2002 read with Section 13 of 1976 Act, on the contention that the impugned order is contrary to the provisions of section 20-A (1-B) of the Act of 2002 read with section 13 of 1976 Act and barred by time as fixed under sub-section (7) of section 20 of 2002 Act - grant of Input tax Rebate - pre-deposit - violation of Section 20A (1B) of 2002 Act - Deemed Assessment.
Held that:- In the present case, evidently the petitioner availed the benefit under Deemed Assessment Scheme for the Assessment period 2014-15 which was accepted with carried forward Input-tax rebate ₹ 1346886/- for the year 2015-16, by order dated 27/07/2016, brought on record as Annexure P/2 - the rebate of Input Tax under sub-section (1) of Section 14 subject to sub-section (5) thereof, is allowed on being claimed in the circumstances which find mention in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14.
We are not commended at any provision which stipulates that with the acceptance of the application under Deemed Assessment Scheme, the registered dealer is exonerated from all other provisions contained under Section 20 of 2002 Act. The Legal fiction attached to assessment under the Scheme that it is treated as assessment under sub-section (1) of Section 20, cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created or beyond the language of Section by which it is created - the applicability of the provision of Section 20 of 2002 Act is thus not waived.
It was within the competence of the Competent Authority to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 20(5) of the Act of 2002. And since the order has been passed within the extended time period, we perceive no jurisdictional error as would give right to the petitioner to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The petitioner is relegated to avail the remedy of appeal under section 46 of 2002 Act read with 13 of 1976 Act - Petition disposed off.
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2017 (9) TMI 1734
Price manipulation in the scrip of Kailash Auto so as to ascertain the violation of securities laws - violation of provisions of the PFUTP Regulations - Held that:- Considering the fact that there are no adverse findings against the aforementioned 244 entities with respect to their role in the manipulation of the scrip of Kailash Auto, it is of the considered view that the directions issued against them vide interim order dated March 29, 2016 and confirmatory orders dated June 15, 2016, September 30, 2016, October 21, 2016, October 27, 2016 and July 13, 2017 are liable to be revoked.
In exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Section 19 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 read with Sections 11, 11(4) and 11B of the SEBI Act, hereby revoke the interim order dated March 29, 2016 and confirmatory orders dated June 15, 2016, September 30, 2016, October 21, 2016, October 27, 2016 and July 13, 2017 qua aforesaid 244 entities (paragraph 5 above) with immediate effect.
The revocation of the directions issued vide the abovementioned orders (at paragraph 7) is only in respect of the entities mentioned at paragraph 5 of this order in the matter of Kailash Auto. As regards remaining entities in the scrip of Kailash Auto, violations under SEBI Act, PFUTP Regulations, etc., were observed and SEBI shall continue its proceedings against them. Hence, the directions issued vide confirmatory order dated June 15, 2016 against the remaining 2 entities shall continue. This revocation order is without prejudice to any other action SEBI may initiate as per law
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2017 (9) TMI 1733
Liability of VAT - process of setting up the power station - Sub-contract - Applicant submits that the sub-contractors are registered dealers under the provisions of MVAT Act, 2002 and are discharging the applicable VAT on the aforesaid work carried out under the sub-contract. Since the VAT is discharged on the works contract by the sub-contractor, the Applicant does not charge VAT in its invoices raised on the customer for the same sub-contract work.
Whether the Applicant would be liable to pay VAT on the invoice raised to its customer i.e. PGCIL for the work undertaken by sub-contractors on its behalf - The clarification is being sought especially in light of the decision of the Hon. Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro [2006 (10) TMI 377 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] as upheld by the Hon. Supreme Court in STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. VERSUS LARSEN & TOURBO LTD. & ORS. [2008 (8) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT]?
Held that:- The applicant would be liable to pay tax on the entire value of the contract, subject of course to discharge of liability by the sub-contractor to the extent of the amount forming part of the contract value in terms of section 45 of the MVAT Act, 2002 - As regards amount retained by the principal contractor, the same is also a part of the same transaction and is liable to tax subject to the deduction as provided in law.
Prospective effect of order - Held that:- In the present case there is no ambiguity in the provision of Act. The total contract value is taxable in the works contract. The rule 58 is clearly laid dawn for the eligible deductions the principle contractor and subcontractor are held jointly and several responsible for tax liability. The rule 58 has taken due care to avoid double taxation as it provides the deduction of turnover related to subcontractor from total contract value. There is no scope, for any doubt arising out of the provisions. There is no ambiguity in language provided in the Sections and Rules - The applicant cannot prove existence of circumstances which warrant us to use the discretionary power. In fact use of such discretionary powers in the absence of compelling circumstances would be detrimental to legitimate government revenue and would wipe out the legitimate tax liability In these circumstances, we do not allow the use of prospective effect as a tool to protect or to wipe of legitimate tax liability - the pray for granting prospective effect to this order is hereby rejected.
Ruling:- The applicant is liable to pay tax on the entire value of the contract, subject of course to discharge of liability by the sub-contractor to the extent of the amount forming part of the contract value in terms of section 45 of the MVAT Act, 2002 and rule 58 of MVAT Rules, 2005.
Amount retained by the principal contractor is also a part of the same transaction and is liable to tax subject to the deduction as provided in law.
The prayer for prospective effect is rejected.
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2017 (9) TMI 1732
Revaluation of assets - Determination of value of asset - whether assessment would have to be done on the basis of the value of assets as on 1st April 2011 when partnership firm was constituted or revalued value of assets? - what was the value of the assets as on 1st April 2011? - maintainability of appeal - substantial question of law - Held that:- The value would necessarily have to be the value as recorded in the books of the firm as on 1st April 2011, i.e., the value before the revaluation. More over, as observed above, the learned Tribunal arrived at a factual finding with regard to the value of the assets transferred to the partnership as on 1st April 2011 and rejected the contention of the Revenue that the value of the assets as revalued would have to be taken into consideration. The learned Tribunal having factually determined the value of the assets in question as on 1st April 2011, this court cannot entertain any appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Right of appeal is not automatic. Right of appeal is conferred by statute. When statute confers a limited right of appeal only in a case which involves substantial questions of law, it is not open for this Court to sit in appeal over the factual findings arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal. There is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. - Decided against revenue
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2017 (9) TMI 1731
Suit for specific performance of agreement of sale - remedy available to the person aggrieved of the award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the Act - Held that:- The only remedy available to the aggrieved person(respondents herein/plaintiffs) was to file a writ petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court for challenging the award dated 22.08.2007 passed by the Lok Adalat. It was then for the writ Court to decide as to whether any ground was made out by the writ petitioners for quashing the award and, if so, whether those grounds are sufficient for its quashing.
The High Court was, therefore, not right in by passing the law laid down by this Court on the ground that the suit can be filed to challenge the award, if the challenge is founded on the allegations of fraud. In our opinion, it was not correct approach of the High Court to deal with the issue in question to which we do not concur.
Interpretation of the expression "law" occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code - whether the expression "law" occurring in clause(d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code includes "judicial decisions of the Apex Court"? - Held that:- Law includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial precedents. An authoritative judgment of the Courts including higher judiciary is also law.
When this Court has laid down a particular remedy to follow for challenging the award of Lok Adalat then in our view, the same is required to be followed by the litigant in letter and spirit as provided therein for adjudication of his grievance in the first instance. The reason being that it is a law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India - It is then for the writ court to decide as to what orders need to be passed on the facts arising in the case.
Impugned order is set aside and that of the order passed by the Trial Court is restored - appeal allowed.
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2017 (9) TMI 1730
Concessional rate of duty - N/N. 21/2002-Cus. - violation of use conditions - Whether the demand of differential duty on the goods imported by availing concessional rate of duty were eligible or otherwise which were not used for the intended purpose? - Held that:- Since the issue in respect of the very same appellant has attained finality in the hands of the Tribunal in the case of ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE. VERSUS M/S ACALMAR OILS & FATS LTD. AND (VICE-VERSA) [2017 (7) TMI 673 - CESTAT HYDERABAD], we find no reason to deviate from the said view already taken - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2017 (9) TMI 1729
Period of limitation u/s 153 - AO referred the matter for the special audit - Held that:- It is seen that the proviso to Explanation 1 to Section 153(1) comes into being, when, after the receipt of the special audit report or valuation report or information from the competent authority or the rejection of application by the settlement commission, the period available to the AO is less than 60 days, then the period shall be extended to 60 days to enable him to complete the assessment.
Provisions of the Act here cast an obligation on the AO that in case the matter is referred to a valuation officer or for special audit or to a competent authority, the AO is able to receive the information within the time limit prescribed under section 153(1) and in case where the remaining period to complete the assessment is less than 60 days then proviso gives a period of up to 60 days to complete the assessment.
We see considerable force in the arguments advanced by the Ld. Counsel that after the exclusion of the time taken under the situations envisaged under Explanation 1, there has to be some time available with the AO, which can be extended in terms of proviso to Explanation 1.
A combined reading and the intention of the legislature in above proviso clearly shows that the legislature envisaged that there would be class of cases where the special audit report is received when less than 60 days are remaining or available from the period of limitation under the normal provisions. Thus, in order to avoid hardship and give reasonable period to complete the assessment, the period of limitation is extended up to 60 days.
In the present case, the AO referred the matter for the special audit at the fag end on 26.12.2011, when the date for completion of assessment was 31.12.2011. The report of the special auditor was received on 22.06.2012, which was after the date of limitation i.e. 31.12.2011. It was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that once limitation period was crossed, and the information sought by the AO under the Explanation 1 to section 153 was pending, then there was no provision in the Act, which dealt with such situation.
We are of the view that the Assessing Officer has breached the period of limitation while passing the draft assessment order.
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2017 (9) TMI 1728
Reopening of assessment - demand of differential tax - classification of Crusher machine - Held that:- Ass per the statutory scheme of payment of compounded tax under Section 8 (f), the tax payable is based on the production capacity of the machine, which in turn is determined by the jaw size of the crushing machine concerned. The capacity of the machine, based on the power of the motor affixed to the machine, is not the criteria that is specified under the Act for classifying a machine for the purposes of tax.
The material received from the Mining and Geology Department is wholly irrelevant to the determination of the capacity of the machine for the purposes of payment of tax under the KVAT Act - Petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2017 (9) TMI 1727
Penalty u/s 27 (3) (c) and another penalty u/s 27 (4) (2) - mismatch of purchase and sales - opportunity of personal hearing not provided - principles of Natural Justice - Held that:- When the respondent Assessing Officer has passed the impugned order levying two penalties one under Section 27 (3) (c) and another under Section 27 (4) (2) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, the Assessing Officer ought to have given an opportunity of personal hearing - Also, a sum of ₹ 3,41,533/- has been found as balance tax due payable by the petitioner. Therefore, the respondents in my considered opinion, should have given the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to explain his case by appearing in person.
As it had not been done so and the matter involves the appreciation of facts, the respondents are hereby directed to give the petitioner a chance of personal hearing within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and thereafter pass final order - petition allowed by way of remand.
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2017 (9) TMI 1726
Denial of carry forward of loss for set-off in the subsequent years based on Sec. 79 - jurisdiction of AO - Held that:- Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manmohan Das (Deceased) (1965 (11) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT) held whether the loss in any year may be carried forward to the following year and set-off against the income of the subsequent year is liable to be determined by the Assessing Officer who deals with the assessment of such subsequent year. Also further noted that a decision recorded by the Assessing Officer who computes the loss in a previous year that the loss cannot be set-off against the income of the subsequent year is not binding on the assessee in the subsequent actual year of set-off
Assessing Officer in the instant year had no jurisdiction to give a finding that the loss of ₹ 7,96,21,402/- cannot be carried forward and set-off against the income of the subsequent year. Therefore, such observations/directions of AO in our view, are bereft of jurisdiction and are accordingly directed to be removed.
Our aforesaid decision should not be understood as any reflection on the merit or otherwise of invoking of Sec. 79 of the Act prohibiting carry forward and set-off of loss in certain situations. The application of Sec. 79 shall be open to be considered by the Assessing Officer in the subsequent year while evaluating the claim of the assessee for set-off of the impugned business loss. As a consequence of our aforesaid discussion, we set-aside the order of CIT(A) and direct the Assessing Officer to remove the directions relating to denial of carry forward and set-off of loss of ₹ 7,96,21,402/-. Thus, on this aspect, assessee succeeds for statistical purposes.
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