|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 321 to 340 of 467 Records
-
1997 (2) TMI 147
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding refund of excise duty as the High Court's order was based on a Tribunal decision upheld by the Court. The appellants had already refunded the duty before any changes in the statute regarding unjust enrichment. No other points were raised. No costs were awarded. (1997 (2) TMI 147 - SC)
-
1997 (2) TMI 146
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the petitioners who made payments for the period 1979 to 1984 under protest. The court found that the petitioners knew of the mistake as the payments were made under protest.
-
1997 (2) TMI 145
Issues Involved:
1. Remission of demurrage charges.
2. Discrimination against the petitioner.
3. Validity of the conditions imposed for remission.
4. Legal right to maintain the writ petition.
5. Implementation of policy decisions by the Port Trust.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Remission of Demurrage Charges:
The petitioner sought a writ of Mandamus to command the respondents to grant remission of demurrage charges for a consignment of ZVL-ZKL Brand Bearings, similar to the remission granted to other importers based in Bombay. The petitioner argued that the consignment was delayed due to customs assessment and not due to any fault on their part. The Port Trust had issued guidelines on 24-1-1992 and subsequent resolutions on 30-8-1995, allowing remission of up to 80% of demurrage charges or release of goods on payment equivalent to the CIF value, whichever was higher.
2. Discrimination Against the Petitioner:
The petitioner claimed discrimination as their application for remission was rejected on the ground that it was filed after 30-8-1995, whereas other importers who applied before this date were granted remission. The petitioner had previously applied for remission on 12-9-1994 and 9-1-1995, but these applications were not considered. The court noted that no cut-off date was specified in the guidelines or the resolution, thus the petitioner was entitled to similar treatment as other importers.
3. Validity of the Conditions Imposed for Remission:
The petitioner contended that the condition imposed by the respondents, requiring applications to be filed before 30-8-1995, was not part of the original guidelines or resolution. The court agreed, stating that the respondents could not rely on a ground inconsistent with the resolution dated 30-8-1995. The court found that the petitioner's right to remission flowed from the resolution and was enforceable in a court of law.
4. Legal Right to Maintain the Writ Petition:
The court held that the petitioner had a legal right to maintain the writ petition. It cited the case of Chaitnya Charan Das v. State of West Bengal, stating that a legal right does not necessarily mean a right flowing from a statute. A citizen can maintain a writ application questioning the inaction of the State in implementing its policy decisions or any unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory action by the State.
5. Implementation of Policy Decisions by the Port Trust:
The court observed that the Port Trust failed to implement its policy decision regarding the remission of demurrage charges for the petitioner. The court referenced Union of India v. M.P. Joseph, which held that administrative orders could confer rights and impose duties. The court concluded that the policy decision adopted by the Port Trust on 30-8-1995 conferred a right on the petitioner and imposed a corresponding duty on the Board to grant remission to eligible applicants.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the application, set aside the impugned order dated 31-7-1995, and remitted the matter back to the concerned respondents. The respondents were directed to pass a similar order as granted to other consignees who were similarly situated to the petitioner. No order as to costs was made.
-
1997 (2) TMI 144
The High Court at Calcutta allowed the Writ petition, quashed the order dated March 14, 1995, and restored Appeal No. E. 131 of 1989 to its original number before Respondent No. 2. The Tribunal was directed to hear and dispose of the appeal on its merits and in accordance with the law. The petitioner can apply for dispensing with the deposit requirement, and the Tribunal will decide on any interim relief based on merit. No costs were awarded, and all parties were to act on a xeroxed signed copy of the order.
-
1997 (2) TMI 143
The High Court of Judicature at Madras allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India and Assistant Collector of Central Excise, setting aside the judgment and decree in a suit for refund of excise duty. The suit was dismissed as not maintainable based on a Supreme Court judgment stating that refund claims must be adjudicated under specific sections of the Central Excise Act or Customs Act.
-
1997 (2) TMI 142
Issues:
1. Challenge to the assessment and rejection of representation by Assistant Commissioner of Customs.
2. Availability of alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Challenge to the assessment and rejection of representation by Assistant Commissioner of Customs
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or any appropriate writ to treat a Bill of Entry filed for home consumption and refund additional import duties. The petitioner, engaged in pharmaceutical manufacturing, imported machinery and spare parts. The Bill of Entry was filed before the Union Budget, which changed duty rates post-budget. The petitioner requested to substitute the Bill of Entry for warehousing with one for home consumption. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the request and levied duties based on post-budget rates, leading to the challenge in the petition. The court noted the availability of an alternative remedy through appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The court highlighted the principle that where an alternative remedy exists, resorting to writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is not permissible. The court disposed of the petition directing the petitioner to file an appeal within two months, allowing the petitioner to challenge the rejection letter in the appeal.
Issue 2: Availability of alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962
The court emphasized that the Customs Act, 1962 provides for an appeal mechanism under Section 128 for persons aggrieved by decisions or orders of Customs officers lower than a Collector of Customs. The appellate authority, now designated as Commissioner (Appeals), allows for challenging assessments made under the Act. Citing legal precedent, the court reiterated that when a statutory forum exists for redressal of grievances, the High Court should not entertain petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court clarified that the petitioner could challenge both the assessment and the rejection letter in the appeal. The court also noted that the Department would not oppose the appeal on the grounds of limitation if filed within the prescribed period. The judgment emphasized the importance of exhausting statutory remedies before seeking relief through writ jurisdiction.
This judgment underscores the significance of exhausting statutory remedies, particularly the appeal process under the Customs Act, before approaching the High Court for relief. The court's decision highlights the principle that alternative remedies should be pursued before seeking intervention through writ jurisdiction.
-
1997 (2) TMI 141
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order refusing waiver of duty, and remitted the matter to the Appellate Authority. The petitioner was given the opportunity to produce the latest financial documents for consideration. No costs were awarded.
-
1997 (2) TMI 140
The Supreme Court held that the appellate authority under Section 128(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 has the power to remand a decision. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order under appeal, and made no order as to costs. The respondent did not appear but filed an affidavit mentioning a previous decision by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal on a similar issue.
-
1997 (2) TMI 139
The High Court allowed the writ petition, granting total exemption to the petitioner company under Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The impugned order was modified, and the appeal before the Tribunal must be heard and disposed of on merit within six months. The stay order dated 3-9-1996 was vacated.
-
1997 (2) TMI 138
Issues: Valid service of show cause notice on the petitioner
The judgment addresses the issue of whether the show cause notice dated 30-9-1986 issued by the Collector of Central Excise was validly served upon the petitioner company. The petitioner, a public limited company, was involved in a series of mergers and name changes, leading to confusion regarding its corporate identity. The notice alleged evasion of central excise duties on cigarettes by mis-declaring assessable values. The notice was served on the Chairman of the company, who claimed he was not involved in day-to-day operations. The company contended that the notice was not served on them directly, raising questions of jurisdiction and time limitations under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
The judgment delves into the legal principles governing the service of notices under the Central Excise Act and the Companies Act. The petitioner argued that service on the Chairman did not equate to service on the company, emphasizing the importance of proper service for initiating legal action. The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that the Chairman could be deemed the authorized agent of the company, especially since the company had submitted to the jurisdiction by seeking clarification on the notice's validity. The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Acts and the concept of piercing the corporate veil to determine liability for alleged fraud.
The court examined the specifics of the show cause notice, the responses from the company and individuals, and the subsequent legal actions taken. It highlighted the company's awareness of the notice contents and its objections raised regarding jurisdiction. The judgment emphasized the principle of natural justice and the actual receipt of the notice over technicalities of service methods. Additionally, the court discussed the role of the Chairman as the authorized agent based on the notice's content and the company's knowledge of the allegations. The judgment concluded that the plea of want of jurisdiction for a writ of prohibition was unfounded, dismissing the writ petition and imposing costs on the petitioner.
-
1997 (2) TMI 137
Issues Involved:
1. Requirement of mens rea for levying personal penalty u/s 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Summary:
1. Requirement of mens rea for levying personal penalty u/s 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962:
The High Court of Judicature at Madras addressed whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that no mens rea was required for levying personal penalty u/s 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962. The applicant imported palmolein and got it cleared under "Open General Licence" (OGL). However, it was later found that the bill of lading was pre-dated, leading to the imposition of personal penalty under Section 112 of the Act. The applicant contended that personal penalty requires deliberate action or knowledge (mens rea), and its absence would make the imposition of such penalty without authority of law.
The Court reviewed various precedents and concluded that in cases of violations of economic laws, including customs, the element of mens rea is not a necessary ingredient for imposing penalties. The Court held that the establishment of blameworthy conduct, proven by the contravention of civil obligations, suffices to justify the imposition of personal penalties in adjudicatory proceedings. The Court emphasized that the nature of penalties under Section 112(a) is remedial and corrective, differing from criminal penalties which require proof of mens rea.
The Court referenced several decisions, including:
- Director of Enforcement v. M/s. M.CT.M. Corporation Private Ltd. (1996), which clarified that proceedings under economic laws are adjudicatory and not criminal, and do not require proof of mens rea.
- Gujarat Travancore Agency v. I.T. Commr., Kerala (1989), which distinguished between civil obligations under tax laws and criminal penalties, stating that mens rea is not required for the former.
- Vijaya Electricals v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991), which held that making a false representation under tax laws constitutes blameworthy conduct sufficient to impose penalties without proving mens rea.
The Court concluded that the imposition of personal penalties under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act is justified without establishing mens rea, as the penalties are intended to be deterrent and corrective for violations that undermine economic stability. The Tribunal's decision was upheld, and the question was answered in the affirmative, confirming that no mens rea is required for levying personal penalty u/s 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.
-
1997 (2) TMI 136
Issues involved: Challenge to show cause notices issued by Assistant Collector of Central Excise regarding inclusion of value of bought out items in assessable value of weighbridges.
Judgment Details:
1. The petitioners, manufacturers of electronic truck weighing systems, were informed to include the value of bought out items in the assessable value of weighbridges based on a previous court judgment. Show cause notices were issued challenging this decision.
2. An interim order allowed the proceedings to continue with no recoveries until the writ petition was decided. The show cause notices were later confirmed during the pendency of the writ petition.
3. The court noted a previous case where it was clarified that the liability to excise duty was only for the indicating system of the weighbridge, not the entire weighbridge itself. It was emphasized that the previous judgment did not categorize weighbridges as excisable goods.
4. Referring to the earlier case law, the court directed the petitioners to file appeals against the orders confirming the show cause notices. The appeals were to be decided considering the judgment in the mentioned case and other relevant judgments, with no limitation on time for filing the appeals and no requirement for pre-deposit for the appeal hearing.
5. The court mentioned that the directions provided had the agreement of the respondents' counsel.
6. The writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.
-
1997 (2) TMI 135
The Supreme Court ruled on a refund issue where the Revenue sought to recover refunded money under the 1991 Amendment Act. The decision referred to Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India. If the appeal is pending, the Tribunal should expedite it, and the Commissioner can proceed with the matter. The appeal was disposed of with no costs.
-
1997 (2) TMI 134
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the Gujarat High Court's judgment on a refund claim for the period January 20, 1980, to August 8, 1982. The refund application was disallowed except for the period February 9, 1982, to August 9, 1982. The Court ruled that the refund claim should be governed by the judgment in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, requiring the assessee to prove that the duty burden was not passed on. The appeal was disposed of with these directions.
-
1997 (2) TMI 133
Issues:
1. Disagreement between Tribunal members on stay order amount
2. Reference to President for third member decision
3. Division Bench composition change for stay matter
4. Refusal to hear stay matter by new Division Bench
5. Judicial discipline and propriety in Tribunal decisions
Analysis:
The case involved a dispute arising from an order by the Collector of Central Excise, leading to the petitioner appealing to the Customs, Excise, and Gold Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner also sought a stay on the order, which resulted in a disagreement between two Tribunal members on the required deposit amount pending appeal. Subsequently, a reference was made to the Tribunal President for assigning the stay matter to a third member. The third member returned the reference to the Division Bench for a decision. A Division Bench comprising different members then considered the matter, deciding to postpone the stay application to be heard at a later date due to non-listing. The Division Bench also disposed of a miscellaneous application related to the stay order modification. However, on the scheduled date for the stay matter, a new Division Bench declined to hear it, citing observations from a previous order. The court emphasized the importance of judicial discipline and propriety, stating that once a Division Bench decides to hear a matter, subsequent benches should respect that decision. Consequently, the order of the new Division Bench was set aside, directing a Division Bench to decide the stay matter in line with the previous Division Bench's observations and directions from 4-1-1996. The court stressed the need for an expeditious resolution within three months and clarified that the decision did not imply any opinion on the case's merits. Since no opposition affidavit was filed, the allegations in the petition were not deemed accepted by the respondents, and the writ petition was disposed of accordingly, with all parties instructed to act on a signed copy of the order.
-
1997 (2) TMI 132
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that plates and black shields are not parts of photocopying machines. No costs were awarded. (Citation: 1997 (2) TMI 132 - SC)
-
1997 (2) TMI 131
Issues:
1. Quashment of show cause notices under Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944
2. Jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226/227 and 265 of the Constitution of India
3. Discrimination in taxation compared to other companies
4. Authority to determine excise duty and classification of goods
5. Applicability of writ jurisdiction in the matter
Analysis:
The judgment by N.K. Jain, J. of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore dealt with three Misc. Petitions filed by the same petitioner seeking quashment of show cause notices under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The petitioner, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, challenged the jurisdiction of the notices issued by the Superintendent, Central Excise, MOR-IV, Indore. The petitioner alleged discrimination in taxation compared to other companies like Remington and Godrej. The respondents contended that the appropriate authority should first be approached to contest the notices and determine the excise duty due. The Court noted that statutory provisions allowed for appeals against such decisions, indicating that resorting to writ jurisdiction was not permissible.
The Court cited the case of Labhchand where it was held that when a statutory forum exists for redressal of grievances, the High Court should not entertain petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The judgment emphasized that revenue authorities are better suited to determine the classification of goods, especially in technical matters, as seen in the case of P. Kesavan. The Court highlighted that the authorities competent to deal with such matters should be allowed to do so. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petitions with directions for the petitioners to reply to the notices within 30 days, raise jurisdictional and discrimination pleas, apply for permission to lead evidence, and seek remedies available in law in case of adverse decisions.
In conclusion, the Court disposed of all petitions without costs, directing the refund of any security amount. The order was to be retained in one petition and copies placed in the other two. The judgment clarified the limitations of writ jurisdiction in matters where statutory remedies and competent authorities exist for redressal, particularly in issues related to excise duty determination and classification of goods.
-
1997 (2) TMI 130
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the import licence after revalidation.
2. Rights of the importer under the original licence.
3. Application of import policy and handbook provisions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the import licence after revalidation:
The key question referred to the High Court was whether the endorsement made on 15-1-1985, revalidating the licence dated 16-1-1984, extinguished the original validity of the licence for shipment of goods in terms of the import policy prior to revalidation up to 31-1-1985.
The applicant imported steel wire and produced three import licences. The licence dated 16-1-1984 was revalidated on 15-1-1985 with conditions, including that it would cease to be valid for items not permissible under the 1984-85 Import Policy. The Collector of Customs and the Tribunal held that the revalidated licence was not valid for the import of goods shipped on 31-1-1985. However, the High Court found that the original licence, valid until 15-1-1985, was automatically extended to 31-1-1985 by Paragraph 207(2) of the Hand Book of Import and Export Procedures.
2. Rights of the importer under the original licence:
The applicant argued that the revalidation endorsement did not extinguish the original validity of the licence. The High Court agreed, stating that the original licence granted on 16-1-1984 carried certain rights and duties. The revalidation created a distinct period with its own conditions, separate from the original licence's validity, which extended automatically to 31-1-1985. The Court emphasized that substantial rights secured under the original licence could not be nullified by the revalidation endorsement.
3. Application of import policy and handbook provisions:
The Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Hand Book, particularly Paragraphs 207 and 208, which deal with the validity and grace period of import licences. The Court concluded that the original licence was valid for shipment until 31-1-1985, and the revalidation applied only after this period. The authorities below erred by not distinguishing between the original and revalidated periods, thereby negating the applicant's substantial rights under the original licence.
Conclusion:
The High Court held that the endorsement dated 15-1-1985 did not extinguish the original validity of the licence for the shipment of goods up to 31-1-1985. The Court ruled in favor of the applicant, stating that the substantial rights under the original licence remained intact despite the revalidation. The authorities below, including the Tribunal, committed a grave error by not recognizing the distinction between the original and revalidated periods of the licence.
-
1997 (2) TMI 129
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves the cancellation of the 'Out of Customs charge' Order under Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the validity of such cancellation.
R.C. 13 of 1985:
The applicants imported 1000 MT of Nickel, leading to disputes under Open General Licence. The Deputy Collector of Customs allowed clearance after confiscation and payment of fine. The applicants obtained an 'Out of Charge' order under Section 47. Upon inspection, damages were found, and a claim for refund was filed under Section 13. The claim was rejected by authorities and appeals, leading to a reference to the Tribunal and subsequently to the High Court.
R.C. 14 of 1985:
Similar to the previous case, the applicants imported 1000 MT of Nickel, faced disputes under Open General Licence, and obtained an 'Out of Charge' order. Damages were discovered, leading to a refund claim under Section 13, which was rejected by authorities and appeals, resulting in a reference to the Tribunal and the High Court.
The counsel for the applicants argued against the cancellation of the 'Out of Charge' order, emphasizing the lack of authority to revoke or cancel such an order. The Department defended its position, supported by lower authorities and the Tribunal. The High Court considered the nature of the order under Section 47 and the authority to review or cancel such orders.
The High Court analyzed the relevant sections of the Customs Act, including Section 47, Section 154, and Section 129D. It highlighted the quasi-judicial nature of the power exercised under Section 47 and the consequences of such orders on rights and obligations. The Court concluded that the proper officer lacked the authority to cancel the 'Out of Charge' order once issued under Section 47, rendering the subsequent cancellation as null and void in the eyes of the law.
In conclusion, the High Court held that the cancellation of the 'Out of Customs charge' order under Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962, was not valid based on the facts and circumstances of the case.
-
1997 (2) TMI 128
Whether copper rods and bars manufactured by the appellant could properly be classified under Item 26A of the Central Excise Tariff and not under Item 68 thereof?
Held that:- Tariff Item 26A(1) refers to a product in any crude form including ingots, bars, blocks, slabs, billets, shots and pellets. Under the ISI Standard bar/rod has been described as any extruded, drawn, cold or hot rolled, forged, cast or combination of any of these processes of solid section supplied in straight length, whose width or distance between parallel faces is greater by 6 mm and the sub-entries following the same show that they can be in different shapes. Therefore, the term `bar' in Entry 26A(1) would also include a rod. Thus the authorities below were wrong in classifying the goods as falling within Tariff Item 68 and not under Item 26A(1). Appeal allowed.
So far as the question of refund is concerned, it will have to be determined in accordance with the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mafatlal's case [1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA].
............
|
9911796707
