|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 341 to 360 of 465 Records
-
1999 (2) TMI 129
The appeal was about the classification of Printed Wrappers for soap cakes. The Board's circular clarified the classification under Heading 4823.19. The tribunal agreed with the department's contention that the item falls under 4823.19, not 4823.90. The appeal was disposed of accordingly, leaving the final assessment to the Asstt. Collector.
-
1999 (2) TMI 128
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi upheld a duty demand of Rs. 1801 on Nickel perforated rotary screens used for printing textiles, classifying them under CET sub-heading 8442.00. The appeal was rejected as per precedent cases.
-
1999 (2) TMI 127
Issues Involved:
1. Levy of Central Excise Duty on buildings, industrial plants, and structurals.
2. Whether the items in question are "goods" and thus subject to Central Excise Duty.
3. Marketability and manufacturing of structural items.
Summary:
Issue 1: Levy of Central Excise Duty on Buildings, Industrial Plants, and Structurals
The appeals concern the levy of Central Excise Duty on various constructions such as coal handling plants, factory buildings, power plants, electricity towers, and structural components used in these constructions. The appellants argued that these constructions are immovable properties and thus not "goods" subject to Central Excise Duty.
Issue 2: Whether the Items in Question are "Goods"
The appellants contended that the structural items involved are not new goods but merely processed materials like iron and steel plates, angles, etc., which are used in construction. They argued that these items do not have a separate identity as goods and are not marketable as such. The Revenue, however, maintained that identifiable new goods come into existence warranting the levy of Central Excise Duty, citing Tariff Heading 7308 which covers structures and parts of structures of iron or steel.
Issue 3: Marketability and Manufacturing of Structural Items
The appellants relied on several judicial pronouncements, including the Supreme Court's decisions in Mittal Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE and Quality Steel Tubes Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, which held that immovable structures are not liable to Central Excise Duty. The Revenue argued that the mention of an item in the Central Excise Tariff is sufficient for levying duty and cited judgments like Hemraj Govardhandas v. H.M. Dave AC to support their position.
Judgment:
The Tribunal examined the records and submissions from both sides. It was noted that the demands varied from the erection of industrial buildings to the preparation of structural materials. The Tribunal found that the appellants' activities did not constitute the manufacture of new goods. The processes involved, such as cleaning, cutting, drilling, and welding, did not bring new goods into existence. The Tribunal also referenced several judicial decisions, including the Supreme Court's ruling in Mittal Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, which reaffirmed that immovable structures are not "goods" and thus not subject to Central Excise Duty.
The Tribunal concluded that the items in question, being part of immovable structures, do not meet the criteria of "goods" as defined for excise purposes. The appeals were allowed, and the demands for Central Excise Duty were set aside. The Tribunal did not address incidental issues like the demands being time-barred, as the appeals were allowed on merits.
-
1999 (2) TMI 126
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT in New Delhi upheld the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Bombay extending the benefit of Notification 67/88 to tableware glass like jugs, cups, plates, drinking glass, and bowls to bake and serveware like plates, bowls, and dishes. The Tribunal referred to a previous order in a similar case and rejected the Revenue's appeal, stating that items like pizza plates, pie dishes, and mixing bowls made of heat resistance glass are covered by the notification.
-
1999 (2) TMI 125
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the process of compressing, drying, and filling hydrogen gas into cylinders constitutes "manufacture" u/s Central Excise law.
2. Whether a new commodity has arisen from the process undertaken by the appellants, thereby attracting additional duty liability.
Summary:
Issue 1: Process of Compressing, Drying, and Filling Hydrogen Gas
- The appellants received hydrogen gas through pipelines from Grasim Industries, compressed it, dried it, and filled it into cylinders without paying additional duty.
- The appellants argued that no new commodity was created as the hydrogen gas remained the same, only its form of delivery changed. They cited TH 2804, which does not distinguish between compressed and non-compressed hydrogen gas.
- The adjudicating authority held that the processes of drying and compressing constituted "manufacture" as per Central Excise law, referencing the case of M/s. D.C.W. Ltd. v. Union of India - 1991 (56) E.L.T. 310.
Issue 2: Existence of a New Commodity
- The appellants contended that the hydrogen gas received was already usable for hydrogenation in manufacturing vanaspati, supported by an affidavit from their Manager, which was not rebutted by the adjudicating authority.
- The adjudicating authority's decision was based on the premise that the hydrogen gas needed to be dried and compressed to be commercially viable, thus constituting a new commodity.
- The appellants referenced the Apex Court's ruling in C.C.E v. Steel Strips Ltd. - 1995 (77) E.L.T. 248, emphasizing the burden of proof on the department to show that a new commodity had come into existence.
- The learned JDR argued that hydrogen gas in pipelines was not commercially usable and relied on technical literature, suggesting a remand for further examination of the affidavit.
Judgment:
- The Tribunal observed that the affidavit provided by the appellants, stating the usability of the hydrogen gas for hydrogenation, was not rebutted by the adjudicating authority.
- The Tribunal noted that the Tariff Heading 28.04 did not differentiate between compressed and non-compressed hydrogen gas.
- The Tribunal concluded that no new commodity had come into existence merely by filling hydrogen gas into cylinders.
- Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeals were allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1999 (2) TMI 124
Issues:
1. Includibility of the cost of containers in the assessable value of chewing tobacco.
2. Application of Section 4(1)(a) and Rule 6(b) of C.E. (Valuation) Rules, 1975.
3. Discrepancies in the cost of containers and pricing methodology.
4. Validity of differential duty demand based on approved price list.
Analysis:
1. The appellants contested the demand for differential duty based on the cost of containers in which chewing tobacco is sold. They argued that the cost of tin containers was already included in the sale price, as the containers were not returnable, and no separate charges were levied. The Department's demand was challenged as misconceived, emphasizing that the declared price to wholesale buyers fulfilled the requirements of Section 4(1)(a). The appellants maintained that Rule 6(b) of Valuation Rules did not apply to their case, as their pricing methodology was consistent with Section 4(1)(a).
2. The Tribunal examined the contentions and found merit in the appellants' arguments. It was acknowledged that the declared price represented the ex-factory price to wholesale buyers, meeting the conditions of Section 4(1)(a). Referring to precedents, the Tribunal emphasized that in cases of ex-factory sales, the ex-factory price could be directly adopted as the assessable value. Additionally, if the normal selling price at the factory gate was ascertainable, it should be considered as the assessable value. The Tribunal clarified that the inclusion of tin containers as primary packing did not automatically trigger the application of Section 4(1)(b) over Section 4(1)(a).
3. The judgment highlighted discrepancies in the cost calculations and pricing methodology employed by the appellants. The Assistant Collector and Collector (Appeals) had raised concerns regarding the artificial manner in which costing data was presented, pointing out inconsistencies in the cost of perfume over the years. The Tribunal noted that the appellants' pricing approach lacked transparency and did not align with the principles of fair valuation under the Central Excise Act.
4. Ultimately, the Tribunal allowed both appeals, setting aside the impugned orders and granting consequential benefits to the appellants. The judgment emphasized that the appellants had satisfied the requirements of Section 4(1)(a) in determining the assessable value, thereby invalidating the differential duty demand based on the cost of containers. The decision underscored the importance of aligning pricing practices with statutory provisions to ensure fair valuation in excise matters.
-
1999 (2) TMI 123
The judgment by Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, Mumbai involved waiver of penalties imposed on Dipesh Textiles, Hasmukh Deochand Shah, and A.I. Lokhandwala. Penalties imposed on Dipesh Textiles and Hasmukh Deochand Shah were partially waived, with Hasmukh Deochand Shah required to deposit Rs. 1 lakh. Penalty imposed on A.I. Lokhandwala was waived as there was no specific finding of involvement in smuggling.
-
1999 (2) TMI 122
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi decided on the classification of blankets manufactured by the appellants under CET sub-heading 6301.00, contrary to revenue's classification under CET sub-heading 5603.00 for the period from 25-1-1990 to 3-8-1990. The blankets were considered "made-ups" and fell under CET sub-heading 6301.00, making them eligible for exemption under Notification 175/86. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
-
1999 (2) TMI 121
The appellate tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal regarding the Modvat credit on glass bottles broken during pharmaceutical production. The tribunal found that the breakage claimed by the assessees was not abnormal, and the demand by the Revenue was unreasonable as it lacked supporting material. The appeal was dismissed as both lower orders were well reasoned and sustained.
-
1999 (2) TMI 120
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, Mumbai considered an application for stay of deposit of Rs. 6,21,582/- duty demanded by a small scale industry manufacturing excisable goods. The issue was whether Explanation VII to Notification 1/93 applied since the cloth was not manufactured in the factory. The Tribunal found the applicant's case weak on merits but directed a deposit of Rs. 2.5 lakhs within two months, with waiver of the remaining duty demanded upon payment. Compliance was required by 22-4-1999.
-
1999 (2) TMI 119
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi ruled that adding flavors and repacking softy shake mix did not constitute manufacturing as there was no duty liability. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal as the activity did not fall under Tariff Heading 22.02 and there was no Chapter Note during the relevant period stating that repacking amounted to manufacturing.
-
1999 (2) TMI 118
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi considered whether administrative charges under U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 should be included in assessable value. The Tribunal upheld that such charges are not to be included based on Section 4(4)(d). The decision was in line with a previous ruling, leading to dismissal of the appeal. (Case citation: 1999 (2) TMI 118 - CEGAT, New Delhi)
-
1999 (2) TMI 117
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, Mumbai ruled in favor of the appellants, processors of gray fabrics, stating that the extended period for demanding duty cannot be invoked as the department knew about the wrong classification when the test results were received. The appellants were not the manufacturers of the fabric and relied on supplier declarations, so the wrong declaration was not deliberate. The appeal was allowed on the point of limitation.
-
1999 (2) TMI 116
The Appellate Tribunal in Mumbai ruled that the description "copper waste and scrap" includes brass scrap as well. The Tribunal found that any reference to "copper" covers alloys thereof as per the Central Excise Tariff. The appeal from the revenue was dismissed.
-
1999 (2) TMI 115
Issues:
1. Classification of electrical resistance wires under Central Excise Tariff.
2. Whether the process of redrawing thicker gauge wire amounts to manufacture.
3. Correct classification of the goods under Tariff Items.
4. Time bar for demanding duty.
Issue 1: Classification of electrical resistance wires under Central Excise Tariff:
The appellants contested the order confirming a differential duty demand on electrical resistance wires drawn into thinner gauge, arguing that the goods should have been classified under Tariff Item 26AA as "steel wires" instead of Tariff Item 33B(ii) as "electric wires." They relied on definitions of conductors and wires to support their contention that the goods were resistance wires, not electric wires. The Tribunal's decision in a similar case was cited to differentiate between electrical resistance wires and electric wires. The appellants also argued that a circular from the Board supported their classification. The respondent, however, maintained that the goods were correctly classified under Tariff Item 33B. The Tribunal analyzed the definitions provided and previous decisions, ultimately siding with the appellants and holding that the goods were not electric wires but resistance wires, classifiable under Tariff Item 26AA.
Issue 2: Whether the process of redrawing thicker gauge wire amounts to manufacture:
The appellants further contended that the process of redrawing thicker gauge wire into thinner gauge did not amount to manufacture as no new excisable commodity emerged. They referenced a previous Tribunal decision to support their argument. The Tribunal agreed with the appellants, stating that even after cold drawing, the wire remained an electrical resistance wire, and no new commodity emerged. Therefore, the process carried out by the appellants was not considered a manufacturing process giving rise to a new excisable commodity liable to duty.
Issue 3: Correct classification of the goods under Tariff Items:
The appellants also argued that the entire demand was time-barred, as the Department had been aware of the nature of the goods since 1978, and there was no suppression of facts. They provided evidence of correspondence and reports detailing the description of the goods and raw materials. The respondent, however, alleged deliberate misdeclaration and suppression of information to justify the extended period of limitation. The Tribunal reviewed the history of communication between the parties and concluded that the demand was indeed time-barred due to the information provided by the appellants over the years.
Judgment:
In conclusion, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellants on both the merits of classification and the time bar for demanding duty. The duty demand was set aside, considering that the process of redrawing wire did not constitute manufacture and that the demand was barred by limitation based on the information provided to the Department over the years. The impugned order was overturned, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.
-
1999 (2) TMI 114
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order, as Fish nuts are classified under Tariff Heading 7318.10, not 7302.90 as previously held. The lower Appellate authority's decision was based on an earlier order that had been disposed of by the Tribunal.
-
1999 (2) TMI 113
The duty demand of Rs. 91,574.59 was confirmed with a penalty of Rs. 10,000 imposed. The appellants argued against clubbing clearances of both units. The order was set aside for fresh consideration with detailed findings and a reasonable opportunity for the appellants to be heard. The appeals were allowed for remand.
-
1999 (2) TMI 112
Issues: Classification of Softy (Plain) Mix, Softy (Choco) Mix, and Softy (Shake) Mix under specific Tariff Headings.
Softy (Plain) Mix Classification:
The Assistant Collector initially classified Softy (Plain) Mix under Tariff Heading 1901.90, but the lower appellate authority remanded the matter due to lack of a show cause notice. The Appellate Tribunal agreed with the remand decision, emphasizing the absence of a notice for the classification change, leading to a re-adjudication.
Softy (Choco) Mix Classification:
The lower appellate authority granted the benefit of Notification 9/90-C.E. to Softy (Choco) Mix, stating that since it contained only chocolate and not cocoa powder, it was eligible for the benefit. The Revenue argued that chocolate inherently contains cocoa powder, thus disqualifying it. However, the Tribunal upheld the lower authority's decision, distinguishing chocolate from cocoa powder and allowing the benefit under the notification.
Softy (Shake) Mix Classification:
The Revenue contended that Softy (Shake) Mix, with 87% milk content, fell under Tariff sub-heading 2202.90 as a ready-to-serve beverage. The lower appellate authority disagreed, noting similarities with the other mixes but lacking vanilla or other essences. However, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Revenue, stating that as a ready-to-serve beverage, it should be classified under Tariff Heading 2202.90, thus not eligible for the benefit of Notification 9/90-C.E.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal revised the duty demand based on the classification decisions, highlighting the importance of proper classification under specific Tariff Headings. The judgment clarified the distinctions between products, the relevance of show cause notices, and the interpretation of relevant notifications for classification and benefit eligibility.
-
1999 (2) TMI 111
Issues involved:
The jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to assess individuals u/s 158BD based on search action u/s 132 and the validity of assessments made on protective basis.
Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer u/s 158BD:
The Assessing Officer invoked section 158BD to assess family members of individuals on a protective basis without proper satisfaction that undisclosed income belonged to them. The absence of search warrants in their names and the Assessing Officer's own findings that the income belonged to the main individual rendered the assessments illegal and void ab initio. The section mandates that the Assessing Officer must be satisfied that undisclosed income belongs to a person other than the one searched, based on material found during the search. Any subsequent material cannot be considered for invoking jurisdiction. The Assessing Officer's lack of satisfaction and the clear attribution of income to the main individual led to the cancellation of the assessments.
Validity of Assessments on Protective Basis:
The assessments on protective basis for family members were deemed invalid as the Assessing Officer found that the undisclosed income actually belonged to the main individual. The assessments were made without proper satisfaction as required by law, and the Assessing Officer's own statements indicated that the income rightfully belonged to the main individual. The protective assessments lacked legal basis and were therefore cancelled. Additionally, specific income related to a Beauty Parlour for certain years was also deemed not undisclosed income based on Tribunal precedent and lack of supporting material.
Conclusion:
The Appellate Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's assessments were illegal and void ab initio due to the lack of proper jurisdiction under section 158BD and the attribution of income to the main individual. The protective assessments made for family members were cancelled, and specific income related to a Beauty Parlour was also not considered undisclosed income. The appeals were allowed in favor of the assessees.
-
1999 (2) TMI 108
Issues Involved:
1. Rectification under section 155(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Withdrawal of investment allowance granted in previous years.
3. Definition and implications of "transfer" under section 32A(5).
4. Creation of trust and its impact on tax allowances.
5. Compliance with conditions for investment allowance.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Rectification under section 155(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The appeals were directed against the rectification made under section 155(4A) for withdrawing the investment allowance granted in earlier years. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) issued notices under section 154 to rectify the assessments and withdraw the investment allowance, citing the conversion of the business from Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) property to trust property as a transfer that violated section 32A(5).
2. Withdrawal of investment allowance granted in previous years:
The ITO withdrew the investment allowance for the assessment years 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82. The contention was that the declaration of trust amounted to a transfer, thus necessitating the withdrawal of the investment allowance under section 32A(5). The assessee argued that the conversion did not amount to a transfer and that the conditions for the investment allowance had been fulfilled.
3. Definition and implications of "transfer" under section 32A(5):
The primary issue was whether the conversion of HUF property into trust property constituted a "transfer" under section 32A(5). The Judicial Member argued that the expression "sold or otherwise transferred" should be interpreted narrowly, focusing on the continuous use of the machinery in the business. The Accountant Member, however, contended that the creation of the trust amounted to a transfer, as it involved a change in ownership, thus violating the conditions for the investment allowance.
4. Creation of trust and its impact on tax allowances:
The creation of the trust by the Karta of the HUF was seen by the ITO as a transfer of the business assets to the trust. The Judicial Member argued that the trust's creation did not constitute a transfer within the meaning of section 32A(5), as the business continued to be operated by the same person, albeit in a different capacity. The Accountant Member disagreed, stating that the trust's creation involved a transfer of ownership, thus necessitating the withdrawal of the investment allowance.
5. Compliance with conditions for investment allowance:
The Judicial Member emphasized that the conditions for the investment allowance had been met, as the machinery continued to be used in the business. The Accountant Member, however, highlighted that the trust's creation violated the ownership condition, as the assessee was no longer the owner of the business assets. The Third Member agreed with the Accountant Member, stating that the creation of the trust constituted a transfer, thus justifying the withdrawal of the investment allowance.
Conclusion:
The majority opinion upheld the withdrawal of the investment allowance, agreeing that the creation of the trust amounted to a transfer under section 32A(5). Consequently, the appeals filed by the assessee were dismissed, and the orders of the lower authorities were upheld. The decision emphasized the importance of maintaining ownership and fulfilling all conditions for the investment allowance to be valid.
............
|
9911796707
