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Showing 381 to 400 of 1719 Records

• 2020 (1) TMI 1339
  

  Condonation of delay in filing petition - whether the High Court, while entertaining a Revision Petition against the order of the Appellate Tribunal (the Board of Revenue), by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, possesses the power to condone the delay? - Classification of goods - rate of tax - Rusk - HELD THAT:- In the present case delay of 1357 days has been occasioned in filing of the present Revision Petition - the petitioner has furnished satisfying reasons to explain the delay, which according to him constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 for condonation of delay.

  It is not required to go into those reasons if eventually we are persuaded to hold that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable for condonation of delay in filing Revision Petition under Section 70 of the Act of 2003.

  The scheme of the Act of 2003 is though slightly different from the one in Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003, but what is common between them is that both enactments are intended to be complete code in themselves. The provisions relating to appeal, revision and review are contained in Chapter VII of the Act of 2003. Section 65 thereof provides for remedy of appeal to the assessee against the order of assessment before the Prescribed Authority within 45 days from the receipt of a notice of demand in respect thereof but with the stipulation that appeal may be entertained within such further period as may be allowed by the said authority for the cause shown to his satisfaction.

  Section 69 (1) of the Act of 2003 has provided for remedy of second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the decision of the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority, within sixty days. However, Section 69(2) vests the Appellate Tribunal with the power to admit the appeal even after sixty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient reason for not filing the appeal within the aforesaid time provided it is filed within one year. Obviously, here the discretion of Appellate Tribunal has been restricted allowing it to entertain the appeal beyond sixty days with a rider that such appeal in any case has to be filed within one year, which shall be counted from the date of the notice of the decision to the aggrieved party. It is in such scheme of legislation that the remedy of Revision Petition against the decision of the Appellate Tribunal or the Commissioner has been provided before the High Court under Section 70 of the Act of 2003, which has to be necessarily filed within sixty days, by the assessee after being notified of the decision. Unlike the provisions of Sections 65, 67, 68 and 69 of the Act of 2003, no discretion has been conferred on the High Court to entertain a Revision Petition filed after expiry of sixty days from the date the assessee is notified of the decision. This leads to two conclusions; firstly, the Act of 2003 is a complete Code by itself and secondly, applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Revision Petition filed under Section 70 of the Act of 2003 stand excluded by necessary implication.

  Thus, the Act of 2003, especially, Chapter VI with respect to remedy of appeal, revision and review, is a complete Code in itself. Wherever the legislature intended to provide period of limitation for filing of appeal, revision or review petition, it did so by specifically indicating the time period. In the case of revision or review, referable to Sections 66 and 67 respectively, the legislature has not provided any period of limitation. As would be evident from Sections 65, 68 and 69 of the Act of 2003, discretion has been conferred on the appellate authorities concerned to entertain the appeal even beyond the period of limitation - While conferring the discretion on the Appellate Tribunal under Section 69(2) of the Act to entertain the appeal against the decision of the Appellate Authority/Revisional Authority, even after sixty days, on sufficient cause being shown, a rider has been put that such appeal in any case should be filed within one year. Section 70 of the Act of 2003 simply provides for remedy of revision before the High Court against the decision of the Commissioner, within sixty days, but does not confer any discretion on the High Court to entertain the same beyond that period.

  The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 70 of the Act of 2003 stands excluded by necessary implication and therefore it would not be applicable to the Revision Petition filed before the High Court under that provision - application for condonation of delay being not maintainable, and is accordingly dismissed - revision petition dismissed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1338
  

  Revocation of CHA License - forfeiture of security deposit - custom house agent is in appeal on the submission that the charge against them had been framed for not obtaining letter of authority from the exporter which, according to them, does not constitute breach of obligation as ‘custom house agent’ as there is no mandate in the Regulations for obtaining such letter of authority for every instance of shipment - HELD THAT:- The appeal of custom house agent has not advanced any plea of breach of the procedure laid down in Custom House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2003. Nor is there any submission that the principles of natural justice have been denied to them. There is a clear finding of the licensing authority that the ‘custom house agent’, though dealing with the exporter for a long time, had failed to maintain the authority letter which was required to be obtained for each job undertaken.

  Power of Commissioner of Customs (General) to review orders of Commissioners of Customs - section 129D (1) of CA, 1962 - HELD THAT:- It was held in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (GENERAL) , MUMBAI VERSUS MUKADAM FREIGHT SYSTEMS PVT LTD [2017 (5) TMI 798 - CESTAT MUMBAI] that there is no such provision for review in the Customs House Agents Licencing Regulations, 1984.

  Furthermore, from a reading of section 146 of Customs Act, 1962 that enables notification of regulations for governing the operation of custom house agents and in which the scope and extent of such regulations to encompass, specifically, appeals are enumerated while limiting such appeals only to the appeals, if any, against an order of suspension or revocation of a license, and the period within which such appeals shall be filed - Had the general provision of appellate jurisdiction in Customs Act, 1962 sufficed, this specific enablement would not have been necessary. By enabling appellate jurisdiction through the power to frame regulations under section 146 of Customs Act, 1962, which is conspicuously absent in the general power to frame rules and regulations under section 156 and 157 of Customs Act, 1962, not only is a separate framework contemplated but also limited the recourse only to the licensee.

  Appeal dismissed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1337
  

  Exclusion of period of 60 days from the CIRP as per Section 12(3) 2nd proviso of Code - section 12(3) r/w section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - HELD THAT:- A bare perusal of Section 12 of the IBC, 2016 mandates that the CIRP period should be completed within the period of 330 days. Further, it has been clearly stated that the CIRP extension, beyond the stipulated period of 180 days, shall be granted only once, not exceeding 90 days. However, the IBC, Amendment Act, 2019 fails to address on how this Tribunal can treat the Applications which seek for CIRP extension beyond the period of 270 days to 330 days.

  In the facts of the present case, it is evident from the records that CIRP extension was already granted once for a period of 90 days from 23.10.2019 and thereby the 270 days period of CIRP came to an end on 21.01.2020. The second proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 12 of the IBC, 2016 states that the CIRP shall be mandatorily completed within a period of 330 days from the Insolvency commencement date, including any extension of the period of the CIRP granted under this section and the time taken in the legal proceedings - thus, it can be inferred from the second proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 12 of the IBC, 2016 that after granting extension once for a maximum period of 90 days, and upon 270 days of the CIRP coming to an end, this Tribunal has the power to exclude certain period from the CIRP proceedings provided the said exclusion period should not exceed the total CIRP period of 330 days. In other words, exclusion can be granted only for a period of 60 days after the expiry of 270 days.

  As to the facts of the present case, it can be seen, that if the 60 days are excluded from the CIRP period, the total period of the CIRP would be 330 days as mandated under Section 12 of the IBC, 2016.

  The Application stands allowed and the period of 60 days stands excluded from the CIRP timeline and as a result thereof, the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor is directed to be completed on or before 20.03.2020 - Application allowed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1336
  

  Exclusion of certain period from Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - Section 60(5) read with 12(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules 2016 - HELD THAT:- Looking to the very object of IB Code, CoC desires to get exclusion in the CIRP period as there is every likelihood that some Resolution Plan will be accepted and/or approved by the CoC. In that event, a Corporate Debtor will be saved from Liquidation and more so, livelihood of number of employees will also be saved as it is dependent on the Corporate Debtor.

  Hon'ble Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors of COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS OF ESSAR STEEL INDIA LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORISED SIGNATORY VERSUS SATISH KUMAR GUPTA & OTHERS [2019 (11) TMI 731 - SUPREME COURT] observed that even an extension beyond 330 days timeline as specified in the IB Code can be granted by the Adjudicating Authority under exceptional circumstances - the Supreme Court has observed that 330 days is the outer limit within which resolution of the stressed assets of the Corporate Debtor must take place.

  Thus, if the time is extended within the outer limit of 330 days, there is every likelihood that some Resolution Applicant may succeed for its acceptance and approval - the application so filed by RP is allowed by excluding 22 days from the CIRP period which was spent in negotiation with the prospective Resolution Applicants i.e. from 03.01.2020 to 24.01.2020.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1335
  

  100% EOU - Refund of Service Tax paid - rejection on the ground that appellant failed to establish the nexus between exports and input services - HELD THAT:- It is observed that in his order, ld Commissioner (Appeals) had primarily dealt about the nexus between output services and input services and even gone to the extent of analysing as to if in the absence of such input services, the quality and efficiency of the provision of service would be adversely impacted or not. This being the facts on record, it can be said that the Commissioner (Appeals) had gone beyond the scope of Circular and Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as the primary intention of the legislature was to allow refund to exporters so was to avoid any cascading effect of taxes on export and to promote exports.

  Refund allowed - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1334
  

  Recovery of Differential Duty - import of ‘myristic acid’ - importer accepted the error in having sought availment of the wrong entry in the exemption notification and accepted the liability for differential duty - HELD THAT:- The eligibility of the impugned goods for concessional rate under N/N. 46/2011-Cus dated 1st June 2011 is not in dispute. The specific entry within the said notification appears to have been erroneously claimed and, upon it being pointed out, the importer accepted the error in the bill of entry. That this error is, as claimed by the appellant, inadvertent would appear to be tenable as the possibility of confusion between the numbers corresponding to the claimed entry and the eligible entry cannot be ruled out.

  Furthermore, as pleaded by Learned Counsel, the declaration of tariff item, as well as description of the goods, would also make it apparent that there has been no misdeclaration within the meaning of section 111 of Customs Act, 1962 and that such a patent error cannot be seen as an attempt at misleading the system - the invoking of section 111 and section 112 of Customs Act, 1962 is not warranted.

  Appeal allowed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1333
  

  Maintainability of petition - suit for partition - main contention of the appellants are that the civil rights are to be decided only by the civil courts and therefore, the appellants plaintiffs cannot be denied to adjudicate the civil rights before the civil court in the suit instituted - HELD THAT:- This court is of an opinion that section 34 of the SARFAESI Act enumerates "No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter, which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 - Admittedly, the suit schedule property is the subject-matter of the SARFAESI Act, and the bank filed an original application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore, which is pending for adjudication. This being the admitted fact, this court is of an opinion that the express bar as contemplated under section 34 of the SARFAESI Act should be pressed into service and consequently, the decision arrived by the trial court is in consonance with section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and with reference to section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  When there is an express bar, then no suit can be entertained. When section 34 of the SARFAESI Act provides an express bar of the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the civil court cannot entertain the suit for partition.

  There is no infirmity in respect of the conclusion arrived by the trial court and accordingly, the suit cannot be entertained by the civil court - Petition dismissed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1332
  

  Recognition u/s 80 G denied - as per CIT-E in the absence of sufficient activities, it is not possible to verify the genuineness of the objects and the activities of the trust - AR submitted that, its application for grant of registration under section 12 AA of the Act is valid - HELD THAT:- Undisputedly, assessee has been granted registration under section 12AA of the Act, and that there is nothing on record brought out by authorities below, or Ld.CIT DR regarding violation of objects of Trust.

  grant of approval/recognition under section 80 G of the Act, can act as catalyst to encourage prospective donors to look at intended activities/objects and possibly provide financial support through donations/contributions. In the facts of present case, assessee was holding valid registration under section 12 AA of the Act, as on date of impugned order, which conversely means that Ld.CIT (E) was satisfied with objects of assessee in not disputing the registration under section 12 AA.

  Reasons cited by Ld.CIT(E) are not the requirements mandated by provisions of the act, and cannot be the basis for rejection of assessee’s application for recognition under section 80G. We also noticed that Ld.CIT(E) has not examined the application of assessee in terms of section 80 G (5) - we remand the question of grant of approval under section 80 G (5) (vi) of the Act to Ld.CIT (E) for fresh consideration - Decided in favour of assessee for statistical purposes.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1331
  

  Deduction u/s. 80IC - income earned from sale of scrap - Income derived from the activities of the eligible business or not? - AO denied the claim of assessee in claiming deduction in respect of income from sale of manufacturing scrap at Roorkee Plant - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) by placing reliance on the order in assessee‟s own case [2012 (3) TMI 658 - ITAT PUNE] and allowed the claim of assessee by holding that the income earned from sale of scrap is an eligible business and the assessee is entitled to claim the said income as deduction u/s. 80IC of the Act vide para 5.2 of impugned order. No contrary order was brought on record by the appellant-revenue. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) and it is justified. - Decided against revenue.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1330
  

  Direction to IRP to constitute CoC - It is submitted that such direction itself made application under Rule 11 infructuous so that the parties cannot settle which is against the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SWISS RIBBONS PVT. LTD. AND ANR. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. [2019 (1) TMI 1508 - SUPREME COURT].

  HELD THAT:- Taking into consideration the fact that the Appellant has already settled the matter with the 2nd Respondent much prior to the constitution of the ‘Committee of Creditors’ and two demand drafts have also been handed over on 9th January, 2020 and the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ also accepted that the ‘Committee of Creditors’ was not constituted by that date and the Application under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 has been moved, it is held that the Adjudicating Authority without disposing of the Application filed under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 has no jurisdiction to defer the matter and direct the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ to constitute the ‘Committee of Creditors’ to render Application filed under Rule 11 as infructuous - If the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal) is of the view that the Application under Rule 11 is fit to be rejected and only after rejecting the same, it could have directed the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ to constitute the ‘Committee of Creditors’.

  The impugned order is dated 18th December, 2019 and within a month i.e. prior to the constitution of the ‘Committee of Creditors’ on 9th January, 2020, the demand drafts had been prepared and handed over. For the said reason, it is a fit case to entertain the Application under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 and to allow the same.

  Application disposed as withdrawn.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1329
  

  Rectification of Mistake - typographical error - error apparent from the face of record - collection of duty, fine and penalty in respect of undeclared goods have also been set aside in Final Order - HELD THAT:- As far as the corrigendum dated 28.09.2016, the same appears to be an inadvertent error on the part of the Department and the same, thus, stands corrected as per prayer made to be issued by Additional Commissioner of Customs in place of Commissioner of Customs.

  Issue regarding collection of duty, fine and penalty in respect of undeclared goods have also been set aside in the said Final Order inadvertently by the Tribunal - HELD THAT:- This is an apparent error on the part of the Tribunal and is rectifiable mistake under the provisions of Section 129 B(2) of the Customs Act. We, therefore, modify our order to the extent that setting aside the order in respect of undeclared cargo is error apparent and the same stands deleted from the portion of the order dated 17.06.2019 - We modify the concluding paragraph of order to be read as “in respect of the undeclared Cargo the Department will be well within its right to deal with the matter and adjudicate the case pertaining to undeclared goods and to collect applicable customs duty and fine and penalty under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962.

  ROM allowed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1328
  

  Approval of Resolution Plan - Section 30 (6) read with Section 31 (l) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with Regulation 39 (4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 - HELD THAT:- The Resolution Plans were taken up for consideration by the Committee of Creditors. Both the Resolution Plans complied with the mandatory requirements stipulated under Section 30 (2) of the Code read with Regulations thereunder. The Committee of Creditors discussed the feasibility and viability of the Resolution Plans and the capability of the Resolution Applicants to implement the Resolution Plan and carry out the evaluation of the Resolution Plans. Finally, a evaluation matrix was arrived at, as per the scoring rate Sterlite Power Transmission Limited (STPL) scored 91.26%, IMR Metallurgical Resources AG score was 80.42 %. Based on the evaluation criteria set out in the RFRP Sterlite Power Transmission Limited was declared as a highest evaluated Resolution Applicant. The 31^st Committee of Creditors Meeting held on 13^th November, 2019, the Resolution Plan submitted by M/S Sterlite Power Transmission Limited (SPTL) was approved by the Committee of Creditors by 95.15 % of voting shares.

  The Resolution Plan submitted by M/S Sterlite Power Transmission Limited (SPTL) i.e. Resolution Applicant, approved by 95.15 % of voting share in 31^st Committee of Creditors Meeting dated 13.11.2019 is APPROVED, as per Section 31 (l) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Accordingly, the same shall be binding on the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members, all creditors including Central and State Government and local authorities, guarantors and other stakeholders.

  Application allowed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1327
  

  Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor failed to make repayment of its dues - existence of debt and dispute or not - HELD THAT:- On a perusal of CRILCFGMO which is a Return of defaulted borrowers placed as Annexure 1 in page No. 146 and 147 this Authority is satisfied that on 20.07.2018 Syndicate Bank, the Financial Creditor has reported to have moved the borrower into the "Moved to Default Status' on 16.07.2018 along with 10 various other lending Banks. Also, the Financial Creditor has issued a recall notice on 05.12.2018 to the Corporate Debtor instructing them to clear the dues, failing which recovery action will be initiated including filing before NCLT. A contention is seen to have been made by the Authorized Representative who appeared on behalf of the Corporate Debtor that a Resolution Plan is already under consideration by all other Financial Creditors and only the Applicant/Financial Creditor who is having a negligible 1.64% voting power in the total claim has come forward for the CIRP process.

  In the instant case, the Financial Creditor has complied with all the requirements with respect to initiating the CIRP process against the Corporate Debtor Company and produced all the applicable documents in support of initiating the CIRP process in the prescribed manner. Accordingly, this Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that default has occurred and the application under sub-section 2 of Section 7 of I&B Code, 2016 is complete in all respects notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Creditor has acted against the interest of other lending institutions in violation of the Joint Lending Arrangements and stipulations contained in various agreement such as Joint Deed of Hypothecation, Master Inter Credit Agreement [MICA], necessary inter se agreements, Trust and Retention Agreement, etc.

  This Tribunal is required to adjudicate the matter within contours prescribed under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code without having regard to any other policy matter or guideline issued by the competent authority with respect to the Joint Lending Arrangement amongst the Bank or similar other documents. This Authority is duty bound to admit this application initiated under Section 7 by a Financial Creditor if a default has occurred and the application is complete in all respect and there is no disciplinary proceeding is pending against the proposed Resolution Professional - taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the position of Law, we are of the view that this Application as filed by the Applicant -Financial Creditor is required to be admitted under Section 7(5) of the I&B Code, 2016.

  The Petition stands admitted in terms of Section 7 of the Code and the Moratorium shall come into effect as of this date.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1326
  

  Condonation of delay in filing appeal - time limitation - appeal before him was filed after a period of 3 months and 10 days - power of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone the delay beyond three months - HELD THAT:- That before the Commissioner (Appeals) the Order-in-Original 17/ST-2013 dated 21.03.2013 was challenged. The same was acknowledged to be received by the appellant on 23.06.2014. However, the appeal was filed on 02.12.2014 though it was to be filed on or before 22.08.2014 thereby causing a delay of 3 months and 10 days in filing the same before Commissioner (Appeals). We observe that the applicant had, therefore, filed an application praying for condonation of delay before Commissioner (Appeals) and order of Commissioner (Appeals) is in respect of the said application praying for condonation of delay. In view of Section 35 of Central Excise Act, delay was not condoned. As a result where of the appeal could not have sustained.

  In the present case, Commissioner (Appeals) has not passed any order of confirming any demand against the dead person. The Order was squarely on the ground of limitation. The same has been upheld by this Tribunal only because of the statutory mandate upon the Commissioner (Appeals) to not to condone the delay beyond three months.

  Application dismissed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1325
  

  Appointment of insolvency professional (IP) - HELD THAT:- Section 16(3)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) requires the Adjudicating Authority (AA) to make a reference to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Board) for recommendation of an insolvency professional (IP) who may act as an interim resolution professional (IRP) in case an operational creditor has made an application for corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) and has not proposed an IRP. The Board, within ten days the receipt of the reference form the AA is required under section 16(4) of the Code to recommend the name of an IP to the AA against whom no disciplinary proceedings are pending.

  This Bench recommend to the IBBI the name of Shri Rajendran P.R., Insolvency Professional to appoint him as Resolution Professional in IBA/49/KOB/2019 - Application disposed off.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1324
  

  Revision u/s 263 - allowability of “CSR” expenses borne by a PSU controlled by the Government of India u/s 37 since incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business - HELD THAT:- This assessee has admittedly incurred its corporate social responsibility expenditure as per the Government of India’s guidelines only. It has been further subjected to statutory audits as well qua all the expenses incurred from time to time. The question as to whether the relevant assessment order must expressly discuss the issues in question or not so as to attract sec, 263 revision proceedings stands settled long back in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gabrial India Ltd. [1993 (4) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] that mere non-discussion on an issue in the assessment order does not render it an erroneous causing prejudice to the interest of the Revenue.

  Hon'ble apex court’s landmark decisions in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. [2000 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT] and Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Max India [2007 (11) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT] also hold that before an assessment is sought to be revised as erroneous causing prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, these twin conditions must exist simultaneously.

  Even if it is held that the AO had erred in not carrying out the necessary enquiry / factual verification on the assessee’s claim of its “CSR”, the same could not have caused any prejudice interest of the revenue in case of a public sector undertaking bound by the Government of India’s directions issued on the subject. More particularly before the insertion of Explanation-2 in sec. 37 of the Act in assessment year 2013-14 since the amended legal position carries prospective effect only - CIT’s assumption of revision jurisdiction in these facts and circumstances is not sustainable - Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1323
  

  Cancellation of petitioner's DIN - Disqualification as Director in respect of all companies, of which he was a director, due to default apparently committed by one of such companies only - HELD THAT:- No ratio of law pertaining to the question-in-dispute in the present case was decided at all, either by the Division Bench or by the learned single judge, against whose order such appeal was preferred before the Division Bench. As such, the judgment cited on behalf of the respondent-authorities has no relevance to the instant case.

  Accordingly, the respondent-authorities acted palpably de hors the law in disqualifying the present petitioner from his status pertaining to the petitioner's DIN in respect of all companies where he was a director and not merely the non-compliant company.

  Petition allowed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1322
  

  Reversal of credit - Section 140 of CGST Act read with Rule 117 of CGST Rules - Cesses such as Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess covered or not - HELD THAT:- Heard for interim relief also. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it appropriate to stay the operation of the order of the learned Single Judge, as it is likely to be applied in other such similar cases.

  Post the matter after six weeks.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1321
  

  CENVAT Credit - capital goods - electrical wires - electrical stampings - electrical control panels - switch gear - machines and mechanical appliances and tools etc. - HELD THAT:- This Bench in M/S JAI BALAJI INDUSTRIES LTD. VERSUS CCEX., BOLPUR [2019 (10) TMI 1353 - CESTAT KOLKATA] has allowed the appeal filed by the appellants holding that the case is squarely covered by the Hon’ble High Court Court of Allahabad’s decision in the case of THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE CUSTOMS & SERVICE TAX VERSUS M/S. JUHI ALLOYS LTD., ANIL KUMAR SHUKLA [2014 (1) TMI 1475 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT].

  Appeal allowed.

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• 2020 (1) TMI 1320
  

  Violation of principle of natural justice - Baggage Rules - Section 129A of Customs Act, 1962 - case of appellant is that principle of natural justice was required to be followed by considering their written submissions filed by them on 24-4-2019 and no consideration has been given to them - HELD THAT:- Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) has violated the principle of natural justice and written submissions filed by the appellant were required to be considered while passing the impugned order, therefore, the impugned order is set aside and matter remanded back to Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the issue after considering the written submissions filed by the appellant and to give a personal hearing to the appellant, thereafter to pass an order in accordance with law.

  The appeal is disposed of by way of remand.

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