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Showing 381 to 400 of 1255 Records
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2015 (5) TMI 881
Denial of Exemption claim - 100% EOU - additional duty of excise under the Finance Act, 1999 - Scope of Notification No.22/2003 - Held that:- In the notification under section 5-A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Government exempted the duty of excise leviable thereon under the provisions specified therein, namely, Central Excise Act, 1944, Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 and the Additional Duties of Excise (Textile and Textile Articles) Act, 1978. The intention was clearly to limit the exemption only in respect of the enactments specified in the notification. The Finance Act of 1999 was not one of them. - A plain reading of the notification itself makes it clear that the exemption was not to operate in respect of the additional excise duty levied under the Finance Act, 1999 - The Finance Act levying the additional excise duty was enacted only in the year 1999, i.e., after first notification of the year 1994. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (5) TMI 880
Validity of detention order - Non-supply of documents within the stipulated time in the language known to the detenue - Delay in execution of the detention order - Delay in disposal of the representation - Delay in passing the detention order - held that:- The petitioner was served with a detention order on 23.6.2014. While receiving the detention order the endorsement was made by the petitioner in his handwriting in English language and the acknowledgement was also signed in English language - after receipt of the detention order the petitioner filed a representation on 7.8.2014 before the Special Secretary-cum-Director General, CEIB, and also to the Chairman COFEPOSA Board. This representation was also made in English language. - petitioner was working in a company. The petitioner has been carrying on a business, which would entail filling up of forms and addressing letters and, thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner does not understand or is not fully conversant with the English language. - Decision in the case of Kubic Darusz v. Union of India [1990 (1) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] followed.
As the petitioner could not be served in the ordinary way a look out circular was issued on 28.3.2014. The Department took steps under Section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act. A copy of the order dated 31.3.2014 was published in the official gazette. A publication was carried out in the local newspaper and a report was also sent to the ADG, DRI, for filing the same before the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate. - Department has been able to satisfactorily explain the steps taken by them to serve the petitioner.
Representation is to be decided without any unreasonable delay and the explanation of the delay would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The objective of an expeditious disposal of the representation is closely associated with the liberty of a person. In the case of Rajamal (1998 (12) TMI 607 - SUPREME COURT), the detention order was quashed and the explanation rendered that the Minister was on tour for five days was considered to be unjustifiable. In the present case as well the respondent was aware that once the order of detention was passed a representation was likely to be made, hence, the same should have been decided within the shortest period of time.
Delay of 8 months has not been explained. We have in the paragraph aforegoing noticed that the house of the petitioner was searched on 12.4.2013; his statement was recorded n 16.4.2013 and thereafter a proposal was sent on 14.6.2013 for issuance of a detention order; the screening committee in its meeting held on 28.6.2013 considered the proposal for preventive detention of the petitioner and approved the same. - The provisions of the COFEPOSA Act vests extra ordinary power in the Government to detain a person, without recourse to ordinary law of the land and without a trial by the Court, and thus, the power is to be exercised with due care and caution
There is unexplained delay in passing the detention order of approximately 8 months. The chart showing the chronological sequence of events prepared by the respondents would show that the proposal was approved for preventive detention of the petitioner on 28.6.2013, however, the detention order was passed only on 18.2.2014, we are not satisfied with the explanation which is sought to be relied upon by the respondent in the counter affidavit as also in paragraph 25 of the detention order.
Detention order was served upon the petitioner without any delay on the part of the respondent, as all necessary steps were initiated by the department to serve the petitioner. We are also of the view that the petitioner was conversant with the English language and petitioner has workable knowledge of English language and the department cannot be faulted for non-supply of the documents and the order of the detention in Bengali language. But there is unexplainable delay on the part of the department for deciding the representation of the petitioner. After passing of the detention order, the department was well aware that a representation is likely to be made, however, 17 days were taken to dispose of the representation, out of which it is claimed that there were six holidays, still it leaves a period of 11 days, which is considered to be an inordinate delay in the facts of this case. The petition must succeed even on the ground of not passing the detention order for a period of 8 months, after the proposal was accepted on 28.6.2013 - Decided in favour of petitioner.
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2015 (5) TMI 879
Denial of refund claim - Where and admittedly there is a nil assessment order, whether the assessee is entitled to claim refund without making a challenge to such assessment order - Held that:- As the provisional assessment as well as the final assessment in respect of all the bills of entry were nil assessment, the question of raising a challenge to the said orders before the Appellate Authority would not arise at all. The appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved by the said orders and consequently, the question of filing any appeal would not arise. The judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the authorities which levied duties, would not be applicable to the present case. In the cases before the Apex Court, there was an assessment order levying duty which was not challenged. This is not the situation in the present case. In the present case, the assessment order was a nil assessment and no duties were levied and as such, the appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved by such order. In such circumstances, we find that the reliance by the Commissioner (Appeals) and CESTATE on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Priya Blue Industries Ltd. (2004 (9) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) is not justified in the present case. - appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved with the correctness of the order of nil assessment. The order sanctioning refund passed by the Assistant Commissioner dated 14/12/2007 is accordingly justified. Consequently, the orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the order passed by the CESTAT cannot be sustained and deserve to be quashed and set aside - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (5) TMI 878
Application for restraining Respondent from invoking and encashing bank guarantees/pay orders - Held that:- The bank guarantees/pay orders were retained because the Petitioner having failed to discharge the export obligation and no certificate having been obtained in that behalf, there was a default in complying with the requisite provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Rules made thereunder. It is for that purpose and to secure the revenue that this without prejudice arrangement was made. If the Revenue has any powers in terms of the rules and regulations to initiate legal proceedings, they are free to do so. They are equally free to pass such orders as are permissible in law. However, we cannot allow the retention of the bank guarantees/pay orders, as sought by the Respondents. The bank guarantees/pay orders be returned, duly cancelled, within a period of four weeks - Decided in favour of appellant.
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2015 (5) TMI 877
Application for Scheme of Amalgamation under Sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 - Official Liquidator's observations regarding issuance of shares at a premium of ₹ 9370/-, disputed sales tax & Excise duty liabilities, Default in payment of TDS duly addressed - Held that:- In reply to the first observation made by the Official Liquidator, the petitioner companies in their reply dated 11th March, 2015 have submitted that the valuation report prepared by SMC Capitals Limited has recommended the share swap ratio of 8:100 based on the value per share of the transferor company and the transferee company i.e. ₹ 748.20 per share and ₹ 9,380/- per share for the transferor company and the transferee company respectively, thus, reflecting the fair price per share of the transferee company i.e. ₹ 9,380/- per share (including a premium of ₹ 9,370/- per share over the face value of ₹ 10/- per share).
In reply to the second observation made by the Official Liquidator in para 14 of his report, the petitioners, while referring to Para 9 of the Scheme, have undertaken that post the Scheme becoming effective, all the pending proceedings of the transferor company shall not abate or be discontinued and instead the same shall continue in the name of the transferee company. The aforesaid undertaking is accepted and the petitioner shall remain bound by the same. In view of the aforesaid, the observations made by the Official Liquidator stand satisfied.
No objection has been received to the Scheme of Amalgamation from any other party. The petitioner companies, in the affidavits dated 11th March, 2015 of Mr. Rajesh Bansal and Mr. Saurabh Bansal, authorized signatory of the transferor and transferee companies respectively, have submitted that neither the petitioner companies nor their counsel have received any objection pursuant to the citations published in the newspapers on 16th January, 2015.
Considering the approval accorded by the equity shareholders and creditors of the petitioner companies to the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation and the affidavits filed by the Regional Director, Northern Region, and the Official Liquidator not raising any objection to the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation, there appears to be no impediment to the grant of sanction to the Scheme of Amalgamation. Consequently, sanction is hereby granted to the Scheme of Amalgamation under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. - Application for Scheme of Amalgamation approved.
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2015 (5) TMI 876
Application for reduction in issued, subscribed and paid-up share capital under Sections 100 to 105 of Companies Act, 1956 and other applicable provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 - Held that:- It has been submitted by the petitioner that the equity shares of the petitioner company were listed and traded on the National Stock Exchange (NSE), Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), Delhi Stock Exchange (DSE) and Madras Stock Exchange (MSE). It is further submitted that one of the promoters of the petitioner company namely, Denso Corporation, holding 47.93% of the paid up capital of the company, vide its letter dated 26.04.2013 proposed to voluntarily delist the equity shares of the petitioner company from the aforesaid stock exchanges by acquiring upto 73,98,019 equity shares held by public shareholders in the petitioner company. Thereafter, Denso Corporation vide a public announcement dated 12.08.2013 made an offer to acquire the shares of the petitioner company and the final price for accepting the equity shares in the Delisting Offer was fixed at ₹ 145/- per equity share. It is further submitted that pursuant to the acquisition of the equity shares, Denso Corporation along with other promoter and promoter group shareholders of the petitioner company held 93.02% of the subscribed and paid up equity share capital of the petitioner company, as on 03.10.2013.
It is further submitted that many of the shareholders for various reasons including change of address, improper contact details, misplaced share certificates and due to expiry of the offer date missed the exit opportunity given by the holding company and have been deprived of an opportunity to make liquid their investment, therefore, Denso Corporation gave a Final Exit Opportunity to remaining non promoter public shareholders, who had not tendered their shares in the Delisting Offer/whose tender of offer shares had been rejected in the Delisting Offer, to participate in the acquisition process for a period of one year from the date of delisting i.e. 05.11.2013 and is valid upto 04.11.2014.
It is further submitted by the petitioner that as on 08.08.2014, the promoters of the petitioner company were holding 95.94% of the paid up capital of the company and the remaining 4.06% of the paid up capital of the company were held by non-promoters/public being approx. 8000 in number, which clearly indicate that large number of non promoter shareholders individually held insignificant shares. It is also submitted that even after sending the reminder letters to these shareholders, the said shareholders are not traceable due to various reasons and therefore the possibility of such shareholders offering their shares under the Final Exit Offer is highly improbable. It is further submitted that the Board of Directors of the petitioner company have decided to reduce the share capital of the company in accordance with the provisions of Sections 100 to 105 of the Companies Act, 1956 since in their view it is the only practical and economically efficient option available to the petitioner company in order to give exit opportunity to the shareholders since the shares held by them are no longer marketable and are illiquid stocks.
Despite publication of notice, no objection has been received from any creditor or any member of the public. The petitioner company, in the affidavit dated 5th January, 2015 of Sh. N.P.S. Chawla, Advocate of the petitioner company has submitted that neither the petitioner company nor its counsel have received any objection pursuant to citations published on 20th November, 2014. Thus, there appears to be no legal impediment in allowing the present petition.In view of the averments made in the petition and there being no objection from any creditor or any member of the public, the petition is hereby allowed. - Application for reduction in Share capital allowed.
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2015 (5) TMI 875
Attachment of property - Money laundering Act - whether provisional attachment of the properties in issue, could have been passed without a charge sheet having been filed under Section 173 of the Cr.PC qua the scheduled offences. - breach of principles of natural justice - Held that:- Scheme of Act, as it now operates, is directed not only against persons and juridical entities which are prosecuted for scheduled offences by various agencies, such as the CBI, Customs, SEBI etc., but also operates qua persons who conceal, possess, acquire, use and project or claim proceeds of crime - A bare reading of the provisions, in particular, Section 5 would show that for the authorised officer (not below the rank of Dy. Director) to exercise power of provisional attachment, it is no longer necessary, that the person, who is in possession of any proceeds of crime should have also have been charged for commission of a scheduled offence. The Act 2 of 2013 has deleted Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 5, as it stood prior to the amendment. Clause (c) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 5, as it stood prior to the 2013 amendment, is now shown as Clause (b) in the amended statute. - Consequently, the designated officer can provisionally attach a property which, does not concern a person charged with a scheduled offence as long as the following ingredient is found: he has reason to believe, based on the material in his possession, that a person is in possession of proceeds of crime and, such proceeds, are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating proceedings relating to confiscation of proceeds of crime.
The reasonability of the grounds which lead to the formation of belief warranting provisional attachment is tested from the point of view of whether or not they are germane to the formation of belief that if, provisional attachment is not ordered, it could lead to frustration of proceedings under the Act. Therefore, if the grounds are relevant and have nexus to the formation of belief then, of course the designated/authorised officer would have the necessary jurisdiction to take action under the Act. What is required to be examined is not the adequacy or sufficiency of the grounds but the existence of belief. In coming to this conclusion, in my view, all that one is to examine, is that, whether there was some material which, gave rise to a prima facie view that if provisional attachment was not ordered, it would frustrate proceedings under the Act.
Provisional order of attachment passed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the PMLA even though valid for 180 days requires the designated / authorised officer to file a complaint before the adjudicating authority within a period of 30 days from the date, when attachment is ordered. - A perusal of the details of the properties of the petitioners, which have been provisionally attached, would show that the designated / authorised officer has included within its ambit, essentially, properties, which were, clearly were acquired between 2009 and 2014. The petitioner no.1, in his statement dated 24.09.2014 made to the DOE gave details of immovable properties and bank accounts owned by his family members, which included properties owned by him and his wife as well
Having regard to the material accompanying the impugned order and the discussion therein, one cannot but come to the conclusion that the designated / authorised officer had reason to believe that the properties in issue were involved in money-laundering, and that, if they were not attached, immediately, it could lead to the proceedings under the PMLA, being frustrated.
Legislature, has excluded the requirement to issue notice or having to hear the person whose, property is sought to be provisionally attached as this power is vested in the designated / authorised officer to avoid and / or prevent a situation, which would result in, any proceeding, under PMLA, being frustrated. The PMLA provides for issuance of notice and hearing at the stage of section 8 proceedings before the adjudicating authority, after a complaint under Section 5(5) is filed, having regard to the nature of power vested in the designated / authorised officer. It is an emergent power, invested in a senior officer of the DOE to deal with a situation at hand, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
The fact that a post facto hearing is provided under Section 8 of the PMLA, in my view, rules out, by necessary implication, the requirement to issue notice and of hearing at the stage of provisional attachment, under Section 5(1) of the Act. Therefore, complete opportunity was given to the petitioner to agitate and advance its case. As a matter of fact under PMLA, the decision of the adjudicating authority can be assailed by way of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. - No merit in petition - Decided against Appellant.
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2015 (5) TMI 874
Exemption claim - Urban land - assessee submitted that since the property in question is not a vacant land but there was a building under construction over the said land, it cannot be treated as urban land u/s. 2(ea)(v) - Failure to furnish documentary evidence - whether the property subjected to Wealth Tax is an 'urban land' as per Section 2(ea)(v)- Held that:- Any area comprised within the jurisdiction of a municipality or Cantonment Board which has a population not less than 10,000 according to the land census or in any area which is within such distance not being more than 8 KMs from the local limits of any municipality or Cantonment Board as notified by the Central Government shall be treated as urban land. However, the said provisions also excludes certain categories of land from being treated as urban land if they satisfy conditions mentioned therein.
Structure standing over the land during the relevant period being a half/semi-finished one cannot come within the exclusionary clause so as to take it out from the ambit of urban land. - even accepting assessee's claim that there was a building under construction over the land during the relevant time, but no documentary evidence has been brought on record to indicate approval of the appropriate authority for such construction. In course of hearing when the Ld. AR was specifically asked whether there is an approval of the appropriate authority for the construction, he admitted that there is no such approval. That being the case, the conditions of clause-1(b) to Section 2(ea) is not satisfied for claiming exemption from Wealth Tax. - Decision in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax and another Vs. Giridhar G.Yadalam [2007 (3) TMI 334 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] followed - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (5) TMI 873
Liability to deduct tds - agreements between the assessee and non-residents are not fee for technical services within the meaning of Section 9(1)(vii) so as to oblige the assessee to deduct tax at source under Section 195 as held by ITAT - Held that:- ITAT was unduly influenced by all the regulatory compulsions which the assessee had to face. Besides international convention and domestic law that mandated aircraft component overhaul, the manufacturer itself – as a condition for the continued application of its warranty, and in order to escape any liability for lack of safety, required periodic overhaul and maintenance repairs. Unlike normal machinery repair, aircraft maintenance and repairs inherently are such as at no given point of time can be compared with contracts such as cleaning etc. Component overhaul and maintenance by its very nature cannot be undertaken by all and sundry entities. The level of technical expertise and ability required in such cases is not only exacting but specific, in that, aircraft supplied by manufacturer has to be serviced and its components maintained, serviced or overhauled by designated centres. It is this specification which makes the aircraft safe and airworthy because international and national domestic regulatory authorities mandate that certification of such component safety is a condition precedent for their airworthiness. The exclusive nature of these services cannot but lead to the inference that they are technical services within the meaning of Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. The ITAT’s findings on this point are, therefore, erroneous. This question is accordingly answered in favour of the Revenue.
Whether payments made by the assessee fell within the purview of the exclusionary clause of Section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act and were not, therefore, chargeable to tax at source? - Held that:- Coming to the instant case, it is evident that fee which has been named as "success fee" by the assessee has been paid to the NRC. In the present case, the ITAT held that the overwhelming or predominant nature of the assessee’s activity was to wet-lease the aircraft to LCAG, a foreign company. The operations were abroad, and the expenses towards maintenance and repairs payments were for the purpose of earning abroad. In these circumstances, the ITAT’s factual findings cannot be faulted. The question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2015 (5) TMI 872
Reopening of assessment - whether the ATM is a computer or ought to be treated as normal plant and machinery, attracting different rates of depreciation? - Held that:- When the returns for the subsequent years were processed, the AO had disallowed the claim made @ 60% and added a sum of ₹ 3,71,00,000/- to the income of the assessee-Bank, by allowing depreciation @ 15% only, by treating the ATMs as plant and machinery. Keeping in view the fact that the ATMs had been operationalised by March, 2005, reasons were recorded to believe that the income of the assessee, chargeable to tax, had escaped assessment. There is no disputing the fact that the assessment for the said years, i.e., 2005-06 and 2006-07, under Section 143(3) had concluded on 28.11.2007 and 30.11.2007 and determination of tax upon the assessee was made on the basis of the assessment. The proviso to Section 147 provides that no action shall be taken under the said section, after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to make the return or respond to the notice issued under Section 142(1) or Section 148. The other condition is that there should be disclosure of fully and truly all material facts necessary for the said assessment year.
The reason for reopening, thus, being merely a change of opinion on account of the assessment being made for the subsequent years would not give the AO the jurisdiction to reopen as he would, thus, be reviewing his earlier decision which has been held not to be permissible. Reopening notice quashed - Decided in favour of assesse.
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2015 (5) TMI 871
Reopening of assessment - absence of reasons recorded prior to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the objections furnished by the petitioners to the Section 148 notice had not been disposed of by a separate speaking order prior to the re-assessment order - Held that:- As seen from the provisions of Section 148(2) as also the decisions of this Court in Haryana Acrylic(2008 (11) TMI 2 - DELHI HIGH COURT), and that of Baldwin Boys High School (2015 (2) TMI 806 - KARNATAKA HIGH COUR), that the reasons have to be recorded prior to the issuance of notice under Section 148. If they are not so recorded, then the notice under Section 148 and proceedings pursuant thereto are without authority of law. In the present case, it is evident that the reasons were recorded only on 18.09.2012, i.e., after the notice under Section 148 had been issued on 30.08.2012. Clearly, the statutory provisions, as explained by judicial decisions, indicate that the notice under Section 148 would be invalid and consequently all proceedings pursuant thereto would also be vitiated.
Assessing Officer has to pass a speaking order disposing of the objections “before proceeding with the assessment”. In the present case, a separate speaking order has not been passed and the objections have been dealt with, if at all, in the re-assessment order itself. On this ground also, the petitioner is liable to succeed. See GKN Driveshafts [2002 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME Court] - Decided in favour of assesse.
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2015 (5) TMI 870
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - claim of deduction under Section 80-P(2)(d) - Held that:- In the case in hand the applicant submitted the revised return and on basis of that tax was recovered. True it is, at the fist instance the assessee claimed exemption as per provisions of Section 80-P(2)(d) of the Act of 1961 but immediately on knowing about its non-applicability a revised return was filed disclosing accurate income. Under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 it is required to be seen as to whether the assessee has concealed the income or the details supplied by him in return were found incorrect, erroneous, not accurate, not according to the truth or not exact depiction of the taxable income. No such eventuality in the instant matter exists. The Commissioner of Income Tax as well as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal after examining the entire record arrived at the conclusion that first return submitted by assessee Udaipur Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. was a bonafide error and that was immediately rectified by submitting a revised return.
In this factual background we do not find any substantial question of law that may demand adjudication by us by entertaining an appeal as per provisions of Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. - Decided in favour of assesse.
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2015 (5) TMI 869
Disallowance of warranty provision - whether ITAT was right in law in treating provision for warranty in the present case as an ascertained liability, despite failure on part of the assessee to establish historical or scientific basis of arriving at the said provision? - Held that:- The question is answered in favour of the respondent by the judgment of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Majestic Auto Ltd. [(7) TMI 568 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] which was also relied upon by the Tribunal.
So is the view taken in Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1959 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court] wherein held that the liability on the assessee having been imported, the liability would be an accrued liability and would not convert into a conditional one merely because the liability was to be discharged at a future date. There may be some difficulty in the estimation thereof but that would not convert the accrued liability into a conditional one; it was always open to the tax authorities concerned to arrive at a proper estimate of the liability having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Also see Rotork Controls India P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [ 2009 (5) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] 314 ITR 62 (SC)- Decided in favour of assesse.
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2015 (5) TMI 868
Arrears of income tax - Attachment of accounts and money in these accounts was appropriated towards arrears of income tax - Whether the civil suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent was not barred under Section 293 of the Income Tax Act? - Held that:- A perusal of Section 293 of the Income Tax Act reveals that no suit shall be brought in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any proceeding taken or order made under the Income Tax Act thereby leaving no ambiguity that a Civil Court is prohibited from entertaining a suit to set aside or modify any order or proceedings initiated under the Income Tax Act. An exception, would obviously be available where the order passed or proceedings initiated are vitiated by fraud and then also if the fraudulent act is attributed to an officer exercising power under the Income Tax Act. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 does not allege any fraud by or at the behest of the Income Tax Department. The courts below have held that the fraud was perpetuated by M/s Janta Janta Scheme (Regd.) but have not returned a finding of fraud against the department.
The plaintiff/respondent No.1 was competent to file a suit for recovery against M/s Janta Janta Scheme (Regd.) but in absence of any allegation of fraud against the department, could not maintain a suit against the Income Tax Department. The substantial question of law is consequently answered in favour of the appellant by holding that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, to entertain the suit, against the Income Tax Department, was barred by Section 293 of the Income Tax Act.
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2015 (5) TMI 867
Amortization of premium paid on investments under "held to maturity category" - ITAT holding that the same is revenue expenditure in nature - held that:- The identical question came to be considered by in the case of Rajkot Dist.Co-op. Bank Ltd. [2014 (3) TMI 110 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and considering the paragraph (vii) of the CBDT Circular No.17 of 2008, it is held that the assessee is entitled to the amortization of security premium, as claimed. - Decided in favour of the assessee
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2015 (5) TMI 866
10% disallowance of the expenditure on doctors - CIT(A) deleted the addition as confirmed by ITAT - Held that:- The Tribunal has agreed with the detailed reasoning given by the CIT (Appeals) for deleting the disallowance. Upon a consideration of the materials on the record, we do not find the said reasoning as unacceptable. - Decided against revenue.
Delayed payment of employer’s contribution under Section 43B - Tribunal deleting the addition - Held that:- From a perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it is evident that while doing so it has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Vinay Cements Limited [2007 (3) TMI 346 - Supreme Court of India] which decision has been reiterated in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Alom Extrusions Ltd.: (2009 (11) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT). - Decided against revenue.
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2015 (5) TMI 865
Revision u/s 263 - AO failed to examine the taxability of the difference between the cost of the assets and fair value of the assets transferred to BIL, shown directly credited to the ‘Reserves for Business Restructuring’ by the assessee company in its balance sheet and that the AO failed to examine as to whether the said difference was to be assessed as capital gain u/s 45 of the Act or as a business income u/s 28(iv) of the Act - capital loss on transfer of PI undertaking by the assessee to BIL for Nil consideration - Held that:- The assessee transferred telecom passive infrastructure undertaking to BIL at Nil consideration resulting in capital loss of ₹ 5739 crores. The said loss was not a tax deductible item and had been suo-motu added by the assessee in its computation of income under normal provisions. Thereafter the assessee had revalued its investment in the subsidiary company i.e. BIL from ₹ 5,00,000/- to ₹ 8218 crores and had given the corresponding credit to the Reserves for Business Restructuring, out of the said reserves an amount equal to the loss of ₹ 5739 crores had been credited to the P & L a/c.
From the above entries it is clear that the assessee had claimed the loss in the P & L A/c. However, the said amount was suo-motu added in the computation of income because it was not an allowable loss. This fact was examined by the AO who framed the draft assessment order for the approval of the DRP. The AO prepared a draft assessment order u/s 144C(1) of the Act and the said draft assessment order inter alia covered the issue relating to the taxability of transfer of PI undertaking to BIL at Nil consideration. The AO referred to the notes to the accounts and computation of total income, then specifically asked the assessee about the justification of the claim of capital loss amounting to ₹ 5739 crores which is evident from page nos. 73 to 78 of the draft assessment order dated 16.11.2011, copy of which is placed at page nos. 125 to 130 of the assessee’s compilation.
From the above noted facts, it therefore, appears that the issue on the basis of which assessment order was considered by the ld. CIT as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue was examined by the AO in detail and it was directed by the DRP that the addition was not to be made after proper verification. However, the AO arbitrarily made the addition. On the appeal of the assessee, the said addition was directed to be deleted by the ITAT vide its order dated 11.03.2014. We, therefore, do not see merit in this observation of the ld. CIT that the assessment order dated 30.10.2012 appeared to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue because the AO failed to examine the taxability of ₹ 5739 crores.
The assessee passed the adjustment entries for a sum of ₹ 5739 crores in its books of account which had no effect on the profit/income of the assessee, therefore, the ld. CIT was not justified in holding that the AO had not examined the issue relating to the loss on account of transfer of passive telecom infrastructure to the subsidiary company. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessment order dated 30.10.2012 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
As regards to the adjustment entry for revaluation of investment in subsidiary company i.e. BIL the amount of ₹ 5739 crores transferred from Business Restructuring Reserves of ₹ 8218 crores was not a taxable item, the obvious corollary would be that the balance amount of ₹ 2479 crores (Rs. 8218 crores – ₹ 5739 crores) remaining in the said reserve account after the aforesaid transfer was non-taxable. The same finding had been given by the ITAT vide aforesaid order dated 11.03.2014. Therefore, the ld. CIT was not justified in holding that the order passed by the AO was erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue particularly when the ld. CIT himself failed to arrive at a definite conclusion and to form an opinion regarding the tax implication of the impugned transaction. In the present case, the ld. CIT on the one hand, stated that the transfer of telecom passive infrastructure undertaking at Nil consideration resulted in a capital gain of ₹ 2479 crores, on the other hand, the same transaction was alternatively alleged to have resulted in a business income of ₹ 2479 crores u/s 28(iv) of the Act. Moreover, the ld. CIT directed the AO to re-examine and verify the issue, however, he himself failed to arrive at a definite conclusion. Therefore, we are of the view that the ld. CIT without arriving at a definite conclusion was not justified in holding the assessment order dated 30.10.2012 as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Action of the ld. CIT was impermissible u/s 263 of the Act particularly when he directed the AO to re-examine the issue and proposed to tax ₹ 2479 crores either under section 45 or section 28(iv) of the Act.
As regard expenditure incurred by the assessee towards amount paid to BIL for usage of passive telecom infrastructure ld. CIT directed the AO to re-examine the allowability of expenditure claimed by the assessee but he had not stated as to how and in what manner the expenses claimed by the assessee were impermissible, therefore, the action of the ld. CIT was not justified. As in the former part of this order that the AO in the original assessment proceedings had accepted the claim of the assessee after proper examination and verification of the claim and the ld. CIT had not given any finding as to how and in what manner the order of the AO on this issue was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. He simply directed the AO to make further verification and examination for allowing the claim which the AO had already done, therefore, the order of the ld. CIT u/s 263 of the Act deserves to be set aside on this issue. This revision u/s 263 set aside - Decided in favour of assesse.
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2015 (5) TMI 864
TDS u/s 194I - Premium for acquiring leasehold rights for the leased plot - whether falls within the purview of sub clause (i) of explanation to sec. 194I which specifies the meaning of the term ‘rent’? - whether payment of premium was for acquisition of leasehold rights or for use of land? - Held that:- Commissioner of Income Tax(A) has also dealt with other cases pertaining to the land leased by MMRDA in the same or adjoining area and has held that the impugned deposit of lease premium does not constitute advance rent but it is a lease premium for acquiring land with right to construct a commercial building although with certain restrictions, but it is a capital expenditure not falling within the ambit of section 194- 1 of the Act. We also observe that the payment of lease premium was not to be made on periodical basis but it was one time payment to acquire the land with right to construct a commercial complex thereon and the lease premium was paid to MMRDA in four instalments, therefore, we are unable to see any perversity, infirmity or any other valid reason to interfere with the findings of the Commissioner of Income Tax(A). See CIT vs Vegetable products [1973 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court]- Decided in favour of the assessee .
In the case of ITO vs Indian Newspaper Society (2013 (9) TMI 158 - ITAT DELHI) held that in case the lease premium paid by the assessee is held to be capital in nature and the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS on payment of lease premium to MMRDA. The issue is therefore decided against the revenue.
As regards the lease deed contained restrictive clauses therefore the payment of the assessee is in the nature of rent. A bare perusal of the clauses referred to by the revenue shows that they are only regulatory in nature for the uniform development of the area of land leased out to the assessee. Regulatory clauses are also present in the cases of development of freehold land owned by a person. Such regulatory clauses cannot convert the lease premium into tenancy as per section 194 I of the Act. Accordingly the issue is decided against the revenue.
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2015 (5) TMI 863
Revision u/s 263 - DIT(E) erred in holding that Receipts of appellant from Test Laboratory Services and Consultancy Services do not fall within the ambit of Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act - appellant is not eligible for claiming exemption u/s 11 on income derived from the above receipts - Held that:- Assessing Officer raised query about the revenues received from test laboratory charges and consultancy charges and the assessee placed required details and explanation before the AO in this regard and this fact was also noted by the CIT(A) in paragraph 4.4 of the impugned order. We are unable to approve the observations of the CIT that the AO did not examine the issue of taxability of revenue from test laboratory and consultancy charges in the light of proviso to section 2 (15) of the Act. We may also point out that the AO has considered this issue in paragraph no. 2 and 3 of the assessment order and conclusion of the AO cannot be held as erroneous merely because the AO has not decided the issue in so many words as per expectation of the Ld. CIT.
Thus the CIT was not justified in holding that the view taken by the AO was granting exemption u/s 11 of the act was not inaccordance with law and was unsustainable. Per contra, from bare reading of the assessment order, it is vivid that the assessing officer made reasonable inquiry on the issue of test laboratory charges and consultancy charges and the AO took a plausible and reasonable view that the revenue earn from these activities cannot be held as income with the main object to earn profits. We also clearly note that the activities of laboratory testing and consultancy was in furtherance of main and charitable object of the assessee association it cannot be termed as activities with the main object of profit earning motive. - Decided in favour of assesse.
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2015 (5) TMI 862
Benefit of Section 11 - whether Registration U/S 12A does not automatically guarantee exemption from income tax U/S 11 of the Act? - whether registration has been granted u/s. 12A of the I.T. Act, AO cannot override exemption while passing the assessment order? - Held that:- The impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) is contrary to the law and facts and on the file by holding that once registration has been granted u/s. 12A of the I.T. Act, AO cannot override exemption while passing the assessment order.
We have discussed in detail assessee-trust u/s 12AA of the Act as has been granted in the present appeal, then it will not be precluded to the AO to examine in details the every object of the society and to give finding in the assessment order as to whether the assessee has complied with the requirement of section 11 of the Act or not as to when the assessee is seeking exemption u/s. 11 of the I.T. Act. The registration granted u/s. 12AA of the Act to the assessee should not be obstacle in the way of AO, at the time when the assessment proceedings are to be taken and to decide as to whether the assessee is entitled for the benefit of section 11 and 12 of the I.T. Act as the case may be. After examining the Income and Expenditure Statement of the assessee for the asstt. year in dispute, we are of the view that the assessee has not incurred any expenditure for charitable purpose, as per their aims and objects. Therefore, the activities of the assessee is not charitable in nature and is commercial in nature. In view of the aims and objects of the assessee-society and the activities done by the assessee, we are of the view that the printing and stationery of the books fall under the general public utility limb of definition u/s. 2(15) of the I.T. Act, 1961 and not an education, because the activities of the society is not pertaining to systematic instructions school or training.
After going through the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities as well as the documentary evidence filed by the assessee in the shape of Paper Book, we are of the considered view that assessee has not proved that activities done by the assessee for the asstt. years in dispute is charitable in nature, as per the provisions of section 2(15) of the I.T. Act. We find that the Ld. First Appellate Authority has passed the impugned order and granted the exemption u/s. 11 and 12 of the I.T., Act to the assessee, which is contrary to the law and facts on the file, therefore, the order is not sustainable in the eyes of law, hence, we cancel the impugned orders by allowing all the appeals filed by the Revenue. - Decided against assesse.
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