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Showing 381 to 400 of 1621 Records
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2016 (5) TMI 1246
Agricultural lands within the ‘Urban agglomeration’ or within the notified area limits - whether would not falll within the ‘Scope & Domain’ of the terminology ‘Asset” as contemplated u/s 2(ea)(v) of the W.T.Act, 1957? - Held that:- The legislature has, by virtue of the Finance Act, 2013, introduced the amendment to section 2(ea)(v) with retrospective effect from 01.04.1993. This amendment by way of Explanation 1(b)(ii) – section 2(ea)(v), is as follows (relevant extract)
“but does not include land classified as agricultural land in the records of the government and used for agricultural purposes….”
The appeals pending before us pertain to assessment years 2004-05 to 2006-07.
In view of the above, all the appeals of the assessees are squarely covered by the aforesaid retrospective amendment brought in by the legislature in the Wealth Tax Act. Therefore, agricultural lands are no longer ‘assets’ (within the amendment of section 2(ea)(v) of the Act), because of the retrospective amendment brought in. As such, they are not exigible to Wealth Tax Act. Action of the AO in including the value of the assessees lands in their net wealth, is reversed. Accordingly, the orders passed by the ld. CWT(A), confirming this action are also reversed.- Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (5) TMI 1245
Cenvat Credit - Nexus between output service and input service - Whether the Tribunal did not examine the aspects as to the output services could be said as service or not and whether the Tribunal ought not have remanded the matter - Held that:- at the relevant point of time, the service was not a service reckoned for the purpose of CENVAT credit followed by the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of PR. Commissioner of Service Tax Versus Mportal (India) Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (4) TMI 409 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] but the Tribunal did not consider the said aspect. Under the circumstances, we do not find that the matter would call for interference as sought to be canvassed. Also the Tribunal has relegated the matter for finding/ascertaining the nexus between input service and the output services which would be required to be examined by the authorities. When the Tribunal was satisfied that the matter deserves further examination on facts for finding out the nexus, by exercise of discretion, it cannot be said such exercise of discretion is perverse. As there is no substantial questions of law arise for consideration, no case is made out for our interference. - Decided against the revenue
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2016 (5) TMI 1244
Imposition of penalty - Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 - Banking and other Financial Services and Sponsorship Service - received from foreign firms who do not have any office in India - liable to pay tax under reverse charge - Held that:- in the instant case the non-payment of tax was on account of bonafide belief and the Revenue had conducted Audits which would go to show that there was in fact no suppression of facts. On the other hand it is found that the judgement of the Tribunal in the case of Atwood Oceanic Pacific Ltd. -Vs- CST [2012 (12) TMI 425 - CESTAT, AHMEDABAD] is more akin to the facts of the present case and therefore the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly applied the said judgement for waiver of penalty under Section 78. Moreover a mere pendency of Civil Appeal in Atwood's case before the Supreme Court is no ground not to follow a binding precedent. One more aspect to be noted is that during the relevant period, Section 80 was in operation which does not figure in the Central Excise Act, where there is a discretion not to impose penalty when reasonable cause is shown. Therefore, the ends of justice would be met by upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) for the reasons stated above. - Decided against the revenue
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2016 (5) TMI 1243
Whether the eligibility for credit on input services is to be denied since the same was used outside the factory - Held that:- as per definition of input services there is no requirement in law that the credit can be taken only on the service tax paid on the services received in the factory premises supported by the Tribunal's decision in the case of L.G. BALAKRISHNAN & BROS. Ltd. Vs. CCE, Coimbatore [2010 (6) TMI 211 - CESTAT, CHENNAI]. By following the decision of Tribunal in the case of Ramgarh Chini Mills Vs. CCE, Kanpur [1998 (2) TMI 278 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI], the Cenvat credit will be admissible to them if the bills are in the name and address of their Corporate Office, LAB (R& D Unit) and the marketing Office and not in their factory. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the genuineness of the transaction and the duty paid documents are not doubted, therefore, credit cannot be denied. Cenvat being a beneficial piece of legislation, which was enacted for removing the cascading effect, the denial of credit sighting procedural irregularities is unsustainable. Hence the impugned order is set aside. - Decided in favour of appellant
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2016 (5) TMI 1242
Denial of refund - Unjust enrichment - Held that:- The Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order held that the Original Authority is bound to follow the earlier appellate order, which allowed the adjustment of excess with short payment during the finalization of provisional assessment. On this issue, the impugned order cannot be faulted as such adjustment of duty on finalization of provisional assessment is held to be legally valid by the Tribunal in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. [2015 (11) TMI 953 - CESTAT NEW DELHI (LB)]. The Tribunal followed the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CCE,LTU, Bangalore [2011 (10) TMI 201 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]. Considering the ratio followed by the Tribunal, no merit found in the present appeal filed by revenue. - Decided against the revenue
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2016 (5) TMI 1241
SSI Exemption - wrong valuation - Tread rubber cleared by the appellant was not valued at the rate of 115% (or 110% with effect from 05.07.2003) of the cost of production and when so done, the appellants exceeded the SSI exemption limit prescribed under Notification No.8/2003-CE, dated 01.03.2003 - Willful mis-statement or suppression of facts. - Period of limitation - Demand of duty alongwith interest and imposition of penalty -
Held that:- in the case of Uniworth Textiles Ltd. Vs. CCE, Raipur [2013 (1) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT] it was held that mere non-payment of duties is not equivalent to collusion or wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, otherwise there would be no situation for which ordinary limitation period would apply. Inadvertent non-payment is to be met within the normal limitation period and the burden is on Revenue to prove allegations of wilful mis-statement. The onus is not on the assessee to prove its bona fides. In the case of Chemphar Drugs Liniments [1989 (2) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA], the Supreme Court held that some positive other than mere inaction or failure on the part of the assessee or conscious or deliberate withholding of information when assessee knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with the liability the extended period. In the case of Continental Foundation Joint Venture [2007 (8) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA], Supreme Court went to the extent of ruling that mere omission to give correct information is not suppression of facts unless it was deliberate and that an incorrect statement cannot be equated with wilful mis-statement. In the case of Vivek Re-rolling Mills Vs. Collector [1995 (8) TMI 317 - SUPREME COURT], Supreme Court held that extended period is not invokable when assessee had reason to believe that its goods were exempted. Bombay High Court in the case of CC Vs. Star Entertainment [2015 (2) TMI 1050 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] in effect held that extended period is not invokable in the case of unclear or doubtful legal position.
In view of the above, the allegation of wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts cannot be sustained. It is found that the Show Cause Notice was issued on 22.03.2006 where the demand pertains to the period 2001-02 to 2003-04 and therefore the entire demand is beyond normal period of one year. We may point out that the Notification No.8/2003-CE, dated 01.03.2003 cited in the Show Cause Notice was effective from 01.04.2003 while part of the demand pertains to the period prior to the date of issuance of the said Notification. However, we need not dwell upon this point as the entire demand has been held to be time barred. By following the judgment of High Court of Allahabad in the case of CCEST Vs. Monsanto Manufacturer Pvt. Ltd. [2014 (4) TMI 505 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], once the demand is held to be time barred there is no occasion for the Tribunal to enquire into the merits and such act of Tribunal was outside of its jurisdiction. Therefore, we refrain from discussing the merits of the case. - Decided in favour of appellant
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2016 (5) TMI 1240
Admissibility - Cenvat Credit of GTA Services availed by the Appellant from the factory gate to their godown/depots - Held that:- the goods are sold from the godowns/depots of the Appellant and no sales are effected at the factory gate. Reliance placed by the department on the wording of Notification No.20/2007-CE dated 25.04.2007, to the effect that place of removal and point of clearance will be the factory gate of the Appellant, is mis-placed and is not the correct appreciation of law made by the First Appellate Authority. In the light of definition of input service given in Rule 2(l) of CCR read with the definition of place of removal , as defined in Section 4(2)(c) of the Central Excise Act, it is held that input service credit of the services availed upto the place of removal is admissible and in the present Appeals filed by the Appellant the place of removal will be godown/depots from where goods are sold and not the factory gate. - Decided in favour of appellant
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2016 (5) TMI 1239
Eligibility of Cenvat credit - received material from HMIL and had paid duty which was indicated in the invoice - took credit based on the proper invoice issued by HMIL - HMIL paid the said duty and the goods were cleared under the cover of the said invoice - Held that:- the appellant’s contention is that there is nothing on record to show that the assessment of HMIL has been questioned by their jurisdictional officers, it would not be proper for any other officer to comment on the said payment has not been stated to be wrong or an erroneous proposition of law by the Revenue and therefore accepted. Therefore, by applying the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CCE Vs. MDS Switchgear Ltd. [2008 (8) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT], the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
It is found from the original authority's order that he is not able to ascertain the correct amount of credit taken by HMIL and the correct amount which is required to be reversed by HMIL, when that is the position, it is not known as to how he can come to a conclusion that the appellant is not eligible to take credit of the amount mentioned in the invoice. As rightly pointed out by the appellant that the jurisdictional officers of HMIL have not disputed the duty paid and the alleged excess payment has not been granted as refund. Therefore, both the lower authorities have erred in denying the credit to the appellant.
Period of limitation - Invokation of proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - appellant availed the credit based on the duty amount paid by HMI as mentioned in the invoice - Held that:- when there is no dispute with regard to the payment of duty by HMIL, the same cannot be denied to the appellant. The instant case pertains to a situation where there is an excess payment of duty. Extended period can be invoked only when there is an intentional failure to pay duty which is not the case here. The appeal succeeds on limitation also as no credit in excess of the amount mentioned in the invoice was taken by them. - Decided in favour of appellant
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2016 (5) TMI 1238
Period of limitation - Suspension of CB licence - Violation of Regulation 11 of CBLR 2013 - Imposition of penalty under Regulation 22 read with Regulation 20 of the CBLR 2013 - Held that:- the Court is unable to agree with the submission for the simple reason that the SCN dated 19th September 2015 was not issued under the CBLR 2013. Further, it was not issued to the Petitioner. By adding the name of the Petitioner to the said SCN dated 19th September 2015 issued under the CA by way of a corrigendum dated 1st February 2016, it cannot be said that an SCN was issued to the Petitioner under the CBLR 2013 on 19th September 2015. It bears reiteration that in terms of Regulation 20(1) of the CBLR 2013, the SCN had to be issued to the Petitioner within ninety days from the date of the receipt of offence report, i.e., within 90 days from 18th February 2015. Clearly the SCN under Regulation 20(1) of the CBLR 2013 was not issued within ninety days after 18th February 2015.
Therefore, the Petitioner not having been issued the SCN within ninety days of receipt of the offence report by the Customs, the SCN dated 2nd February 2016 issued to it by the Commissioner of Customs (General) is clearly unsustainable in law. The order dated 23rd March 2015 confirming the suspension of the Petitioner's CB licence cannot also be continued on account of the failure to issue the SCN and therefore complete the enquiry within the time limit specified in Regulation 20. Consequently the said order dated 23rd March 2015 is hereby declared to be invalid and set aside on that basis.
Suspension of licence - Alleged illegal imports - Held that:- the name of M/s Universal Enterprises in respect of one B/E does not find mention in the table of the said order. Therefore there is an obvious error in the impugned order. It is not clear as to the precise nature of the alleged violation committed by the Petitioner and whether it was qua the transactions involving M/s Universal Enterprises or the transactions involving Chaman Lal & Sons and Shyama Corporation. What appears to have happened is that in drafting the suspension orders qua each of the 10 CHAs/CBs there has been a mix up of facts. This by itself is sufficient to show that there was a total non-application of mind to the facts involving the Petitioner as far as the decision to suspend its CB licence was concerned. Therefore, the suspension order is set aside. - Petition disposed of
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2016 (5) TMI 1237
Validity of Customs Notifiaction No. 91/2009 dated 11th September 2009 - restricting the transfer/sale of goods imported using the Served From India Scheme ('SFIS') duty certificates/scrips for the purpose of payment of customs duty - Held that:- it is obvious in the instant case that the impugned notification dated 11th September 2009 issued by the DoR under Section 25(1) of the CA on the one hand and the amendment to the FTP 2009-2014 with effect from 1st August 2013 and the HBP cannot co-exist. The notification dated 11th September 2009 issued by the DoR takes away what the amended para of the FTP 2009-14 and the HBP permits. It also takes away what para 3.6.4.6 of the FTP 2004-09 read with para 2.43 of the HBP permits. On the contrary, the DoR should have on its own have issued a fresh notification consistent with the changes brought about to FTP 2009-14.
In the event of conflict of views between two ministries of the central government, the view taken by the ministry that is primarily responsible for the policy in question, which in this case is the FTP, should prevail. The SFIS was introduced by the Ministry of Commerce and its instrumentality, i.e. the DGFT has been statutorily entrusted with the final word on the interpretation of the FTP. The letter dated 6th September 2013 from the Commerce Secretary to the Revenue Secretary is instructive. It refers to Circular No. 837/14/2006 dated 3rd November 2006 issued by the CBEC under the Ministry of Finance which acknowledged that payment of customs duty could be made by using the duty credit scrips.
The Court posed a query to the learned ASG whether denying permission to alienate goods imported under the SFIS when the FTP 2004-09 was operational while permitting such alienation if goods were imported under the SFIS under FTP 2009-14 was based on any rational criteria or was designed to achieve any legitimate objective. The learned ASG was unable point out any. Indeed denial of permission to transfer vessels imported more than three years ago only because they were imported under FTP 2004-09 serves no useful or rational purpose.
The stand taken by the DoR appears to be unjustified. The result of such a stand would be that while the transfer of vessels that were imported three years after 1st August 2013 do not require any permission, vessels that were imported more than three years earlier to 1st August 2013 would not be permitted to be transferred except by way of re-export or within the group or to managed hotels, come what may. While it is not clear what revenue is sought to be protected in that process, it surely subjects the importer of goods that fall in the latter category to discrimination. Such denial of permission would attract the vice of impermissible discrimination in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution particularly since it is based on no rational criteria. In fact it contradicts the intent expressed in the relevant paras of the FTP 2004-09 and the HBP which have been adverted to. There is also nothing in the FTP which prohibits the sale of vessels that have completed more than three years after import from being sold in the domestic market. In other words, there is no justification for the DoR to insist that the vessels of the Petitioner that have completed more than three years after import should be transferred only by sale within group companies or managed hotels or be re-exported.
Therefore, the impugned Customs Notification No. 91/2009 dated 11th September 2009 under Section 25(1) of the CA to the extent it restricts the transfer/sale of goods imported using the SFIS duty certificates/scrips for the purpose of payment of customs duty, even where such goods satisfy the criteria for transferability under the FTP and HBP, is in violation of the FTDR Act, the FTR Rules as well as FTP 2004-2009 and FTP 2009-2014.
It is further held that the letter dated 12th June 2013 issued by the DoR asking the DGFT to keep in abeyance the NOC granted by the PRC is contrary to the legal position explained above and can have no binding effect on the DGFT. On questions of interpretation of the FTP, it is the DGFT whose views will prevail. For the same reason, the stand of the DoR conveyed to the Court through the letter to the DoR, and recorded in the Court's order cannot prevail. Hence, the DoR is restrained from objecting to the transfer/sale of the vessels Greatship Aarti, Greatship Ahalya, Greatship Amrita, Greatship Anjali and Greatship Asmi belonging to the Petitioner since each of the said vessels has been imported more than five years ago. - Petition disposed of
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2016 (5) TMI 1236
Re-assessment proceedings - Imposition of tax - Period prior to 2013 - Period after 2013, petitioner himself started paying tax - claiming exemption from tax on sales effected under SEZ policy announced by the State of M.P. - Held that:- by considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others [1984 (11) TMI 63 - SUPREME Court], as the huge amount of more than ₹ 98.18 crores is dues against the petitioner, the petitioner is directed to pay 10 % of the total amount within a period of four weeks from today and furnish Bank Guarantee for the remaining dues within a period of six weeks from today. - Stay granted partly.
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2016 (5) TMI 1234
Penal interest for late deposit of excise duty on wastage of Beer in excess of 10% - sale of Beer and Indian made foreign liquor - Held that:- When the High Court quashed the demand notice, it was wiped out from the face of the earth. Once the demand order was quashed, it was no longer in existence and, therefore, there was no valid demand for payment of excise duty during the period when the order of the High Court prevailed. It is only when the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court that the excise demand became payable upon a fresh notice of demand. Penal interest becomes payable when the fresh demand is not paid within the stipulated period. In the instant case, the excise demand was paid within the stipulated period and, therefore, the question of demand of penal interest does not arise.
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2016 (5) TMI 1233
Calculation of arrears to the bank - SARFAESI Act - Held that:- We vacate the direction that no other expenses like legal expenses, publication of notice in the newspaper will be added in calculating the arrears. In other words, it will be open to the Bank to include all the expenses, which it actually incurred as per law. The first installment is to be paid by the writ petitioners/respondents on or before 20.03.2016 in a sum of ₹ 25 Lakhs. We record the undertaking of the writ petitioners/respondents that they will not transfer the property consisting of plant, machinery and the building to anyone nor will they create any third party interest till the entire amount due to the appellants is cleared off. In case of default, we further direct that it will be open to the Bank to take possession as provided in law. The judgment of the learned Single Judge stands modified as above
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2016 (5) TMI 1232
Stay of demand extended beyond 365 days - Held that:- The matter is no longer res integra. While interpreting the provisions of Section 35C(2A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is pari materia to section 254(2A) of the I.T. Act, this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Rohtak vs. M/s Voice Telesystem (2016 (1) TMI 1101 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT ) after considering the relevant case law on the point concluded that wherever the appeal could not be decided by the Tribunal due to pressure of pendency of cases and delay in the disposal of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee in any manner, the interim protection can continue beyond 365 days in deserving cases. Reference was made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Ahmedabad vs. Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Limited, (2005 (1) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ).
Thus ITAT has not acted in contravention of the Second Proviso of Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as the combined period of stay has exceeded 365 days - Decided against revenue
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2016 (5) TMI 1231
Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) - Held that:- Assessee society has not fulfilled both the requisite conditions for claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act. It neither exists solely for educational purpose, nor was it substantially or wholly financed by the Government. Therefore, the CIT(Appeals) was not correct in holding that the assessee is entitled for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) of the act. We accordingly set aside the order of CIT(Appeals) and restore the order of Assessing Officer in this regard. - Decided against assessee.
Status of assessee trust - whether society registered under a statute is to be assessed as an Artificial Juridical Person (AJP)? - Held that:- From the records available for the AY 2005-06, we find that the status of assessee was shown to be co-operative society. The AO has shown the same status of the assessee in the assessment order on the basis of status shown in the return of income, therefore the AO cannot be held responsible for assessing the assessee under different status. It is also an admitted fact that there would neither be any change in the computation of income nor tax effect, even if the status of the assessee is to be changed from AOP to AJP, because the assessee has already been assessed at the rates applicable to the co-operative societies. It is also noticed from the record that during the AY 2005-06 in the tax computation form, the status of the assessee was shown to be AJP, meaning thereby in the income tax computation form, the AO has assessed the assessee in the status of AJP. Therefore, no grievance of the assessee is left out in the AY 2005-06. For the remaining assessment years, the assessee has not filed the income tax computation form issued by the AO. Therefore, in the absence of this information, we cannot hold conclusively that assessee was not finally assessed in the status of AJP in the income tax computation form.
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2016 (5) TMI 1230
Intimation u/s.143(1) being time barred - Held that:- The copy of order dated 16.02.2012 is on the file which speaks about the finalization of the assessment. There is no iota evidence on the file to which it can be assumed that the assessee received the intimation after the expiry of one year in view of the proviso u/s.143(1) of the Act. Therefore, in the said circumstances the contention raised by the assessee which is not supported by any documents on record, is not liable to be tenable in accordance with law. Hence these grounds are decided in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
Computation of income under section 115JB - non acceptance of loss to the tune of ₹ 1,49,819/- declared by the appellant and in connection with the acceptance to the tune of ₹ 20,57,890/- as capital gain which is infact the capital receipt - Held that:- The receipt which is not in nature of income is not required to be taxed u/s.115JA of the Act and income which is also exempted u/s. 50 of the Act would also remain exempted as per provision of subsection 4 of section 115 JA of the Act. The capital gain arising to an assessee u/s.50 of the Act on a depreciable asset is liable to be excluded from calculation on deemed profit u/s. 115JA of the Act. In view of the said circumstances it is apparent that the capital receipt to the tune of ₹ 20,57,890/- is not liable to be included while determining the profit and loss account and accordingly the income of the assessee is liable to be assessed in accordance with law. Since there is no other ground challenging the figure of amount in the said assessment therefore, we are of the view that the learned CIT(A) has wrongly upheld the finding of the Assessing Officer on this ground, hence the finding of the learned CIT(A) on the point is hereby ordered to be set aside. Concluding this facts that the capital gain exempted under the provision of the law is not liable to be added to the income of the assessee. Accordingly this issue is decided in favour of the Assessee
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2016 (5) TMI 1229
Addition of difference in form No. 26AS showing the gross hire charges and as per the books of accounts of the assessee - Held that:- TDS were deducted by the recipient of service i.e. M/s Punj Lloyd Ltd amounted to ₹ 6,10,41,854/- whereas undisputedly, the assessee accounted only ₹ 5,56,09,575/- thereby resulting into short accounting of the said income to the tune of ₹ 54,32,279/-. The said difference was explained by the assessee to be on account of the reasons that the bills for hire charges were raised in the next year 2010-11 relevant to the AY 20011-12 whereas M/s Punj Lloyd Ltd accounted the expenditure in the current year i.e F.Y. 2009-10 relevant to AY 2010-11 and also deducted TDS thereon.
We find merit in the arguments of the ld AR and also note that the whole exercise by the AO is neutral tax unit as the assessee had duly accounted for the difference of ₹ 54,32,279/- in the next financial year and also booked the corresponding expenditure in that year and the return of income was filed accordingly and was also accepted by the AO. We also find merits in the arguments of the ld. AR that the credit of service tax on the hire charges would not be available to the assessee had he booked the said hire charges under the current financial year. Looking to the totality of facts of the case , we are of he opinion that since the assessee has booked the full amount of hire charges as per Form No.26AS into two years and offered the same for taxation though the claim of TDS on the entire hire charges was made in the assessment year 2010-11.
In any case, if the hire charges as mentioned in form No.26AS are to be considered in the current year then the corresponding income as shown in the next year with the relevant expenditure are to be deleted from the next year which seems to be meaningless and un-productive at this stage. Even worth noting is fact that the income has been accepted by the department in the subsequent year. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion that since the full amount of hire charges stood offered to tax by the assessee in two years , addition of ₹ 54,32,279/- can not be sustained as it will result in double taxation of the same income. Accordingly, we set aside the order of ld.CIT(A) and direct the AO to delete the addition - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (5) TMI 1228
Non-deduction of tax at source on year end provision - Held that:- Tribunal for the A.Y.2007-08 in assessee’s own case, wherein the Tribunal while relying upon another decision of coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of IDBI Vs. ITO, (2006 (7) TMI 248 - ITAT BOMBAY-H ) has held that since the payee is not identifiable at the time of making of provision and further the entire provision has been written back in the next year and the actual amounts paid/credited were subjected to TDS as and when the liability was crystalised or the payments were made and even when the assessee himself had disallowed the entire amount in the computation of income upon which no TDS was deducted, in that event proceeding u/s.201(1) and the levy of interest u/s.201(1A) was not justified. Thus appeals of the revenue relating to disallowance made on account of nondeduction of TDS on year-end and provision are hereby dismissed. - Decided in favour of assessee
Non-deduction of tax at source on purchase of traded goods and packing material - Held that:- The provisions of Chapter XVII·B of the Act cannot be said to be applicable on purchase of finished/traded goods Accordingly, there is no default on the part of tile Appellant in complying with the provisions of Chapter XVII-B of the Act while making payment for purchase of finished/traded goods and Purchase of Packing Material without deducting tax at source This ground of appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant. - Decided in favour of assessee
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2016 (5) TMI 1227
Reopening of assessment - Held that:- HC order sustained [2015 (7) TMI 297 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] - impugned notices under Section 148 of the Act to reopen the proceedings beyond 4 years and within 4 years on the aforesaid ground i.e. on the ground that the payment of purchase price in excess to the SMP has escaped the assessment cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (5) TMI 1226
Eligibility for deduction under Section 80 IB denied - manufacturing activity - Held that:- We find that the assessee has not clearly established that the income was derived from manufacturing activities or that the income is directly relatable to the manufacturing activities. The assessee admittedly had trading activity. It is not clear as to whether the income, as indicated above, aggregating to approximately ₹ 30 lacs arose out of activities relating to manufacturing activity. The question no.1, for lack of appropriate evidence, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of revenue.
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