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Showing 41 to 60 of 652 Records
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2002 (1) TMI 1314
The petitioner, proprietor of M/s. Darshan Tent House, obtained registration under U.P. Trade Tax Act. An ex parte assessment order was passed for the previous year without notice. Restoration application was rejected for being filed late. First and second appeals were also rejected. High Court set aside the second appeal and directed the First Appeal to be heard on merits within six weeks. Trade Tax Revision was allowed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1313
Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of impugned summons.
2. Whether the facts alleged in FIR No.2-AC-2000 and charge sheet dated 23.3.2001 arise from the same transaction as Crime No.13/AC/96.
3. Violation of undertakings given in Letters Rogatory issued under Section 166-A Cr.P.C.
4. Directions/orders required to meet the ends of justice.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Quashing of Impugned Summons
The court held that the burden of proof in corruption cases shifts to the accused once the prosecution establishes certain facts. It is not permissible to quash the summons at a pre-trial stage as this would pre-empt the trial. The accused can present their defense during the trial. Therefore, the court concluded that it is improper to quash the impugned summons under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage.
Issue 2: Same Transaction Allegation
The court noted that determining whether the facts in FIR No.2-AC-2000 and charge sheet dated 23.3.2001 arise from the same transaction as Crime No.13/AC/96 is complex and should not be decided at a pre-trial stage. It would be unsafe to conclude this without a full trial. The court emphasized that quashing the process at this stage would be inappropriate and could lead to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, it is not within the court's purview to decide this issue under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Issue 3: Violation of Undertakings in Letters Rogatory
The court highlighted the importance of adhering to the undertakings given in Letters Rogatory issued under Section 166-A Cr.P.C. The evidence collected through these Letters Rogatory should be used only for the specific case for which they were issued. Any violation of this undertaking would render the trial unfair and the evidence inadmissible. The court found that the prosecution's use of evidence gathered under Letters Rogatory for a different case (C.C.No.2 of 2001) than the one it was intended for (Spl.C.C.No.7 of 1997) was a violation that vitiated the proceedings in C.C.No.2 of 2001.
Issue 4: Directions/Orders Required
The court directed that the records and evidence gathered in FIR No.2-AC-2000 and charge sheet dated 23.3.2001 should be transferred to the Designated Court handling Spl.C.C.No.7 of 1997. The Designated Court should then decide the appropriate course of action, whether to issue summons based on the new evidence as a supplementary report or to take fresh cognizance and proceed accordingly. The court emphasized the need for a fair trial and directed the Designated Court to expedite the process and conclude the trial within six months.
Conclusion:
The petitions were dismissed with specific directions to transfer the records to the Designated Court, ensuring a fair trial and adherence to the undertakings given in the Letters Rogatory. The court also appreciated the assistance provided by the Amicus Curiae.
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2002 (1) TMI 1312
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed or from the date of non-approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Whether failure to make an application under Section 33(2)(b) renders the order of dismissal inoperative.
Summary:
Issue 1: Ineffectiveness of Dismissal Order
The Supreme Court addressed the conflict between different benches regarding the effectiveness of a dismissal order under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Strawboard Manufacturing Co. and Tata Iron & Steel Co. cases held that if approval is not granted, the dismissal order becomes ineffective from the date it was passed, entitling the employee to wages from the date of dismissal to the date of disapproval. Conversely, the Punjab Beverages case held that non-approval or failure to apply for approval does not render the dismissal order inoperative; it merely subjects the employer to punishment under Section 31 of the Act, and the employee's remedy lies in a complaint under Section 33A or a reference under Section 10(1)(d).
Issue 2: Failure to Apply for Approval
The Court emphasized that the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory, requiring the employer to pay one month's wages and apply for approval simultaneously with the dismissal. The Court reiterated that non-compliance with these conditions renders the dismissal order inoperative. The Court rejected the view in Punjab Beverages that contravention of Section 33(2)(b) does not invalidate the dismissal order, stating that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the proviso and allow employers to dismiss employees without adhering to statutory protections.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court endorsed the views in Strawboard and Tata Iron & Steel Co., holding that the dismissal order remains inchoate and ineffective without approval under Section 33(2)(b). The Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Tribunal's and High Court's findings that the appellant failed to comply with Section 33(2)(b) provisions, rendering the dismissal order inoperative.
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2002 (1) TMI 1311
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... ... ..... . Arijit Pasayat, JJ ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1310
The appeal filed by the Revenue against a refund claim held not barred by limitation. The duty paid during appeal considered under protest, not subject to time bar provisions. Commissioner (Appeals) decision upheld, Revenue appeal rejected.
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2002 (1) TMI 1309
The Rajasthan High Court rejected a reference application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, related to a contractor's assessment. The Assessing Officer applied a net profit rate of 10% on total receipts, considering admissible depreciation. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed depreciation separately. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision. The Court held that no referable question of law arose from the Tribunal's order and rejected the reference application.
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2002 (1) TMI 1308
Issues:
1. Validity of the order expunging appellant's name from revenue record.
2. Legal basis for the entry in the revenue record.
3. Authority of the collector to correct entries in consolidation proceedings.
Issue 1: Validity of the order expunging appellant's name from revenue record:
The case involved a dispute over a plot of land vested in the gram sabha, where the appellant's name was expunged from the revenue record and replaced with respondent names during consolidation proceedings. The appellant challenged this order, arguing that once their name was recorded during consolidation, it couldn't be expunged. The court disagreed, stating that as the land was vested in the gram sabha and no lease had been executed in favor of the appellant, the collector's order was merely correcting a wrong entry in the revenue record.
Issue 2: Legal basis for the entry in the revenue record:
The court emphasized that the appellant had no legal title over the land in dispute and the resolution proposing the lease lacked legal sanctity without the assistant collector's approval. The entry in the revenue record must have a legal basis, and the appellant couldn't claim title based on a wrong entry. The collector, as the district deputy director of consolidation, had the authority to correct entries under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, even if a wrong provision was initially cited.
Issue 3: Authority of the collector to correct entries in consolidation proceedings:
The court held that the collector had the power to correct wrong entries in the consolidation record, even if a different provision was initially referenced. The order expunging the appellant's name was deemed valid under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The court found no infirmity in the collector's order and dismissed the appeal, stating that the order was a consequential correction of the erroneous entry in the revenue record.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the collector's authority to correct entries in the revenue and consolidation records, emphasizing the lack of legal title for the appellant and the necessity for entries to have a legal basis. The appeal was dismissed, with no costs awarded.
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2002 (1) TMI 1307
The High Court of Rajasthan rejected the reference application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by Shri Parswanath Granite Industries (P.) Ltd. The Assessing Officer disallowed cash credits of Rs. 43,000 and Rs. 17,000 in the names of Miss Pramila and Mr. Suresh Kumar Golecha, respectively, as they failed to prove the genuineness of the credits. The Tribunal's decision was upheld, and the application was rejected.
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2002 (1) TMI 1306
Issues Involved:
The issue involves the taxability of an amount received by the assessee from the former employer on voluntary retirement under section 17(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act.
Summary:
Facts:
The assessee, a management and technical consultant, received an amount of Rs. 5,50,000 from his former employer upon voluntary retirement. The employer and the assessee had entered into an agreement where the assessee agreed to refrain from certain activities in consideration of the payment.
Assessing Officer's Decision:
The Assessing Officer held that the amount was taxable under the head 'Salaries' u/s 17(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act, as it included profit in lieu of salary and compensation received upon termination of employment.
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Decision:
The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) reversed the assessment order, considering the receipt as a capital receipt due to a restrictive covenant between the assessee and the employer, which was not taxable.
Appellate Tribunal Decision:
The Appellate Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), stating that the amount received was a capital receipt and not taxable under section 17(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the provision did not cover voluntary retirement or resignation situations.
Key Points:
- The Tribunal highlighted that the legislative intent excluded situations like voluntary retirement from section 17(3)(i) and the subsequent amendment supported this exclusion.
- The Tribunal relied on case law to support that a restrictive covenant payment is a capital receipt and not taxable under the Income-tax Act.
- The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the non-taxability of the amount received by the assessee upon voluntary retirement.
This summary provides a detailed overview of the judgment, focusing on the issues involved and the decisions made at different stages of the case.
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2002 (1) TMI 1305
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... ... ..... ariava, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1304
The High Court of Rajasthan considered two questions regarding income tax deductions. The court ruled that expenses for preparing tax returns are not wholly for business purposes and disallowed the deduction. However, expenses incurred on customers were allowed as per section 37(2A) based on a previous court decision. The court ruled in favor of the revenue on the first question and in favor of the assessee on the second question.
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2002 (1) TMI 1303
Issues: Violation of section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
Analysis:
1. The appeal was against the order of the CIT(A) upholding the addition of Rs. 1,37,956 out of Rs. 1,52,956 made by the Assessing Officer under section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1989-90.
2. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had made cash payments to labor contractors totaling Rs. 1,52,956, which violated the provisions of section 40A(3). The assessee argued that the Orissa High Court decision in CIT v. Aloo Supply Co. was applicable, stating that the provisions of section 40A(3) were attracted only when payments exceeding Rs. 10,000 were made at a time during the day. The Assessing Officer deemed the payments as an attempt to circumvent the law and made the addition. The CIT(A) upheld the action to the extent of Rs. 1,37,956.
3. During the hearing, the assessee's representative argued that no payment exceeding Rs. 10,000 was made at a particular time. The details of the payments were presented, showing that no single payment exceeded Rs. 10,000. The representative contended that payments were made in cash due to the urgent cash requirements of laborers and that the payments were genuine, falling within the exception provided in Circular No. 220 issued by CBDT.
4. The Revenue's representative supported the lower authorities' orders, stating that the Assessing Officer disallowed Rs. 1,52,956 under section 40A(3), which was reduced to Rs. 1,37,956 by the CIT(A). It was argued that the payments could have been made through account payee cheques or bank drafts as the labor contractors had submitted bills in advance.
5. The Tribunal analyzed the purpose of section 40A(3) to prevent tax evasion and unaccounted money flow. Referring to the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Walford Transport (Eastern India) Ltd. v. CIT, it was noted that a liberal view should be taken in genuine transactions where the identity of the payee is established. As no single payment exceeded Rs. 10,000 and the genuineness of the transactions was established, the Tribunal held that the disallowance of Rs. 1,37,956 was not justified. The addition was deleted, and the appeal of the assessee was allowed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1302
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the assessment order and penalty.
2. Delay in filing the appeal and condonation of delay.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Assessment Order and Penalty:
The petitioner, a cooperative society registered under the Pondicherry Cooperative Societies Act, was assessed for the year 1989-90 with an annual turnover of approximately Rs. 98 lakhs. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer passed an assessment order on 27/09/1990, and a penalty u/s 12(5)(iii) of Rs. 3,58,537/- was levied for failing to disclose the turnover of sales of food and drinks in their hotel. The respondents contended that the penalty was the minimum of 50% of the difference in tax payable and was justified.
2. Delay in Filing the Appeal and Condonation of Delay:
The petitioner received the assessment order on 06/10/1990 and initially communicated with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on 05/11/1990 to withhold the assessment orders, which was not considered as a formal appeal. The formal appeal was filed on 01/02/1991, resulting in a delay of 93 days. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal due to the delay, as per Section 31 of the TNGST Act, which allows condonation of delay only up to 30 days beyond the prescribed period of 30 days. The Taxation Special Tribunal upheld this decision, leading to the current writ petition.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226:
The petitioner argued that the High Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction u/s Article 226 of the Constitution of India to condone the delay and direct the appellate authority to hear the case on merits. However, the Court held that it cannot extend the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. The Court cited several precedents, including the Supreme Court's rulings, emphasizing that statutory time limits must be strictly adhered to and cannot be extended by the Court.
Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the appellate authority and the Taxation Special Tribunal's decisions were legal and proper. The Court clarified that it has no jurisdiction to direct the appellate authority to consider the appeal on merits after the expiry of the prescribed time limit. The dismissal of the writ petition does not prevent the Government from granting any relief under its powers.
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2002 (1) TMI 1301
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the detention order under the COFEPOSA Act.
2. Non-placement of vital documents before the detaining authority.
3. Violation of the detenu's right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Detention Order under the COFEPOSA Act:
The petitioner challenged the detention order dated 31-10-2001, issued under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act). The detenu was found in possession of Indian currency notes totaling Rs. 16,80,000/-, suspected to be counterfeit, and was detained to prevent him from committing similar prejudicial acts. The petitioner's counsel argued that the detention order was invalid due to the non-placement of vital documents before the detaining authority.
2. Non-placement of Vital Documents Before the Detaining Authority:
The critical issue raised was the non-placement of the complaint and FIR dated 5-10-2001 before the detaining authority. The petitioner argued that these documents were of a "vital nature" and could have influenced the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. The detaining authority and the Deputy Director, D.R.I., contended that the FIR was not a vital document and its non-consideration did not impair the subjective satisfaction required for the detention order.
3. Violation of the Detenu's Right to Make an Effective Representation:
The petitioner asserted that the failure to supply copies of the complaint and FIR to the detenu violated his fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to make an effective representation against the detention order. The court examined precedents where non-placement of vital documents before the detaining authority led to the vitiation of detention orders due to non-application of mind. The court concluded that the non-placement of the complaint and FIR, which contained similar allegations as the grounds of detention, could have influenced the detaining authority's decision.
Conclusion:
The court found merit in the petitioner's argument regarding the non-placement of vital documents. It held that the non-placement of the complaint and FIR before the detaining authority vitiated the detention order on the grounds of non-application of mind. Additionally, the failure to supply these documents to the detenu impaired his right to make an effective representation. Consequently, the court quashed the detention order and directed the immediate release of the detenu, unless he was wanted in another case.
Petition allowed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1300
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2002 (1) TMI 1300. Justices N. Santosh Hegde and S.N. Phukan presided over the order.
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2002 (1) TMI 1299
The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals with no costs. (Citation: 2002 (1) TMI 1299 - SC Order)
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2002 (1) TMI 1298
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the assessee's activity of the publication department could be construed to be a business activity and losses therefrom could be adjusted against other income.
2. Whether the maturity value of Canstar is exigible to tax under the head "Capital gains" or "Income from other sources".
Issue 1: Publication Department as Business Activity
The assessee, a political party, claimed that its publication department's activities constituted a business, and losses from this should be set off against other income. The assessee argued that the publication activity was a continuous, systematic, and organized activity, with separate accounts and proper registration. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Assessing Officer held that the publication of journals and literature by a political party was not a business activity but part of its political activities, and thus, losses could not be set off against other income. The Tribunal upheld this view, noting that the political party's objective was not profit-making and that the publication activity lacked profit motive, which is a necessary requisite for a business.
Issue 2: Taxability of Maturity Value of Canstar
The assessee invested in Canstar units, which assured a minimum annual income ploughed back for investment purposes. The issue was whether the surplus on the maturity value of Canstar should be taxed as "Capital gains" or "Income from other sources." The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) treated the surplus as capital gains, noting that the assessee had opted for the capital gains scheme. The Tribunal, however, held that the surplus should be treated as income from other sources, reasoning that the accretion was in the nature of interest income and not capital appreciation. The Tribunal noted that the scheme could not override the provisions of the Income-tax Act and that the income should be assessed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee.
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2002 (1) TMI 1297
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition as no question of law was involved. The delay was condoned.
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2002 (1) TMI 1296
Issues Involved:
1. Reopening of assessment u/s 147/148.
2. Exemption u/s 54 for investment in more than one flat.
3. Enhancement of assessment u/s 251(2) regarding expenditure on new flat.
4. Enhancement of assessment u/s 251(2) rejecting the valuation report for fair market value as on 1-4-1981.
Summary:
1. Reopening of Assessment u/s 147/148:
The assessee challenged the reopening of the assessment, arguing that since the original return was accepted u/s 143(1)(a) and no order u/s 143(3) was made, the reopening was invalid. The Tribunal upheld the reopening, stating that the issuance of notice u/s 148 was justified as the income had escaped assessment, and the time limit for issuing notice u/s 143(2) had expired.
2. Exemption u/s 54 for Investment in More Than One Flat:
The assessee claimed exemption u/s 54 for two flats purchased in the same building. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that exemption u/s 54 is available only for one residential house. The Tribunal noted that the language of the statute is clear, and "a residential house" means one residential unit. The Tribunal also considered the assessee's family size and concluded that the second flat was not required for residential purposes as it was let out.
3. Enhancement of Assessment u/s 251(2) Regarding Expenditure on New Flat:
The CIT(A) had enhanced the assessment by disallowing Rs. 14,94,357 out of the total expenditure of Rs. 17,26,908 incurred by the assessee to make the new flat habitable. The Tribunal held that the expenditure incurred to make the flat habitable should be included in the cost of the new asset. Therefore, the enhancement by the CIT(A) was deleted.
4. Enhancement of Assessment u/s 251(2) Rejecting the Valuation Report for Fair Market Value as on 1-4-1981:
The CIT(A) rejected the valuation report of the Government Approved Valuer and adopted a lower fair market value. The Tribunal set aside this issue and directed the CIT(A) to refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for a proper valuation.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed, with the Tribunal upholding the reopening of assessment and the restriction of exemption u/s 54 to one residential house, while deleting the enhancement related to the expenditure on the new flat and remanding the valuation issue for reconsideration by the DVO.
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2002 (1) TMI 1295
Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition after condoning the delay. (2002 (1) TMI 1295 - SC)
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