|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 612 Records
-
2003 (3) TMI 741 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... act that assessee had paid C.V.D. had been confirmed. Since the Assistant Commissioner was satisfied on merits he should not have denied the credit on technicalities. In the judgment in the case of CCE, Jaipur vs. Poddar Pigment Ltd., 2000 (119) ELT142 (Tri) reconstructed triplicate copy of bill of entry was held as admissible document. The effect of verification is the same as the production of a re-constructed triplicate copy. Since there was no doubt in the mind of the original authority as to the importation of the machinery by the same assesses, his denial on such technicality was wrong. 3. The appeal is allowed with consequential benefits, if any.
-
2003 (3) TMI 740 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... samples are to be worked out on pro-rata basis for the samples as per S.4(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act read with Rules 7 and 6(b) of the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975 or on some other basis. The Tribunal has not decided this question even after holding that the goods were excisable. We, therefore, remit these matters back to the Tribunal for a decision on this point. The Appeals Stand Disposed of Accordingly. No order as to costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 739 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... monial litigation in a case of this nature cannot beheld to be violative of one's right of privacy. 86. To sum up, our conclusions are 1. A matrimonial court has the power to order a person to undergo medical test. 2. Passing of such an order by the court would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution 3. However, the Court should exercise such a power if the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the Court. If despite the order of the court, the respondent refuses to submit himself to medical examination, the court will be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him. 87. Subject to the observations made hereinbefore we are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed a jurisdictional error in passing the impugned judgment. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 738 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ut in the case in hand, the assessing officer has not brought on record except the DVO's report that the assessed has received more than what he has declared. On the basis of the DVO's report, the fair market value cannot be adopted as full value of consideration to determine the capital gain. We have also carefully examined the judgment in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Income Tax Officer (supra) and we find that identical issue was also adjudicated by the Tribunal in which it has been held that in such type of circumstances, fair market value cannot be used a full value of consideration. On conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the ratio laid down in aforesaid judgments, we are of the considered view that the revenue was not justified in rejecting the claim of the assessed. Accordingly, we set aside the order of Commissioner (Appeals) and delete the addition made on this count. 13. In the result, the appeal of the assessed is allowed.
-
2003 (3) TMI 737 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ted to an alternative place apparently to avoid the unpleasantness of facing any contempt proceedings, this Court cannot uphold the order of the High Court and leave the matter to the State Government to reconsider the question whether the school building is still required for its purposes. Admittedly, the school building was hundred years old, dilapidated and in dangerous condition. Shifting school building to the alternative site had, therefore, become necessary to avoid any possible catastrophe by collapse of the building. On this ground, however, it cannot be held that the public purpose for acquiring the building no longer exists. The last prayer made on behalf of the respondent/owner also, therefore, cannot be accepted. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh are set aside. In the circumstances aforesaid, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.
-
2003 (3) TMI 736 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y imposition of fee where there were circumstances to establish that there was quid pro quo for the fee nor it will affect any regulatory measure. This completely demolishes the argument on behalf of the appellant." The aforesaid decision was referred to and relied upon in M/s Gujchem Distillers India Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 399 . In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the condition empowering the State Government to recover the actual cost of supervisory staff posted at the premises of respondent cannot be said to be in any way illegal or ultra vires as it constitutes the price or consideration which the Government charges to the licensee for parting with its privilege and granting licence. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court requires to be set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 735 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the tax is made out. In S.T.R. No. 657 in case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Galaxo Laboratories, decided on 22nd January, 2003. This Court held that merely because Form 31 was not got endorsed before taking the delivery of goods inasmuch as the purchases were shown in the books of account no inference of any attempt to evade the tax could be drawn and levy of penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) by the Tribunal was held unjustified. 7. In the present case the applicant has disclosed the purchases of imported goods in the books of account and shown such purchases before Assessing Authority at the time of the assessment. Therefore, no inference can be drawn that there was any attempt to evade the tax. In the circumstances of the case, order of Tribunal confirming the penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) cannot be sustained. 8. In the result, the revision is allowed and order of Tribunal dated 27th August, 1991 is set aside, penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) is cancelled.
-
2003 (3) TMI 734 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... atter. In the circumstances, Annexure-K is set aside. 8. Sri. Devadasi, learned counsel in the course of arguments would say that the respondents would consider application-Annexure-L and other representations on its merits and pass appropriate orders. Sri Vishweshwara, learned counsel apprehends that in the light of Annexure ‘D’ the respondents are not considering his request. 9. In the light of the submissions made on either counsel, I am of the view that after issue of Annexure-d petitioner actually exported and the same has not been objected to by the respondents the respondents are also considering his application development and on the peculiar facts of this case, I deem it proper to issue a direction to the respondents to consider annexure-N and other representations in accordance with law de-hors Annexure-D and pass appropriate others within twelve weeks from today. 10. Write petition is allowed in the above manner. Parties to bear their respective costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 733 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . In the normal course, we would have set aside the order giving liberty to the respondents to hold a fresh inquiry. Since the appellant was superannuated and at this length of time, we think it is neither appropriate nor desirable to direct a fresh inquiry. 4. Under these circumstances, we think it just and appropriate to set aside the order dated 21.7.1999 passed against the appellant removing him from the status of Check Pilot and restore him the position of Check Pilot but without granting him any monetary benefits except awarding compensation of ₹ 25,000/-. 5. In the result, the impugned order is set aside, the order dated 21.7.1999 passed against the appellant is also set aside and the position of Check Pilot is restored to the appellant. An amount of ₹ 25,000/- shall be paid as compensation by respondent No. 2 to the appellant. The appeal is allowed in the above terms with cost quantified at ₹ 10,000/- to be paid by respondent No. 2 to the appellant.
-
2003 (3) TMI 732 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ssed. This fact clearly indicates that the appellants did not have a genuine grievance against Section 5A inquiry held by the Collector. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment on the grounds now advanced by the appellants. As regards Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1998, the appellants did not raise any objection within a reasonable time after Section 6 Declaration was made. The possession of the land itself was given to the third parties for the purpose of starting the industry. Moreover, the land of the appellants is surrounded completely by other plots which are acquired and sought to be used for industrial purposes. We do not find any justifiable ground to exclude the appellants' lands from acquisition. The Division Bench has correctly held that the appellants were not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition. In view of the above, we see no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 731 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on expenses, etc. from the interest earned on the amount realised by the sale of assets kept in fixed deposit with banks. The Supreme Court held that in merely realising the assets of the appellant-company in the course of its winding-up and banking the proceeds in fixed deposits, the liquidator could not be considered as having carried on any business of the company, and therefore, the appellant-company cannot be said to have carried on any business to bring the interest income within the meaning of section 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was accordingly held that the income from interest was liable to be computed only under the head ‘Income from other sources’. 7. We had earlier answered the same question in the case of the assessee, itself by our judgment in ITA Nos. 90, 91 and 93 of 2000, relying on the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above. We accordingly answer the question referred in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
2003 (3) TMI 730 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 92. We have perused the said judgment. The questions involved in the case before the Supreme Court was as to whether the assessee is to be assessed on the gross amount of interest received by him on his Fixed Deposits or on the interest received as reduced by the amount of interest paid on the loan amount taken on the security of the said deposits. The Supreme Court held that the interest that the assessee received from the bank on fixed deposit was income in his hands and it could stand diminished only if there was a provision in law permitting such diminution. There is none, and therefore, the amount paid by the assessee as interest on the loan he took from the bank did not reduce his income by way of ‘interest on the fixed deposits placed by him in the bank’. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the question referred to has to be answered in negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. We answer accordingly.
-
2003 (3) TMI 729 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... was held that Job Worker isentitled to Modvat Credit. We follow both the decisions in this instant case. It is to be held that when a manufacturer produces as a job worker out of raw material given by the principal manufacturer a product or undertakes certain process on such raw materials then it is considered as an intermediate product. Rule 57C of the C.Ex. Rules will not come into play in that circumstance. But such a job worker manufacturers the same product which he manufactured for the principal manufacturer, out of the raw materials produced by him,(Job worker) and if such a product is exempted from duty, then provisions of Rule 57C will come into play. That Rule will not apply to the intermediate product. In this appeal, job worker has manufactured intermediate product and returned to the principal manufacturer, hence he cannot be denied the credit. 14. We allow the appeal of the assessee and set aside the impugned order, with consequential benefit according to law.
-
2003 (3) TMI 728 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... roundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial......................... Provisions or Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it." For the foregoing reasons. Ext.P2 is quashed. It is held that petitioners are not liable to be prosecuted for any offence punishable either under Section 56(b) or under Section 57(a) of the Act, It is also declared that Rule 9(2) of the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 2002 introduced on 1.4.2000 fixing the strength of ethyl alcohol in toddy drawn from coconut palms as 8.1 v/v is arbitrary and unreasonable and hence illegal and unenforceable. The Original Petition is allowed in the above terms.
-
2003 (3) TMI 727 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... gation of payment of the entire cost of supervision regarding which they receive a final account or bill through the impugned demand notice and, therefore, the respondents ought to pay the amount demanded. o p /o p As pointed out by Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., as he then was, what the respondents agreed to pay was the price of a exclusive privilege which the State parted with in their favour. They cannot, therefore, avoid their liability by contending that the payment which they were called upon to make is truly in the nature of excise duty and that no such duty can be imposed on liquor not lifted or purchased by them. The respondents, in our view, must fail in their contention both on account of the objection to the maintainability of the appeals and on merits concerning the nature of the payment which they are liable to make. o p /o p For the foregoing reasons, we allow all the appeals and set aside the impugned judgments. However, there shall be no order as to costs. o p /o p
-
2003 (3) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dge Benches, we must reject the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants and uphold the view taken by the High Court. The award of the district Judge, Nashik, in the Reference Case where-under the benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and Section 28 of the L.A. Act as amended by the 1984 Act were extended to the respondents, calls for no interference. Some attempt was made to assail the conclusion of the Reference Court and the High Court vis-a-vis the quantum of market value. It is contended that the amount claimed by the land-holders/respondents is much less than what was awarded by the court. No such contention was raised before the High Court nor any material placed before us to substantiate this contention. Moreover, we are informed that a Review Petition was filed in the High Court and the same was dismissed. But no S.L.P. has been filed against that order. We need not dilate further on this contention. In the result the appeal is dismissed, but, without costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 725 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... forts were made for nearly 3 1/2 months i.e. between 23-10-2001 and 7-2-2002 to apprehend the petitioner. It is also not the case of the respondents that any application was filed before the Magistrate either praying for the cancellation of the bail or praying that the petitioner shall not be granted exemption from personal appearance since he is evading arrest pursuant to the order of detention. o p /o p Clearly, therefore, the respondents have miserably failed to offer any explanation, let alone a satisfactory explanation in respect of delay in execution of the order of detention. The inevitable conclusion is that the respondents were not serious in detaining the petitioner under the preventive law of the COFEPOSA . o p /o p 4. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of detention dated 23-10-2001, as amended on 9-4-2002 is quashed. The petitioner is directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. o p /o p The writ petition is allowed accordingly. o p /o p
-
2003 (3) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t there is some procedural irregularity which cannot be termed to be negligence to warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from service. These aspects do not appear to have been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. In the fitness of things, therefore, the High Court should examine these aspects afresh. The consideration shall be limited only to the quantum of punishment and not to any other question. As the appellant would have superannuated in the normal course in the year 1994, and the matter is pending for a long time, the High Court is requested to dispose of the matter within six months from the date of receipt of this order. It is made clear that no opinion has been expressed by us as to what would be the appropriate punishment. In this view, the impugned order is set aside. The writ petition is remitted to the High Court for disposal in the light of what is stated above. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
-
2003 (3) TMI 723 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e 234 of the Constitution of India. The existing Recruitment Rules did not comply with the provision of Article 234 of the Constitution of India. The State Government, therefore, referred to the High Court for consultation and approval of the Rules. The administrative side of the High Court framed the Draft Rules and the appointment offered to Shri N.A. Acharya was in accordance with the Draft Rules. This apart, the eligibility criteria for appointment on the post of the President of the Industrial Court has been determined by the High court and the same has been incorporated in the Draft Recruitment Rules at the request of the Government. o p /o p For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that no illegality is committed by recommending the name of Shri N.A. Acharya as the President of the Industrial Court, for appointment by nomination. o p /o p The appeals are allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. o p /o p
-
2003 (3) TMI 722 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
........
|
