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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 82 Records
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1974 (4) TMI 81 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his case, no such particular was either given or could be given merely because the assessee s books were held to be unreliable and the petitioner was assessed on the basis of best judgment. We are accordingly not satisfied that there was any material on the basis of which the Sales Tax Officer could have reason to believe that the assessee had concealed any part of its turnover or any particulars furnished by it in the return was wrong. Accordingly, he had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. If the Sales Tax Officer has some other material in his possession on the basis of which he could be satisfied that the particulars of the turnover disclosed by the assessee were wrong or that it had deliberately concealed some particulars, he may, if it is open to him under the law, re-commence the proceedings by issuing fresh notice in accordance with law. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The notice dated 4th September, 1973, is quashed. Petition allowed.
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1974 (4) TMI 80 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1968 21 S.T.C. 212 (S.C.)., The State of Rajasthan and Another v. Karam Chand Thappar and Brothers (Coal Sales) Ltd., Jaipur 1909 23 S.T.C. 210 (S.C.)., and Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore and Others 1972 29 S.T.C. 246 (S.C.). 8.. The Tribunal was, therefore, perfectly right in holding that the turnover of the petitioner relating to the supply and distribution of fertilisers is exigible to sales tax under the Act. 9.. We find no merit in the petitioner s contention that the sales tax was not leviable on the turnover relating to the sale of damaged foodgrains. The sale in question was effected in the course of the regular business of the petitioner and no valid ground has been shown as to why the said turnover should be treated as exempt from tax. 10.. In the result, we confirm the orders passed by the Tribunal and dismiss these four tax revision cases. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (4) TMI 79 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act and no steps were taken to suitably reduce the rigour and the restriction on the licensees when the sales tax was imposed. Therefore, in my view, here the imposition directly restricts and Impedes the free flow of trade, and the requirement under article 304(b) not having admittedly been complied with, must be held to be ultra vires the Constitution. On the conclusions as above, this application succeeds and the rule is made absolute. Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, in so far as it deletes country spirit from entry 25, Schedule I, to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, and imposes sales tax on the sale of country spirit is declared ultra vires the Constitution. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus do issue directing the respondents not to give any effect to the said provision in respect of the sale of country spirit. Let the operation of this order of mine remain stayed for a period of one month from this date. Petition allowed.
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1974 (4) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is rationality in the belief of the legislature that capacity to pay the tax increases, by and large, with an increase of receipts?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. A large dealer occupies a position of economic superiority by reason of his volume of business and to make the tax heavier on him, both absolutely and relatively, is not arbitrary discrimination, but an attempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus arrive in the end at a more genuine equality. The capacity of a dealer, in particular circumstances, to pay tax is not an irrelevant factor in fixing the rate of tax and one Index of capacity is the quantum of turnover. The argument that while a dealer beyond certain limit is obliged to pay higher tax, when others bear a less tax, and it is consequently discriminatory, really misses the point, namely, that the former kind of dealers are in a position of economic superiority by reason of their volume of business and form a class by themselves. They cannot be treated as on a par with comparatively small dealers. An attempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus bring about a real and factual equality cannot be ruled out as irrelevant in levy of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. The object of a tax is not only to raise revenue but also to regulate the economic life of the society.
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1974 (4) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Oppression and mismanagement Power of Tribunal on application under sections 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... done in civil suits on payment of appropriate court fees. This is not the object of the provision. Clause (g) of the said provision is only a residuary one and has to be construed in the light of the object with which section 402 has been enacted, viz., to give directions regarding the internal management of the company. Section 402 of the Act, cannot, in my opinion, be utilised for the purpose of agitating the disputes about liabilities or for staying the tax liability of the company. If there are any objections to the tax as levied, then such an objection has to be got raised by recourse to the provisions of the Income-tax Act. Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act are for relieving the shareholder against the oppression or mismanagement of the affairs of the company. The liability to tax levied on the company is outside the scope of these provisions. Section 402 of the Act cannot, therefore, be invoked or applied in such a case. The application is dismissed with costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Memorandum of association - Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of, Length of notice for calling meeting
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1974 (4) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... for a long period of twelve years. It was further found that the company had the object of doing mining business but the colliery mines had been taken over by Government and the object of the company could not be promoted in that respect. These distinguishing features are very important and the facts of that case are not on ail fours with the present case and the decision given by me in that case is thus not of much avail in the present one. Learned counsel for the opposite party raised another point that in the present case, the petitioner could not ask for winding up under clause (f)-the just and equitable clause mdash of section 433 of the Act. His objection is that the sanction given by the Regional Director was confined to an application under clause (c) of section 433 alone. It is unnecessary to go into the point in view of my decision to refuse the prayer. In the result, this application is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order for costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... ons 542 and 543 of the Act. As submitted by the counsel for the official liquidator, the purpose of joining respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to this proceeding was to have the entire case regarding the amount claimed from Messrs. Hindustan Lever Ltd. before the court at one and the same time. Thus, either the first respondent was a debtor, or the second and the third respondents had received the money but had not credited the same to the company. In view of the fact that the application cannot proceed against the first respondent, it becomes unnecessary to proceed against the second and the third respondents in this case, as they are being proceeded against in respect of the same amount in another pending proceeding. With these observations, which are without prejudice to the pending claim against the second and the third respondents, who have not been given notice at all in this case and have not been summoned, I dismiss this application. I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Offence - Criminal offence - Prohibition ... ... ... ... ..... establish that the person was knowingly concerned with the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition in respect of the goods. As to what activities, acts or omissions or violations of provisions of law will attract the penal consequences mentioned in the Section will have to be decided by the court in a particular case. 32.In the result I set aside the order or discharge passed by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate and direct the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with law. As he has not considered the facts of the case, he will go through the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution so far and after hearing the learned advocates for the complainant and for the accused, he will decide whether a charge should be framed against all or any of the accused before the court. If he is so inclined, he may direct the separation of the trial of one accused or a set of the accused as the case may be. 33.Rule is made absolute.
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1974 (4) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
Smuggled goods Burden of proof is on the Department Presumptions of innocence Penalty Seized goods Writ jurisdiction Criminal trials
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1974 (4) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Assessment made at the rate of 75 per cent of total income under the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 challenged on the ground that section 2(hh) and (kk) and clauses (2) and (3) of Part I to the Schedule of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1970, are violative of article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The impugned provisions of the Amending Act of 1970 are not violative of article 14. The petitions are accordingly dismissed
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1974 (4) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... within the meaning of section 12(1). These contributions were not covered by section 12(2), and could not themselves be dealt with as if they were income from property held under trust for purposes of section 11. Of course, the income that the petitioners may earn or derive from the properties which constituted these contributions would be income from property held under trust and would be directly governed by section 11. The dividend income received by the petitioner-trust on the shares initially donated by the J. K. Charitable Trust to the petitioners would be governed by section 11 of the Act. In the result both the petitions succeed and are allowed. The respondent, Income-tax Officer, is directed not to include the value of the shares, etc., mentioned above, received by the petitioners by way of donations from the J. K. Charitable Trust as petitioners income, but to treat the dividend income as governed by section 11 of the Act. The petitioners will be entitled to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 30 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Standard Deduction, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... India Corporation (P.) Ltd., Commissioner of Income-tax v. Periakaramalai Tea and Produce Co. Ltd., Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Steel Rolling Mills Ltd., Metal Box Company of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chunilal Khushaldas, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vasantha Mills Ltd., First National City Bank v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. and Kothari Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax. The only decision which is of some use is Periakaramalai Tea and Produce Co., wherein it was observed that a provision to meet a present liability is not a provision by way of reserve. After carefully considering the entire matter, and for the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. PRITAM SINGH PATTAR J.-I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (4) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
1922 Act, Act Of 1961, Assessment Order, Association Of Persons, Change Of Law, Finding Or Direction, Jurisdiction To Reassess, Notice Of Reassessment, Reassessment Of Firm
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1974 (4) TMI 28 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Deductions From Total Income, Industrial Undertaking, Reconstruction Of Business ... ... ... ... ..... ourt relying on a decision of the Supreme Court observed that an inference drawn from the facts proved is a question of fact and not of law, and the Tribunal s finding on that question is final. In this connection the Division Bench observed as follows The Supreme Court in this case further held that an inference drawn by the Tribunal on the proved facts was a question of fact and could not be interfered with on reference. The High Court could interfere only if there was a question of law. In the instant case also the learned Tribunal on the facts of the present case has drawn a clear inference that it was a case of unproved cash deposit and this being a finding of fact no question of law arises for our decision. For these reasons, therefore, we answer the reference in the affirmative and hold that the Tribunal was right in deciding that the assessees were entitled to the exemption provided under section 84 of the Income-tax Act of 1961. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (4) TMI 27 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... lled for as to in what circumstances he omitted to add back the amounts which were mentioned in the profit and loss account and were, in fact, added back by the Income-tax Officer. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner took the view that there was gross negligence, and wilful default whereas the Tribunal has taken quite a contrary view. As a matter of fact, about the two additions, namely, wealth-tax and income-tax, even the counsel present in court were ignorant that they are not permissible deductions. If this is the case with the legal profession, how can one expect a different standard from a layman more particularly, when the assessee can only read and write Urdu. In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. There Will be no order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (4) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... ondition, namely, that the property held under trust only in part for charitable purposes is satisfied, clause (b) becomes applicable and the income to the extent to which it is utilised for wholly charitable purposes is exempt. It is, in fact, the application of the income which is material. The fact that the donor of the property had earmarked his property for wholly charitable purpose will not be decisive for determining whether it would be exempt from being included in the total income. In the present case the question referred to us proceeds on the basis that the entire income from both the categories of donations was actually spent for charitable purposes only. In the context of this fact it is apparent that all such income would be exempt. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (4) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Loss ... ... ... ... ..... ed it is with reference to section 12B of the Act. We, therefore, reframe the question in the manner following Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was a transfer of the shares held by the assessee in Merchandise and Stores Ltd. and Rajputana General Dealers Ltd. in favour of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., within the meaning of section 12B when the assessee was allotted shares in Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. as a result of the amalgamation of Rajputana General Dealers Ltd. and Merchandise and Stores Ltd., so as to result in any capital loss in respect of the assessment year 1961-62 under section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ? For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the question is in the affirmative and is in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to its costs of this reference from the department. A. N. SEN J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (4) TMI 24 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sferred the amount to its reserve byajkhata in the relevant accounting year, it cannot be said that it was an income which accrued in that year. As the assessee neither received this income nor did it accrue to it in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1963-64, it could not be treated as income earned by it in that year. We find that the Tribunal has interfered with the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in this regard without, in any way, pointing out any circumstance from which it could be inferred that this was the assessee s income earned during the relevant previous year. In our opinion the Tribunal was not justified in treating this amount as the assessee s income earned in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1963-64. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered in the negative and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to receive his costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (4) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... s to the extent of the shares possessed by them. This is not a case of abandonment of his title to the extent of 71 by the assessee. Since both the clauses (a) and (c) are inapplicable and since the transfer was for consideration, it was not a gift so as to be liable to gift-tax. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider whether an exemption under clause (xiv) of section 5(1) of the Act could be allowed. On the facts and the findings mentioned above, we reframe the two questions of the Tribunal which is as follows Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the transfer in question was a gift as defined by the Gift-tax Act or was covered by clause (a) or (c) of section 4 of the Act? Our answer to the question is that the transfer was not a gift as defined and was not covered either by clause (a) or (c) of section 4 of the Act. The assessee will be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200. The fee of the counsel is also assessed at the same figure.
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