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Showing 41 to 60 of 150 Records
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1976 (4) TMI 194 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oconuts except sunvamaru or bhutakhia as classified above would go as oil-seed. It must, however, be pointed out that watery coconut (locally called paido or dabo) may or may not contain any kernel at all. Even where the beginning of a kernel is in formation, it is in such a stage that no oil is available out of it. We would, therefore, agree with the learned standing counsel that paido (watery coconut) in its proper sense is not oil-seed. 5.. It is unnecessary to refer to the authorities for reaching the conclusion on such a question though both sides placed several decisions before us for our consideration. In view of what has been said above, our answer to the question referred to us shall be The Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was correct in holding that dry coconuts are oil-seeds and, as such, are declared goods as per the description in section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. We make no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (4) TMI 193 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld be charged for separately and not included in the price of goods sold. In view of the above, we hold that the submissions of Mr. Das are of no substance. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The judgment and order of the learned Judge in the trial court is affirmed. It may be recorded that no point other than the points as mentioned above was urged by Mr. Das. Since the facts and points of law involved in F.M.A. No. 780 of 1975, which is directed against the judgment and order dated 3rd October, 1974, made in Civil Rule No. 1481(W) of 1969, by Banerjee, J., are similar to that of F.M.A. No. 784 of 1975 and, in fact, the same has been made on the basis of the determinations made by M.M. Dutt, J., the judgment and order proposed by us in this appeal would govern the other case, viz., F.M.A. No. 780 of 1975. Thus F.M.A. No. 780 of 1975 also fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in both these appeals. ANIL K. SEN, J.-I agree. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 192 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the defendants had acquired full title to the suit property by prescription under the law in force at the relevant time?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The plaintiffs' suit for title to the land in occupation of the defendants and for their eviction so far as that portion of the land with their house on its concerned in dismissed. The plaintiffs' suit for declaration in respect of the remaining portion of the land, however, is decreed. As there is no prayer for eviction of any person other than the defendants, that claim is rejected. No opinion with regard to the claim of persons who may be in occupation of the land other than the defendants who are not impleaded in the suit and against whom no relief has been claimed. The judgment and decree of the Additional Judicial Commissioner to the extent indicated in this judgment are set aside.
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1976 (4) TMI 191 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the transaction envisaged by the contract entered into by the applicant with the Public Works Department of the Government of Gujarat on 6th September, 1965, for the manufacture and supply of kiln-burnt bricks to the said department and the supply of bricks to the said department in terms of their running bill No. XI dated 28th October, 1967, is a sale or a works contract?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The contract in this case is a contract of sale and not a works contract. The assessee is, therefore, liable to sales tax. The High Court was not right in answering the question in favour of the assessee.
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1976 (4) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
SALE OF GOODS — WORKS CONTRACTS — CONTRACT TO BUILD RAILWAY COACHES ON UNDERFRAMES SUPPLIED BY RAILWAY — WHETHER SALE OR WORKS CONTRACT — LIABILITY TO SALES TAX.
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1976 (4) TMI 189 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant is exempt from inter-State tax on the sales of poles and cables to the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking by reason of the provisions contained in section 5(2)(a)(iv) of the Punjab Sales Tax Act hereinafter referred to as the State Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court was correct in holding that the sales to the undertaking supplying electrical energy were not exempt from tax generally within the meaning of section 8(2A) of the Central Act read with section 5(2)(a)(iv) of the State Act.
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1976 (4) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, in exercise of his powers under section 20(3) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, the Additional Commissioner was competent to reassess the gross turnover of the petitioner by taking into consideration additional material which had not been made available to the assessing officer?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The whole thing was duly processed. As already stated, the Commercial Tax Officer, Central Section, by his notice dated October 25, 1960, gave adequate opportunity to the appellant to explain the discrepancies in its cash memos and books of account. Another opportunity to explain the suspicious circumstances relating to the alleged suppression of the turnover as also to refute the material collected by the Commercial Tax Officer, Central Section, as a result of the investigation made by him and to show cause why action to subject the escaped turnover to tax be not taken was afforded to the appellant by the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, when on receipt of the aforesaid report dated December 27, 1960, of the Commercial Tax Officer, Central Section, he gave a notice to the former and furnished him with a full copy of the report. It cannot, therefore, be maintained with any show of force that, in admitting and relying on the aforesaid report dated December 27, 1960, of the Commercial Tax Officer, Central Section, the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, committed any illegality or breach of any statutory provision or rule or transgressed the limits of his jurisdiction.
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1976 (4) TMI 164 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Advertisement of petition ... ... ... ... ..... them argued the case before me. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I.A. No. 2049 of 1975 filed by the company is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 1,000 if certified. Consequently, in accordance with rule 96 read with rule 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, it is directed that advertisement be duly published in the prescribed manner. The requisite steps for this purpose be taken by the petitioners within two weeks from today. In addition to the publication being made in the official Gazette of the State as required by rule 24, it shall also be made in one issue each of the daily newspapers Nai Duniya of Indore and M.P. Chronicle of Bhopal. The date of hearing to be mentioned in the advertisement be fixed by the office and necessary steps be taken to ensure the advertisement more than 14 days before the date fixed for hearing. It is also directed that the notice be sent to the Central Government in accordance with rule 89 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.
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1976 (4) TMI 155 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... efore a magistrate who takes cognizance of it, then the case would become a pending case before a magistrate and could be transferred to this court under section 446(3), if the court thought it fit to transfer the same. Thus, the result of this analysis is that the present proceedings cannot be initiated in this court, because this court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence either under section 538 or under section 541 of the Companies Act, 1956. This court s jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences is restricted to that which is contained in section 454(5A) of the Act. However, this court has power to transfer a pending complaint for trial to itself under section 446(3) of the Act. The result will be that this complaint has to be returned on the ground that it is not cognizable by this court and may only be filed before a magistrate. The result would be that this complaint will have to be returned to the complainant who may file it before the proper court.
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1976 (4) TMI 154 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... ner, it is obvious that the very title of the respondents to the shares got transferred by them by executing various documents, is being challenged. Sawan Singh, though he admitted his signatures on all those documents, yet pleaded that he signed them under undue influence when he was drunk. These matters can hardly be gone into in the proceedings under section 155 of the Act which proceedings are essentially of summary nature. Keeping in view all these facts, in my opinion, it is a fit case where the petitioner should be declined the discretionary relief. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 are decided accordingly and it is held that the petition is not maintainable and the petitioner should be directed to seek her remedy in the civil court. In view of my findings on issues Nos. 1 and 2, it is hardly necessary to record findings on issues Nos. 3, 4 and 5 because in view of the findings on issues Nos. 1 and 2 the petition has to be dismissed and I order accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1976 (4) TMI 153 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition ... ... ... ... ..... hat the matter had been compromised between the parties and the parties would abide by that and for that reason I deferred the publication of the advertisement in the newspapers lest the company s reputation was harmed by that. For a considerable period, the matter of compromise was kept hanging and for that reason the proceeding was delayed. Ultimately, the company failed to pay the dues by instalments as agreed to between them and thereafter the advertisements were ordered to be published on the 5th of April, 1974, after nearly one year of the date of its admission on April 27, 1973, for various reasons. The petition has not been heard during two years which have elapsed since then. To a large extent, I find from the records, the fault lies with the company for delaying the present proceeding. I was, therefore, at first inclined to pass an order for costs, but I am conscious that award of costs should not be done by way of punishment and I, therefore, refrain from doing so.
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1976 (4) TMI 134 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... td., were managed prejudicially from the standpoint of the shareholders. As a matter of fact after this affidavit-in-rejoinder of the transferor-company, Karamchand Premchand Pvt. Ltd., was filed in this court, the official liquidator has filed an additional report dated January 15, 1976, and stated as under in paragraph 2 thereof Thereafter, Shri P. N. Shah, secretary of the company, filed his affidavit-in-reply dated October 1, 1975. In the said affidavit-in-reply, report of M/s. S. V. Ghatalia and Co., chartered accountants, for determination of exchange ratio on equity shares was annexed. On perusal of the said report and on reply of my further inquiry as to the 92 per cent, rate of capitalisation adopted by M/s. S. V. Ghatalia and Co., chartered accountants, I am of the opinion that the exchange ratio as proposed in the scheme of amalgamation appears to be reasonable. In view of this additional report, therefore, the objection of the official liquidator no more survives.
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1976 (4) TMI 125 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... r which attribute could not be given to an entry in the order sheet. If the entry was, of course, complete in all these respects, in that event, a copy of the said entry could go to the assessee and not a copy of another unsigned paper lying on the file. In the instant case the entry in the order sheet was not a speaking entry and it did not indicate the amount directed to be collected from the assessee. Accordingly the said entry in the order sheet was not an order as had been referred to s. 156 of the Act. The entry in the order sheet was the only thing which had been singed by the ITO in this regard. A part from this there was no other order singed by the ITO in pursuance of which the notice under s. 156 could be issued. There being no valid order for the levy of a penalty, the AAC, in our opinion was justified in cancelling the penalty. We, therefore uphold his action and rejected the Department rsquo s appeal. 4. In the result, the Department rsquo s appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 122 - ITAT NAGPUR
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... ... ..... WTO, for disposal afresh according to law. 31. There are some other points which were pressed by Shri Jain at the time of the hearing of these appeals. We are not going into these points even for the sake of completeness because we have held that the orders of the Departmental Authorities from which these points have arisen are illegal and we have directed that these orders are set aside. It will be open to the assessee to agitate all or any of the points before the Departmental Authorities in the course of the fresh proceedings if so advised. For the present we do not express any opinion on any of these points as it is unnecessary to do so. 32. For the reasons stated earlier, we direct that the orders of the AAC and the WTO for each of the five years under consideration are set aside and the matter restored to the file of the WTO for disposal afresh according to law and in pursuance to our findings and directions stated earlier. 33. All the appeals are deemed to be allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 119 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... a mode of computation for determining the dividend income from shares by allowing a deduction upto Rs. 3,000. So, what the law determines as the dividend income of the wife is after allowing the relief under s. 80-L. We are unable to see how in so far as the assessment of the appellant is concerned or in the computation of his total income by application of s. 64(iii) any higher income in respect of dividend could be brought in that what the law by a particular mode of computation determines as the dividend income of the wife. In view of s. 80-L, the dividend income of the wife is the total dividend income received by her minus Rs. 3,000. It is only this dividend income which can be brought in for inclusion under s. 64(iii). It, therefore, follows that 80-L relief is admissible to the dividend income of the wife before it is clubbed with the income of her husband. This point is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 118 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... the partition, the share income in including only in the assessment of the HUF and has been rightly done. The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that at least the amounts provided for the daughters should be excluded in the present assessment years. As the amounts or income relating thereto has not been included in these years we need not finally pronounce on it. We may also state that even if there is no partition, still there are modes known in law whereby a HUF consisting of only the male Karta and females as members could diminish its property. If any of its properties has been diminished in any of the manner known to law, then it is needless to say that the income relation thereto would be excluded, even though the dimunition was not by partition. However, the question does not arise in the assessment year under consideration and therefore we do not consider it necessary to examine this issue further for these year. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 115 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... e of Only You . As these aspects require ascertaining of and enquiry into a mass of new facts and as the revenue in all fairness must have an opportunity of putting to proof the evidence (having regard to the probable nature thereof) which the assessee may seek to tender, we consider it fit and proper to restore the matter regarding the allowance of loss of Rs. 70,200 to the Income-tax Officer. It would be open to the assessee to tender all evidence direct or circumstantial on which it seeks to rely and for the Income tax Officer to make any enquiries he considers necessary. The Income-tax Officer will, therefore, come to a finding, giving his reasons thereof as to whether either or both horses had become unfit at the time of sale for racing activity as pursed by the assessee. If either or both had so become unfit then the loss of Rs. 70,200 or appropriate part thereof would be an allowable deduction, otherwise not. 28. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed in part.
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1976 (4) TMI 112 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... for carrying out the terms of the deed. (3) If Dileep Kumar dies unmarried, the trust shall be administered substituting in the trust deed his brother rsquo s name Pradeep Kumar. (4) If both Dileep Kumar and Pradeep Kumar die unmarried or if their wives pre-decease them, the trust properties shall be administered for public charitable purposes. The two sons of the assessee were living at the time of the creation of the trust and since the properties were sought to vest in their wives, it must necessarily happen during the life time. If both the sons die unmarried, the property should vest in a public charitable trust. Thus, it can be seen that the vesting of the property is not postponed beyond the life time of the persons in existence at the time of transfer. The rule against perpetuities is not, therefore, violated. Hence the trust created is valid and proper. This point is answered in affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 14. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 111 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... right to receive interest in respect of the amount that became payable under clause 14 (c) of the trust deed. The Income -tax Officer has gone wrong in failing to distinguish that interest income can accrue only in respect of payments under clause 14(a) whereas no such income can accrue in respect of payments under clause 14 (c). Payability is not the only criterion for the accrual of income. The accrual of income, in the present case, depends on the terms of the trust deed and the said deed clearly provides for payment of interest only in respect of amount unpaid under clause 14 (a). In respect of the amount unpaid under clause 14( C ) no interest income can accrue. Since the amounts remained unpaid pertain to payments under clause 14 ( C ), no interest income can accrue to the assessee. The order of the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner is confirmed. The point is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 9. In the result, both the appeals fail and stand dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 110 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... The assessee belongs to the Nattukottai Chettiar community which is essentially a business community. Knowing the financial position of Pudukotta Textile Mills in which the assessee had shares, it cannot be stated that the assessee had advanced monies as investments. On the materials available, there is a clear evidence to indicate that the assessee was engaged in money-lending business. That being so, the loss incurred by him in the course of such business is certainly an allowable business loss. 5. In the view that we have taken, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the loss could be allowed as a bad debt. The assessee had advanced this amount in the course of his regular business in money-lending and as the entire debtor mill was taken over by another, the assessee had to assign this asset also and incurred a loss. This can also be treated as a bad debt. However, we need not go into this issue in detail. 6. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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