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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 49 of 49 Records
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1959 (5) TMI 9
Whether the receipt of sale proceeds at Ratlam (which included the assessee's profits) in respect of goods sent by the assessee to customers in Part A or C States by V. P. P. amounted to receipts of income, profits or gains at Ratlam in Part B States?
Whether the bank drafts payable in Part A or C States but received at Ratlam and encashed through the assessee's bankers at Bombay constituted receipts in Part A State ?
Held that:- The answer to the first question should have been in favour of the Commissioner. It should have been held that the income in respect of goods sent by V. P. P. was received in Part A and C States and not in a Part B State.
Question 2 should also have been answered in favour of the Commissioner and the income, profits and gains arising out of these transactions must be held to have been received by the respondents in Part A or C States. In both the cases the respondents would not be entitled to a concessional rate of taxation applicable to Part B States. Appeal allowed
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1959 (5) TMI 8
Whether the assessment of the said sum of ₹ 61,282 should be on Mr. Rohatgi personally or on the assessee Hindu undivided family ?
Held that:- The finding in this case is that the promotion of the company and the taking over of the concern and the financing of it were all done with the help of the joint family funds and the said B. K. Rohatgi did not contribute anything out of his personal funds if any. In the circumstances, we are clearly of opinion that the managing director's remuneration received by B. K. Rohatgi was, as between him and the Hindu undivided family, the income of the latter and should be assessed in its hands. We, therefore, set aside the answer given by the High Court to the second question and answer the same by saying that the assessment of the whole of the sum of ₹ 61,282 should be on the assessee Hindu undivided family. The result is that this appeal is allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 7
Whether the sums of ₹ 1,98,643 and ₹ 4,96,365 being the amounts of the cheques received by the appellant for the goods supplied to the Government of India amounted to receipt of income, profits and gains in British India during the said accounting years inasmuch as the said cheques were drawn on banks in British India and were liable to tax?
Held that:- The appellant could not have intended that the cheques would be sent otherwise than by post and it was not the case of the appellant that the cheques received from the Government were delivered by hand on behalf of the Government to the appellant at Baroda and following the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd.[1954 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court] the Tribunal correctly held that the amounts of the cheques referred to above were received by the appellant in the taxable territories and as such the appellant was liable to tax under section 4(1)(a) of the Act. Appeal dimissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 6
Whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner left the Income-tax Officer free of his earlier order, and whether he was under a duty to reconsider the position under section 23(5)(b)?
Held that:- The Income-tax Officer, therefore, was under a duty to modify the assessments of the partners accordingly, and to take the matter up again from the point at which the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had placed it. He had once again to determine whether he would, in the altered circumstances apply section 23(5)(b) to this case or not.In our opinion, the Income-tax Officers in question did not do their duty as required by law, and we should, therefore, by a writ compel them to do so.
With due respect, that the High Court should have, on a correct appraisal of the legal situation, ordered this relief, and we accordingly, after explaining the law applicable to the case, order the appropriate Income-tax Officer to hear and determine this matter in the light of our observations. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 5
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and on a true construction of the trust deed, dated 16th September, 1948, and the policy dated the 13th January, 1949, the payments made by the assessee company and referred to in paragraph 4 above constitute 'expenditure' within the meaning of that word in section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in respect of which a claim for deduction can be made, subject to the other conditions mentioned in that clause being satisfied ?
Held that:- In our opinion, the payment was not merely contingent but the liability itself was also contingent. Expenditure which is deductible for income-tax purposes is one which is towards a liability actually existing at the time, but the putting aside of money which may become expenditure on the happening of an event is not expenditure. In the present case, nothing more was done in the account years. The money was placed in the hands of trustees and/or the insurance company to purchase annuities of different kinds, if required, but to be returned if the annuities were not bought and the setting apart of the money was not a paying out or away of these sums irretrievably.
High Court correctly answered the question in negative. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 4
Whether the receipt of the cheques in Bhavnagar amounted to receipt of sale proceeds in Bhavnagar ?
Held that:- The question of law which was referred by the Tribunal to the High Court for its decision was : "Whether the receipt of the cheques at Bhavnagar amounted to receipts of sale proceeds in Bhavnagar" and it was only based on the facts admitted and/or found by the Tribunal which had relevance only to that question and not to the question which was sought to be mooted by the High Court in its judgment under appeal. If the latter question was allowed to be entertained the question would have to be recast as under : "Whether the posting of the cheques in British India at the request, express or implied of the appellant, amounted to receipt of sale proceeds in British India"--a question quite distinct and separate from the question of law which was actually referred by the Tribunal to the High Court in the statement of case drawn on November 5, 1954.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was in error in not deciding the reference before it and answering the question on the facts disclosed in the statement of case. We are also of opinion that in the circumstances of this case the High Court had no jurisdiction under section 66(4) to direct the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of case on the points mentioned in its judgment.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal will be allowed and the matter remanded to the High Court to arrive at its decision on the question of law referred to it in the statement of case already submitted to it by the Tribunal
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1959 (5) TMI 3
Whether in view of the fact that the sum of ₹ 43,692-11-9 had been entered on the credit side in the books of account even though it was not money actually received but only money treated as received on the basis that it was due and receivable, the sum of ₹ 24,809 which had been entered as debit, being the liability of the appellant undertaken by it to earn those receipts, should be deducted in determining the taxable profits and gains of the appellant?
Held that:- It is to be noted that the appellant had led evidence before the Income-tax authorities in regard to this estimated expenditure of ₹ 24,809 and no exception was taken to the same in regard to the quantum, though the permissibility of such a deduction was questioned by them relying upon the provisions of section 10(2) of the Act.
It, therefore, follows that the conclusion reached by the High Court in regard to the disallowance of ₹ 24,809 was wrong and it should have answered the referred question in the affirmative. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 2
Whether in law, if there is an obligation on the employer to pay a certain bonus, the Excess Profits Tax Officer is bound to allow it as a deduction and is precluded from exercising his discretion under rule 12(1) of the First Schedule of the Excess Profits Tax Act?
Whether on a true construction of the agreement between the assessee and its employees and the Provident Fund Rules, the assessee company is under obligation to pay the bonus without deducting the excess profits tax?
Held that:- The Excess Profits Tax Officer having come to conclusion (b), viz., that payment to an individual employee or to his provident fund by the company was unreasonable or unnecessarily large, having regard to the requirements of the business, applied conclusion (a), viz., that the payment of percentage without deduction of excess profits tax was per se unreasonable and unnecessary to reduce these large payments and contributions. In our opinion, there was material on which he could proceed, and the Tribunal in affirming that finding had further material to act upon. The decision of the High Court impugned here was correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 1
Issues: Interpretation of excise duty exemption notification and applicability to soap manufacturer's production; Entitlement to exemption from excise duty; Estoppel in excise duty payment dispute.
Interpretation of Exemption Notification:
The petitioner, a soap manufacturer, sought relief from excise duty demands based on a notification exempting the first 200 tons of soap for home consumption. The petitioner guaranteed production within the limit. The demand notice covered a period where the petitioner cleared less than 50 tons of soap. The exemption did not apply to soap other than household or laundry, exceeding specified limits, or involving certain manufacturing processes. The court found the petitioner eligible for exemption as the soap cleared fell within the exemption criteria, and no manufacturing processes with power or steam were used. The notification's statutory force and the Superintendent's grant of exemption indicated entitlement.
Applicability of Exemption to Soft and Liquid Soap:
A dispute arose regarding whether soft and liquid soap fell under the exemption proviso. The respondents contended soft and liquid soap were not exempt, citing a specific proviso. The court rejected this argument, stating that soft and liquid soap could be household or toilet soap, thus qualifying for the exemption. The judgment emphasized that soft and liquid soap did not form a separate class outside the exemption criteria.
Estoppel Argument and Final Decision:
The petitioner raised an estoppel argument against the respondents, suggesting they were prevented from demanding excise duty due to past actions. However, the court did not delve into this issue as it found in favor of the petitioner on the main question. Ultimately, the court issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to refrain from enforcing the demand notices, deeming them illegal and invalid. Each party was ordered to bear its costs, and the petitioner's entitlement to exemption was upheld based on a thorough interpretation of the exemption notification.
This judgment clarified the interpretation of excise duty exemption notifications, specifically in the context of soap manufacturing, and emphasized the importance of statutory provisions and factual circumstances in determining entitlement to exemptions.
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