|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 64 Records
-
1960 (9) TMI 86
The assessment orders for the quarters prior to and ending on December 31, 1949, are valid; but the assessment orders for subsequent quarters are invalid and must be quashed. The order of the High Court for refund of fees paid by the respondent is set aside. The certificate proceedings taken against the respondent must now be restricted to the tax payable for those quarters only for which the assessment orders are valid - Appeal allowed in part.
-
1960 (9) TMI 84
From the record of this case, we cannot say when the lis commenced, and unless it can be proved conclusively that it was before the amendment of the law, the rule in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case [1953 (2) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] cannot apply. There is no averment that a right of appeal had vested, and has been wrongly taken away - Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 74
Constitutional validity of section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, XIX of 1947, as amended by the Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, VI of 1949, is challenged.
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act as it stood at the material time was constitutionally valid and that the assessee in that case was properly taxed for the period 1st April, 1949, to 25th January, 1950
-
1960 (9) TMI 71
Whether the transactions between the petitioners and its selling agents outside the Province were 'sales' within the meaning of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court rightly answered the question, viz., whether the transaction between the petitioners and its selling agents outside the Province were "sales" within the meaning of the Act, in the affirmative.
-
1960 (9) TMI 70
Whether a transaction is outside the State?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. These sales must, therefore, be treated as made within the State of West Bengal. The customs barrier is a barrier for customs purposes, and duty drawback may be admissible if the goods once imported are taken out of the country. The customs duty drawbacks have nothing to do with the sale of aviation spirit, which takes place in West Bengal. The customs barrier does not set a terminal limit to the territory of West Bengal for sales tax purposes. The sale beyond the customs barrier is still a sale, in fact, in the State of West Bengal. Both the buyer and the seller are in that State. The goods are also there. All the elements of sale including delivery, payment of price, take place within the State. The sale is thus completely within the territory of the taxing State.
-
1960 (9) TMI 64
Whether property in the goods passed on shipment or at some point of time before shipment?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The scheme of the Legislature clearly is that where the intention as declared has not been carried out purchase tax should be levied. To hold otherwise would be to make the declaration of the intention useless. Our conclusion therefore is that the Courts below have rightly interpreted the words "a person" in section 10(b) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act as a "registered dealer" and that the purchasing dealers have rightly been assessed to purchase tax under section 10(b).
-
1960 (9) TMI 61
Whether the fish exported to Calcutta was not sold in Orissa?
Held that:- On the findings given by the assessing authorities, the respondent was not liable to tax for any of the four quarters under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. Accordingly, the appeal fails of The State of Orissa and the Sales Tax Officer, Puri
-
1960 (9) TMI 59
Whether this interpretation of section 11(2) of the Act is correct?
Held that:- We consider it proper not to embark on an investigation of the proper construction of section 11(1) and (2) of the Act and the sustainability of the rival contentions urged before us on this matter. Nor do we consider it necessary or proper to deal with the soundness or otherwise of the constitutional objections which have been put forward to the demand by the State, to amounts "collected by way of tax" if that were to include collections in respect of sale-transactions not charged to tax under the Act. We consider it desirable to reserve the determination of these questions to an occasion when they properly arise and have necessarily to be decided. Appeals dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 54
Whether section 29(2)(s) in so far as it empowers the State Government to make a rule prescribing fees for appeals and applications in revision was within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature?
Held that:- We do not think that section 29(2)(s) can be held to be bad on the ground of legislative in- competence. Nor do we think that rule 59 goes beyond what is permitted under section 29(2)(s). The fees imposed are not taxes at all; they come within the expression "other matters (including fees) incidental to the disposal of appeals and applications for revision etc.
Unable to agree with the High Court that the word "incidental" has reference to a matter of casual nature only. The procedure for disposal of an appeal includes as a necessary incidental matter the filing of an appeal on a proper fee. We consider that the fees imposed by rule 59 are for services rendered by a govern- mental agency and though ordinarily fees are uniform, there may be various kinds of fees and it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases.
Section 12(5) talks of a period, and the period may consist of more than one quarter. The return has, however, to be submitted in Form IV which read with rule 20 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, requires the assessee to furnish details of his turnover for each quarter. The assessment must, therefore, be made on the taxable turnover of each quarter - unable to hold that the assessment for the last three quarters was bad - Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 48
Whether tobacco was delivered in the State of Bombay for consumption in that State?
Held that:- On the facts of this case that when tobacco was delivered in the State of Bombay for the purpose of changing it into a commercially different article, viz., bidi patti, the delivery was for the purpose of consumption. The purchases in this case therefore fall within the meaning of Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) and must be held to have taken place inside the State of Bombay. Petition dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 30
Whether directors of the company knowingly and wilfully parties to the failure to lay before the company in general meeting the balance-sheet and profit and loss account as at March 31, 1953, and thereby became punishable under section 133(3) of the Act for a default in complying with the requirements of section 131?
Held that:- Section 131 of our Act contains some provision about the laying of the balance-sheet before the general meeting. This provision was inserted in the Act by the amending Act of 1936. The fact, that one of the requirements of the English section 26 is not present in section 32 of our Act cannot create any material difference between section 32 of our Act and section 26 of the English Act. If the principle that a person charged with an offence cannot rely on his own default as an answer to the discharge is correct, as we think it is, and which we do not find Chagla C.J. saying it is not, then that principle would clearly apply when a person is charged with a breach of section 32 of our Act. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 29
Issues Involved:
1. Confirmation of alterations in the objects clauses of the memorandum of association.
2. Compliance with the Reserve Bank of India's directives.
3. Implementation of the sanctioned scheme of arrangement.
4. Potential banking activities in disguise.
5. Applicability of Section 49C of the Banking Companies Act, 1949.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Confirmation of Alterations in the Objects Clauses:
The appellant company sought confirmation of alterations in its memorandum of association to convert from a banking to a non-banking company. The company had already passed resolutions and held meetings to alter its name and object clauses. Despite the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies' opposition, the court initially confirmed the alterations, including deleting and modifying several sub-clauses and changing the company's name. The alterations were duly registered, but the Central Government later required further changes to fully eschew banking activities.
2. Compliance with the Reserve Bank of India's Directives:
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) directed the company to cease banking activities, alter its memorandum, and change its name. The company complied by passing resolutions and seeking court confirmation. However, the Central Government suggested further modifications to avoid any semblance of banking activities. The company passed additional resolutions to comply, but the Registrar opposed the application, fearing disguised banking activities.
3. Implementation of the Sanctioned Scheme of Arrangement:
The Registrar argued that the company failed to implement a court-sanctioned scheme of arrangement with its creditors, suggesting that the attempt to convert to a non-banking company was to avoid this scheme. Despite this, the court noted that the company had already been stripped of its banking character by a previous order, making it difficult to continue banking activities. The court emphasized that creditors and shareholders had agreed to the alterations, and proper procedures had been followed.
4. Potential Banking Activities in Disguise:
The court addressed concerns that the company might engage in banking activities under the guise of a non-banking company. The court clarified that essential characteristics of banking include accepting deposits repayable on demand and withdrawable by cheque. The company's proposed activities, such as lending money, did not constitute banking as defined by the Banking Companies Act. The court referenced legal definitions and precedents to support this distinction.
5. Applicability of Section 49C of the Banking Companies Act, 1949:
Mr. Sen argued that Section 49C, introduced by an amendment, required RBI certification for altering a banking company's memorandum. The court held that this section, affecting substantive rights, was not intended to apply retrospectively to pending proceedings. The application for confirmation had been filed before the amendment, and the court concluded that Section 49C did not bar the current application.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the previous judgment and order, and confirmed the alterations in the company's memorandum. The petitioner company was awarded taxed costs for both the trial and appeal.
-
1960 (9) TMI 24
Issues Involved:
1. Locus standi of the petitioner to present the petition.
2. Liability of the company to be wound up under clauses (c) and (f) of section 433 of the Companies Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Locus Standi of the Petitioner:
The first issue regarding the locus standi of the petitioner to present the petition was not pressed, and no arguments were addressed on this issue. Therefore, it did not require determination.
2. Liability of the Company to be Wound Up:
The primary issue requiring determination was whether the company is liable to be wound up under clauses (c) and (f) of section 433 of the Companies Act. The petitioners alleged that the company did not commence its business within a year from its incorporation, despite obtaining a commencement certificate on August 11, 1956. It was admitted that the company had not done any active business from its incorporation in March 1955 up to the date of the petition on May 9, 1959. According to section 433(c), a company may be wound up by the court "if the company does not commence its business within a year from its incorporation, or suspends its business for a whole year."
The company argued that the court's power to wind up the company is discretionary and sought condonation for the failure to commence business, citing the revocation of the licence by the Central Government and harassment of the managing agent by disgruntled shareholders. However, the court found this reason insufficient. The court noted that if no business has been or is likely to be commenced, it should pass an order for winding up on the petition of the shareholders. The company had not commenced any business since its inception, and the court decided not to exercise its discretionary power in the company's favor.
Substratum of the Company:
The court examined whether it was just and equitable to wind up the company under clause (f) of section 433. The managing agent admitted that the company's licence was revoked in December 1958 and that the company had incurred significant losses. The company's assets mainly consisted of uncalled capital, money due from defaulting shareholders, a plot of land, and some chaff-cutting machinery. The court found that the company had done no business, had not set up any factory, and had not purchased any significant plant or machinery. The company had incurred losses exceeding Rs. 76,000 by the end of the financial year 1958, and its assets were minimal.
The court referred to the principle that if the main object for which the company was formed has substantially failed or the substratum is gone, it would be just and equitable to wind up the company. The court cited precedents where the substratum was deemed gone when the principal object of the company became impracticable. The court found that the main object of setting up a cotton mill had failed, and the company had not engaged in any other industrial activity. The recent chaff-cutting activity was insufficient to demonstrate a viable business.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the substratum of the company was gone, and it was just and equitable to wind up the company. The court rejected the suggestion to place the matter before a domestic forum or call a meeting of shareholders, noting the lack of vigilance by shareholders in the past. The court ordered the winding up of the respondent company under clauses (c) and (f) of section 433 and appointed the official liquidator to carry out the liquidation process.
-
1960 (9) TMI 11
Whether the learned Judicial Commissioner of Bhopal rightly dismissed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution made by the Bhopal Sugar Industries Limited, hereinafter referred to as the appellant company, praying for the issue of an appropriate order or direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus to compel the Income-tax Officer, Bhopal, respondent herein, to carry out certain directions given by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, to the said officer in an appeal preferred by the appellant company from an order of assessment made against it by the respondent?
Held that:- By the impugned order the respondent failed to carry out a legal duty imposed on him and such failure was destructive of a basic principle of justice, a writ of mandamus should issue ex debito justitiae to compel the respondent to carry out the directions given to him by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, and it is unnecessary to consider the decisions referred to above except merely to state that in none of them arose any question of condoning a refusal by an inferior tribunal to carry out the directions given to that tribunal by a superior tribunal in the undoubted exercise of its appellate powers, on the ground that the order of the superior tribunal was wrong. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 10
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was any evidence before the Commission to come to the conclusion to which it came in its report ?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, was the order C. No. 76(1) I.T./51 dated October 25, 1951, of the Government of India passed under the provisions of section 8(2) of the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act read with section 3 of the Opium and Revenue Laws (Extension of Application) Act of 1950, a legal and valid order ?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order passed by the Income-tax Officer in pursuance of the directions of the Government under section 8(2) of the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1124, was a legal and valid order ?
Held that:- By sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Investigation Act, the findings recorded by the Commission in cases or points referred to them are made final in all assessment or reassessment proceedings. The Act has, by sub-section (2) of section 8, removed the bar of limitation which arose by section 25 of the Income-tax Act. It was competent, therefore, to the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment proceedings notwithstanding any lapse of time and the previous order of assessment did not operate as a bar to such reassessment. The High Court was, therefore, in our judgment right in recording its answers in the affirmative on the three questions submitted by the Commissioner of Income-tax. In that view, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 9
Whether by the guarantee of full ownership, use and enjoyment of the private properties under the merger agreement the properties of the appellant were not rendered immune from liability to pay tax imposed by the Act and that, in the absence of an express provision, his income from lands was liable to pay agricultural income-tax?
Held that:- The amendment in the definition of " person " in section 2, clause (i), of the Act was made not with the object of excluding the Rulers of former Indian States from liability to pay tax ; it was only made to delete a clause which, in view of political changes, had no practical significance. Liability to pay tax is imposed by the Act and there is in the Act no express exemption in favour of the appellant. The claim of the appellant to exemption on the ground that he is not a "person" cannot, therefore, be sustained.
On the grounds, therefore, that liability to pay agricultural income-tax in respect of his private property is imposed upon the appellant by section 3 of the Act, and the immunity claimed by the appellant is not one of the personal rights or privileges within the meaning of the merger agreement and that the claim made by the appellant is not justiciable, the objection raised by the appellant to liability to pay agricultural income-tax assessed under the Act cannot be sustained. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 8
Whether every material fact, for and against the assessee, has been considered fairly and with due care?
Whether the evidence pro and con has been considered in reaching the final conclusion?
Whether the conclusion reached by the Tribunal has been coloured by irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice?
Held that:- We do not think that in a case like the one before us the Department was required to prove by direct evidence that the sum of ₹ 87,500 was income in the hands of the appellant. Indeed, we agree that it is not in all cases that by mere rejection of the explanation of the assessee, the character of a particular receipt as income can be said to have been established ; but where the circumstances of the rejection are such that the only proper inference is that the receipt must be treated as income in the hands of the assessee, there is no reason why the assessing authorities should not draw such an inference. Such an inference is an inference of fact and not of law. For the reasons given above we are of the view that no question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal and we see no grounds for interference with the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court, dated October 4, 1956. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 7
Whether an individual case which was not a pending case could be transferred from one Income-tax Officer to another under sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Patiala Act, which was kept alive for assessment and reassessments relating to previous assessment years?
Held that:- Special provision for transfer of pending cases is all that is provided there, and if such a transfer takes place, the provisions of sub-section (7A) will be invoked. Those provisions are to be read as not prejudicing the general powers granted by sub-section (5) and vice versa. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 6
Whether the excess profits tax assessed could be validly recovered from the appellant by resort to the machinery for collection provided by section 46 of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- The entire basis on which the assessment proceedings completed after notice to Thyagrajan Chettiar as the managing partner of Muthappa & Co. have been held by us to be binding on the appellant would preclude any argument of the type advanced to challenge the binding character of the notices served. The appellant was clearly an " assessee in default " within section 46(1) of the Income-tax Act and the amount of tax and penalty due from him would be " an arrear " within section 46(2).
The proceedings for the recovery of the excess profits tax could properly be taken and that the order of the High Court dismissing the appellant's petition for the issue of a writ of prohibition was correct. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (9) TMI 5
Whether the High Court did not correctly construe the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 6 of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act (U. P. Act III of 1949)?
Held that:- It is indeed true, as has been, pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants, that the Act like the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, contemplates an assessment for each year on the income of the previous year. That does not necessarily mean that the restriction imposed by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 6 is limited to one year only. The proviso must be construed with reference to the language used and the scheme of section 6. That section mentions two alternative methods of computation, and by the substantive part of sub-section (1) gives the assessee an option to adopt any one of the two methods ; then comes the proviso which says that once the option is exercised, there can be no variation without the permission of the Board of Revenue. The appellants are seeking to read the words " in any one year " after the word " computation " in the proviso, and this they cannot be allowed to do.
We are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
|
9911796707
