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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 208 Records
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1984 (9) TMI 266 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... liable to be quashed as instructions contained therein are adverse to the interest of the petitioner and have been issued by an unauthorised authority and without hearing the petitioner. It is, therefore, liable to be quashed. The learned Assistant Advocate-General has rightly conceded that the communication P.11 has no force of law and is not binding on the Assessing Authority. It has further been argued that the Assessing Authority has in fact neither relied upon it nor has referred to it in the impugned assessment order. The grievance of the petitioner regarding the communication P.11 is misplaced. The contention of the learned Assistant Advocate-General must prevail. The communication P.11 has no force of law. It has neither been followed nor referred to by the Assessing Authority in the impugned assessment order. The petitioner, therefore, cannot make any grievance about it. In view of discussion above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 265 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Sales Tax Officer to raise such a presumption. On their own showing the sales tax authorities initiated proceedings on the ground that the customs record at the Bombay dock showed that the petitioner had been importing goods like motor vehicle parts from abroad and had been getting those cleared at Bombay. There was not an iota of evidence that those goods had been sold in the State of Maharashtra or that the petitioner was a dealer carrying on business in that State. The preliminary objection raised in the counter-affidavit that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition is also misconceived. The petitioner received the impugned notices and assessment orders at Delhi. In view of the fact that the sales tax authorities at Bombay had no jurisdiction to proceed against the petitioner, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The result is that the impugned assessment orders are quashed and the petition is allowed. No order as to costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 264 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ramswaroop Banwarilal 1981 14 VKN 146 (MP). It is, therefore, clear that in the case in hand whether the Board should depart from the practice and call upon the assessee to prove that the agent was taxed is a question of law which deserves decision. 5.. In this view of the matter, therefore, in our opinion, the application is allowed and it is directed that the learned Tribunal shall state the case and make a reference for answering the questions to this Court (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee could be held liable to be taxed when the sales were made through a commission agent who is a registered dealer, despite the absence of evidence that the adatiya had paid tax? (2) Whether it was necessary for the assessee to produce evidence that the tax was paid by the adatiya? In the circumstances, so far as this petition is concerned, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Application allowed.
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1984 (9) TMI 263 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... IOC and IEL. Unfortunately, the nature of the disputes has not been stated before me on oath. The result is that the court cannot apply its mind to those disputes. For the above reasons, I am of the view that no order for refund should be made in this application. I make it clear however that the petitioner will be at liberty to make a fresh application for refund on proper materials and upon notice to the proper parties as and when advised. In the result, this application succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the assessment orders made by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on respondent No. 3 in so far as they include the cost of transportation or delivery charges. There will be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to reassess all the assessment already made and to make future assessment in the light of the observations indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Writ Petition allowed.
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1984 (9) TMI 262 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of sale of bill book could have been entered at that stage. It is only when the assessee bestowed labour and skill on a simple paper by means of printing equipment or machinery, bill book came in existence. So, on the date of contract, there was no contract for transfer of a chattel qua chattel. The end-product, which was transferred to the customers by the assessee, came in existence only when the assessee added its labour and skill. So, it is the labour and skill of the assessee that bestowed end in the bill book that became a subjectmatter of sale. So, the contract was not the one of sale, but it was a contract of work and labour. Relying on the principles evolved by the Honourable Supreme Court, I uphold the view taken by the Tribunal. The authorities relied on by the Revenue do not consider or distinguish the authority of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Kame 1977 39 STC 237 (SC). In the result, the revision is dismissed and the parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 261 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mended. This Court in the said authority observed In such cases it is the bona fide of the assessee which shall have to be examined. So long as the calculation is honest and fair the dealer shall not incur any liability to pay interest. So, interest is not chargeable from the assessee in all the cases when the amount of tax remained with the assessee and not with the Department. The facts and circumstances of each case shall have to be examined to come to the conclusion whether the Department was deprived of the use of the amount due from the assessee on account of the default of the assessee or due to the action of the Department itself. In the case of the former, the interest will be charged but not in the case of the latter. For the reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 28th April, 1980 passed for the assessment year 1964-65 and 1965-66 by respondent No. 2, which are annexures 11 and 12 respectively, are quashed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 260 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion in form XII-A . This part of the rule, therefore, fastens a liability on the purchasing dealer for payment of composition fee and it also authorises the authorities to specify the goods in the certificate of registration as provided in this rule. It is therefore clear that in the case in hand the petitioner could not be held liable for payment of the difference of tax between the full rate of tax and the concessional rate of tax and therefore, the order passed by respondent No. 2 dated 24th April, 1979 and the order passed by respondent No. 3 dated 28th May, 1981 could not be maintained. 8.. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The orders passed by the two authorities referred to above are hereby quashed. It is further directed that if recovery has been made in pursuance of these orders, the petitioner is entitled to refund of the same. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Security amount deposited be refunded to the petitioner.
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1984 (9) TMI 259 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Valuation - Valuation - Dutiability ... ... ... ... ..... equiring the appellant to pack the cement in old and new gunny bags in a certain proportion cannot imply that there has been any such agreement in accordance with which the bags became returnable. 10. emsp The Appellant rsquo s argument that the gunny bags had earlier paid duty at the appropriate rates and, therefore, should not be subjected to duty a second time has to be dismissed for the simple reason that when cement is packed in them the tax levied is on the value of the cement which includes the value of the packing and not on the value of the gunny bags as such. Their plea that duty should be charged on the value of the gunny bags, if at all, from 8-11-1975 (on which date they received the Superintendent rsquo s letter calling for the enhancement of assessable value) has also to be rejected as ignorance of law cannot be an excuse for avoiding law. 11. emsp For these reasons, we hold that the orders of the authorities below are correct. We, therefore, reject the appeal.
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1984 (9) TMI 252 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the whole includes the parts?
Whether legume, whole grain, when notified as a "specified agricultural produce" within the meaning of the expression in section 2(t) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 ("Act" for short), would also comprehend its split folds or parts, commercially called dal so as to enable Mandi Samiti (Market Committee for convenience of reference) to levy market fee under section 17 of the Act on the transaction of sale of dal of legumes specified in the Schedule to the Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed by way of remand. If the view taken by the High Court on the question that split grain of legume, that is, dal was not comprehended in the whole grain of legume as set out in the Schedule and therefore, the same was not a specified agricultural (produce) is held not to be correct and accordingly the judgment of the High Court would have to be upset, all the matters may be remitted to the High Court for disposing of other contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondents who were petitioners in the High Court as the High Court declined to examine them, as the writ petitioners were allowed on this one narrow contention which according to the High Court went to the root of the matter.
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1984 (9) TMI 244 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Right to present winding-up petition where company is being wound-up voluntarily or subject to courts supervision
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1984 (9) TMI 243 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition ... ... ... ... ..... court exercising its original civil jurisdiction has tried the suit on its merits and, on the facts of that case, came to the conclusion that the surety could not resist the claim of the bank, perhaps for what remained unsatisfied after the principal debtor had failed to satisfy. I have already expressed that in cases like this whether it is made out prima facie that the respondent-company may succeed in its defence or not, the parties should be referred to the civil court for adjudication. It is not proper for this court to pronounce upon a defence validly set up, the ground for which cannot be said not to exist. In that view of the matter, I am satisfied that this is not a case in which this court should interfere under the Act to coerce the first respondent company to pay its debt when it is not yet quantified or adjudicated upon by the competent civil court. Therefore, the petition is rejected with liberty reserved to the petitioner to seek the remedy in the civil court.
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1984 (9) TMI 242 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Registration of change of name and its effects thereof ... ... ... ... ..... Cas. 639 (Cal.) are entirely different from the facts of the case before us. There, a company had been dissolved by operation of a statute and a new company had taken over the assets and management of the dissolved company. The suit having been filed against the dissolved company was held to be incompetent. We agree with the said decision with respect. The decision of the Supreme Court in Purshottam Umedbhai and Co. s case, AIR 1961 SC 325, though not directly on the point, supports the view that a suit filed in the wrong name would be a case of misdescription and not a suit by a non-existent person. This is also the view of the two other Division Benches of this court in the decisions noted earlier. For the above reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The operation of the judgment is stayed for a fortnight from date but there will be an interim order directing stay of further proceedings in the suit during the said period. Suhas Chandra Sen J. mdash I agree.
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1984 (9) TMI 222 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Public deposits ... ... ... ... ..... ate on which the return has to be filed and the date on which it is actually filed. The default, if any committed, is committed on the last date allowed to file the return, the default cannot be one committed every month thereafter. The words in section 18(1)(a) of the Act, for every month during which the default continued indicate only the multiplier to be adopted in determining the quantum of penalty and do not have the effect of making the default in question a continuing one. The principle enunciated therein applies on all fours to the case on hand. The failure to repay the excess deposits on or before April 1, 1975, is a single default, which gets completed on the expiry of the aforesaid period and cannot be said to be a continuing one. As the respondents herein were not directors of the first accused-company on the date of the commission of the offence, viz., April 1, 1975, they are not liable to be proceeded against. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.
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1984 (9) TMI 221 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meetings and proceedings - Annual General Meeting ... ... ... ... ..... ny for the financial year in question were laid, adopted and passed by the shareholders. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Bandhan Ram Bhandani 1961 31 Comp. Cas. 1 (SC), we find that, in the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners could be prosecuted both under section 166 as well as under section 210(5) of the Act. In our opinion, there has not been any illegality or impropriety on the part of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence under section 210(5) of the Act and issuing processes against the petitioners. There is, therefore, no ground for quashing the impugned proceedings. In the result, the rule stands discharged. Manoj Kumar Mukherjee J. mdash I agree. Later The oral prayer of the petitioners for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court is refused as no substantial question of law requiring determination by the Supreme Court is involved in this case.
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1984 (9) TMI 220 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company – Name of ... ... ... ... ..... rise in Bombay. On this count also, one can say that the effect of the order passed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 is felt in Bombay. In my view, therefore, this court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition. In these circumstances, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). Accordingly respondents Nos. 1 to 3 are directed to remove the name of respondent No. 4 from the register. Respondent No. 4 is restrained from using the words Methodist Church in its name. Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are directed to make the name the Methodist Church in India Trust Association P. Ltd . available to the petitioners for registration, without requiring them to produce any no objection certificate, either of respondent No. 4 (since the question now does not arise of getting their consent) or from the Methodist Church in Northern India Trust Association. The rule is made absolute accordingly. The respondents will pay to the petitioners costs of this petition.
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1984 (9) TMI 196 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up - Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... been drawn to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of K. S. Mathura Dass v. State of Punjab 1977 47 Comp. Cas. 467 , showing that a similar appeal was entertained by that court, going through that judgment, we find that that question was never before the court and the court had no occasion to consider the same. As such, the said decision may not be of much assistance. In the above view, the appeal would not be maintainable under section 483 of the Companies Act also. Therefore, the appeals are rejected. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled. Time to surrender one month. Counsel for the appellants in both the cases make an oral application under section 134A of the Constitution for certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of the importance of the question and in view of the fact that there is no considered precedent on the matter, we certify this case as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.
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1984 (9) TMI 187 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Clandestine removal ... ... ... ... ..... world to make such an admission as made by the statement of 30-9-1981 unless it was true. The conduct of the factory in other respects also satisfy us that the statement was true. The Collector rsquo s calculation of the figures of production in the different times cannot be said to be arbitrary or without foundation. If anything, there would be a case for saying that the figures arrived at by him were low because he took the power consumption recorded by the defective meter which recorded low consumption. We have this on the statement of the appellants themselves. There is more than a likelihood that the actual figures of production and clearances were higher than those arrived at by the Collector but we will not go into this now. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is nothing of the Collector rsquo s order that requires us to interfere. It does not appear to be unjust or baseless or whimsical. Therefore, we are unable to interfere with it. 15. We reject the appeal.
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1984 (9) TMI 186 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Refund - Sugar ... ... ... ... ..... ility for the duty leviable on his production of khandsari sugar during the period for which the said sum had been paid. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 92B indicates the manner in which the sum payable has to be determined sub-rule (4) of Rule 92B provides that at the time of submission of the application under Rule 92C, payment is initially for a period of two weeks thereafter, weekly payments shall be made two days in advance of the week next following. It is also stated that the balance out of the duty deposited shall be adjusted at the end of the season, if so desired by the manufacturer who had made the deposit. As the payment for any particular week is to be made two days in advance of the week next following, the additional payment made initially assumes the character of a deposit and it is not a duty of excise, refund of which would be covered by Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In this view of the matter, I allow the appeal and order consequential relief.
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1984 (9) TMI 185 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Pre-mature appeal ... ... ... ... ..... that decision, nor for several years afterwards. The fact that the appellants had appealed against the decision of the Assistant Collector even then would also be a sufficient answer in case it is argued against them that the Assistant Collector rsquo s decision was not challenged and had therefore become final. 8. The facts set out above further confirm the Appellate Collector rsquo s view that the appeal before him was premature and in the nature of an academic exercise. In these circumstances we consider that it would be an equally academic exercise for us to go into the basis of the Assistant Collector rsquo s finding. We have no doubt that in case the issue is sought to be re-opened by the Central Excise Authorities at a future date, they would examine the issue on its merits without invoking the Assistant Collector rsquo s decision of 11-4-1977. In this view we hold that the Appellate Collector rsquo s order was justified and we accordingly reject the appeal against it.
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1984 (9) TMI 184 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Job work - Demand ... ... ... ... ..... e yarn, would shift to the Department. The Department has also relied on the ruling reported in AIR 1974 SC 859 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1546 (S.C.) (Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormull). But that ruling has no application to the present facts because the goods concerned were of a foreign origin. The ruling reported in 1981 (8) E.L.T. 613 (Ahura Chemical Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India) also does not apply to the present fact as the notification involved was totally different. The object of interpretation of a statute should be to avoid double taxation. Once the initial onus is discharged, by the assessee leading prima facie proof that the base yarn had or must have suffered duty, there is no warrant for collecting it again. 7. Hence on a careful consideration of the facts of the present cases, we are of the view that the approach of the lower authorities regarding the issues involved was not justified. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and allow the appeals.
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