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Showing 401 to 420 of 454 Records
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2002 (3) TMI 54
The Supreme Court of India allowed the civil appeal, setting aside the judgment and order under appeal. The search conducted in both the shop and house of the appellants, despite the warrant being limited to the shop, led to a breach of natural justice as the Panchas were not produced for cross-examination.
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2002 (3) TMI 53
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh held that the respondent-assessee was liable to pay duty of Rs. 9,05,814.44. The Tribunal directed the assessee to make the deposit, which was done. The Tribunal's order was set aside, and the assessee was directed to take credit of the amount in his PLA account. The Revenue's petition was dismissed as the refund had already been adjusted.
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2002 (3) TMI 52
The Supreme Court of India allowed the appeal due to lack of notice in an ex-parte order by the Tribunal. The order under challenge was set aside, and the matter was restored to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing. No costs were awarded.
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2002 (3) TMI 51
The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal regarding the classification of imported goods for improving electricity transmission and distribution network. The Tribunal's order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to consider if there would be a substantial expansion in the network capacity. The definition of 'power project' was clarified to include projects that transmit and distribute electricity. The case was restored to the Tribunal for further consideration.
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2002 (3) TMI 50
The Supreme Court of India ruled in favor of the appellant based on a previous judgment. The Court rejected the argument for reconsideration in light of another judgment and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for further examination.
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2002 (3) TMI 49
Special additional duty at four per cent on the customs duty leviable on the goods levied
Held that:- The point to note is that for the purposes of customs duty, the taxable event occurs on the date on which the goods are cleared from a bonded warehouse for house consumption. It is that date which is relevant for the purposes of the rate of customs duty and any additional duty thereon. In the present cases, on the dates on which the goods were cleared from the bonded warehouses the special additional duty, introduced on 1st June, 1998, was already in existence and the assessee was correctly made liable to pay the same.
The judgment in the case of Polyset Corporation [1999 (10) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] deals with the Excise Act. Under the Excise Act, the taxable event occurs when the goods are manufactured, but the collection of the duty may be deferred for administrative convenience. It is, therefore, the date of manufacture which is relevant for the purposes of excise duty and any additional duty thereon. That is what has been held in the case of Polyset Corporation. It has no application to these appeals. The judgment in the case of J.K. Synthetics [1999 (10) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] is quite alien to the issue that is before us. Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (3) TMI 48
Conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 challenged
Held that:- Law on the point is very clear that even if there is any sort of procedural illegality in conducting the search and seizure, the evidence collected thereby will not become inadmissible and the Court would consider all the circumstances and find out whether any serious prejudice had been caused to the accused. If the search and seizure was in complete defiance of the law and procedure and there was any possibility of the evidence collected likely to have been tampered with or interpolated during the course of such search or seizure, then, it could be said that the evidence is not liable to be admissible in evidence.
In the present case, though the mahazar was not prepared at the spot where the accused persons were found to be in possession of the contraband article but the same was done only at the Office of the Customs Department while the accused persons were very much present throughout, there was no allegation or suggestion that the contraband article was, in any way, meddled with by the officers. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant has rightly been found to be in possession of the opium. We find no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence entered against the appellant. The appeal is dismissed
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2002 (3) TMI 47
Whether the respondents were engaged in the manufacturing/propagation of yeast leviable to central excise duty?
Held that:- In the appeals before the CEGAT, there was no dispute that 'yeast' itself is exigible to duty, but what was contended before the Tribunal was limited to the so-called product of yeast obtained by propagating the same by mixing it with molasses and water for manufacture of potable alcohol. Hence, in our view, the finding given by the CEGAT that the goods in question were having a very short self-life; there was no evidence to prove that such goods were either marketed or were marketable cannot be held to be, in any way, illegal or erroneous because it has not been proved that such intermediate product is marketed or marketable. Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (3) TMI 46
Preventive detention
Held that:- The factum of non-placement of relevant documents, in our view, has had a serious effect and definite inroad to petitioner's liberty without application of mind. Non-placement of the order of payment of additional duty of ₹ 11,56,803/- within 30 days from the receipt of the order of the Commission has not only transgressed the rights of the petitioner but in our view speaks a volume about the conduct of the officials rendering the proceeding before the Detaining Authority vitiated and thus turned out to be illegal.
On the question of representation, the records depict that the same was sent to the President of India on 10th April, 2001 and the same was sent to the Ministry of Finance on August 16, 2001 - some explanation has been put forth, but we need not, however, detain ourselves in dealing with the same since we wish to state that non-placement of relevant materials before the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority is not only a lapse but a serious lapse on the part of the officials resulting in the order of detention to be declared unlawful and illegal and thus resultantly cannot be sustained. Thus the writ petition succeeds. The detention order stands quashed and set aside
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2002 (3) TMI 45
Whether the trust-Sai Publication Fund, which has been set up by some devotees of Saibaba of Shiridi for spreading his message, can be held to be a "dealer" in respect of sale of books, booklets, pamphlets, photos, stickers and other publications containing message of Saibaba and the turnover of such publication can be assessed to sales tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 ?
Held that:- the question of profit motive or no profit motive would be relevant only where person carries on trade, commerce, manufacture or adventure in the nature of trade, commerce, etc. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case irrespective of the profit motive, it could not be said that the trust either was a "dealer" or was carrying on trade, commerce, etc. The trust is not carrying on trade, commerce, etc., in the sense of occupation to be a "dealer" as its main object is to spread the message of Saibaba of Shiridi as already noticed above. Having regard to all aspects of the matter, the High Court was right in answering the question referred by the Tribunal in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent-assessee. We must however add here that whether a particular person is a "dealer" and whether he carries on "business" are matters to be decided on the facts and in the circumstances of each case.
The question set out in the beginning in the negative and in favour of the respondent-assessee.
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2002 (3) TMI 44
Whether after the quashing of a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under section 6?
Held that:- While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omis sus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. The language of sec tion 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent.
The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principle is clearly unacceptable. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the Legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent notifications containing declaration under section 6 of the Act are quashed.
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2002 (3) TMI 43
Issues involved:
Challenge to notices issued under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1975-76; Interpretation of liberty granted by the court to make assessment under section 143 after quashing draft assessment order under section 144B; Time limit for assessment under section 143 and validity of notices issued beyond the specified period.
Analysis:
The petitioner challenged the notices issued under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1975-76, seeking their cancellation, withdrawal, and rescission by the court. The High Court noted that section 144B, under which draft assessment orders were passed, was omitted by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987. Consequently, the court quashed the draft assessment orders and granted liberty to make an assessment under section 143 of the Act. The writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs, and a judgment from a previous case was referred to in support of the decision.
The petitioner contended that the time limit for assessment under section 143 is specified under section 153 of the Act, and no assessment can be made beyond the prescribed period. Referring to a Supreme Court judgment, the petitioner argued that the Income-tax Officer cannot issue notices after the expiry of the specified time limit. However, the court noted a provision in the Act extending the time limit in certain cases, which was distinguished from the case cited by the petitioner. The court highlighted amendments to section 153(3)(ii) and emphasized that the liberty granted by the court does not debar the authority from proceeding with the assessment.
The court further discussed the distinction between an observation of the court and granting liberty, emphasizing that the authority cannot be debarred from issuing notices based on the liberty granted under the court's order. The court dismissed the writ petition, stating that challenging the notices directly before the court was not the proper course of action. It emphasized the importance of consistency in court orders and refused the prayer for stay. The judgment was to be supplied to the parties within seven days for compliance.
In conclusion, the court upheld the authority's right to issue notices based on the liberty granted under the court's order, dismissing the writ petition due to the improper challenge of the notices directly before the court and emphasizing the need for consistency in court orders.
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2002 (3) TMI 42
Issues:
1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in upholding the deletion of gratuity payable to employees on transfer to the telecommunication department of the State Government.
2. Whether the Tribunal correctly held that the provision of section 40A(7) could not be invoked to defeat the assessee's claim for gratuity and that it was allowable under section 28 or 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
3. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the subsidy amount should not be deducted from the cost of the generator for calculating depreciation.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The case involved the transfer of the telecommunications department of the assessee to a government organization, resulting in accrued liability for gratuity payments to transferred workers. The provision made by the assessee for this liability led to the deletion of the gratuity amount. The Tribunal, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), and the High Court agreed that the deletion of the sum of gratuity was justified in law. The judgment was in favor of the assessee on this issue.
Issue 2:
Regarding the claim for gratuity, the argument centered around the applicability of section 40A(7) and whether the provision was deductible under section 28 or 37(1) of the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal opined that since the payment was not for employees who had ceased to be such, it was deductible under section 37(1). Citing relevant case laws, the High Court agreed that the provision for gratuity was generally deductible as a business expense, leading to a favorable judgment for the assessee on this issue.
Issue 3:
The third question revolved around the treatment of a subsidy amount received for a generator set in the calculation of depreciation. The Tribunal found that the subsidy was not given towards the cost of the generator sets, and thus, it should not be deducted for depreciation calculation. The High Court upheld this decision, stating that the Tribunal did not err in law. The judgment favored the assessee on this issue as well.
In conclusion, all three questions raised in the case were answered in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee. The judgment provided detailed analysis and interpretation of relevant legal provisions, case laws, and factual findings to support the decisions on each issue.
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2002 (3) TMI 41
Issues involved:
The validity of the provision of section 234B, Explanation 1, as amended by the Finance Act, 2001, and the retrospective enforcement of the amendment.
Judgment Summary:
Validity of Section 234B, Explanation 1:
The court considered the amendment to section 234B, Explanation 1, which clarified the calculation of assessed tax. The original provision based interest on income as declared in the return, while the amendment calculated interest on income determined by the assessing authority minus tax paid or deducted. The court found the amendment aimed to remove ambiguity and was not arbitrary. The petitioner lacked a cause of action as no notice, demand, penalty, or threat of conviction was issued.
Retrospective Enforcement:
The petitioner argued that the retrospective enforcement of the provision violated Article 20(1) of the Constitution by allowing conviction for an offense when the law was not in force. However, the court clarified that the amendment regulated interest levy and did not entail penalties, thus not infringing Article 20. No other points were raised, leading to the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
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2002 (3) TMI 40
Issues Involved:
Whether proceedings u/s 154 of the Income-tax Act can be initiated after the Assessing Officer has given a notice u/s 143(2) to the assessee?
Judgment Details:
The judgment pertains to an appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, involving the initiation of proceedings under section 154 for rectification of an intimation under section 143(1)(a) after the Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 143(2) to the assessee. The assessee, a public limited company, claimed a deduction on account of dividend paid to shareholders in its return for the assessment year 1990-91. Subsequently, notices were issued under sections 143(2) and 154(1)(b), leading to an order dated February 25, 1993. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the assessee's claim, which was challenged by the Revenue. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, resulting in the current appeal before the High Court.
The main contention raised was whether there is any legal bar for the Assessing Officer to invoke jurisdiction under section 154 after issuing a notice under section 143(2) to the assessee. The court emphasized that the power under section 154 is limited to correcting an error apparent on the record, while proceedings under section 143(2) have a broader scope, including making assessments and determining tax liabilities. The court cited precedents, including a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court and the Delhi High Court, to support the view that allowing parallel proceedings would be inefficient and unnecessary.
The court agreed with the cited precedents and held that once a notice under section 143(2) has been issued, any necessary corrections should be made during the assessment under section 143 and not through section 154. The court highlighted that the scope and application of section 154 have been extensively examined in previous cases, emphasizing that rectifications should be made within the assessment process. As no contrary decision was presented, the court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it summarily.
Therefore, the High Court upheld the view that initiating proceedings under section 154 after issuing a notice under section 143(2) would be redundant and inefficient, and rectifications should be made within the assessment process under section 143.
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2002 (3) TMI 39
Issues:
Interpretation of exemption certificate under section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for a petitioner granted a lease in a Sixth Schedule area and the applicability of section 206C of the Act.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a Scheduled Tribe member, was granted a lease in a Sixth Schedule area by the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council. The authority demanded income-tax and royalty, despite the petitioner's eligibility for exemption under section 10(26) of the Act. The exemption certificate issued by the Income-tax Officer excluded income from trading in forest produce under section 206C. The petitioner challenged this in court under article 226 of the Constitution.
Legal Arguments:
The petitioner's counsel argued that the exemption certificate's restrictions contradicted section 10(26) of the Act, which exempts income from Sixth Schedule areas. They cited court decisions supporting the view that if no income-tax is payable, collection at source is unnecessary. The Revenue's counsel contended that uncertainty regarding the income's origin justified collection at source, refunding if found exempt later.
Court's Interpretation:
The High Court referred to previous judgments clarifying that income from a Sixth Schedule area qualifies for exemption under section 10(26). It affirmed that income from the petitioner's lease, regardless of payment location, originated from a Sixth Schedule area. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to exemption under section 10(26), rendering section 206C inapplicable.
Conclusion:
Relying on legal precedents, the High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the authority's action demanding income-tax and royalty. The exemption certificate was upheld, granting the petitioner exemption from income-tax on profits from forest produce trading in the leased area. The judgment emphasized that if income is exempt, collection at source is invalid, in line with established legal principles.
Final Decision:
The High Court allowed the petition, overturning the authority's demand for income-tax and royalty. The exemption certificate was upheld, granting the petitioner exemption from income-tax on profits from forest produce trading in the leased Sixth Schedule area. The judgment reiterated the inapplicability of collection at source when income is exempt under section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
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2002 (3) TMI 38
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in including sales tax liability u/s 263.
2. Tribunal's dismissal of the departmental appeal without addressing the correctness of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) findings.
Summary:
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in Including Sales Tax Liability u/s 263
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer exceeded his jurisdiction by including a sales tax liability of Rs. 32,40,408 in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax u/s 263. The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner's order was on the limited issue of recomputation of relief u/s 80HH and did not explicitly address the sales tax matter. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal, stating that the Income-tax Officer must adhere to the specific directions of the superior authority and cannot independently alter matters not addressed by the Commissioner. The High Court referenced the cases of Katihar Jute Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT and Surrendra Overseas Ltd. v. CIT to support this view.
Issue 2: Tribunal's Dismissal of the Departmental Appeal
The Tribunal dismissed the departmental appeal by accepting the cross-objection of the assessee without deciding on the correctness of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) findings. The High Court observed that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had dismissed the appeal for statistical purposes, as the original assessment order had been set aside by the Commissioner in revision. The High Court emphasized that if the original section 154 order was not sustainable, it remains subject to challenge even when repeated in a fresh assessment. The Tribunal must now examine on merits whether the sales tax receipts should be included in the assessee's income.
Additional Observations:
The High Court clarified that if the Commissioner in revision finds that section 154 was wrongly invoked, he should explicitly state so and cancel the section 154 order. The Commissioner should then direct the addition of the amount if justified, ensuring that the fresh assessment does not repeat the flawed section 154 order. This approach would prevent future issues similar to the present case.
Conclusion:
Both questions were answered in the negative. The Tribunal is directed to rehear the matter concerning the sales tax addition and section 43B, and decide on the merits and in law whether the addition should be maintained or deleted.
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2002 (3) TMI 37
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Sagbara Estate passed on the death of the deceased and if estate duty was payable.
2. Whether the personal properties of the deceased were on the same footing as the Sagbara Estate and if they passed on his death.
3. Whether the findings of the Tribunal regarding the passing of properties and the levy of estate duty were correct.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Sagbara Estate Passing on Death and Estate Duty:
The Tribunal concluded that no property from the Sagbara Estate passed on the death of Vasava Karansinhji in 1957. The Deputy Controller of Estate Duty had initially held that the deceased retained proprietary rights over the Sagbara Estate despite its takeover by the Government in 1948, and thus, estate duty was payable. However, the Tribunal observed that the Sagbara Estate was taken over by the Government of India in 1948 as part of the Rajpipla State without any separate agreement with the Vasava. The Tribunal noted that the Government of India did not recognize the Vasava's rights over the estate, and the estate vested in the Government of India as part of Indian territory by an act of State. Therefore, no property passed on the death of Vasava Karansinhji, and no estate duty was payable.
2. Personal Properties of the Deceased:
The Tribunal found that the personal properties of the deceased, including three Dumala villages, were also taken over by the Government along with the Sagbara Estate. The Tribunal held that the personal properties stood on the same footing as the Sagbara Estate, and there was no distinction between them. Since these properties were also taken over by the act of State, they did not pass on the death of the deceased, and no estate duty was payable.
3. Findings of the Tribunal:
The Tribunal's findings were based on the historical context and the legal principles governing acts of State. The Tribunal held that the Sagbara Estate and the personal properties were taken over by the Government of India in 1948, and the deceased had no rights over them at the time of his death. The Tribunal concluded that the subsequent recognition of the Vasava's rights in 1958 was a fresh grant and not a recognition of existing rights. Therefore, the Tribunal's finding that no property passed on the death of the deceased and that no estate duty was payable was correct in law and sustainable from the material on record.
Conclusion:
The High Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that no property from the Sagbara Estate or personal properties of the deceased passed on his death in 1957. Consequently, no estate duty was payable. The reference was answered in the affirmative, against the Revenue, and in favor of the accountable person.
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2002 (3) TMI 36
Issues:
1. Application for recalling an order dated July 11, 2001, passed by the court in I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001.
2. Allegations of the appellant's counsel having to leave for Maheswar on July 6, 2001, and not being able to return for the hearing on July 9, 2001.
3. Interpretation of the provisions of Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to the dismissal of the appeal in limine.
4. Consideration of whether the impugned order was passed in default of the appellant's appearance and the applicability of Order 41, rule 19 for recalling the order.
5. Analysis of the legal position regarding the dismissal of suits or appeals on merits when the party does not appear for the hearing.
6. Determination of whether a sufficient cause was demonstrated to empower the court to recall the impugned order.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an application made under Order 41, rule 19, read with Order 47, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code seeking the recalling of an order dated July 11, 2001, passed in I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001. The applicant, who was the appellant in the said appeal, was absent during the hearing on July 9, 2001, leading to the dismissal of the appeal in limine on July 11, 2001. The application was based on the appellant's counsel having to attend to ailing relative in Maheswar, preventing his appearance for the hearing. The court considered the provisions of section 260A(7) of the Income-tax Act, making Civil Procedure Code provisions applicable to appeals under section 260A, thereby allowing the application under Order 41, rule 19 for recalling the order.
The court acknowledged the counsel's affidavit supporting the cause for non-appearance and accepted that a sufficient cause existed within the meaning of Order 41, rule 19, justifying the recall of the impugned order. It was emphasized that the dismissal of an appeal on merits does not preclude the appellant from seeking restoration, especially when the order was passed in default of appearance. The judgment highlighted the distinction between orders passed on merits and those passed in default, emphasizing the right of the appellant to invoke Order 41, rule 19 in case of non-appearance. The court clarified that the right conferred by the Legislature cannot be negated by court orders, underscoring the importance of demonstrating a good or sufficient cause to recall orders passed in default.
The court specifically mentioned that the order was recalled solely under the provisions of Order 41, rule 19, without entertaining any grounds under Order 47, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently, the impugned order dated July 11, 2001, was recalled, and the appeal, I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001, was restored for admission before the appropriate Bench hearing such appeals. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the legal principles governing the recall of orders passed in default of appearance, ensuring the appellant's right to seek restoration based on sufficient cause demonstrated.
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2002 (3) TMI 35
Issues involved: Jurisdictional conflict between High Courts regarding section 256(2) application and transfer of assessment.
Summary:
The application for recall of an ex parte order was made due to jurisdictional issues involving two High Courts. The assessee's assessments were transferred from Gauhati to Calcutta by an order passed on July 28, 1997. However, the reference application was made in regard to a decision by the Gauhati Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, leading to a dispute over jurisdiction. The assessee argued that the appropriate Bench of the High Court at Assam should have jurisdiction in this case. The application under section 256(1) was rejected by the Gauhati Tribunal on September 17, 1997. The assessee relied on previous High Court decisions to support their contentions.
The Revenue argued based on the Explanation of section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which controls assessment transfer powers. The argument was made that section 256(2) application should be made before the High Court at Calcutta due to the order of transfer of assessment. However, the Court disagreed with this argument, emphasizing that the High Court of one state should not interfere in matters of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal of a different state. The Court concluded that the application for setting aside the ex parte order was allowed due to lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The reference application was rejected on the same grounds.
The order was set aside, and parties were directed to act on a signed copy of the order. The Revenue was given the liberty to continue proceedings in accordance with the law.
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