|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 421 to 438 of 438 Records
-
1999 (12) TMI 19
The High Court of Delhi admitted the appeal regarding two substantial questions of law arising from the Tribunal's order on ITA No. 1491/Delhi of 1996 for the assessment year 1992-93. The questions involve deduction of interest payable on loans from J and K Bank and the disallowance of expenses on estimate basis. The appellant is required to file ten copies of documents within three months for the appeal to be listed for hearing.
-
1999 (12) TMI 18
Issues:
1. Deductibility of debts allotted to legal representative in computing net wealth under Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
2. Deductibility of share of liability as legal heir while computing wealth of the assessee.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The case involved Tax Cases related to the deductibility of debts allotted to legal representatives in computing net wealth under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The respondents, sons and daughters of an industrialist, inherited an estate which was partially distributed among them by the administrator. The Wealth-tax Officer disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessees, stating that the liability was incurred in relation to exempted shares. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed, allowing the deduction. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal also ruled in favor of the assessees, stating that the liability was not contingent and was incurred after the death of the deceased. The Tribunal held that the assessees were entitled to claim deduction of the liability in the computation of net wealth. The Revenue challenged this decision, arguing that the liability was contingent and fastened on exempted assets.
Issue 2:
Another issue in the case was the deductibility of the share of liability as a legal heir while computing the wealth of the assessee. The Tribunal held that the liability was not fastened on the assessees as legal representatives of the deceased and could not be considered a contingent liability. The Revenue contended that the liability could only extend to the value of the property inherited by the assessees. However, the Tribunal found that the debts were incurred by the executor after the death of the deceased for tax liabilities related to the estate. The Tribunal concluded that the liabilities were not inherited debts but were passed on to the assessees separately. The assessees had undertaken to discharge the liabilities, and the Tribunal ruled in their favor, allowing the deduction of the liability as a deductible item.
In conclusion, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the assessees were entitled to claim deduction of the liability as a deductible item. The Court found that the liability was not contingent, not fastened on exempted assets, and not limited to the value of the inherited property. The Court held that the debts were incurred by the executor for estate tax liabilities and were not inherited debts of the assessees. Therefore, the questions of law were answered in favor of the assessees, and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
-
1999 (12) TMI 17
Issues:
1. Quashment of order dated September 7, 1999, rejecting a declaration made under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998.
2. Interpretation of the time limit for payment under the scheme.
3. Condonation of delay in payment.
Analysis:
The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order rejecting their declaration under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, due to a delay in payment. The petitioner contended that the payment deadline should be calculated from the date of communication of the order, not the date of passing the order. The Commissioner rejected the declaration citing a two-day delay in payment, stating there was no provision for condonation of delay. The petitioner argued for condonation of the one-day delay based on the purpose of the scheme. The petitioner relied on the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court regarding a similar issue. The court considered the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997, and emphasized allowing some leeway when circumstances are beyond the citizen's control.
The court acknowledged the one-day delay in payment but noted that March 25, 1999, the deadline, was a bank holiday, and the payment was made on March 27, 1999, with a valid explanation. The court held that the delay was minimal and should have been condoned by the Commissioner. The court referred to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, stating that the principle of allowing flexibility in deadlines should apply to the current scheme. Consequently, the court quashed the order rejecting the declaration and directed the Commissioner to accept the declaration. The writ petition was allowed, emphasizing the importance of considering reasonable delays in such cases to uphold the purpose of the scheme and ensure fairness in enforcement.
-
1999 (12) TMI 16
The High Court of Allahabad ruled that in a case involving a partnership firm reconstitution due to the death of a partner, two separate assessments should be made instead of a single assessment. This decision was based on the Supreme Court's ruling in CIT v. Empire Estate [1996] 218 ITR 355. The Tribunal's order was misinterpreted, and the correct question was reframed to address this issue.
-
1999 (12) TMI 15
The High Court of Allahabad upheld the Tribunal's decision that interest on funds diverted for interest-free advances to directors is not deductible in business income. The disallowance must be calculated at the same rate as the interest paid on borrowed funds. This decision is in line with previous court rulings.
-
1999 (12) TMI 14
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the computation of interest income under the Interest-tax Act, 1974.
2. Interpretation of "chargeable interest" under Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act in the context of the method of accounting employed by the assessee.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The primary issue was whether, due to the incorporation of Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, into Section 21 of the Interest-tax Act, 1974, the interest income should be computed based on the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. The assessee argued that since it maintained its books of account on a cash basis and was assessed under the cash system under the Income-tax Act, the chargeable interest should also be computed on a cash basis for the Interest-tax Act. The Assessing Officer, however, computed the interest on an accrual basis, rejecting the cash system of accounting. The Tribunal upheld the Assessing Officer's computation, stating that Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act mandates the interest to be assessed on an accrual basis.
2. Interpretation of "Chargeable Interest" under Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act:
The court examined the scope of "chargeable interest" under Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act, which states that the chargeable interest of any previous year of a credit institution shall be the total amount of interest accruing or arising in that previous year. The court noted that Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act differs from Section 5 of the Income-tax Act, which includes income received or deemed to be received in India. The Interest-tax Act specifically refers to interest accruing or arising, not received. The court cited several precedents to elucidate the distinction between "accrue" and "arise" and their implications for tax liability.
The court emphasized that the inclusion of Section 145 in Section 21 of the Interest-tax Act does not alter the fundamental requirement that interest must be computed on an accrual basis as per Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act. The proviso to Section 145 of the Income-tax Act allows the Assessing Officer to determine the computation method if the accounts are correct but the method employed does not properly deduce income. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was justified in computing the interest on an accrual basis, aligning with the statutory requirements of the Interest-tax Act.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision to uphold the Assessing Officer's computation of interest on an accrual basis was correct. The first question was answered in the affirmative, in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee. Consequently, the second question, which was of academic interest, was also treated as answered in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee. The court's interpretation ensured that the charging section of the Interest-tax Act remained operative and effective, aligning with the legislative intent and statutory framework.
-
1999 (12) TMI 13
Issues:
Interpretation of section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding deduction of bad debts written off as irrecoverable. Analysis of the applicability of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 on bad debts. Consideration of the Central Board of Direct Taxes Circular dated January 13, 1971 in relation to the Ordinance.
Interpretation of Section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The case involved the deduction of bad debts under section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, amounting to Rs. 32,57,894 for the assessment year 1985-86. The Tribunal's decision was challenged regarding the deduction of bad debts written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had initially allowed the deduction, but the Tribunal reversed this decision. The Tribunal permitted the assessee to proceed against Tata Mills for recovery, leaving the matter open for further action under section 36(1)(vii).
Applicability of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983:
The judgment delved into the implications of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 on the bad debts in question. The Ordinance aimed to take over the management of textile mills to improve working conditions, including assets, rights, and leaseholds. Section 7 of the Ordinance clarified that liabilities incurred by a textile company before the appointed date were enforceable against the company, not the Central Government. The judgment analyzed the relationship between the Ordinance and the bad debts to determine if the debts were recoverable from Tata Mills under the Ordinance's provisions.
Consideration of Central Board of Direct Taxes Circular dated January 13, 1971:
The judgment examined the relevance of the Central Board of Direct Taxes Circular dated January 13, 1971 in the context of the Ordinance and the bad debts. The Circular, issued under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dealt with undertakings of textile mills managed under the Cotton Textile Companies Act, 1976. The Circular highlighted restrictions on filing suits against undertakings without Central Government permission and the cessation of liabilities post-Act enforcement. However, the absence of similar provisions in the 1983 Ordinance indicated that the Circular's applicability to the current case was limited. The judgment emphasized that the assessee had the option to pursue recovery against Tata Mills and seek relief under section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Conclusion:
The High Court, in disposing of the reference, affirmed the Tribunal's decision, concluding that the assessee could have taken action against Tata Mills for debt recovery and sought relief under section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The judgment clarified the relationship between the Ordinance, the Circular, and the deduction of bad debts, ultimately upholding the Tribunal's decision and answering the referred question in the affirmative.
-
1999 (12) TMI 12
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of "passing of an order" under section 90(2) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998.
2. Compliance with the statutory period for payment under the scheme.
3. Validity of the direction at the foot of Form No. 2A.
4. Issuance of the certificate in Form No. 3 by the designated authority.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of "Passing of an Order" under Section 90(2) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998:
The core issue revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "passing of an order" in section 90(2) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998. The court examined whether this phrase means the date on which the designated authority signs the certificate of intimation in Form No. 2A or the date on which the order is communicated or served to the declarant. The court concluded that the phrase "passing of an order" means the date when the order is communicated to the declarant. This interpretation ensures that the statutory right of the declarant to pay the determined amount within 30 days is preserved and not curtailed by any delay in communication by the designated authority.
2. Compliance with the Statutory Period for Payment under the Scheme:
The petitioner contended that he made a valid declaration and paid the tax within the prescribed period, i.e., within 30 days of receiving the intimation. The designated authority, however, refused to issue the certificate in Form No. 3 on the grounds that the petitioner did not deposit the amount within 30 days from the date the order was signed (February 25, 1999). The court held that the statutory period of 30 days for payment starts from the date the order is communicated to the declarant, not from the date it is signed by the designated authority. Thus, the petitioner complied with the statutory period by depositing the amount within 30 days of receiving the intimation on March 18, 1999.
3. Validity of the Direction at the Foot of Form No. 2A:
The court scrutinized the direction at the foot of Form No. 2A, which instructed the declarant to make the payment within 30 days from the date of the certificate. The court found this direction to be inconsistent with the scheme's statutory provisions. It emphasized that the legislative intent was to grant the declarant 30 clear days for payment from the date of communication of the order. The direction in Form No. 2A was thus deemed illegal and not in accordance with the scheme.
4. Issuance of the Certificate in Form No. 3 by the Designated Authority:
Given the court's interpretation that the period for payment starts from the date of communication, it held that the petitioner, having paid the dues within 30 days of receiving the intimation, was entitled to the issuance of the certificate in Form No. 3. The court directed the designated authority to issue the requisite certificate in Form No. 3 to the petitioner, thereby quashing the earlier communication dated June 22, 1999, which denied the issuance of the certificate.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the writ petition, quashed the communication denying the certificate, and directed the designated authority to issue the certificate in Form No. 3 to the petitioner. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
-
1999 (12) TMI 11
Issues Involved:
1. Violation of section 269T of the Income-tax Act by repayment of loans otherwise than by an account payee cheque.
2. Violation of section 269SS of the Income-tax Act by accepting deposits of Rs. 10,000 or more otherwise than by an account payee cheque.
3. Applicability of section 6 of the General Clauses Act to the omission of penal provisions (sections 276E and 276DD) from the Income-tax Act.
4. Liability of the second accused who joined the company after the alleged violations occurred.
5. Whether the trial court's acquittal based on the deletion of penal provisions was valid.
6. Consideration of reasonable cause for failure to comply with sections 269T and 269SS.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Violation of Section 269T:
The appellant contended that the first accused company violated section 269T by repaying loans otherwise than by an account payee cheque. The trial court acknowledged the violation but acquitted the accused, citing the deletion of section 276E, which provided penal provisions for such violations, effective from April 1, 1989.
2. Violation of Section 269SS:
The second batch of appeals involved the accusation that the first accused company accepted deposits of Rs. 10,000 or more in cash, violating section 269SS. The trial court similarly acquitted the accused, referencing the omission of section 276DD, which penalized such actions, effective from April 1, 1989.
3. Applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act:
The appellant argued that the repeal or omission of sections 276E and 276DD should not affect ongoing proceedings, invoking section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The court agreed, stating that section 6 ensures that the repeal does not affect any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment acquired under the repealed enactment.
4. Liability of the Second Accused:
The trial court found that the second accused, who joined the company on September 14, 1987, could not be held liable for violations that occurred before his tenure. This finding was upheld, as it was undisputed that the second accused was not involved in the company's activities during the period of the alleged violations.
5. Validity of the Trial Court's Acquittal:
The trial court's acquittal based on the deletion of penal provisions was found to be erroneous. The court held that the omission of sections 276E and 276DD did not retroactively invalidate prosecutions initiated while these sections were still in force. The trial court's reliance on Rayala Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 494, was deemed misplaced, as the facts of that case differed significantly.
6. Reasonable Cause for Non-Compliance:
The accused argued that there was reasonable cause for not issuing account payee cheques, citing operational practices and customer accommodation. The trial court did not adequately address this defense. Section 278AA of the Income-tax Act, which provides immunity from prosecution if reasonable cause is proven, was applicable at the time of the alleged violations. However, the court decided not to remit the case for further consideration due to the passage of time and the technical nature of the offense.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the omission of sections 276E and 276DD did not affect pending prosecutions. The trial court's acquittal in cases involving the second accused (C.A. Nos. 279 to 288 of 1990) was upheld due to the lack of liability. However, the acquittal in other cases (C.A. Nos. 249 to 277 of 1990) was set aside, although the court chose not to remit these cases for retrial due to the significant time lapse and technical nature of the offenses. All criminal appeals were disposed of accordingly.
-
1999 (12) TMI 10
Issues Involved:
1. Rejection of declaration under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, based on the pendency of application under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Rejection of declaration under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, due to no outstanding demand after adjustment of refunds.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Rejection of Declaration Based on Pendency of Application under Section 254(2):
The petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 3317 of 1999(R) challenged the rejection of their declaration under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Ranchi, on the ground that the application filed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, cannot be considered as a pending appeal in terms of clause 95(i)(c) of the Scheme.
The petitioner argued that the application under section 254(2) for rectification of mistakes should be treated as a continuation of the appeal, making the declaration under the Scheme maintainable. However, the respondent-department contended that an application under section 254(2) is not an appeal and thus, no appeal was pending, disqualifying the petitioner from the Scheme's benefits.
The court held that an application under section 254(2) is limited to rectifying mistakes apparent from the record and cannot be treated as a continuation of the appeal. Therefore, clause 95(i)(c) was applicable, and the rejection of the declaration was justified.
2. Rejection of Declaration Due to No Outstanding Demand After Adjustment of Refunds:
The petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 3318 of 1999(R) challenged the rejection of their declaration under the Scheme on the ground that there was no outstanding demand as the tax liability was adjusted against refunds from the assessment year 1994-95.
The petitioner argued that the adjustment was invalid as it breached section 245 of the Income-tax Act, which requires prior intimation in writing before adjusting refunds. The department claimed that notice was given, but the petitioner refused to accept it.
The court found no clear evidence of prior intimation in writing as required by section 245, rendering the adjustment invalid. Consequently, the tax liability was considered outstanding on the date of filing the declaration, and the rejection of the declaration was unjustified.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed C.W.J.C. No. 3317 of 1999(R), upholding the rejection of the declaration under the Scheme due to the non-pendency of an appeal. Conversely, C.W.J.C. No. 3318 of 1999(R) was allowed, quashing the rejection of the declaration and directing the Commissioner to reconsider the matter in terms of the Scheme.
-
1999 (12) TMI 9
The High Court of Madras ruled in favor of the respondent in a case involving the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997. The respondent's application was accepted despite a three-day delay in tax payment, as the court found the delay reasonable due to circumstances. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that the decision was within the judge's discretionary power and not contrary to the law.
-
1999 (12) TMI 8
Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding the initiation of proceedings for escaped income assessment based on failure to disclose material facts.
2. Validity of the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) due to the failure of the assessee to disclose the presence of closing stock relating to chips.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a question of law under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, regarding the initiation of proceedings for escaped income assessment. The Tribunal considered whether the failure of the assessee to indicate the presence of closing stock relating to chips could give rise to a reasonable belief as required by the said section. The Tribunal noted that the Department initiated proceedings under section 147(a) based on the discovery of an unsigned paper during a search and seizure operation, showing a different valuation of stock items than what was disclosed by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the failure to disclose the value of closing stock of chips, even at nil value, during the original assessment stage, coupled with the later discovery of the paper, led to a reasonable belief that the assessee had not fully disclosed necessary facts for assessment, resulting in underassessment of income.
2. The Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) was challenged by the assessee, arguing that all particulars regarding closing stock were disclosed during the original assessment. However, the Tribunal observed that the discovery of the paper with different stock valuation, including items not disclosed by the assessee, indicated a failure to fully disclose material facts. The Tribunal held that the failure to indicate the presence of stock relating to chips during the original assessment stage could give rise to a reasonable belief for the Assessing Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a). The Tribunal emphasized that the subsequent addition to the closing stock value was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), further supporting the validity of the initiated proceedings.
3. The Tribunal's decision was upheld by the High Court, affirming that the failure of the assessee to disclose the presence of closing stock relating to chips, even at nil value, could lead to a reasonable belief under section 147(a) for initiating assessment proceedings. The Court clarified that the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to initiate such proceedings is not contingent on the final addition or confirmation of the proposed adjustments, as the assessee may still provide explanations or evidence to counter the alleged escapement of income. The Court concluded that the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of the law and upheld the decision in favor of the Revenue, ruling against the assessee.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed the interpretation and application of section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, emphasizing the importance of full disclosure of material facts by the assessee to avoid underassessment of income. The decision underscored the Assessing Officer's authority to initiate proceedings based on a reasonable belief of escaped income, even if subsequent assessments or appeals may result in different outcomes.
-
1999 (12) TMI 7
Issues:
1. Validity of the Commissioner's order under section 263 regarding the partition in a Hindu undivided family.
2. Legality of the partial partition between two groups under Hindu law.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute over the validity of the Commissioner's order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, regarding a partition in a Hindu undivided family. The Assessing Officer had accepted the partition, but the Commissioner set aside this decision, stating that the members of the family should have taken individual shares instead of being grouped. The Tribunal overturned the Commissioner's order on the grounds that notice was not given to all family members before the decision and that the partition was valid. The Tribunal's decision was supported by a previous judgment regarding a similar partition in a different family, which was deemed valid.
2. The second issue revolved around the legality of a partial partition between two groups within a Hindu undivided family. The court examined the definition of "partial partition" under section 171 of the Income-tax Act, which allows for partitions that are partial concerning either the family members or the family properties. In this case, the partition involved dividing the family's interest in a firm between two groups within the family. The court held that this arrangement constituted a valid partial partition under the law, as it fulfilled the requirements of section 171. The court relied on previous judgments and legal interpretations to support its decision, emphasizing that the partition did not need to involve all family assets or members to be considered valid.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of the assessee, upholding the validity of the partial partition between the two groups within the Hindu undivided family. As a result, the first question regarding the Commissioner's order became redundant, and the court declined to answer it. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the legal principles involved, referencing relevant case law and statutory provisions to support the decision.
-
1999 (12) TMI 6
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of block assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the Income-tax Act.
2. Scope of judicial review of the Settlement Commission's order.
3. Consideration of undisclosed income versus other income in block assessment.
Summary:
1. Legality of Block Assessment under Chapter XIV-B:
A search was conducted on the residential premises of the assessee on December 14, 1995, revealing investments in movable and immovable properties and benami business activities. A notice u/s 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was issued, and the assessee declared undisclosed income of Rs.1,50,000. The Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax determined the undisclosed income at Rs.66,58,300 based on available materials. The assessee and his family filed applications before the Settlement Commission, which passed orders on December 21, 1998. The petitioners later filed miscellaneous applications to recompute the undisclosed income, which were rejected by the Settlement Commission on May 14, 1999, as the order u/s 245D(4) had become final.
2. Scope of Judicial Review of the Settlement Commission's Order:
The petitioners challenged the Settlement Commission's orders, arguing that the block assessment should be confined to income detected from search records. The court noted that the judicial review of the Settlement Commission's decisions is very restricted, focusing on the legality of the procedure rather than the validity of the order. Citing precedents, the court emphasized that judicial review concerns the decision-making process, not the decision itself.
3. Consideration of Undisclosed Income versus Other Income in Block Assessment:
The petitioners contended that only undisclosed income should be considered for block assessment, and other income should be assessed regularly u/s 143. The court found that the Assistant Commissioner assessed only the undisclosed income as defined u/s 158B(b) and that the Settlement Commission's order was based on the petitioners' applications disclosing full and true income. The court concluded that it could not re-evaluate whether the income assessed was undisclosed or not, as the Settlement Commission followed the correct procedure.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petitions and connected miscellaneous petitions, upholding the Settlement Commission's orders and the block assessment conducted by the Assistant Commissioner. The court found no merit in the petitioners' arguments and emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in such matters.
-
1999 (12) TMI 5
New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction, Trust - "(1) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing the deduction under section 80L to the assessee-trust treating the status as individual? - (2) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in deleting the addition of Rs. 1,99,12,300 being interest paid by the assessee-trust to its beneficiaries? - (3) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in deleting the addition of Rs. 8,40,000 made on account of estimate of earned interest at the rate of 12 percent, on bank fixed deposits of Rs. 70 lakhs existing in the name of the beneficiaries? - (4) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in deleting the addition of Rs. 6,49,726 made on account of interest on deposits amount to Rs. 1.70 crores made by the assessee-trust with Norma Detergent Pvt. Ltd., and on behalf of the beneficiaries? - (5) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing the deduction under section 80-I of the Act - we find that there is no merit in the appeal, and the appeal stands dismissed.
-
1999 (12) TMI 4
Business Expenditure, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction, Computation Of Capital, Actual Cost, Subsidy From Government - "(i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the contribution paid as per the provisions of section 69 of the Gujarat Rajya Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, is not deductible in the computation of the total income? - (ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that depreciation was not admissible on 30 percent value of the plant and machinery received from Indian Dairy Corporation? - (iii) Whether, on the facts, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that 30 percent of value of the plant and machinery received from Indian Dairy Corporation was not to be included in the computation of the capital employed for the purpose of granting relief under section 80J?"
-
1999 (12) TMI 3
It is contended that Sikkim was not a part of India and at that time the Income-tax Act was not applicable in respect of the assessment year for which notice was served at New Delhi - held that notice section 148 of the Act issued in relation to income which is stated to have arisen in India was valid even if petitioner company had its head office at Sikkim
-
1999 (12) TMI 2
Business of manufacture of yarn - claim for higher rate of initial depreciation on the machinery employed in the manufacture on the ground that its manufacturing product, viz., "yarn" falls under item No. 21 of the Ninth Schedule to the Income-tax Act - Tribunal is justified in law in holding that the manufacture of yarn would amount to manufacture of textile within the meaning of Entry 21 of the Ninth Schedule and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to higher rate of initial depreciation
....
|
9911796707
