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2003 (10) TMI 641
Whether the post of Part-Time Lecturer is not contemplated as a cadre post under the Rules?
Whether the appellants being not in the regular employment, the principles of service jurisprudence cannot be extended to an advocate who is acting as a Part-Time Lecturer?
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2003 (10) TMI 640
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the High Court's acquittal of the accused.
2. Reliability of prosecution witnesses and evidence.
3. Impact of non-examination of the Investigating Officer.
4. Applicability of Section 302 IPC versus Section 304 Part II IPC.
5. Role of appellate courts in reversing lower court judgments.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the High Court's Acquittal of the Accused:
The Supreme Court questioned the legality of the High Court's judgment that acquitted nine respondents. The High Court's conclusions were found to be based on irrelevant grounds and a perfunctory consideration of evidence. The Supreme Court emphasized that appellate courts must prevent miscarriage of justice by intervening when necessary. The High Court's judgment was criticized for being practically non-reasoned and for failing to provide sound footing for its conclusions.
2. Reliability of Prosecution Witnesses and Evidence:
The High Court doubted the reliability of prosecution witnesses because their names were not mentioned in the FIR and some were accused in a counter case. The Supreme Court clarified that not mentioning witnesses in the FIR does not automatically discredit their testimony. The Court cited precedents to support this view, emphasizing that credible and trustworthy evidence should not be disregarded merely because the witnesses were accused in a counter case.
3. Impact of Non-Examination of the Investigating Officer:
The High Court found that the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, who died during the trial, caused prejudice to the accused. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that non-examination does not always affect the credibility of the prosecution's case. The Court referenced several cases where it was held that non-examination does not vitiate the trial if the remaining evidence is credible and trustworthy.
4. Applicability of Section 302 IPC versus Section 304 Part II IPC:
The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence and found that the only shot fired by Bundeo Jha (A-1) from a considerable distance did not warrant a conviction under Section 302 IPC. Instead, the Court held that Section 304 Part II IPC was applicable, which deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Court also convicted other accused under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC, considering their roles in the incident.
5. Role of Appellate Courts in Reversing Lower Court Judgments:
The Supreme Court highlighted that appellate courts must provide reasoned judgments, especially when reversing lower court decisions. The Court criticized the High Court for not giving adequate reasons for its conclusions and emphasized that reason is the "heartbeat of every conclusion." The Supreme Court decided to analyze the evidence itself due to the long passage of time and provided a detailed judgment.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent indicated, confirming the acquittal of some accused while convicting others under Section 304 Part II IPC and related sections. The Court ordered the respondents on bail to surrender to custody to serve the remainder of their sentences. The judgment emphasized the importance of reasoned conclusions by appellate courts, particularly in cases of reversal.
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2003 (10) TMI 639
Whether a person who has been in possession of the temple as an hereditary trustee can claim title to one of the items of the property belonging to the temple as his own?
Whether the certificate issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments is conclusive as the question of title to the immovable properties belonging to the temple?
Whether the right of a temple can be negatived on the mere strength of the assessment register standing in the name of the plaintiff/Respondent or any other person?
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2003 (10) TMI 638
Whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise corned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the set of such party?
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2003 (10) TMI 637
Legal judgment: Supreme Court dismissed the Civil Appeal in 2003 (10) TMI 637 - SC. Justices S.N. Variava and H.K. Sema found no reason to interfere.
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2003 (10) TMI 636
Whether dispute regarding sharing of standby charges for providing 275 MVA standby facility to BSES by TPC is not an issue of tariff, but is a dispute relating to sharing or apportionment of the charges being paid by TPC to MSEB for providing the former with a standby facility of 550 MVA and, therefore, it does not come within the purview of the Commission under Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act?
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2003 (10) TMI 635
Issues Involved:
1. Legislative competence of the State to levy fees on industrial alcohol.
2. Nature of the fee under Rule 3(a) of the U.P. Licences for the Possession of Denatured Spirit and Specially Denatured Spirit Rules, 1976.
3. Correlation between the fee charged and the administrative expenses incurred by the State.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legislative Competence of the State to Levy Fees on Industrial Alcohol:
The primary issue was whether the State of Uttar Pradesh had the legislative competence to levy a fee on industrial alcohol, specifically denatured spirit, under Rule 3(a) of the 1976 Rules. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle established in the Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. case, stating that the State cannot levy taxes on industrial alcohol as it falls under the exclusive domain of the Parliament. The Court clarified that the State could regulate non-potable alcohol to prevent its misuse as potable alcohol, but this regulatory power does not extend to imposing taxes on industrial alcohol.
2. Nature of the Fee under Rule 3(a):
The Court examined whether the fee imposed under Rule 3(a) was a legitimate regulatory fee or a tax in disguise. The respondents argued that once industrial alcohol is denatured, it is permanently unfit for human consumption, and they were already paying a fee under Rule 2 for the denaturation process. The Court found that the State had not provided any evidence of additional services or regulatory measures that justified the fee under Rule 3(a). The Court held that the fee lacked the necessary correlation to any additional regulatory expenses and was essentially a tax imposed under the guise of a regulatory fee.
3. Correlation Between the Fee Charged and Administrative Expenses:
The Court emphasized the need for a reasonable relationship between the fee charged and the services rendered by the State. It was noted that the respondents were already paying a fee under Rule 2 for denaturation, which had been justified in a previous case (Vam Organics-I) as necessary to meet regulatory costs. The Court found no evidence of additional regulatory measures or expenses that would justify the fee under Rule 3(a). The State's failure to demonstrate any additional costs for further regulation of denatured spirit led the Court to conclude that the fee was not a genuine regulatory fee but a tax.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the fee under Rule 3(a) was invalid as it was essentially a tax in the guise of a regulatory fee. The Court directed the discharge of the bank guarantees furnished by the respondents, as the levy itself was held to be invalid. The decision reinforced the principle that the State cannot impose taxes on industrial alcohol and must demonstrate a clear correlation between any regulatory fee and the administrative expenses incurred.
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2003 (10) TMI 634
Whether the objection as regard the age of the respondent was made in writing before the returning officer but the same was rejected without giving an opportunity of hearing to him, purported to be on the ground that such objection had been filed in relation to one Rakesh Kumar alias Samrat Choudhary while the nomination paper had been filed by Rakesh Ku.?
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2003 (10) TMI 633
The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment on 15-10-2003, dismissed the Review Petition (C) No. 1266 of 2003 filed by Beekay Engineering & Casting Ltd. against CEGAT Order No. 164/2002. The Court found no merit in the review petition and passed the order to dismiss it.
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2003 (10) TMI 632
Whether the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Code apply to delay in instituting the prosecution or to delay in taking cognizance?
Held that:- If this interpretation of Chapter XXXVI of the Code is to be applied to the facts of the case then we notice that the offence was detected on 5.3.1999 and the complaint was filed before the court on 3.3.2000 which was well within the period of limitation, therefore, the fact that the court took cognizance of the offence only on 25.3.1999 about 25 days after it was filed, would not make the complaint barred by limitation.
Thus it is not necessary to go to the next question argued on behalf of the appellants that the court below was in error in invoking Section 473 of the Code for extending the period of limitation. Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 631
Issues:
1. Validity of the order rejecting the review application under section 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948.
2. Interpretation of the exemption application rejection grounds.
3. Binding nature of circulars issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax.
4. Compliance with partnership deed for loan procurement.
5. Object of section 4A for encouraging new industries.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a partnership firm, challenged the validity of the order dated June 5, 1992, which rejected their review application under section 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. The petitioner established a new unit for manufacturing polythene bags following a Government order dated September 30, 1992.
2. The rejection of the exemption application was based on two grounds: non-registration as a small-scale industry on the specified date and loan disbursement to a partner instead of the firm. The petitioner argued that the rejection was contrary to a circular dated March 10, 1987, emphasizing that differences in dates should not lead to denial of exemption.
3. The circular issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax was deemed binding on authorities, as established in previous court decisions. The court referenced cases where such circulars were held to be legally enforceable, emphasizing the importance of following directives from higher authorities.
4. The partnership deed authorized a partner to procure loans on behalf of the firm, as evidenced by documents submitted. The court highlighted the compliance with the partnership agreement regarding loan procurement, further supporting the petitioner's position.
5. The court emphasized the objective of section 4A, which aims to encourage the establishment of new industries. Relying on a Supreme Court decision, the court stressed that interpretations should align with the legislative intent to promote industrial growth. Consequently, the order rejecting the review application was set aside, and the Divisional Level Committee was directed to grant the eligibility certificate to the petitioner promptly. Additionally, tax realization for specific assessment years was stayed until the issuance of the eligibility certificate.
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2003 (10) TMI 630
Issues:
Penalty under section 15-A(1)(o) for alleged tax evasion based on ownership of imported crane and form 31 submission.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Ownership of Crane and Form 31 Submission:
The case involved a dispute regarding the ownership of a crane imported by the applicant against form 31 issued by M/s. Tata Chemical Ltd. The check-post officer seized the crane, alleging that the applicant, being the owner of the vehicle as per the hire contract, should have had form 31 in their name. The Tribunal upheld the penalty under section 15-A(1)(o), leading to the revision before the High Court.
2. Legal Precedents and Interpretation:
The applicant relied on various legal precedents, including the division Bench decision in Aster Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U. P., and judgments in cases like Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. The court analyzed these precedents to establish that the submission of form 31 by the hirer, M/s. Tata Chemical Ltd., did not amount to tax evasion, as the purpose of the form was to notify authorities of the import, not determine ownership.
3. Purpose of Form 31 and Tax Evasion Allegations:
The court emphasized that the purpose of form 31 was to inform tax authorities about the import of goods, ensuring accountability, and preventing tax evasion. It noted that all necessary documents were submitted at the check-post, and the goods were traceable to the parties involved. The court highlighted that penalty under section 15-A(1)(o) could only be imposed in cases of attempted tax evasion.
4. Decision and Legal Rationale:
After thorough analysis, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, quashing the penalty levied under section 15-A(1)(o). The court concluded that the crane's import against form 31 of the hirer did not violate section 28-A, and no attempt to evade tax was evident. By citing legal principles and precedents, the court established that the submission of form 31 by the hirer was in compliance with the law, and the penalty order was unsustainable.
In conclusion, the High Court's judgment clarified the legal interpretation regarding form 31 submission for imported goods, emphasizing accountability and preventing tax evasion. The decision provided a detailed analysis of ownership, form submission, and tax evasion allegations, ultimately setting aside the penalty order based on the lack of evidence of tax evasion in the case.
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2003 (10) TMI 629
Issues:
1. Whether the amount of freight deducted in bills should be considered part of the turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in accepting the books of account for the assessment year 1987-88 despite incriminating evidence revealing suppressed sales.
Issue 1 Analysis:
The revisions were against the Tribunal's order related to assessment years under the Central Sales Tax Act and U.P. Sales Tax Act. The main dispute was whether the amount of freight deducted from bills should be part of the taxable turnover. The assessing authority included the freight amount in turnover, but the Tribunal ruled otherwise. The Tribunal found that the seller's responsibility ended upon handing over goods to carriers, and the freight was to be paid by the purchaser. As the freight was not paid by customers, it was concluded that it should not be part of the turnover. The Tribunal cited relevant legal precedents to support its decision. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that there was no error in the Tribunal's view.
Issue 2 Analysis:
Regarding the books of account for the assessment year 1987-88, the assessing authority had rejected them, leading to enhanced turnover. However, the first appellate authority accepted the books, which was upheld by the Tribunal. The Commissioner of Sales Tax appealed against this decision. The Tribunal found that adverse inference drawn from a specific chalan was erroneous, as the necessary entries were made in the books of account. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings, stating that they were factual and required no interference. Consequently, all revisions were dismissed.
In conclusion, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision regarding both issues, ruling that the amount of freight deducted in bills should not be considered part of the turnover and that the Tribunal was justified in accepting the books of account despite the presence of incriminating evidence.
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2003 (10) TMI 628
Issues:
1. Transit pass issuance and tax liability for goods passing through the State en route to another State.
2. Authority of checkpost officials to detain goods and impose tax based on suspicion without proper compliance with legal provisions.
Analysis:
Issue 1: The petitions raised the question of transit pass issuance and tax liability for goods passing through the State en route to another State. The petitioners, engaged in the business of selling chicken and fish, faced difficulties when checkpost authorities failed to issue transit passes as required under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The petitioners argued that unless goods are sold within the State, there is no liability to pay sales tax. Section 30B of the Act mandates obtaining a transit pass for goods passing through the State, and failure to do so may lead to a presumption of tax liability. The judgment emphasized that tax liability only arises when goods are sold or presumed to have been sold within the State. The court declared that the refusal to issue transit passes and impose tax based on mere suspicion, as seen in the case, was unwarranted and illegal.
Issue 2: The second issue involved the authority of checkpost officials to detain goods and impose tax based on suspicion without proper compliance with legal provisions. The judgment highlighted that the authorities cannot impose tax solely on suspicion without valid grounds. The court emphasized that the petitioner's grievances were genuine, as the transit passes were not issued at the first check-post, leading to the imposition of tax based on suspicion. The judgment directed the respondents to give necessary instructions to comply with the legal provisions regarding transit pass issuance and tax liability for goods passing through the State en route to another State.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring that they were entitled to transit passes as per the legal provisions and that imposing tax based on suspicion without compliance with the law was unjustified. The judgment directed the authorities to issue transit passes promptly and consider refunding the amount already paid by the petitioners.
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2003 (10) TMI 627
Issues:
Challenge to recovery proceedings initiated by the respondent-State involving arrears of tax and property attachment.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a company facing heavy losses, challenged recovery proceedings by the respondent-State, including actions by Karnataka State Finance Corporation and Debt Recovery Tribunal. The petitioner admitted liability for tax arrears and pending proceedings before a Magistrate and Tahsildar. The petitioner's counsel argued against parallel proceedings and attachment of the managing director's property.
The court examined the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979, specifically section 8(4)(a), which allows tax recovery through various modes without prohibition on multiple proceedings. The court noted three recovery modes: land revenue proceedings, attachment and sale, and criminal court actions. Referring to a previous judgment, the court clarified that authorities can pursue different recovery methods sequentially until the full amount is collected, without prejudicing the assessee.
Citing a relevant case, the court rejected the petitioner's claim of harassment against the managing director's family members, noting the lack of factual basis for the argument. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitions, upholding the recovery proceedings initiated by the respondent-State.
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2003 (10) TMI 626
Whether the employer should be denied the salary for the period he was kept under suspension preceding the removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement?
Whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date or his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement?
Held that:- The appellate authority directed reinstatement of the respondent and held that he was not entitled to get back wages for the period he was out of service. It may be noticed that the respondent was removed from service without any enquiry and he was not even given show causes notice prior to his dismissal from service. There was fault on the part of the employer in not following the principle of natural justice. These relevant facts were considered and the learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench ordered the payment of back wages. We do not think this is a fit case where the Fundamental Rule 54 could have been invoked by the authorities. We find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 625
Revision u/s 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 - Claim for exemption on the basis of form III-B -Genuineness of forms - Proper procedure for reassessment and enquiry u/s 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 - HELD THAT:- In the present case the assessing authority did not probe deep into the matter and has acted merely on the information that the forms in question were not issued by the sales tax department to the two purchasing dealers referred to above. What was further required to establish was that the present dealer acted in a manner lacking bona fides or that he was in collusion with the purchaser and knowingly accepted fictitious forms. A dealer acting bona fide may be cheated by a purchasing dealer by issue of forms that were not genuine for one reason or the other but merely because some one had cheated the selling dealer, the later cannot be subjected to liability for sales tax without showing that he acted in a manner that lacks the care and caution of a reasonable man.
Nothing of this sort has been shown in the conduct of the revisionist. Learned Standing Counsel laid stress on an averment made by the assessing officer in the assessment order for assessment year 1981-82 that Sri Arun Kumar the owner of the business in the name of the revisionist had stated that he had been doing business with this party for the past several years and the forms were genuine and that he accepted the responsibility for any defect in the disputed form III-Kha.
After the initiation of action u/s 21 no statement of Arun Kumar seems to have been recorded to extract from him any information which may indicate that while entering into the transactions of sale in question and accepting forms III-B, he knew that the said firm do not exist and the forms are forged and fictitious. No information has been gathered about the manner in which the transactions were executed. The payment for the sales were made and the goods were transported. Therefore, from the mere information that the forms in question were not issued by the sales tax department to the two parties referred to above without indicating to whom they were actually issued, the present revisionist cannot be assumed to have any guilty intention to avoid payment of tax by accepting the disputed forms.
In my view therefore, the Tribunal's finding that the dealer was wrongly allowed exemption in the original assessment or that the transactions of sales purporting to have been made to the two parties against form III-B were liable to tax is legally erroneous. The sales in question were granted exemption in the original assessment and no good reason had been made out to withdraw that exemption and bring to tax the sales in question.
In the result, revision is allowed and the order of Tribunal dated November 3, 1990 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to pass appropriate order in the light of observations made above.
Petition allowed.
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2003 (10) TMI 624
Issues Involved:
1. Eligibility of petitioners for sales tax concession under G.O. Ms. No. 108 dated May 20, 1996.
2. Definition and interpretation of "manufacturing activity" in the context of packaged drinking water.
3. Compliance of respondents with court directives in previous litigation rounds.
4. Applicability of the Kerala High Court's decision in Teejan Beverages Ltd. v. State of Kerala [2002] 128 STC 216.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Eligibility of petitioners for sales tax concession under G.O. Ms. No. 108 dated May 20, 1996:
The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O. Ms. No. 108 dated May 20, 1996, offering incentives for industries established in certain areas. These included investment subsidies and sales tax deferment or exemption. The petitioners, having established small-scale industries for mineral water production, claimed these benefits. Initially, the benefits were extended, but later, the commercial tax department withdrew the sales tax exemption, leading to the current litigation.
2. Definition and interpretation of "manufacturing activity" in the context of packaged drinking water:
The core issue was whether the process of making packaged drinking water qualifies as a "manufacturing activity," which was not defined in G.O. Ms. No. 108. The petitioners argued that the process and the significant investment involved should qualify as manufacturing. The respondents, however, denied this, citing a decision from the Kerala High Court, which held that making packaged drinking water does not constitute manufacturing.
3. Compliance of respondents with court directives in previous litigation rounds:
The court observed that in two prior rounds of litigation, it had directed the respondents to determine whether the process undertaken by the petitioners was a manufacturing activity. Despite these directives, the respondents failed to comply, reiterating their initial stance without proper examination or providing the petitioners an opportunity to present their case.
4. Applicability of the Kerala High Court's decision in Teejan Beverages Ltd. v. State of Kerala [2002] 128 STC 216:
The respondents based their denial of sales tax exemption on the Kerala High Court's decision, which held that making packaged drinking water is not a manufacturing activity. However, the court noted that the Kerala case involved a specific definition of "manufacture" in the notification, which was absent in the current case. Therefore, the Kerala High Court's decision was not applicable.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the petitioners are entitled to the sales tax exemptions under G.O. Ms. No. 108 dated May 20, 1996. It noted the distinction in the sales tax schedules between ordinary water and packaged drinking water, taxed at different rates. The court found that the respondents unjustifiably denied the concessions and failed to follow court directives in previous litigation rounds. Consequently, the writ petitions were allowed, granting the petitioners the claimed tax exemptions.
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2003 (10) TMI 623
Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of tax exemption under G.O. Ms. No. 377 for roller flour mills.
2. Interpretation of G.O. Ms. No. 377 in the context of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
3. Historical background and representation leading to the issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 377.
4. Misrepresentation and fraud in obtaining G.O. Ms. No. 377.
5. Applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legitimacy of Tax Exemption Under G.O. Ms. No. 377:
The appellant, M/s. Kalyani Roller Flour Mills (P) Limited, was assessed on gross and net turnover for the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93. The Commercial Tax Officer levied tax on the first sale of wheat and wheat products and the sale of atta by the assessee. The appellant contested the tax imposition, arguing that G.O. Ms. No. 377 granted them an exemption from sales tax. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, however, withdrew the exemption, stating that the exemption was only applicable to roller flour mills undertaking the grinding process, which the appellant did not.
2. Interpretation of G.O. Ms. No. 377:
The appellant argued that the exemption should apply generally to all roller flour mills, regardless of whether they undertook the grinding process. The Commissioner, however, interpreted G.O. Ms. No. 377 as only applying to mills that engaged in the grinding of wheat, based on the historical context and the representation made by the millers' association. The court examined the language of the G.O. and concluded that the exemption was intended for mills involved in the grinding process, as supported by the historical background and the specific wording in the representation to the government.
3. Historical Background and Representation Leading to Issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 377:
The A.P. Roller Flour Mills Association had requested an exemption from sales tax on wheat products to restore parity with neighboring states. The court noted that the representation specifically sought the removal of sales tax on wheat obtained by roller flour mills for grinding, indicating that the exemption was intended for mills engaged in the grinding process. This historical context was crucial in interpreting the scope of G.O. Ms. No. 377.
4. Misrepresentation and Fraud in Obtaining G.O. Ms. No. 377:
The court found that the exemption under G.O. Ms. No. 377 was obtained through misrepresentation by the roller flour mills association, as they falsely claimed that neighboring states did not levy sales tax on wheat and wheat products. This misrepresentation led to the issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 561, which withdrew the earlier exemption. The court cited the division bench's observation in Roxy Roller's case that the exemption was based on fraudulent claims and thus could not be sustained.
5. Applicability of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel:
The appellants argued that the withdrawal of the exemption amounted to a breach of promissory estoppel, as they had relied on the exemption to their detriment. However, the court held that since the exemption was obtained through misrepresentation, the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply. The government was justified in withdrawing the exemption, as it was based on fraudulent claims.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals, finding no justification for extending the tax exemption under G.O. Ms. No. 377 to the appellants, who did not engage in the grinding process. The court emphasized that the exemption was intended only for roller flour mills involved in grinding, as evidenced by the historical background and specific representations made to the government. The court also upheld the government's decision to withdraw the exemption due to misrepresentation, rejecting the appellants' claim of promissory estoppel. Appeals dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 622
Issues Involved:
1. Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
2. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation
3. Principles of Natural Justice
4. Want of Enabling Provision in the Statute to Withdraw the Exemption Granted
5. Implicit Waiver of Right to Rescind the Beneficial Exemption Before the Lapse of Fixed Period
Detailed Analysis:
1. Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel:
The petitioners argued that the withdrawal of the exemption granted by the Government Order (G.O.) violated the doctrine of promissory estoppel. They contended that they had started or expanded their industries based on the promise of a five-year exemption from sales tax. However, the court found that the petitioners did not establish the necessary ingredients for promissory estoppel, such as a clear promise made to them individually. The court also noted that the exemption was obtained through misrepresentation by the Roller Flour Mills Association. Furthermore, the court held that the impugned G.O. was a legislative act, and as per established legal precedents, the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply to legislative actions.
2. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation:
The petitioners claimed that the withdrawal of the exemption without notice violated their legitimate expectation. The court, however, noted that the withdrawal was in public interest to augment the state's financial resources due to the prohibition of arrack. The court cited several rulings, including Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ramkumar and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., to emphasize that legitimate expectation cannot override public interest. The court concluded that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was not applicable in this case.
3. Principles of Natural Justice:
The petitioners argued that the impugned G.O. was issued without notice or an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice. The court held that in matters involving legislative functions, such as the issuance of the impugned G.O., the principles of natural justice do not require individual notice or hearing.
4. Want of Enabling Provision in the Statute to Withdraw the Exemption Granted:
The petitioners contended that there was no statutory provision empowering the government to withdraw the exemption. The court referred to Section 9 of the General Sales Tax Act and Section 15 of the General Clauses Act, which together provide the power to grant and rescind exemptions. The court cited several precedents, including A. Subramania Iyer v. Travancore-Cochin State and K. Parthasarathy Mudaliar v. State of Madras, confirming that the power to grant exemption includes the power to rescind it.
5. Implicit Waiver of Right to Rescind the Beneficial Exemption Before the Lapse of Fixed Period:
The petitioners argued that specifying a five-year period in the rescinded G.O. implied a waiver of the right to withdraw the exemption before the period's lapse. The court found no foundation for this contention in the pleadings and noted that waiver must be properly pleaded and proved, as established in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The court also emphasized that the withdrawal was in public interest.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petitions, finding no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners. The impugned G.O. was upheld as a valid exercise of legislative power, and the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation were deemed inapplicable. The court also confirmed the government's authority to rescind exemptions and rejected the arguments related to natural justice and implicit waiver.
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