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Showing 61 to 80 of 90 Records
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1973 (2) TMI 30
Land Acquisition - state appeals against the compensation for land acquired determined by subordinate judge - whether the Income-tax authorities should wait for disposal of appeal before assessing the capital gains - "Whether assessment of the sum as capital gains chargeable to tax under section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is valid in law? - in cases where section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, applied, the assessee can seek a rectification of the order of the Tribunal if the income determined by the subordinate judge or the Land Acquisition Officer as the case may be and taken by the taxing authority to be the true income is varied after the order of the Tribunal by an appellate authority. In this case, the appeal to the High Court did not succeed and the quantum fixed by the subordinate judge has been upheld and no such difficulty as envisaged by the assessee actually arose - We see no error in the order of the Tribunal
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1973 (2) TMI 29
Issues: - Failure to pay advance tax and imposition of penalty under section 221 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. - Interpretation of whether advance tax constitutes "tax" for penalty purposes.
Analysis: The judgment by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dealt with the issue of failure to pay advance tax and the subsequent imposition of a penalty under section 221 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee was issued a notice of demand for advance tax under section 156 of the Act, which was not paid, leading to the imposition of a penalty. The assessee failed to pay the first instalment of advance tax and did not provide any explanation for the non-payment, resulting in the imposition of a penalty of 10% of the amount in default. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the penalty. The key question referred to the High Court was whether the penalty was properly levied for the default in advance tax payment.
The primary argument raised was whether advance tax should be considered "tax" for the purpose of penalty under section 221. The Tribunal relied on previous judgments from the Mysore and Allahabad High Courts, which held that penalty could be imposed for default in advance tax payment. The High Court agreed with these interpretations, emphasizing that advance tax is essentially income tax paid in advance before regular assessment. Therefore, failure to pay advance tax can lead to penalty under section 221.
Furthermore, the High Court analyzed the language of sections 220 and 221 of the Act. Section 220 pertains to the payment of amounts other than advance tax, while section 221 deals with penalties for default in tax payment. The court concluded that the failure to pay amounts specified in section 220 would invite penalty proceedings under section 221. Additionally, the court highlighted that Form No. 28, a statutory notice for advance tax payment, explicitly stated the consequences of default, reinforcing the applicability of section 221 to advance tax defaulters.
In conclusion, the High Court affirmed that penalty under section 221 can be imposed for default in advance tax payment. The court emphasized that the legislative intent, supported by statutory forms and previous judgments, clearly indicated that advance tax defaulters are liable to penalties under section 221. The judgment was delivered in favor of the revenue, upholding the imposition of the penalty due to the assessee's default in paying advance tax.
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1973 (2) TMI 28
Sales tax department enhanced turnover for sales tax assessment. The enhanced sales were not included in income-tax returns - whether there is deliberate concealment by the assessee attracting levy of penalty - whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, penalty under section 28(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, has been Tightly levied - If the above question is answered against the assessee whether the quantum of penalty levied is justifiable
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1973 (2) TMI 27
Petitioner in this application challenges three orders of penalty passed under section 73(5) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, read with section 46(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 - When a certificate was issued for collection under Public Demands Recovery Act and the certificate officer allowed payment to be made in installments, whether penalty can be levied by Assistant Controller for non-payment of installments as allowed by him
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1973 (2) TMI 26
Taxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964 - This appeal has been preferred by an auction purchaser against the judgment of the learned single judge allowing the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of the sale of his properties held in recovery of certain dues under the Income-tax Act - Whether the sale proceedings are valid under s. 3(b)(iii) of Taxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964
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1973 (2) TMI 25
Seizure and confiscation of smuggled goods - Whether record of criminal court proceeding could be relied on in assessment proceedings and whether Evidence Act could be applied to assessment proceedings - if the proceeding section was enacted subsequent to the assessment year, whether it is applicable to the assessment proceedings i.e. the finding that assessee was in possession of gold during the seizure and was therefore the owner of it was justified - Whether smuggled goods confiscated by the Customs authorities can be claimed as business loss and provisions of set off are available
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1973 (2) TMI 24
Assessee in this case are the trustees to the estate of late Tarun Kumar Roy - Portion of the income was payable to one beneficiary and the balance was payable to more than one beneficiary - whether the shares can said to be indeterminate - whether maximum marginal rate will have to be applied - Whether on a correct construction of the trust deed the Tribunal was right in holding that the maximum rate of tax could not be applied in this case under the 1st proviso to section 41(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1973 (2) TMI 23
Estate Duty Act, 1953 - " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the value of the properties settled under the deed of settlement dated 6th October, 1941, was exempt from assessment under section 22 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ? " - The beneficial interest alone to which the deceased was entitled during his lifetime will be property under Estate Duty Act - Such a beneficial interest having ceased on the death of the deceased and a benefit having arisen by cessor of such interest - It could be brought to tax under section 5 read with section 7(1) of the Estate Duty Act - Value of the entire property cannot be liable to estate duty.
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1973 (2) TMI 22
This is a petition under article 226 of the Constitution and is directed against a seizure of currency notes of the value of Rs. 2,02,500 by the Income-tax Officer, B-Ward, Chhindwara, under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. - Petition dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 21
Issues: 1. Interpretation of whether profit on the sale of shade trees is assessable as capital gains under section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The judgment delivered by the High Court of Kerala revolved around the interpretation of whether the profit from the sale of shade trees should be considered as capital gains under section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The case involved the sale of old shade trees during the accounting period relating to the year of assessment 1964-65, where the Income-tax Officer assessed the profits and gains from the sale under section 45 of the Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner initially ruled that the profits constitute agricultural income and should not be taxed. However, the Tribunal accepted the revenue's contention that the trees were "property of any kind" and not "agricultural land in India," leading to the profits being taxable under section 45.
The primary issue addressed by the court was whether the trees in question could be classified as "capital assets" as defined in section 2(14) of the Act. The court analyzed the definition of "capital assets" and deliberated on whether the trees should be excluded as "agricultural land in India." The court emphasized that the principle of "what is attached to the land belongs to the land" was not applicable in India, citing relevant legal precedents to establish that trees are property but not necessarily agricultural land. Consequently, the court concluded that the trees were not "agricultural land in India" and, therefore, constituted a capital asset, making the profits taxable under section 45.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the profits from the transfer of trees could be considered as agricultural income and thus excluded from the definition of "capital asset." The court referred to a Supreme Court decision to establish that such profits are capital receipts arising from the transfer of a capital asset, not agricultural income. The court rejected the argument that profits from the transfer of "agricultural capital assets" should be treated as agricultural income, emphasizing that the definition of agricultural income in the Act does not encompass such profits. The court also discussed the constitutional provisions and statutory definitions related to agricultural income to support its conclusion that the profits in question did not qualify as agricultural income.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of the department and against the assessee, affirming that the profits from the sale of shade trees were assessable as capital gains under section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the legal principles and interpretations surrounding the classification of assets and income for tax purposes, setting a precedent for similar cases in the future.
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1973 (2) TMI 20
This is an application under article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to cancel or to rescind the said notice issued under section 148 - When the Tribunal observes that the amounts in question must have been earned in an earlier year whether it is a finding or direction within the meaning of section151 and whether it saves limitation for reassessment of an earlier year - observation that the said sum of Rs. 25,000 was earned by the assessee in earlier year or years, that is to say, in years prior to the assessment year 1959-60, cannot be the finding or direction within the meaning of the expressions used in sub-section (1) to section 150 of the Act of 1961 and section 150 would not be attracted for the purpose of giving effect to the aforesaid directions and observations - this application must succeed.
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1973 (2) TMI 19
Whether the provision for treating the registered firm as unregistered one for the purpose of levying interest for belated returns would be in violation of article 14 of the Constitution -Whether advance tax paid can be reduced for the purpose of levying interest from the tax payable - the application is partly allowed. While the order of the Income-tax Officer charging interest holds good, he is directed to determine the actual interest payable by the assessee by making appropriate allowance of the advance tax paid by the assessee
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1973 (2) TMI 18
Gratuity paid to employees in the absence of gratuity scheme - Whether the amount paid was not related to the salary or the length of service would be allowable if the decision to pay gratuity was taken after the employees left the services – held that amounts were not deductible as business expenditure
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1973 (2) TMI 17
Trust - A trust filed an appeal before the Tribunal. For the subsequent years, it filed revision petition before the commissioner after the Tribunal's decision - Whether the trust can file an application for amending the revision petition - It cannot hence be said that the assessee was guilty of raising a fresh point for the first time in the revision petitions without raising them at the appellate stage when the matter was decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Similar was the situation when the revision applications were filed. In our opinion, in the context of the facts and the circumstances of the case, the amendment application ought to have been allowed and the point raised therein ought to have been considered on merits - writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders of the Commissioner disposing of the revision petitions are quashed. The matter is sent back to the Commissioner for the disposal of the revision petitions in accordance with law
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1973 (2) TMI 16
This petition has been filed by an assessee to quash an orderof the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala, in so far as he has included a sum of Rs. 13,607 in the total income of the assessee under the head capital gains while giving substantial reduction to him under other heads - When the Commissioner allows assessee's claims and also rectifies omission in assessment, whether the order is valid when the final order was not prejudicial to the assessee - Dealing with section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which contains the same provision as section 264(1) of the present Act, the Privy Council stated that an order under section 33 of the Act can be said to be prejudicial to the assessee, only when he is, as a result of it, in a different or worse position than that in which he was placed by the order. The contention raised by the petitioner cannot, therefore, succeed. This original petition is accordingly dismissed
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1973 (2) TMI 15
Petitioner belongs to the Garo community, which is a Scheduled Tribe as defined in clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution, and is a permanent inhabitant of the Garo Hills District, which is an area specified in Part A of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution - Whether the provision granting exemption for the income of a member of Scheduled Tribe accruing in certain areas and no exemption being given to income from other areas would be discriminatory and contravenes article 14 of the Constitution - challenge to the validity of section 10(26) cannot survive - Application dismissed
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1973 (2) TMI 14
The assessee is a firm registered under the Act. For the assessment year 1962-63 it did not file a return of its income as required by section 139(1) of the Act - assessee estimated the income below the taxable minimum but the assessed income was in excess of the taxable minimum - whether penalty can be levied for failure to file the returns
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1973 (2) TMI 13
Issues Involved: 1. Genuineness of the partnership deed. 2. Validity of the application for registration under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. 3. Requirement of signatures by all partners on the partnership deed and application for registration. 4. Compliance with procedural rules for registration.
Issue-wise Analysis:
1. Genuineness of the Partnership Deed: The primary issue was whether the partnership deed was genuine, given that Shri Rabinder Kumar's signatures were allegedly forged. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) conducted an elaborate inquiry and concluded that the signatures were not genuine. Consequently, the ITO refused the registration of the firm for the assessment year 1960-61. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld this finding, stating that forged signatures on the partnership deed invalidated the document, rendering the firm non-genuine.
2. Validity of the Application for Registration: The second issue was whether the application for registration under section 26A, which also allegedly contained forged signatures of Shri Rabinder Kumar, was valid. The assessee argued that even if the signatures were forged, the subsequent application signed in the presence of the ITO should be considered valid. The AAC dismissed this contention, stating that the genuineness of the firm itself was in question, making the application for registration irrelevant. The ITAT agreed, concluding that a forged document cannot constitute a genuine partnership, thus invalidating the application for registration.
3. Requirement of Signatures by All Partners: The legal contention revolved around whether it was mandatory for all partners to sign the partnership deed and the registration application. The assessee argued that a genuine partnership could exist even if not all partners signed the deed, provided they consented to the partnership terms. The court examined precedents and concluded that the law did not require all partners to sign the partnership deed for it to be valid. The primary requirement was the existence of a genuine firm as depicted in the instrument of partnership.
4. Compliance with Procedural Rules for Registration: The procedural compliance with rules 2, 3, and 4 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, was scrutinized. The court noted that the ITO's duty was to ensure a genuine firm existed as per the instrument of partnership and that the application was properly made. The court found that the ITO and the ITAT failed to conduct a genuine inquiry into whether a valid partnership existed, focusing instead on the forged signatures. The court emphasized that a partnership could be valid even if the deed was not signed by all partners, provided the firm existed as shown in the partnership instrument.
Conclusion: The court concluded that the ITAT misdirected itself by focusing solely on the forged signatures without verifying the existence of a genuine partnership. The court held that the registration of the firm was not rightly refused, answering the referred question in the negative, in favor of the assessee and against the revenue. The court emphasized that the ITO should have conducted a thorough inquiry to verify the existence of the firm as constituted in the partnership deed, rather than solely relying on the authenticity of the signatures.
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1973 (2) TMI 12
Valuation of shares - methods of valuation - If section 7(2)(a) had been properly applied by the Wealth-tax Officer at the stage of the original assessment, the original assessment order cannot be said to proceed on a wrong basis - Tribunal was right in law in cancelling the reassessments for 1959-60 and 1960-61 made under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act as illegal
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1973 (2) TMI 11
" Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the interest amount of Rs. 16,878 and the ground rent of Rs. 3,793 constituted part of the actual cost of the plot to the assessee for the purpose of determining the capital gain? "
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