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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 118 Records
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1975 (8) TMI 58 - ITAT DELHI-B
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... ... ..... acious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed or failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impost the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bonafide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that there was no concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income in these cases and hence penalty under s. 271(1)(c) is not leviable. Penalties are deleted. 7. The appeals are allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 57 - ITAT DELHI-B
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... ... ..... squo s funds inherited by her. The property constructed with the deceased husband rsquo s funds will bear the same character as the property inherited by a widow. Therefore, by virtue of the provision of s. 2 of the Hindu Widow rsquo s Remarriage Act, 1956, the super structure also vested in Shri Dilshare Singh on the remarriage of Smt. Amrit Kaur by operation of law. In a recent full Bench decision in the case of Bhondu vs. Ram Dayal AIR 60 Madhya Pradesh 51, it has been held that a widow on her remarriage is divested of her husband rsquo s property and it vests in the heirs of her deceased husband. This decision has been referred to in the passage at page 107 of Mulla Hindu Law, 13th Edition relied on by the assessee. For all these reasons, we hold that the property in question belongs to Shri Dilsher Singh and therefore, the income there from has rightly been excluded from the total income of the respondent assessee. 7. In the result of the Revenue s appeals are dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 56 - ITAT DELHI-A
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... ... ..... s wrongly taken the working of yield at 66 per cent which should be 67 per cent. Hence this appeal by the assessee before us. 3. Heard both the learned counsel for the assessee, Shri K.L. Goel and the learned authorised Representative of the Department, Shri G.R. Angihotri. We have seen that in an identical case of Banwari Lal Hari Ram, the same ITO allowed driage at 2.5 per cent for the same asst. yr. 1973-74 and the AAC allowed the driage at 5 per cent vide page 11 of the paper book. If that is so we do not think the addition sustained could be said to be reasonable, more so when it is an admitted fact that the groundnut crushed by the assessee was of inferior quality as compared to the last year. In view of this we do not think there is any justification for maintaining the addition when the difference in the percentage of yield is only 25 per cent as compared to the last year. In the result the addition sustained is deleted and the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 55 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... n expenses treated as entertainment expenses. It appears that the assessee had to incur some expenditure when a representative of the shipping line whose business they are handling visited them. The expenditure was mainly stay in hotels, cost of momentees etc. These were disallowed as entertainment expenditure. The disallowance was upheld by the AAC. The counsel for the assessee submitted that these are business expenditure. We agree that these are business expenses and would have been allowable under s. 37 but for the provisions of s. 37(2). This section is a non-obstante clause and business expenses which are in the nature of entertainment expenses cannot be allowed as a deduction. The nature of the expenses leaves no doubt in our mind that they are in the nature of entertainment only. The disallowance for both the years is upheld. A similar disallowance is made in respect of crew also for 1974-75. This will also be upheld. 5. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 54 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... ir business activity for financing their trade. Thus where there are materials to show that an assessee became a subscriber of a chitty or several chitties as a normal step for getting finances for his business then any profit arising from the chitty or loss would be assessable or allowable as the case may be while computing the income from business. But in order to do that, the Department has to show a nexus with business. The nexus has not been shown here. The learned Departmental Representative pointed out that the subscriptions had come out of the business funds. That may be so. So do the partner s withdrawals for their personal expenses. Looking on the facts of the case, there is no prima facie nexus. The chitty is of an unusually long period. The assessee had never bid in any of the auctions. He has merely treated it as an investment. On these facts, we think that the assessee s contention is correct and the amount could not be brought to tax. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 53 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... h the statutory provisions what is to be looked into is whether there was any conscious disregard of the obligation. No penalty will be imposed merely because there is a default. The default has to be coupled with some material to show that there was conscious disregard on the part of the assessee. As we noted above, the delay is only for a very short period. Considering the explanation given by the assessee we cannot say that there was any conscious disregard on the part of the assessee so as to call for a levy of penalty. The Departmental Representative drew our attention to the fact that there is no evidence that any application for extention of time was filed. Since the period of default is short enough to preclude out infering any conscious disregard of the obligations it becomes unnecessary for us to adjudicate whether the assessee did really apply for any extension of time. Our decision is not based on the application for extension of time. 4. The appeals are allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 52 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... atuity which will have to be paid at the time of their retirement, resignation, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal. The liability imposed by the Act therefore can generally be said to be a liability incurred from year to year and for every year an employee continues in service he gains the right to claim a certain amount towards gratuity from the employer. In view of the pronouncement, it is not necessary for the purpose of claiming a deduction that the employees should have completed 5 years of service. However, we find that the figure claimed is without any discount being made for the discharge of this liability in the distant future. It is very necessary that a proper discount should be made. For the purpose of making such a discounted valuation which might be an actuarial valuation of the liability, we set the matter aside and remit back to the ITO to enable the assessee to file a revised valuation of the liability figures. 3. The Departmental appeal is partly allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... ated hereinbefore and in the facts of this, the demand should not be executed pending the disposal of the revisional application. I, therefore, direct that the revisional application be disposed of by the respondents as soon as practicable and pending the disposal of the revisional application under Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, there will be a stay in execution of the demand by the respondents. 4. This Rule is, therefore, made absolute to the extent indicated hereinbefore. I, however, make it clear that any observation made in this application will not be taken to be a firm finding of fact and the revisional authorities can decide the question of fact before them and dispose of the revisional application in accordance with law. The revisional authority will decide all the points raised in the revisional application. Liberty is also given to the petitioner to move again if he is aggrieved by the revisional order. 5. There will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (8) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the presumption contained in Section 123 of the Act, corresponding to Section 178A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, or, any other provision of law would place the onus of proving innocent possession of these goods upon the appellant?
Held that:- The very appearance of the goods and the manner in which they were packed indicated that they were newly manufactured and brought into this country very recently from another country. The inscriptions on them and writing on the boxes were part of the state in which the goods in unopened boxes were found from which inferences about their origin and recent import could arise. The appellant's conduct, including his untruthful denial of their possession, indicated consciousness of their smuggled character or mens rea. In any case, there was some evidence to enable the Courts to come to the conclusion that the goods must have been known to the appellant to be smuggled even if he was not a party to a fraudulent evasion of duty. Consequently, the appellant had been convicted only under Section 135(1)(ii) of the Act. We do not find sufficient reason to interfere with this finding of fact or the sentence imposed. It would also follow that the goods were rightly confiscated. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 49 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
Customs Appeals - Rejection of for non-deposit of duty or penalty - Ambit and scope ... ... ... ... ..... the appeal immediately after rejecting the prayer made under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962. The impugned orders of the Appellate Authority and of the Revisional Authority are therefore quashed. 12. The appellant-petitioner is allowed one month s time from today to deposit the penalty levied with the proper officer and if the deposit is made within the stipulated time, then the Appellate Authority shall restore the appeal to its file and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 13. If the penalty levied is not deposited with the proper offices within the time fixed herein, the present petition shall stand dismissed and the Rule shall stand discharged and the impugned orders of the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority also will stand. 14. The petition is allowed conditionally and the Rule is made absolute conditionally on the above terms. We, however, make no order as to costs. 15. Records shall be sent down immediately.
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1975 (8) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Scrap - Dutiability as final product ... ... ... ... ..... The impugned order of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise is quashed by a Writ of Certiorari. The case is remitted back to the Appellate Collector of Central Excise and he is directed to re-hear the matter in the light of the observations made hereinabove within two months from date with notice to the petitioners. The petitioner shall have liberty to place all the relevant materials and evidence in support of their contentions before the Appellate Collector of Central Excise. If it is necessary, the Collector should get these scraps chemically examined in order to find out whether these are broken parts of the confectionery or not. After considering all the materials, he will pass the order in accordance with law. 16. There will be no order as to costs. 17. The petitioner has deposited in pursuance of the Order of this court a sum of Rs. 18,000/- with the Registrar, A.S. of this Court. The petitioner shall be at liberty to withdraw that amount on a proper application.
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1975 (8) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural justice - Right of cross-examination ... ... ... ... ..... ed here-in-before and in the facts of this, the demand should not be executed pending the disposal of the revisional application. I, therefore, direct that the revisional application be disposed of by the respondents as soon as practicable and pending the disposal of the revisional application under Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, there will be a stay in execution of the demand by the respondents. 4. This Rule is, therefore, made absolute to the extent indicated hereinbefore. I, however, make it clear that any observation made in this application will not be taken to be a firm finding of fact and the revisional authorities can decide the question of fact before them and dispose of the revisional application in accordance with law. The revisional authority will decide all the points raised in the revisional application. Liberty is also given to the petitioner to move again if he is aggrieved by the revisional order. 5. There will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (8) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
Appeals and Revisions - Condonation of delay in filing ... ... ... ... ..... said that the authorities have power to condone the dealy. Consequently, Respondent No. 1 also dismissed the revision. It is this order of the 1st Respondent that is challenged in this writ petition. 2. Mr. E.D. Nathan appearing for the petitioner attacks the impugned order on the ground that it is not a speaking order. I regret, I cannot accede to this contention. A perusal of the impugned order would show that the Government of India have considered the points raised by the petitioner in the revision petition and observed that the rejection of the appeal as time-barred under Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act was in order, and the impugned order was correct in law. A perusal of the order in appeal would show that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was time-barred. 3. In these circumstances, there is no substance in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (8) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
If 99 per cent of duty-paid crude' were used for manufacture of sheets etc., should the final product be exigible to tax at ₹ 500/- per MT?
Held that:- By simple arithmetic worked out by the Collector of Central Excise and forwarded to the Central Government (Annexure E), the balance of stock of finished goods manufactured out of duty-paid slabs as on April 25, 1960 was 93.5099 MT. This quantity was actually cleared on payment of duty at the rate of ₹ 500/- per MT. But having been made out of duty-paid slabs the exemption notification applied and only ₹ 200/- per MT was payable. Thus the excess collected i.e. ₹ 300/- per MT was refundable. This is no surviving dispute on this matter.
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1975 (8) TMI 44 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Reassessment Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... . We have already found that the first ground given by the Income-tax Officer in his report praying for sanction for acting under section 148 is admittedly a mistaken ground and, therefore, non-existent. That being so, the satisfaction of the Additional Commissioner in the instant case, so far as the first ground is concerned, is wholly mechanical without applying his mind. Regarding the second ground, we find that the satisfaction could in law be only with respect to clause (b) of section 147 and that being so the notice issued on March 10, 1971, would be clearly barred under section 149 of the Act. In the result, in any view of the matter, we find that the impugned notice under section 148 in the instant case is bad in law and without jurisdiction. Accordingly, we quash the impugned notice dated March 10, 1971, under section 148 of the Act. The petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. We, however, make no order as to costs. D. M. SEN J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 43 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Levy Of Penalty, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... tax Officer concerned had condoned the delay and, therefore, there was no error apparent on the face of the record which justified the rectification orders. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue, and we hold that the rectification orders were legal and valid orders. Before we part with this judgment, we must put on record that the revenue authorities were not justified in treating the instalments of the annuity deposit as subject to tax in subsequent years and the least which we can recommend in the facts of these references is that the competent authority should consider the facts of these references and make necessary orders for refund of the tax collected in subsequent years on respective instalments repaid under section 280D of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of these references, there should be no order as to costs in these references. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (8) TMI 42 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Levy Of Penalty, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... sed penalty. The penalty was sustained by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but was vacated by the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal categorically found ................. the assessee s only income was the share of profit from the firm in which he was a partner and when the firm could not finalise its accounts and determine its profits, it was certainly not possible for the partner to ascertain his correct income in respect of the share from the firm and to file the return.............. These, in our view, provide sufficient cause for the assessee for not filing the return within time and no penalty should have been imposed. The legal position has been stated, in our view, in an appropriate way in the case, of Venkateswara Power Rolling Mills v. Commissioner of Income-tax. On the facts of the case we hold that the Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We make no order as to costs. N. K. DAS J.-I agree.
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1975 (8) TMI 41 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... the Act. In the instant case, clause 4 defines the objects of the trust. The trust is mainly for the purpose of relief of the poor, education and medical relief. The Tribunal has found it as a fact. The finding that up to 30th June, 1971, a sum of Rs. 5,25,000 had been applied for charitable purposes has not been disputed by the department. That fact was not challenged in the application seeking for reference to this court. Therefore, the main object of the trust being the relief of the poor, education and medical relief the carrying on of a business with a view to fulfil those objects does not deprive the assessee of the exemption under section 11 of the Act. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to costs of this reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (8) TMI 40 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Deemed Gift, Gift Tax, Market Value, Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... y settlement and the transaction has been made bona fide to put an end to the dispute amongst the members of the family of the deceasedassessee and, therefore, this transaction is not a transfer. In order to bring a case within the scope of section 4(1)(a) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, first there must be a transfer for consideration and such consideration must be found to have been inadequate consideration. That being the case, in our opinion, the provisions of section 4(1)(a) (section 4(a) unamended) of the Gift-tax Act are not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case and there was no deemed gift taxable in the hands of the assessee. In the result we answer the first question of law in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The answer to the first question of law being in the negative, the second question of law does not arise and need not be answered. The reference is answered accordingly. We, however, make no order as to costs. D. M. SEN J.-I agree.
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1975 (8) TMI 39 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Commencement Of Business, Expenditure Incurred ... ... ... ... ..... al, in our opinion, has not applied the correct tests and has consequently arrived at an erroneous conclusion regarding the commencement of the business activity of the assessee-company. Under these circumstances it is clear that at any rate from October 1, 1964, the assessee can be said to have commenced its business activity of the second category and, therefore, the assessee-company had commenced business and all expenses incurred by the assesseee-company between October 1, 1964, and March 31, 1965, namely, the amount of Rs. 48,004 can be said to have been incurred by it as business expenditure. Under these circumstances, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this expenditure of Rs. 48,004 incurred between October 1, 1964, and March 31, 1965, should have been allowed as business expenditure. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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