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Showing 61 to 80 of 160 Records
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1979 (8) TMI 100 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... oth the years a sum of Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 2,500 respectively, as such it cannot be said that there has been any information in possession of the ITO within the meaning of s. 147(b) of the Act on the part of the assessee, on which the ITO could have had reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessments. Further more, no material has been placed with us much less any be facts or evidence to show that he reassessment proceedings, taken by resorting to s. 147(b) of the Act, were in consequence of information in possession of the ITO. The Revenue has no case much less any justification to have had a resort to s. 147(b) of the Act on the facts and in the circumstances of the cases in appeal before us. As such the notices, that resulted reassessment proceedings and the impugned order of the Commr. which is a common consolidated one for both the asst. yr. under appeal, are, all quashed. 9. In the result, both the appeals by the assessee succeeds and are allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 99 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... claim of the assessee to exclude the income of the minors received from the partnership firm in which the assessee as the Kartas of their respective HUF, are partners. 3. We have heard both the sides. We find that this point has come up in appeal before the Tribunal in ITA No. 336 (Gau) of 1978-79. Vide order dt. 12th June, 1979 the Tribunal has allowed the claim of the assessee following the decision of the Hon ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sanka Sankaraiah (2) in which it was held that the income of the minors cannot be included along with the income of the assessee under s. 64(1) of the IT Act. We find that the principle enunciated by the Hon ble High Court mentioned above has also been reiterated in the case of Dinubhai Ishvarlal Patel(1) as decided by the Hon ble Gujarat High Court (118 ITR 122). Under the circumstances, we find that the orders of the AAC in both the appeals are in order which we hereby confirm. 4. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 98 - ITAT CUTTACK
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... ... ..... y the assessee in this connection was rightly treated as revenue expenditure by the Commissioner and so he wanted us to uphold the order of the Commissioner of this point. 11. We have heard the rival contentions and are of the opinion that the order of the Commissioner on this point does not require any interference. It is clear from the assessment order that the construction of quarters for which the assessee contributed 1/3rd of the cost did not belong to him. The Commissioner also found as a fact that the assessee had to pay rent for user for these quarters. We were also told that the quarters were temporary huts. In view of these facts we are of the opinion that the CIT(A) had done nothing wrong in deleting the disallowance of Rs. 31,882 made by the ITO. We, therefore uphold the order of the CIT (Appeals) also. 12. In the result, the assessee s appeal shall be treated as allowed for the purpose of statistics while the Cross Objection filed by the Department is dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 97 - ITAT CUTTACK
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... ... ..... d for the asst. yr. 1974-75, and the assessee gave reply for that very asst. year. The explanation of the assessee was not considered by the ITO although it was in compliance with the notice issued by the ITO. 11. In our opinion, the AAC was justified in deleting the penalty because the assessee filed the explanation for the show cause notice issued for the asst. yr. 1974-75 even thought it was meant for the asst. yr. 1972-73. If the ITO by mistake had mentioned the asst. yr. As 1974-75 so also the assessee had mentioned the asst. yr. 1974-75. But the fact remains that the reply or the explanation was definitely filed by the assessee against the show cause notice issue by the ITO. Since the show cause notice was not considered by the ITO the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity off being heard. In this view of the matter the AAC was justified in deleting the penalty. No interference is called for. 12. In the result, both these Departmental appeals stand dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 96 - ITAT CUTTACK
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... ... ..... s it had field the same on 29th July, 75. We are, therefore, constrained to come to the conclusion that the assessee could not explain the delay for the period of four complete months and so we are of the opinion that it was liable to penalty for the default of four months only. We, therefore, direct the ITO to recompute the quantum of penalty for the asst. yr. 1973-74 treating the default for four months only. We are unable to concede to the submissions of the assessee s authorised representative that the return for the asst. yr. 1973-74 could not be filed immediately after the auditors report was available as that report was to be approved by the shareholders in their Annual General Meeting hich was held on 31st Oct., 1975, because we see that the assessee did not wait till the Annual General Meeting of the shareholders and filed return long before 31st Oct., 1975. 8. In the result, the appeal for the asst. yr. 1972-73 is allowed and that for the 1973-74 is partly allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 95 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... the matter dealing with the additions in the assessment on merits was not considered necessary. The Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment in the case of S.P. Jaiswal is a clincher wherein it has been held that the combined effect of the operation of s. 297(2)(a) of the 1961 Act and of the IT (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, is that all proceedings in relation to an asst. yr. In respect of which the return of income was filed before April, 1, 1962, must be dealt with as if the 1961 Act has not been passed. The Hon ble Punjab and Haryana High Court for its judgment relied on several decisions both of the High Courts and in particular that of the Supreme Court in the case of Sankappa (S) vs. ITO, Central Circle-II, Bangalore(4). It is thus an accepted position that the judgment in S.P. Jaiswal s case has not been reverted by the Supreme Court. Therefore, we decline to give reference and dismiss the Commr. s application under s. 256(1). 5. Reference application dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 94 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... in order to prevent deterioration and with a view to give better polish and appearance treated them with methyl bromide. The High Court held that the assessee was not engaged in the processing of goods because it was not it self engaged in what could be the business of the company to become an industrial company and it was necessary that he company itself must do the processing of goods. That case has no bearing because in the instant case, we are concerned wit the question whether the assessee is engaged in production or manufacturing of goods and not of processing. There can be little doubt that the assessee is engaged in processing of goods but that does not help the Department s case in any manner since we have held that it was engaged in the manufacturing or production of goods. We, therefore, hold that the assessee is engaged in production or manufacturing of goods and allow the appeal and direct allowance of initial depreciation under s. 32(1)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961.
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1979 (8) TMI 93 - ITAT AMRITSAR
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... ... ..... he case. In the first instance he should have gone into the legal position. It was the duty of the AAC to enquire whether the WTO altered the status of the assessee from the HUF to Individual, after giving notice or without notice. The AAC having failed in doing so, we set aside his combined order and restore the matter back to the file of the WTO with the direction that he will frame the assessment orders De novo after giving a notice to the assessee that he proposed to change status from HUF to Individual. The counsel for the assessee informs that the assessments for the next following years 1974-75 to 1976-77 have been set aside by the AAC with the direction that the assessments be made De novo. To obviate any inconsistency in the orders, we direct the WTO to pass afresh orders for both the sets of asst. yrs. i.e. for 1972-73 and 1973-74 and for the years 1974-75 to 1976-77 together. 6. In the result both the appeals will be treated to be allowed for statistical purposes.
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1979 (8) TMI 92 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
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... ... ..... y him and if he should have exercised this option in the circumstances of the case but did not in fact exercise the option, the AAC will be entitled to direct him to exercise his option he had. In T.C.N. Menon vs. ITO (2) the Kerala High Court quashed the order of assessment on the ground that in view of s. 69 of the IT Act, the assessee was entitled to an opportunity to explain the amount of undisclosed investment even when assessment was made under s. 144 of the IT Act. The finding was that s. 142(3) deals with a stage before the ITO came to the tentative decision or proposal to determine the total income at a certain amount on the basis of the materials gathered by the ITO and that those materials could be used against an assessee only after giving an opportunity of being heard. In our view, the AAC rightly gave the directions to which he was entitled to give and which he ought to have given on the facts of this case. 4. In the result these appeals fell and are dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 91 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
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... ... ..... come in miscellaneous application against the order. 4. Shri L. A. Deputy, the learned counsel for the assessee urged that the only point with the Tribunal was to decide was whether the ITO should have passed an order under s. 154 accepting the assessee s application, the Tribunal had, however, restored the matter to the ITO with a direction to consider 143(2) application. He urged that 143(2) application was not before the Tribunal. He therefore, requested that the order of the Tribunal dt. 10th Oct., 1978 may be set aside and the matter decided after giving a fresh hearing. 5. We found that the final conclusion of the Tribunal is a composite one covering both 154 and 143(2) aspects. No doubt, technically the assessee is right when he points out that the Tribunal should not have come to the application under s. 143(2) at all. Hence, we set-aside the order of the Tribunal in ITA no. 997(Ahd)/77-78 dt. 10th Oct., 1978. The matter would be kept for fresh hearing and disposed.
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1979 (8) TMI 90 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Dutiability - Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... 17(4) of the Central Excise Tariff. From these Trade Notices and from the earlier decision dated August 11,1966, it is obvious that the Excise authorities are not clear in their mind as to whether the process of printing and polishing amounts to manufacture and whether such process converts the paper into a different category inviting excise duty under Tariff Item No. 17(4). If the Excise authorities themselves are not clear, then it is futile to levy excise duty on an assumption that the process converts the paper into a different category. In my judgment, the entire approach of the Excise authorities to the problem was erroneous and has resulted into serious infirmity in the orders passed by them. The orders passed by the authorities below are required to be struck down. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of paragraph 25 of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 89 - JUDICATURE OF HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
Classification of goods or demand - Writ jurisdiction - Remand to Departmental office ... ... ... ... ..... ng the tariff advice to claim that the product manufactured by the petitioners is liable to excise duty under Tariff Item No. 18. 7. In the result the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute and the order passed by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Division IV, Bombay holding that the product of the petitioners attracts Tariff Item No. 18 and the petitioners are liable to pay excise duty for the monofilament yarns cleared during the period from March 16,1972 to December 31, 1973 and from January 1,1974 to February 28, 1974 is set aside. It is open for the department to adopt independent proceedings against the petitioners even in respect of the period under challenge for claiming excise duty, provided it is permissible by law and there is material before the department excluding the tariff advice to claim that the product manufactured by the petitioners attracts excise duty under Tariff Item No. 18. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 88 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Pilfer Proof Caps will not cover all kinds of caps and Capsules ... ... ... ... ..... at all. As such the goods in question cannot fall within the ambit of pilfer proof caps which alone are classifiable under Item 42 of the Central Excise Tariff particularly when even the Trade does not accept such goods as pilfer proof caps. Despite the words all sorts appearing at the end of description of Item 42 Central Excise Tariff the condition precedent for any goods to fall within the ambit of Item 42 is that these must be pilfer-proof. The test of distinguishing pilfer proof caps from ordinary caps is that the seal or strip or any additional appendage of the cap which gives the character of being pilfer proof once torn out by its first use could not be used again. In respect of the goods in question this test which is put in different words in ISI specification as cited in the order in appeal is thus not satisfied. 3. In the circumstances the order in appeal in question is correct in law. The review proceeding initiated against the said order are therefore dropped.
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1979 (8) TMI 87 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (FULL BENCH)
Customs - Sewing machine parts - Domestic Sewing Machines ... ... ... ... ..... to be classified by application of Interpretative Rules 3(C) to the Import Tariff appearing at the beginning of the Customs Tariff Act 75 wherever there is doubt about the principal use of the particular part. Thus, even if it were assumed that the parts in question find their use both in domestic sewing machines as well as the sewing machines not elsewhere specified and the position regarding their principal use is not clear beyond doubt, the impugned goods would have to be classified under heading 84.41(2) of CTA 75 by application of the Interpretative Rules 3(C). The Government of India, therefore, by virtue of powers vested in them under section 131(3) of Customs Act, 1962 annul the subject order of the Appellate Collector which classified the goods under heading 84.41 (1) CTA 75 and hold that the Importers claims for re-assessment of the goods under heading 84.41 (1) CTA 75 in preference to heading 84.41(2) were correctly rejected by the Assistant Collector of Customs.
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1979 (8) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Valuation - Alternative remedy - Existence of ... ... ... ... ..... t indicate any reasons to come to that conclusion. In these circumstances of the case, in my judgment, this is a fit case which requires interference of this Court 9. Mr Taraporewala has placed reliance upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Cibatul Ltd. P.O. Atul v. Union of India and others reported in 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J68), and also on my judgment in Miscellaneous Petition No. 729 of 1974 decided on July 20, 1979 in support of his submission that the petitioners are not the agents but independent manufactures of razor blades supplied to Union Carbide. Both these decisions undoubtedly support the contention of the learned Counsel. In these circumstances of the case, the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought for. 10. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of paragraph 19 of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The Bank guarantee furnished by the petitioners to stand discharged.
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1979 (8) TMI 85 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Samples - Power of arrest - Samples of unmanufactured products - Drawal of - Validity - Prosecution - Writ of Prohibition
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1979 (8) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Demand - Rule 9(2) - Scope ... ... ... ... ..... oceeded against the petitioners only under Rule 10 of the Rules. Mr. Bhandare submits that the impugned demand notice dated July 2, 1974 was served after expiry of three months from the date on which the duty was liable to be paid and as such the action of respondents cannot be sustained. Mr. Talyarkhan did not dispute that if the case falls within the ambit of Rule 10, then the demand notice would not be valid. In my judgment, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjana s case, the case squarely falls under Rule 10 of the Rules, and Rules 9 (1) and 10-A of the Rules have no application whatsoever. In this view of the matter, the demand notice deserves to be quashed. 14. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of paragraph 21 of the petition. It hardly requires to be stated that the security furnished by the petitioners stands discharged in view of success of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Sugar Year - Connotation of - Taxing Statute - Notification - Deficiency in language - Effect - Alternative remedy - Existence of
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1979 (8) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Proforma Credit - Admissibility of chemical samples ... ... ... ... ..... se leviable thereon. Mr. Desai then submitted that Rule 56-A only enables adjustment and notification merely provides for a concession or a rebate and as such the proviso to Rule 56-A would not be attracted to the facts of the present case. The submission has no merit and must be repelled. lt is clear that the notification dated April 20, 1961 was issued to give certain concession to the pharmaceutical manufacturers on their representations and the concession granted cannot be so extended or construed as to nullify the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 56-A. In my judgment, the authorities below have come to a correct conclusion and their orders do not require interference in this petition. 9. In the result, the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs. Mr. Desai at this stage applies for continuation of the interim order for a period of 4 weeks. The interim order to continue for a period of 4 weeks on condition that the bank guarantee furnished will also continue.
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1979 (8) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Raw Die-Cast Rotors -Board's directions - Validity - Trade Notices - Effect ... ... ... ... ..... ecified that die-cast rotors were only an intermediate stage of production and that they were not fit for use as rotors, they are not capable of being used directly as rotors in any electric motor or such allied systems since various operations are required before they can be commercially accepted as rotors hence they should not be classified as rotors under Item 30(4) of Central Excise Tariff. The respondents are estopped from contending to the contrary. Mr. Bhabha in this connection has relied upon the observations of the Gujarat High Court in Navgujrat Paper Industries v. Superintendent of Central Excise and Anr. reported in 1977 (1) E.L.T. (J 67). The raw die-cast rotors manufactured by the petitioners do not fall under Tariff Item 30(4). 2. Rule is, therefore, made absolute in terms of prayer (a) save and except the last portion thereof which is bracketed in red pencil. 3. Bank guarantee furnished pursuant to order dated 4-12-1974 is discharged. 4. No order as to costs.
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