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Showing 61 to 80 of 1740 Records
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2024 (9) TMI 1683
Interest on refund - interest calculation on the refund amount - petitioner claims that the interest was required to be computed till the date of release of the payment – that is, till 18.10.2019 and not 30.03.2019 - Contention that the date of grant of the interest must be construed as the interest due till the date of passing of the order and not the date on which the amount is released to the assessee, is insubstantial. The expression “refund is granted” would necessarily mean refund of payment of the amount.
HELD THAT:- It is well settled that the interest is paid to compensate the payee for time value of money. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, it is difficult for this Court to accept that “the date on which refund is granted” as used in Section 244A of the Act must be read as the date on which an order accepting the petitioner’s claim for the grant of refund is passed and not the date on which the funds are released.
Accepting the Revenue’s contention would imply that the Revenue could pass an order for the grant of refund, which would stop the clock for the payment of interest and yet continue to withhold the amount without the payment of interest. Clearly, the said contention is unacceptable.
We direct the concerned Assessing Officer to recalculate the interest till 18.10.2019 and release the said amount to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of four weeks from date.
As clarified that this Court has not examined the question regarding the validity of the action to adjust the amount of refund due against the dues allegedly payable by the assessee in respect of the other AY, as the same is the subject matter in another petition. Thus, the examination in this petition is confined to the question whether interest is payable till the date of the order directing the refund of amount due or till the date of payment.
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2024 (9) TMI 1681
Validity of the sanction order can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings or not - violation of Section 45(2) of the UAPA r/w Rules 3 & 4 - violation of statutory timelines and requirement of independent review which includes application of mind - applicability of statutory exemption Under Section 22A of the UAPA.
Whether the Validity of the Sanction Order can be challenged at any stage? - HELD THAT:- The UAPA does not provide for any such saving of the sanction. This implies that, in the wisdom of the legislature, the inbuilt mechanism of the Act of having two authorities apply their mind to the grant of a sanction, is sufficient. This emphasizes the role and sanctity of the operation to be carried out by both these authorities. In order to challenge the grant of sanction as invalid, the grounds that can be urged are that (1) all the relevant material was not placed before the authority; (2) the authority has not applied its mind to the said material; and (3) insufficiency of material. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. The common thread that runs through the three grounds of challenge above is that the party putting forward this challenge has to lead evidence to such effect.
There are no hesitation in holding that while the treasured right of an Accused to avail all remedies available to him recognised under law, in ordinary circumstances challenge to sanction under UAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to enable the Trial Court to determine the question, for its competence to proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on the appellate side would depend on the answer to this question.
Whether a violation of Section 45(2) of the UAPA r/w Rules 3 & 4, if any, vitiates the proceedings? In other words, whether violation of - (a) statutory timelines and (b) the requirement of independent review which includes application of mind, are necessary aspects of procedure without which, any transaction under the UAPA shall be compromised to a point that its sanctity is rendered questionable? - HELD THAT:- The rules provide a seven day period within which the concerned authority is to make its recommendation on the basis of materials gathered by the investigating officer and a further seven days period for the government to grant sanction for prosecution, having considered the report of the authority - The ins and outs of the Appellant's contention is that the said timelines were not followed and, in fact, the first sanction was granted more than a year after the recommendation was moved. This contention ties into another submission that there was no independent review on the part of both recommending authority and central government, as the sanction was merely granted within a day each.
Whether timelines were directory or mandatory? - HELD THAT:- The observations in VIJAY RAJMOHAN VERSUS STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE [2022 (10) TMI 1267 - SUPREME COURT] regarding the power of sanction being open to the standard principle of judicial review; the same being inbuilt in our legal structure; public confidence being at stake if a rule of law is violated, are principles that in our considered view it will apply equally to sanctions under UAPA. In context of the PC Act, it has been held that non- compliance of a mandatory period cannot ipso facto lead to quashing of criminal proceedings. This is where a difference emerges between the PC Act and the UAPA. The implication, social as well as legal of both these acts diverges, in as much as the latter entails far graver consequences. The UAPA provides for a detailed procedure which is to be followed in granting of sanction and undoubtedly, the same must be followed in absolute letter and spirit.
Section 52 of the UAPA grants power to the Central Government to make Rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Specifically, Section 52(2)(ee) deals with the present situation, i.e., enables the Government to prescribe the time for recommendation and grant of sanction Under Section 45. The 2008 Rules are unequivocal in both, using the word 'shall' as also providing a specific time period for both activities, i.e., making recommendation and granting sanction.
In matters of strict construction, when a timeline is provided, along with the use of the word 'shall' and particularly when the same is in the context of a law such as the UAPA, it cannot be considered a mere technicality or formality. It demonstrates clear intention on the part of the Legislature. A compulsion has been imposed, and for compliance with that compulsion, a timeline has been provided. While the legislation is aimed at curbing unlawful activities and practices detrimental to national security and accordingly, provides the authorities of the Government ample power to undertake and complete all procedures and processes permissible under law to that end, at the same time the interest of Accused persons must also be safeguarded and protected. It is expected of the Executive, in furtherance of the ideal of protection of national security, that it would work with speed and dispatch - There have to be certain limitations within which administrative authorities of the Government can exercise their powers. Without such limitations, power will enter the realm of the unbridled, which needless to state is, antithetical to a democratic society. Timelines in such cases, serve as essential aspects of checks and balances and of course, are unquestionably important.
Independent review - bone of contention in this regard is that since both the recommending and the granting authorities took merely a day each in performing their respective functions, the requirement of an independent review which is to be undertaken by both authorities has been left unfulfilled thereby vitiating the sanction in question - HELD THAT:- The import of the term independent review as can be understood from the above is a re-examination, scrutiny or critique of something which is not dependent or subject to control by any other factor or authority. In the present facts, independent review would mean a contemplation or study of the material gathered by the investigating officer to conclude as to whether or not a sanction to proceed under the provisions of the UAPA ought to be granted. Similarly, at the next stage, the sanctioning authority is to mull over and critically notice both the materials gathered as also the conclusion drawn by the recommending authority, in its act of granting sanction - The legislative intent in bringing about the aspect of independent review, by way of an amendment brought into effect from 31st December 2008, within Section 45 of the UAPA is required to be noticed.
There is nothing on record to show that relevant material was not placed before the authorities. There is no question, as there rightly cannot be, on the competence of either of the authorities. Therefore, solely on the ground that the time taken was comparatively short or even that other orders were similarly worded cannot call the credibility of the sanction into question - independent review as well as application of mind are questions to be determined by way of evidence and as such should be raised at the stage of trial, so as to ensure that there is no undue delay in the proceedings reaching their logical and lawful conclusion on these grounds.
An order passed by an administrative authority is not to be tested by way of judicial review on the same anvil as a judicial or quasi-judicial order. While it is imperative for the latter to record reasons for arriving at a particular decision, for the former it is sufficient to show that the authority passing such order applied its mind to the relevant facts and materials - It is not incumbent upon such authority to record detailed reasons to support its conclusion and, as such, the orders challenged herein, cannot be faulted with on that ground.
Misjoinder of Charges and Violation of Code of Criminal Procedure - HELD THAT:- Naseeb Singh [2021 (10) TMI 1409 - SUPREME COURT] holds that a separate trial would not be contrary to law unless a miscarriage of justice can be demonstrated. Similarly, a joint trial, if held, after having considered the two factors given above, cannot be said to be ipso facto prejudicial to the parties.
Whether, in the facts, the statutory exemption Under Section 22A of the UAPA applies to the Appellant who claims to be unaware of the affairs of the company? - HELD THAT:- For Section 22A to apply : (a) offence has to committed by a company; (b) all persons who at the time of the offence were in control of, or responsible for, the company's affairs shall be deemed guilty; (c) such person would be saved from guilt as under (b) if they can demonstrate that such act was (i) not in their knowledge; (ii) they had taken reasonable care to prevent such offence from taking place. The section further provides that if it can be proved that the offence committed by the company was (1) with consent; (2) in connivance of; (3) attributable to neglect on the part of any promoter, director, manager, secretary or any other officer of the company, then they shall be held guilty - this Court cannot, at this stage, decide whether Section 22A applies to the Appellant or not. This is once again a matter for evidence.
Conclusion - i) The validity of sanction should be challenged at the earliest instance available, before the Trial Court. If such a challenge is raised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising the challenge to justify the reasons for bringing the same at a belated stage. Such reasons would have to be considered independently so as to ensure that there is no misuse of the right of challenge with the aim to stall or delay proceedings.
ii) The timelines mentioned in Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules are couched in mandatory language and, therefore, have to be strictly followed. This is keeping in view that UAPA being a penal legislation, strict construction must be accorded to it. Timelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are a way to keep a check on executive power which is a necessary position to protect the rights of Accused persons. Independent review by both the authority recommending sanction and the authority granting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance with Section 45 of the UAPA.
iii) Sections 218-222, Code of Criminal Procedure, are not violated.
iv) Whether or not the exemption Under Section 22A applies is a matter to be established by the way of evidence for the person claiming such exemption has to demonstrate that either he was not in charge of the affairs of the company which has allegedly committed the offence, or that he had made reasonable efforts to prevent the commission of the offence. This, once again, is a matter for the Trial Court to consider and not for this Court to decide at this stage, keeping in view that the trial is underway and proceeded substantially.
Appeal dismissed.
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2024 (9) TMI 1680
Challenge to order under Section 73 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- Taking note of the fact that the appellate tribunal is yet to be constituted, in order to adjudicate the writ petition on merits, the same would require not only scrutiny of records but decision on factual issues - Having regard thereto, it would be prudent at this stage to remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority for a decision on merits especially considering the fact that there was a marginal delay in filing the appeal.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (9) TMI 1679
Disallowance of expenses claimed as deduction under the head business income - expenditures are not liable as deduction because no business was carried on by the assessee - HELD THAT:- This aspect is already dealt by us by holding that the lower authorities had indeed assessed the business income reported by the assessee and accordingly their findings got nullified. Hence, once the fact of business conducted by the assessee is accepted, the assessee would be automatically entitled for business expenditure as deduction. Hence, the assessee succeeds on this ground on merit. Accordingly, the Ground raised by the assessee is allowed.
Invalid approval granted u/s 153D - Approval u/s 153D of the Act has been granted by the ld. Addl. CIT in the instant case before us in a mechanical manner without due application of mind, thereby making the approval proceedings by a high ranking authority, an empty ritual. Such an approval has neither been mandated by the provisions of the Act nor endorsed by any decisions. Hence, we find lot of force in the arguments advanced by the Ld. AR in support of the ground raised in the appeal of the assessee.
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2024 (9) TMI 1678
Accrual of income in India or not? - royalty income - interconnect service charges - HELD THAT:- As decided in M/S. VODAFONE IDEA LIMITED [2023 (7) TMI 1164 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] held that tax is not deductable when payment is made to non-resident telecom operator. This factual aspect is not refuted. No infirmity in the orders under challenge.
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2024 (9) TMI 1677
Accrual of income in India or not? - royalty income - interconnect service charges - HELD THAT:- As decided in M/S. VODAFONE IDEA LIMITED [2023 (7) TMI 1164 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] held that tax is not deductable when payment is made to non-resident telecom operator. This factual aspect is not refuted. No infirmity in the orders under challenge.
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2024 (9) TMI 1676
Accrual of income in India or not? - royalty income - interconnect service charges - HELD THAT:- As decided in M/S. VODAFONE IDEA LIMITED [2023 (7) TMI 1164 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] held that tax is not deductable when payment is made to non-resident telecom operator. This factual aspect is not refuted. No infirmity in the orders under challenge.
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2024 (9) TMI 1675
Accrual of income in India or not? - royalty income - interconnect service charges - HELD THAT:- As decided in M/S. VODAFONE IDEA LIMITED [2023 (7) TMI 1164 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] held that tax is not deductable when payment is made to non-resident telecom operator. This factual aspect is not refuted. No infirmity in the orders under challenge.
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2024 (9) TMI 1674
Rectification of mistake u/s 254 - Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - Levy confirmed on assessee being held liable to pay taxes on its book profits computed in terms of section 115JB by including therein long term capital gains as mandated by law, which the assessee had failed to do while levy deleted on Disallowance of certain expenses claimed by the assessee while computing its income under the normal provisions of the Act - HELD THAT:- The order, while dealing with ground no.2, notes the assessee to have stated the issue to be squarely covered in its favour in CIT Vs. Stock Home India Ltd [2015 (2) TMI 669 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] but goes on to distinguish it by finding that while in the facts of the case before the Hon’ble High Court the assessee was noted to have filed a revised return including therein calculation of Book Profits u/s 115JB of the Act and also filing Form No. 29B, the same was not done by the assessee in the present case. Assessee has pointed out that both the acts could not have been done by the assessee as per law itself since the limitation prescribed in law for filing revised return and form No 29B had expired by the time the assessee became aware of the lapse on its part during assessment proceedings. Ld.DR was unable to controvert this contention of assessee.
Clearly the distinction made for not applying the decision of the Hon’ble High court has been demonstrated to be incorrect.
Also while finding the assessee to have acted malafidely by not paying taxes on book profits by including therein exempt long term capital gain, the ITAT we have noted has not dealt with the explanation of the assessee that inclusion of exempt capital gain in Book Profits was by way of amendment in law applicable from the impugned year onwards and therefore missed out for its consideration.
We agree with assessee that there was a mistake apparent on record in the order of the ITAT finding the assessee to have acted malafidely by only considering the fact that the assessee had consistently been disclosing computation of book profits as per section 115JB of the Act in preceding years while not doing so in the impugned year, without dealing with the aforestated explanation of the assessee of exempt income being included in Book Profits being a recent amendment. This explanation of the assessee not only addresses non-disclosure of Book Profits in the impugned year but also the fact why it was consistently disclosed in earlier years. Not dealing with this explanation of the assessee has resulted in there being a mistake in the order of the ITAT.
There is a clear mistake in the order of the ITAT, while holding the assessee to have not established its bona fides for escaping the levy of penalty, on ground no.2 raised by the assessee.
MA filed by the assessee on this issue also, we hold, is maintainable.
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2024 (9) TMI 1673
Condonation of delay - delay of 55 days involved in preferring of the captioned appeal - HELD THAT:- The action which can be condoned by the court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. As observed by us hereinabove, as the assessee appellant in the present case had not come forth with any cogent explanation elaborating the acceptable reasons leading to the delay in filing the present appeal, and had adopted a lackadaisical approach, therefore, there can be no reason to condone the delay of 55 days involved in preferring of the captioned appeal.
Also, as observed in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [1961 (5) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT] that seeker of justice must come with clean hands, therefore, now when in the present appeal the assessee appellant had failed to come forth with any substantial clarification to support the application for condonation elaborating in the backdrop of sufficient reason that would justify condonation of the substantial delay involved in preferring of the captioned appeal, therefore, we decline to condone the same and, thus, without adverting to the merits of the case dismiss appeal of the assessee as barred by limitation.
In the result, the appeal of the assessee dismissed as not maintainable.
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2024 (9) TMI 1672
WP against order passed by 1st respondent - counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that he had filed appeals before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, it would be suffice if this Court issues direction to the Appellate Authority to consider the petitioner's appeals and dispose of the appeal within a time bound manner- HELD THAT:- As petitioner had filed an appeals for the years 2013 to 2017, before the appellate authority, he is directed to agitate the issue before the Appellate Authority and this Court directs the appellate authority i.e., National Placement Faceless Appeal Centre to dispose of the appeals filed by the petitioner within a period of twelve(12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2024 (9) TMI 1671
Assessment u/s 153A - Validity of the approval taken u/s 153D as the same has been obtained in a mechanical manner - HELD THAT:- We find no mentioning of perusal of the draft assessment order by the concerned authority and no separate application of mind in the instant case in hand while granting approval altogether 110 assessment orders in a single day the same is nothing but the product of total non-application of mind and therefore, we do not hesitate to find the same arbitrary, erroneous and thus, liable to be treated as non-est in the eye of law. The Assessment Order passed on the basis of such approval is therefore, found to be without any basis and thus, quashed. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2024 (9) TMI 1670
Validity of reassessment proceedings - notice issued u/s 147 r/w 148 of the Act was time barred - as also argued reasons which were the foundation for issuance of notice u/s 147 r.w.s.148 were not the result of any fresh information or fresh gathering of the material, but it is the change of opinion or re-appreciation of material - HELD THAT:- he extended limitation under the first proviso to Section 147 of the Act would apply to the cases where there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for assessment of the relevant assessment year. The assessment proceedings and the nature of facts disclose by the assessee clearly show that he has disclosed the acquisition of capital gains and drawing of the FDR. Such FDR was also verified by the Assessing Officer with the bank. There is no failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing the material facts necessary for the relevant assessment year. Therefore, invocation of present petition is barred by first proviso to Section 147 of the Act.
No proper reason which led to issuance of notice dated 26.03.2015 - A glance of the reasons discloses that there were no fresh facts received which could not be made available earlier on account of concealment of any material facts by the assessee and it appears to be a change of opinion on re-appreciation of evidence or material, which facts were already furnished by the assessee during his regular assessment process. Therefore, on this count also, the writ petition is liable to be allowed.
Assessee appeal allowed.
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2024 (9) TMI 1669
Time limitation for filing refund - Interpretation of time limit for refund claim under Customs Act, 1962 based on provisional assessment and final assessment - time limit of one year from the date of payment of duty prescribed under N/N. 102/2007-Custom dated 14.09.2007 read with N/N. 93/2008 Customs dated 01.08.2008 for the refund claim filed in terms of the said notification, can be considered from the date of finalisation of provisional assessment (in cases where the assessment is provisional) or otherwise - whether the refund filed in the instant case is well within the time as prescribed under N/N. 102/2007-Cus and refund is not time barred?
HELD THAT:- This Court in PIONEER INDIA ELECTRONICS (P) LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER [2013 (9) TMI 705 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that 'We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid observations of the Delhi High Court which is followed by the Tribunal to the effect that the date of making the refund application would be required to be considered from the date of final assessment and not from the date of payment of provisional duty as per the provisions of Section 27(1B)(c) of the Act and the reliance placed by the Revenue on the interpretations of the impugned Notification No.93/2008 cannot be applied contrary to the statutory provisions.'
Thus, no question of law would arise from the impugned common order of the CESTAT and therefore, this appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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2024 (9) TMI 1668
Lack of jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice - respondent authorities have not issued the Notice under sub-section (5) of Section 74 read with sub-section (8) of the said section read with Rule 142(1A) of the GST Rules - HELD THAT:- Issue Notice returnable on 10.10.2024.
By way of ad-interim relief, the proceedings pursuant to the impugned show cause notice dated 19.03.2024 may continue however, no final order shall be passed, without permission of this court during the pendency of this petition.
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2024 (9) TMI 1667
Money Laundering - predicated crime - proceeds of crime - Propriety in passing interim order in the nature of staying the provisional freezing order - It is alleged that the borrower has manipulated project cost statements and also diverted the bank funds to its subsidiaries - Compliance with procedural requirements under Section 17 of the PML Act - HELD THAT:- The reasons stated in the order under Section 17(1) of the PML Act indicates that the accused of predicated offence carried out diversion and layering of the POC through related parties and dummy entities for the accumulation of the assets. It is not in dispute that the parties are related with the Directors of M/s Corporate Power Limited as well as registered office is one of the same. In this background, by resorting the powers under Section 17 of the PML Act, the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate has passed freezing orders and by the time, the matter has been referred to the Adjudicating Authority. The Authority on receipt of an application under Section 17(4) of the PML Act, has already issued summons to the petitioners seeking their explanation.
Preliminary investigation paper indicates that during search various property documents, electronic record were recovered on the same registered premises. It was primarily revealed that the seized assets were diversion of proceeds of crime of the accused company in dummy entities of the relatives of accused. Primary search indicates that crores of rupees have been transferred from accused company to the faulty companies. Prima facie there are no deficiency to invoke writ jurisdiction in either of the petitions.
The Magnitude of the investigation is quite vast as allegedly huge sum to the extent of Rs. 4037.87 crores has been siphoned through various shell entities. In the wake of above position, the petitioners have to satisfy the Adjudicating Authority, which is the mechanism set up for its redressal. Apparently, an effective efficacious remedy is available for the petitioners. In view of above, at this stage, there are no propriety in passing interim order. The Authority to expedite the proceeding contemplated under Section 8(2) of the PML Act.
Place the matter for further consideration after six weeks for filing a reply.
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2024 (9) TMI 1666
Invalid approval u/s 153D - exercise of the jurisdiction by non judicial or quasi judicial authority - HELD THAT:- Merely by using the words ‘consideration’ or mentioning that certain mandatory compliances have been done by the AO, the approving authority cannot justify the approval order so as to show that there has been actual consideration of the assessment record and the draft assessment order. The use of words ‘approval’ in the statute does not merely mean a permission or sanction, but approval order should show that the reasons for reaching a finding in draft assessment order, were examined and that material relied by the AO for concluding that income was concealed or misreported, was on the basis of incriminating material and its evidentiary value to make addition has been examined by the AO.
Argument of revenue that as the approving authority is well informed of the assessment proceedings in due course of supervision, so the approvals need not be very elaborate, rather goes against the revenue, as that cannot mean that when approval is given, the same is mere formality. We are of considered view that the approval is not given for validating an act of the AO.
The approval order should indicate to the assessee that there is due exercise of powers of search assessment, under correct provisions of Act and admissible material relied to make additions. In the cases before us, the use of identical languages and reasoning in regard to different set of assessee for whom approval requests were independently received and on different dates the approval was granted, manifests that there was mechanical approval, without going through the records and draft assessment orders.
Thus, we find force in contention of Ld. AR that giving an approvals of an assessee whose case was all together and for which already approval stood granted on 15.11.2019 shows quite mechanical way of handling this important quasi judicial power u/s 153D - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (9) TMI 1665
Abatement of appeal - Rule 22 of CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 - HELD THAT:- Since as per the NCLT order dated 11th November, 2022 the company has been liquidated. The appeals are disposed as abated in terms of Rule 22 of CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982.
Miscellaneous Application and Cross objection also stand disposed of.
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2024 (9) TMI 1664
Money Laundering - postponement of commencement of trial - respondent would mainly contend that the Criminal Revision Petition is not maintainable and beyond the scope of Section 397 (2) of Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- Sub-Section (2) to Section 309 of Cr.P.C stipulates that " If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, any may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody."
In the present case, an application filed under Section 309 Cr.P.C. was allowed. The powers conferred on the High Court under Section 397 (1) would be sufficient to entertain the criminal revision petition against the order passed under Section 309 Cr.P.C. When the High Court is conferred with the powers to verify the correctness and legality of the order, the revision petition would lie. Thus, the maintainability point raised deserves to be rejected.
“Proceeds of Crime” is the focal point for an ECIR, whereas scheduled offence is dealt with under the FIR. Further reliance may be relevant with reference to the judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India and Others [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT] and Rajinder Singh Chada vs. Union of India [2023 (11) TMI 1085 - DELHI HIGH COURT]. Both these judgments have noted the distinction between FIR and ECIR. More so, ECIR is treated as an internal document.
In the present case, PMLA proceedings are set in motion and prima facie findings have already made, investigation completed and complaint was filed. The Court has to frame charges and proceed with the trial. At this stage, it is not a viable ground to take a view that pendency of criminal appeal against an order of conviction is a bar for the continuance of trial with reference to offence under PMLA - A blanket application of the observations made by the Apex Court in Vijay Madhanlal Choudhary's case [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT] will not advance the object set out under PMLA, 2002 and in turn will defeat its primary object. The Vijay Madhanlal Choudhary's case is a binding precedent for all Courts below and on careful application of the judgement, analysing on a case to case basis, the output shall defer for each case and not render the same result.
The impugned order dated 30.04.2024 in Crl.M.P.No.4236 of 2023 in Special C.C.No.02 of 2022 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Puducherry is quashed and the criminal Revision Petition stands allowed.
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2024 (9) TMI 1663
Validity of assessments framed u/s 153A - no valid approval u/sec.153D - HELD THAT:- Sec.153D approval has to be granted on standalone basis after perusing the entire records for each assessment year instead of treating it as a mere mechanical exercise. This tribunal’s recent coordinate bench’s order in SMW Ispat (P.) Ltd. [2024 (6) TMI 404 - ITAT PUNE] has rejected the Revenue’s arguments whilst concluding that a conditional approval than an absolute one is not sustainable in law and therefore, the corresponding assessment(s) framed u/sec.153A of the Act is null and void.
All the impugned sec.153A assessments, all are not sustainable in law and therefore, the same stand quashed in very terms since not framed after a valid approval u/sec.153D.
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9911796707
