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Showing 81 to 100 of 150 Records
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1976 (4) TMI 70 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... were reasonable causes which prevented the assessee from filing the return in time. 17. Accordingly, we are of the opinion, that in the present case penalty is not called for. 18. In the result the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of penalty is cancelled. Anand Prakash, A.M. mdash I concur with the conclusion of my leaned brother that the penalty, having been imposed for the default of s. 139(1), and the said default having not taken place for the reasons given above, the penalty is not exigible. I, however, do not associate myself with the remarks, on the merits of the case, as contained in paras 14 and 15 supra justifying the failure of the assessee to comply with the notice under s. 139(2), for I do not agree with them. for the purpose of disposal of this appeal, it is not in my opinion, necessary to examine the conduct of the assessee under s. 139(2), for the ITO has not penalised him for that default. I, therefore, refrain from giving any opinion on this respect.
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1976 (4) TMI 69 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... n the facts and circumstances of this case. We therefore, hold that the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be applied with full force to the facts of this case. Before we close we may notice the decision of the Delhi High Court in the Case of Sant Lal Kashmiri Lal vs. CIT(4). There the facts are more or less similar and their Lordships held s. 185 (2) gives an assessee an opportunity to rectify the defects if pointed out by the Income-tax Officer. The observations were made by their Lordships on the basis that the Income-tax Officer knew all the facts and that there was merely a technical error. Same is the case before us. 10. We therefore, direct the assessee to file application in form 11-A as stated earlier to regularise the matter and direct the Income-tax Officer to receive the same. The assessee should also make an application for condonation of delay. The Income-tax Officer would then pass appropriate orders. The appeal is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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1976 (4) TMI 68 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1975 XXXVI STC page 482 according to which a division bench of the Kerala High Court has held that manure bags do not have a substantial resale value as the bags get damaged on account of the corrosive action of the contents and that it was, therefore, not possible to draw an inference of implied sale of such bags. There is force in the argument of the learned counsel for appellant which is further strengthened by the ruling in 1971 VKN Vol. 4 page 335 given by the Board of Revenue to the same effect as the judgment cited earlier. The assessment of the assessing authority that tax was leviable on a sum of Rs. 47,000 on account of the implied sale price of such gunny bags is, therefore, not justified and is set aside. 7. The case is, accordingly, remanded as per direction given in the preceding paragraph relating to each ground of appeal and providing such relief in tax as has been specifically ordered and a fresh enquiry and decision according to law in the remaining grounds.
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1976 (4) TMI 67 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... it is possible to let it out more easily as this area appears to be in greater demand. Even if the value is to be worked out on the basis of the net ALV which is Rs. 32,036, Rs. 42,284, Rs. 49,853 and Rs. 49,853 for the asst. yrs. 1964-65 to 1967-68 respectively, a multiplier of 13 to 17 times will have to be applied in order to reach the value taken by the AAC. The Tribunal has applied a multiple of 12 to the net ALV in the case of Shri Radhey Lal Rishi Kumar vs. WTO (Distt. III (19),New Delhi) reported in (1973) Taxation 34(6)-206 to which one of us was a party. If that basis was to be adopted the value would be lesser but in this case there are other factors discussed above on the basis of which the value adopted by the AAC to seems be correct. 8. The other point raised by the assessee in his appeal regarding the addition on account of estimate of value of jewellery was not pressed. It is accordingly decided against the assessee. 9. In the result the appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 66 - ITAT DELHI-C
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... ... ..... een contested both by the assessee and the Revenue. The former is aggrieved in that no relief has been allowed for the asst. yrs. 1968-69 and 1969-70, while the latter contends that the liability for the asst. yrs. 1970-71 and 1971-72 has not yet been incurred and hence no relief should have been allowed for these two years also. 11.6. In our view, the liability is embedded in the very lease deed and cannot be said to have been incurred only with effect from1st Jan., 1969. Besides, the assessee follows the mercantile system of accounting. Hence, the claim should be allowed for each of the asst. yrs. 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72. If the liability is subsequently remitted, the Revenue rsquo s interest will be protected by taking an action under s. 41(1). 12. In the result, ITA Nos. 3315 and 3367/1972-73 80 and 81/1972-73 are partly allowed. ITA Nos. 82, 83/1972-73 and 1021/1973-74 are partly allowed for statistical purposes. ITA Nos. 1429 and 3146/1973-74 are rejected.
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1976 (4) TMI 65 - ITAT DELHI-B
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... ... ..... hamber of Commerce and had also brought out the figures in order to show that the shortage was marginal. These being quasi criminal proceedings, we have therefore to look at the entire matter with a somewhat different approach. As per facts brought by the assessee and discussed by us in details above, we find that the estimated addition of account of marginal shortage could not result in the levy of penalty. It cannot be said that there was any conscious concealment or income or that the assessee was guilty of any fraud or gross or wilful neglect. Normally when we had sent the quantum appeal back to the AAC, we would have deferred the decision in this penalty case till the final adjudication of the former. However, in the totality of circumstances, we are of the opinion that this case would not at all attract penalty, as it is very difficult to hold that the charge of concealment can be brought home to the assessee we, therefore, while allowing this appeal delete the penalty.
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1976 (4) TMI 64 - ITAT DELHI-A
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... ... ..... eement to share the profits, which is absent in this case in the sense that the Finance Agreement only provided the sharing of the profits as a mode of paying interest and compensation for the return for the money borrowed. This agreement in terms is excluded from the purview of the partnership by s. 6 of the Partnership Act. The Supreme Court was not considering a case of this nature. This observation does not therefore help the Department rsquo s view. 11. In view of these observations the decision of the Supreme Court is distinguishable on facts and the Revenue, in our opinion, cannot derive much benefit out of these observations. In any case, the observations of the Gujarat High Court extracted earlier and underlined by us fully explains and answers the point raised by the Departmental Representative. 12. For these reasons, we hold that the view taken by the AAC is absolutely correct and we endorse it without any hesitation. 13. In the result, these appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 63 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... o show that the notice contemplated in that section shall be issued and served only after the publication in the gazette or simultaneously on the parties only on the same day on which it is published in the gazette. Therefore, there is no substance in this submission. 15. So in the end we set aside the acquisition order passed by the competent authority and refer the case back to the competent authority. The competent authority. The competent authority will first decide whether the fair market value of any one of the four schedules specified in the instrument of transfer exceeds Rs. 25,000. And if it so exceeds, proceed further according to law. The competent authority, the transferees and the transferees will be entitled to adduce fresh or additional evidence in support of their respective cases. The transferees and transferors will be also entitled to raise all other questions of law other than what are decided by us this order. These appeals are therefore allowed in part.
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1976 (4) TMI 62 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... ntative that the law with regard to jurisdiction is only a procedural law and therefore it applies to all penalty proceedings as on 1st April, 1971 and that therefore, jurisdiction being a matter of procedure, it is the ITO who is competent to levy penalty. Suffice it to say that the law with regard to jurisdiction is not procedural but substantive. It is only laws like laws of limitation that are procedural. Questions like jurisdiction of the Officer and quantum of penalty are substantive laws. So in this case it is the IAC who had jurisdiction to levy penalty. The ITO should have referred the case to the IAC for imposition of penalty. So we dismiss the appeal preferred by the ITO because the penalty was levied by the ITO who had no jurisdiction to levy the penalty in this case. The AAC was right in the view he held. The cross objection is dismissed because we do not propose to go into the question of fact. 5. In the result, the appeal and the cross objection are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 61 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... pany was distributed the section would apply, but if no part of the assessable income was distributed the section would have no application. A Court must always avoid as far as possible giving an utterly absurd interpretation to a section drafted by the legislature unless a Court looking to the plain and grammatical language used has no other option except to give such a construction. But in this case I am satisfied that the legislature has not used such language as necessarily to drive the Court to so anomalous a conclusion. Therefore, in my opinion, the section has application, whether there is no distribution at all or whether there is distribution of less than 60 per cents of the assessable income. 8. We think, we should adopt the same principles in interpreting this section. We are, therefore, of opinion that the assessee would be entitled to the allowance under s. 24(1)(ix) even though the concerned property was vacant throughout the year. 9. The appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 60 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... that the individual in computing whose income the income referred to in that clause is to be included shall be the husband or wife whose total income excluding the income referred to in that clause is greater. As per this Explanation the ITO has to find out whether the husband or wife has the greater total income before any inclusion is made under s. 64. As given above, the assessee s husband undoubtedly has higher income before such inclusion. Therefore, the ITO was correct in adding the income of the wife in the husband s hand. We are unable to accept the interpretation put on this section by the learned CIT. 4. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 59 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... is not liable to be penalised simply because he submitted an application under s. 271(4A) of the IT Act, 1961. 13. Thus, after appraising the entire material on record, I am satisfied that the omission of the assessee to declare his overtime allowance in his original returns is attributable to the salary certificates issued by the Bank. Since the Department has failed to prove that the conduct of the assessee was dishonest or contumacious or that he was motivated by a malafide design to escape the income-tax liability, the AAC has rightly cancelled the penalties for the assessment years under consideration. The impugned orders are, accordingly upheld. 14. It may also not be out of place to mention here that, in similar circumstances, the Department has dropped the penalty proceedings in the case of another employee, Shri Vidyadhar Sharma. There is no goods reason to give a different treatment to the assessee in the present case. 15. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 58 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
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... ... ..... uisition of these ornaments. 10. It was submitted on behalf of the assessee by Shri Jain that this amount represented sale proceeds of Kardhani which he had sold to society Jewellers. The receipt was with the department. To our mind, the addition would have to be sustained because this amount represented sale of only one item. While the assessee s explanation before the Income-tax was that the assessee had received ornaments from his parents and in laws at the time of his marriage which took place more than 20 years back and he sold them because they had become obsolete. One fails to understand as to why the assessee could not indicate the source clearly of this one single item. There being no satisfactory evidence on record to indicate the source of acquisition of this ornament, the amount has therefore to be treated as income from undisclosed sources. The addition of this amount, therefore is upheld. 11. In the result, both the appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 57 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
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... ... ..... y in support of its contention while the authorities relied on by the Departmental Representative does support his contention. The Departmental Representative also referred to another observation in Kanga and Palkhivala s Commentry on the decision of Rajendra Narayan Bajanja Deo vs. CIT 2 ITC 82, that although no time limit is prescribed for issue of demand notice, it has to be issued within reasonable time, it is interesting to note that in the foot note of commentary another decision of Subha rao vs. ITO (1963 48 ITR 808) has been referred to, in watch it is held that no time limit is laid down by the statute that notice of demand must be issued within a reasonable time. As a matter of fact in that decision challenge as to the validity of demand notice issued about four years after assessment order was made was rejected as having no force. 12. In the circumstances, I reject the legal objection raised by the assessee in this case. In the result the appeal is partly allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Demand and penalty - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... ious notice in writing of the intended proceedings and of the cause thereof or after the expiration of three months from the accrual of such causes . A perusal of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Public Prosecutor, Madras v. Raju, 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J 410) (S.C.) AIR 1972 S.C. 2504 makes it clear that the learned judges pointed out that section 40(2) as it stood then cannot be interpreted so as to confine it only against the Government officers. This amended section has obviously been introduced to get over the difficulty created by the Judgment of the Supreme Court. In the instant case, the alleged evasion of duty and the issuance of the show cause notice were prior to the introduction of the amendment to section 40(2). We may also mention that a similar view has been taken by one of us in W.P. 2600 of 1974 dated 27th February, 1976 and we see no reason to take different view in this case. 6.For these reasons, the writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100.
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1976 (4) TMI 55 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Prosecution - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... rder complained of. At the same time to expect that the complaint should be filed after the departmental proceedings under Rule 223(A) are over would be asking the department to do the impossible. But the situation cannot be remedied as things now stand. It is presumable to get over the prescription of limitation contained in section 40(2) of the Act that the Parliament has now amended the sub-section to make it clear that the time-limit mentioned in the sub-section will be applicable only to proceedings other than suit taken against the Central or State Government or an Officer of the Central Government for anything done under the Act. 8.For the reasons already stated, the acquittal of the accused by the trail court is sustained. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. 9.Before parting with the case I would like to say that Mrs. Hamsala Rajendran, who was appointed amicus curiae has made a thorough study of the papers and presented the case of the accused in an excellent manner.
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1976 (4) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Valuation billing price - Scope of - Post-manufacturing Expenses - - Equalised freight - Wholesale cash price - Precedents
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1976 (4) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Prosecution - Awarding of inadequate conviction ... ... ... ... ..... for an offence under Section 9(2) which was not on the statute book at the time of the commission of the offence. Under the circumstances, the plea of guilty made by opponent No. 1 is of no avail. The order of conviction must, therefore, be set aside but a re-trial must be ordered. The matter will not go back to the trial Court and there will be a re-trial on the same facts under the appropriate provisions of law which was applicable at the material time. The case will be tried by a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who imposed the ridiculously low fine which have rise to the present revision, namely, a Magistrate other than Mr. M.K. Solanki. 5. The order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Magistrate is set aside. The matter is sent back to the trial Court for re-trial in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. The trial Court is directed to complete the trial within three months from the date of the receipt of the writ.
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1976 (4) TMI 52 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Deduction For Co-operative Society ... ... ... ... ..... be decided not on the basis of the provisions of the section dealing with it, but on commercial principles. The Tribunal keeping this legal position in view as a fact found that the income derived from the disputed heads comes within the ambit of profits and gains of business carried on by the assessee. No direct material has been placed before us on behalf of the revenue to challenge this position. Once such a finding is accepted, the assessee becomes entitled to relief under section 81(i)(a) of the Act, that is, the conclusion which the Tribunal arrived at, and we see no justification to take a different view. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it was legal and justifiable for the Tribunal to hold that the income derived by the assessee by way of interest on securities and fixed deposits came within the provision of exemption under section 81 of the Act. We make no direction for costs. N. K. DAS J.--I agree.
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1976 (4) TMI 51 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assets To Minor Child, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... remote one and it could not be said that that income arose directly or indirectly from the transfer of the assets. The learned judges were of the view that there was no nexus between the transfer of the assets and the income in question and in that view, it was held that it cannot be said that that income arose directly or indirectly from the transfer of the assets referred to earlier. In view of the time lag between the dates of cash gift of Rs. 90,000, the purchase of the house property and the subsequent sale eight years later to Tirupathi Devasthanam, we are unable to say that there is proximate connection between the income derived by sale of the house and the cash gift made by the assessee. Therefore, having regard to the ratio in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Prem Bhai Parekh, we uphold the order of the Tribunal and answer the question in the negative and against the Commissioner of Income-tax, but in the circumstances without costs. Question answered in the negative.
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