|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 14 of 14 Records
-
1950 (9) TMI 24 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ard. The court-fee labels have not been affixed to the post card. They have been affixed to a blank sheet of paper to which the post card has been stitched. The Court-fees Act does not require that the document itself should be stamped. In this respect the provisions of the Court-fees Act seem to be slightly different from the provisions of the Stamp Act. The Court-fees Act only requires the payment of requisite court-fee in respect of the document. This condition has been fully satisfied in the present case. The post card, stitched to the sheet of paper upon which court-fee labels for the requisite fee have been affixed, confers sufficient authority upon the learned counsel to file the appeal. The post card does not authorise the learned counsel to do any act on behalf of the appellant other than the act of filing the appeal. The appeal was, therefore, properly presented when it was handed over to the Officer on Special Duty. For the rest, another Vakalatnama has been filed.
-
1950 (9) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... act that there is no long standing practice of the Court, the question does not arise. (4) Poverty or inability to pay full court-fee at the time of filing an appeal can be regarded as a sufficient ground for the exercise of the discretion of the Court in special circumstances but not otherwise. B. Malik, C.J. 29. I fully agree with the answers proposed and have nothing to add. K.N. Wanchoo, J. 30. I agree and have nothing to add. Piayrelal Bhargava, J. 31. I also agree that the questions referred to the Full Bench be answered as proposed. Mushtaz Ahmad, J. 32. I concur. 33. By the Court.--The questions referred to the Full Bench are answered as follows 1. No. 2. No. 3. In view of the fact that there is no long standing practice of the Court, the question does not arise. 4. Poverty or inability to pay full court-fee at the time of filing an appeal can be regarded as a sufficient ground for the exercise of the discretion of the Court in special circumstances but not otherwise.
-
1950 (9) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... e is no indication at all as to how this liability of the Bombay firm in favour of the assessee arose. In proceedings under section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act no assessment can be made unless it has first been found as a fact that the amount sought to the assessed was the income of the assessee. In the absence of any finding that this amount was income it is obviously not assessable to Income Tax at all. The question whether it would be assessable in the year in question or not does not therefore, arise. Further, in view of this finding, it is not necessary to decide the first question whether the issue of notice under section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act was legal. As a result we answer the reference on the second question in the negative and hold that it has not been proved that this sum of ₹ 15,000 was the assessees income liable to be assessed to Income Tax. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1950 (9) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to 10 is liable under such a charge for the arrear rates. A charge which is created under Section 167, Bengal Municipal Act, becomes enforceable against the property only after a suit properly framed is brought for enforcement of that charge. The present suits are not of that description. No such suit had been brought by the pltf. municipality & the latter is not entitled to enforce a charge against the property in the hands of defts. 4 to 10 in the present suit. 17. The result, therefore, is that the decrees as passed by the lower appellate Ct. are set aside as the pltf. is not entitled to get a declaration in the present suits that the decrees obtained in money Suits 19 & 16 of 1940 had created a charge on the holdings concerned. 18. The appeals are accordingly allowed & the suits dismissed with costs in all the Cts. (One set of hearing-fee for the two appeals in this Ct.). S.C. Lahiri, J. 19. I agree. 20. No separate order is necessary on the cross-objections.
-
1950 (9) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... plts. have succeeded on certain of the points urged by them against the findings of the learned Judge and on other points they have failed. But the fact remains that they have induced this Court to set aside the order of dismissal which the learned Judge passed against them. To that extent the appeal has been successful and it must in some measure be rewarded with costs. In our opinion, the fairest order for costs which we can make is that the resps. will pay to the applts. 'half the costs of the appeal. With regard to the costs of the suit which have been awarded against the pltfs., that order of costs will be set aside and the learned Judge when disposing of the suit will also dispose of the question of the coats of the suit. Bhagwati, J. 30. I concur. As regards the question of privilege, I only wish to reaffirm what I said in my judgment in Chamarbaghwalla v. Parpia, AIR1950Bom230 , which has found approval in the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice.
-
1950 (9) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... ot; Learned counsel has referred us to the Income-tax Enquiry Report, Chapter III, Section 1B, and has urged that the main object behind this amendment was to put an end to the practice of fathers transferring property in the names of their minor children or their wives with the object of reducing the liability under the Income-tax Act. We do not think we can take the help of the Report when the language of the section does not appear to create any real difficulty. Cases of fathers trying to avoid their liability may be more frequent than cases of mothers trying to evade liability in the same way, but there is no reason why the section should be so interpreted as to apply only to a male when it is capable of being applied both to a male and a female. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The minors' shares of profits in the firm of Messrs. Baijnath Madan Lal can be included under Section 16(3)(a)( ii) in the mother's assessable income.
-
1950 (9) TMI 18 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er of Income- tax having once admitted the appeal and passed an order under sub-section (2) of the Section 30 of the Act, can re-consider the question, whether the appeal is time-barred, at the time of the hearing of the appeal? Our answer to the second part of the question is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax is not debarred from re-considering the question whether the appeal is time-barred merely because he has passed an order under sub-section (2) of the Section 30 of the Indian Income-tax Act admitting it and the answer to the first part is that where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax has admitted the appeal under Section 30(2) of the Act, a subsequent order of dismissal, after notice was issued to the assessee fixing a date and place for the final hearing of the appeal, is an order under Section 31 of the Act. Under the circumstances, the assessee is entitled to its costs which we fix at ₹ 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1950 (9) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... should have decided the case on merits and the dismissal for default cannot be said to be a hearing of the appeal and its determination. The word "determination" must mean a decision on the points raised in the case and not merely an order of dismissal for default. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal for default. If it wanted to have the right to dismiss the appeal for default, it ought not to have issued a notice to the assessee that if he did not appear, the case would be heard and determined in his absence. The assessee was not bound to engage counsel and he might have felt well satisfied that the merits of his case were such that the Tribunal, merely by looking into the order under appeal, would decide the case in his favour. In the view that we take of this question, question No. (2) formulated by the Tribunal does not arise and we express no opinion on that question. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
-
1950 (9) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... evenue may transfer any case from any one Income-tax Officer to another. Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the re-issue of any notice already issued by the Income-tax Officer from whom the case is transferred." Learned counsel for the assessee has urged that the officer to whom the cases were transferred was not an Income-tax Officer but had authority to make assessment orders under the Excess Profits Tax Act only. No such question was raised either in the application or in the statement of the case and so far as we know, the Income-tax Officers are authorised to exercise jurisdiction, in addition to their own duties, under the Excess Profits Tax Act. In view of the provisions of Section 5(7A) of the Indian Income- tax Act quoted above, our answer to this question can only be that no fresh notices were necessary. The department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1950 (9) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... touched by certiorari. The third head of arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents must, therefore, also fail. In my judgment the first of the two points raised by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the appellant must prevail for reasons stated above. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal and the second point, namely, whether a writ of this nature can lie against the Provincial Government, does not arise. In view of the fact that the Government of India Act, 1935, has been repealed and the provisions of our Constitution on this point are different from those of the Government of India Act, the question has also become academic for future purposes and I express no opinion on it. I, therefore, agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this appeal should be allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below should be set aside and the petition should stand dismissed. I also agree to the order for costs made by my Lord the Chief Justice. Appeal allowed.
-
1950 (9) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fact remains that the entire loss of ₹ 10,947 was written in the books as having been incurred in the accounting year and from what the contention of the assessee has been all along and from what has been said by the Commissioner in his statement of fact it is clear that none of these losses were accounted for in any year before the accounting year. On the whole we have come to the conclusion that the assessee is, in the circumstances of this case, entitled to a set-off of his losses in the third shop against the profits made by the assessee in the other two shops, and our answer to the question formulated by the Commissioner is in the affirmative. Let a copy of our judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar be sent to the Commissioner of Income-tax. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference as certified by his counsel. The counsel for the Department is entitled to a fee of ₹ 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1950 (9) TMI 13 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tute so interpreted that can only be cured by legislation, and not by an attempt to construe the statute benevolently in favour of the Crown. The interpretation of the learned Additional District Magistrate is not warranted by the scheme of the Act and the language of Rule 18. Such an interpretation leads to injustice and absurdity. In Mt. Hasinabai v. Shrikishandas(3), it was held that where one construction leads to absurdity and the other makes the statute logical, the latter construction is to be preferred as every effort should be made to make sense and not nonsense of legislation. The applicant, in our opinion, was not liable to pay tax. He did not contravene the provision of Section 8 of the Act and his conviction is illegal. We set aside the judgments of the two Courts and acquit the appli- cant. Fine, if paid, will be refunded. Accused acquitted. (1) 1902 1 K.B. 388 at p. 396. (3) (1947) I.L.R. 1947 Nag. 402 A.I.R. 1948 (2) (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 100 at p. 122. Nag. 60.
-
1950 (9) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... laintiff was described in the plaint as The Official Liquidator, Himalaya Bank Ltd., in liquidation. In allowing amendment of the plaint Edge, C.J., (Enox, Blair, Banerji, Burkitt . and Aikhan, JJ., concurring) said In my opinion, if there was a defect in the description of the plaintiff in the suit originally, the amendment did not bring a new plaintiff into the suit, and did not bring into operation section 32 of the Act XV of 1877. Section 179 (a) of the Act reproduces section 144 (a) of Act VI of 1882, and section 32 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, corresponds to section 22 of Act XV of 1877. That being so, Muhammad Yusuf v. The Himalaya Bank Ltd. governs the present case and I allow the petitioners to amend the claim petition so as to bring it in conformity with the requirements of section 179 (a) of the Companies Act, 1913. As the point that I am deciding was not conceded on the last date of hearing I award Rs. 50 as costs against the Bank to Pandit Shiv Ram Sharma.
-
1950 (9) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meetings and Proceedings – Chairman of Meeting and Proxies ... ... ... ... ..... arty, according to the chairman, after these exclusions obtained 793 votes in favour of the resolutions while the plaintiffs party obtained only 106. If the excluded proxies are added, the votes in favour of the plaintiffs party will be 767, i.e., 106 plus 661, while the votes obtained in favour of the resolution by the defendants party would be 793 minus 230 leaving a balance of 563. The resolutions therefore must be taken to have been defeated. It follows from this result that the plaintiffs are entitled to the declarations asked for and they are also entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the first defendant company from giving effect to the said resolutions and defendants 4 to 7 from acting as directors of the first defendant company. The appeal therefore must be allowed and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit must be set aside and there should be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs as prayed for with costs here and in the Court below.
|
