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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 34 of 34 Records
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1959 (8) TMI 44 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... able. That being the position, under S. 14(5) of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, any sum payable under S. 14--amount of cess is payable under the said section--may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. That being so I do not think there is any substance in this contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner. (29) In the result, therefore, having regard to the view I have taken on the question as to whether or not the government has the power to levy cess under S. 14 for a period prior to the date of the notifications by which the said cess is levied, these petitions should succeed. There will, be an order quashing the notifications dated 9th April 1956, 15th October 1957 and 12/13th February 1958, so far as they relate to the period to the date on which they were issued. The petitioner will get the costs of these petitions. Advocate's for ₹ 100/-. One set of costs allowed. H. Hombe Gowda, J. (30) I agree. (31) Petitions allowed.
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1959 (8) TMI 43 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can exercise this power under section 33B only if the selfsame point could not have been raised in the appeal pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In my opinion there is no scope for any such interpretation in the absence of anything to that effect in the statutory provision itself. That point might have application in a case where the Assistant Commissioner has already disposed of the appeal from the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer, as has been held in the Supreme Court's decision cited above--but it has no application to a case where the appeal is pending before the Assistant Commissioner and it had not been disposed of by him. In these circumstances I find that there was no restriction in this case on the Commissioner exercising the powers under section 33B of the Income-tax Act and I agree with the Hon'able Chief Justice that the point under reference should be answered in favour of the department. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (8) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, when a statute confers a power on an authority and imposes a duty on it to be a judge of its own cause or to decide a dispute in which it has an official bias, the doctrine of bias is qualified to the extent of the statutory authorization?
Whether the Chief Minister by his acts and speeches disqualified himself to act for the State Government in deciding the dispute
Held that:- The entire scheme of the Act visualises, in case of conflict between the Undertaking and the operators of private buses, that the State Government should sit in judgment and resolve the conflict. The Act, therefore, does not authorise the State Government to act in derogation of the principles of natural justice.We cannot, therefore, accept the argument of the learned Counsel that the Chief Minister is part of the department constituted as a statutory Undertaking under the Act.
We hold that the Chief Minister was not disqualified to hear the objections against the scheme of nationalisation.
The judgment of this Court conclusively decided all the questions raised in favour of the respondents, and if the order of the Regional Transport Authority was set aside and the appellants were given another opportunity to make their representations to that Authority, it would be, as the High Court says, only an empty formality. As their vehicles have already been withdrawn from the routes and replaced by the vehicles of the Corporation, the effect of any such order would not only be of any help to the appellant but would introduce unnecessary complication and avoidable confusion. In the circumstances, it appears to us that as the appellants have failed all along the line, to interfere on a technical point of no practical utility is "to strain at a gnat after swallowing a camel ". We cannot, therefore, say that the High Court did not rightly exercise its discretion in this matter. The appeals fail and, in the circumstances, are dismissed without costs.
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1959 (8) TMI 41 - BIHAR
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... ... ..... earlier, few publications could properly be excluded under this definition. If there is a weekly or a monthly, let us say, devoted entirely to the publication of short stories, dealing solely with Puranic lore, that would perhaps not qualify for registration as a newspaper within the definition of the Post Office Act, as such matter would not be political or other news , or articles relating thereto, or to other current topics . It does not appear that any of the publications mentioned in the orders of the courts below could properly be excluded as not coming within the scope of the definition in the Post Office Act. 5.. The result is, the Board would uphold the contention put forward by the petitioner and set aside the orders of the courts below, disallowing the deduction to the extent of 15 per cent. of their claim for deduction on account of the sale of these publications. This order will govern also Cases Nos. 41 and 42 of 1959, with which it was heard. Orders set aside.
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1959 (8) TMI 40 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erits ex Parte he was mislead into thinking that in any case the Tribunal would consider the judgments of the two lower authorities and give reasons for its decision. He could not possibly anticipate that the appeals would be dismissed for default. Hence the petitioner appears to have been prejudiced by the order passed by the Tribunal. But there is no invalidity or defect in the notice which has been issued in Form XXV which is in conformity with rule 58. The application must be allowed on the simple point that once the Tribunal informs a party that his appeal will be disposed of on merits even if he fails to appear, it cannot dismiss the appeal for default, thereby causing him serious prejudice. 8.. The application is therefore allowed, the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal dated 22nd April, 1958, is set aside and he is directed to restore the appeals to his file and dispose of the same according to law. There will be no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1959 (8) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... I am unable to hold that this is a procedure which is fatal, and one which renders the assessment void. Inasmuch as the assessment is now held to be valid, in so far as gross turnover and the taxable quantum is concerned, the question of penalty follows almost as a matter of course. All that is necessary is for the Commercial Tax Officer to satisfy himself that there was no reasonable explanation forthcoming for the absence of registration. He has mentioned in his assessment order that there was no explanation forthcoming, for the assessee had neither put forward any objection in pursuance of the notice under Form VI, nor appeared at the hearing. In my opinion, therefore, the Commercial Tax Officer was entitled to impose the penalty. The result is that the assessment order appears to me to be perfectly valid and does not call for interference. The application is dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. No order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... engal Immunity Co., Ltd. v. State of Bihar(1), was a case where the Supreme Court was called upon to issue a writ of prohibition and not a writ of certiorari. There the proceedings sought to be initiated were wholly without jurisdiction and the petitioner objected at the earliest moment to his being launched upon a long career of litigation before he reached the highest Court. There a question of the right of the State to impose the tax and the jurisdiction therefor of the officer concerned was involved. I agree that the mere existence of an alternative remedy does not necessarily preclude the exercise by this Court of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. But when a person has started on a course of proceedings which ultimately would lead to this Court, it would not be proper for it to interfere at an earlier stage. On this ground I think the writ petition ought to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dimissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Power of court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... I do not think, therefore, that any useful purpose will be served by giving a finding on this issue. The result of the above discussion is that the petition of the official liquidator succeeds. I, therefore, order rectification of the register of members of Messrs. C.R.E. Wood and Company Limited, New Delhi, respondent No. 1, and I direct that the names of respondents Nos. 10 to 13 be removed from the register of members of Messrs. C.R.E. Wood and Company Limited, and the name of the People s Insurance Company Limited (in liquidation) be restored with effect from the date of the alleged transfer of the 780 shares which stood in the name of the petitioner-company. I also order respondents Nos. 2 to 9 and respondents Nos. 10 to 13 to refund to the petitioner-company such dividends, if any, as might have been received by them on these shares. The costs of this petition are assessed at Rs. 500 which shall be borne by respondents Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 and by respondents Nos. 10 to 13.
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1959 (8) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... dispute. On the other hand, the respondent-company is mysteriously hinting at conspiracies and frauds in the taking over of the assets of the Rayalaseema Constructions and the formation o,f the present respondent-company and in regard to which they did not examine either Mr. C. P. Venugopal or Mr. Morarka, though opportunity was given to the respondent-company to examine them, if so advised. Therefore, I hold that this is not a case of bona fide disputed debt. The respondent-company is directed to be wound up under section 433 of the Indian Companies Act, I appoint the official liquidator as the liquidator. The petitioner will get his costs of this petition from the assets of the respondent-company. The respondent will take out his costs from the company. Advocate s fee Rs. 500 on each side. Before parting with this appeal, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Messrs. V.C. Gopalaratnam, A. R. Krishnaswami and V.V. Raghavan for placing all the relevant authorities before me.
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1959 (8) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... om the court in which the prosecution is pending. (4)In respect of possible claims or civil liabilities, however, relief can be granted even in advance under sub-section (2) of the section without the proceedings being started. (5)While dealing with cases of apprehended claims the powers of the court from which relief is claimed are the same as the powers which the court would have if the proceedings for the enforcement of the claim are actually started before it. As has already been shown, in the present case no relief is being claimed in respect of an apprehended claim. Sub-section (2) of section 633 is therefore not attracted at all. It does not apply to a case of an apprehended criminal prosecution. As no proceedings are pending against the applicants in this court no relief can be granted to them by this court under sub-section (1) of the section. The application of the applicants thus appears to be misconceived and cannot succeed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1959 (8) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Share capital - Further issue of 1371, Reduction of, Reduction of share capital – Application to Tribunal for confirming order, objections by creditors, and settlement of list of objecting creditors, Director – Disclosure of interest by, Compromise and arrangement
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1959 (8) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... (1) and (2) of section 372 of the English Act of 1929, and with reference to sub-section (2) of that Act, it was held in Barry and Staines Linoleum Limited, In re 1934 1 Ch. 227 1934 4 Comp. Cas. 196, and in Gilt Edge Safety Glass Limited, In re 1940 1 Ch. 495 1940 10 Comp. Cas. 244, that the court had the power to relieve against an apprehended prosecution. The same view was taken by the Orissa High Court in Orissa Jute and Cotton Mills Ltd., In re 1956 26 Comp. Cas. 218. I therefore hold that sub-section (2) of section 633 is wide enough for this court to grant relief against an apprehended criminal prosecution. In the circumstances of this case I relieve petitioners 1 to 11 of criminal liability on account of the default referred to, but only on condition that the duties enjoined by the provisions in question are performed within a period of six months from this date. If, for some unavoidable reason, this time proves insufficient, application may be made for further time.
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1959 (8) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the sum of ₹ 7,50,000 is a revenue receipt liable to tax?
Held that:- The answer to the referred question should be in the negative. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed, the answer given by the High Court to the question is set aside and the question is answered in the negative. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (8) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Natural justice - Adjudication proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ion 35 of the Act in order to arrive at a proper decision. 20.To sum up, the appellate authority, namely Respondent No. 2, had acted in violation of the principles of natural justice when he did not hear the petitioner before pronouncing his judgment. He shall also be deemed to have acted arbitrarily when he did not at all apply his mind to the various question of law and fact which had been raised by the appellant in the appeal. Such an error can be rectified by this Court by setting aside the order and directing the appeal to be heard afresh on merits. 21.The petition is hereby allowed and it ordered that a writ of certiorari be issued to quash the order, dated 7-11-1956 of the Deputy Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad, Respondent No. 2. It is further ordered that the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order, dated 1-3-1956 of the Superintendent, Respondent No. 1, shall be deemed to be still pending which should be heard and disposed of in accordance with law.
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