|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 60 Records
-
1963 (11) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... merely stated that he saved by earning in several ways and that he was keeping it in cash on hand. He did not even obtain any receipt for the amounts which he advanced. He had some property till about 1956, which he had sold away and at the time of his examination, was living on the support of his nephew. The statement of Krishnamurthi is not much different. He has no records. He advanced the amount on account of friendship and faith. There was no stipulation with regard to the payment of any interest. He was unwilling to disclose what his sources of earning the money were. Peculiarly enough, the assessee is the only person with whom he had any money dealings. Having read the evidence of these witnesses, it will suffice to state that even if this evidence had been tendered earlier, the department could not have reached a different conclusion. In the result, the question is answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1963 (11) TMI 83 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... from doing--that is, to formulate precise rules for the guidance or embarrassment of business men in the conduct of business affairs. There never has been, and I think there never will be, much difficulty in dealing with any particular case on its own facts and circumstances; and, speaking for myself, I rather doubt the wisdom of attempting to do more." The plain fact in the present case is that there has been a capital expenditure on certain structures made under the terms of the lease, and the fact that the lease was initially for the short period of two years, though renewable at option, cannot change the nature of this capital expenditure into a revenue expenditure. I, therefore, consider that the view taken by the authorities was correct and that the question referred to us for decision must be answered in the affirmative. The Commissioner will have his costs from the assessee. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. DULAT J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1963 (11) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... decide was whether a person admittedly in possession can be dispossessed by executive action when such executive action is not founded on any law, and the decision proceeded on the provisions of Art. 31 (1) of the Constitution. We do not wish to examine the question which these decisions have considered, because, in our opinion, possession of the respondents cannot be said to constitute any right against the appellant, having regard to the fact that the properties in question originally belonged to the appellant and had been granted by the appellant to the predecessors of the respondents, unless the effect of the terms of the grants is duly determined. That being so we must hold that the High Court was in error in issuing a writ against the appellant and in favour of the respondents in the writ petitions from which the two appeals arose. 14. The two appeals are accordingly allowed, and the orders issued by the High Court are set aside with costs throughout. One set of costs.
-
1963 (11) TMI 81 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is difficult to see how this decision can assist us in determining the question which arises on the present reference. In this case the Court was concerned with the limited question as to whether water pumps could be said to be agricultural implements. The question was not whether water pumps could be said to be machinery used in agriculture. The question which we have to consider is, however, an entirely different question, namely, the true connotation of the expression "machinery used in the manufacture of goods" and on that question this decision unfortunately does not throw any light. 8. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, humidifiers sold by the applicants under their bill No. 117 dated 30th October, 1960, are covered by Entry 15 of Schedule C and not by Entry 20 of Schedule C and the question referred to us will, therefore, be answered accordingly. The respondent will pay the costs of the reference to the applicants. 9. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (11) TMI 80 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is transferred. There is nothing in the context of section 12B(1) of the Act to indicate that the word "transfer" should not be interpreted in a comprehensive meaning including both a transfer by act of parties and a transfer by operation of law. Our attention has been drawn to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shrikrishan Chandmal , where a Division Bench observed as follows at page 840 "'Capital gains' include profits or gains arising from a sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset. A compulsory acquisition by the Government of some property may not constitute a sale; but it would be a 'transfer' and the profit obtained by the transferor on such transfer would be capital gains." As already stated, we are also inclined to take the same view. In the result, the reference is answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1963 (11) TMI 79 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... are equivalent to the assets as on April 1, 1957 (the date on which the Act came into operation) have been taken into consideration. As pointed out by Lord Denman C.J. in Queen v. Inhabitants of St. Mary Whitechapel , a statute is not retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The assets of an individual on April 1, 1957, alone are liable to wealth- tax, but they must necessarily include the assets acquired by him in the previous year. For these reasons, I hold that the Act does not suffer from any of the constitutional infirmities urged on behalf of the petitioner. I also hold that the assessment for the year 1957-58 is valid. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are accordingly answered in the negative and question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative. There shall be one consolidated hearing fee of ₹ 200 (Rupees two hundred) payable to the opposite party. R.K. DAS J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (11) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tors who may on occasions be in possession of more than 100 mds. of foodgrains grown in their fields. If a cultivator produces more than 100 mds. in his fields or otherwise comes into possession of such quantity of foodgrains once in a year and casually sells them or stores them, the Order apparently did not want to make such possession, sale or storage liable to be punished under cl. 3(1) read with s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. However that may be, having regard to the words used in cl. 3(2), we are unable to hold that the Judicial Commissioner was wrong in coming to the conclusion that cl. 3(2) by itself would not sustain the prosecution case that the respondent is a dealer under cl. 3(1); and that inevitably means that the charge under s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act is not proved against him. That being so, we must hold that the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Commissioner is right. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... thin the four corners of the statute, or may be gleaned from the underlying policy of the Act. If we are satisfied that, in the scheme of Indian Income-tax Act, the department has not been clothed with the powers of taxing an association or the individual members in a naked arbitrary fashion, we must uphold it as being constitutional. It seems to us that, properly understood, the charging section does not confer any despotic power on the department to treat associations differently and tax with unequal hands or to adopt one mode or the other governed only by its will. There is sufficient indication in the scheme, design and policy of the Act to fetter free and unbridled taxing power. We are, therefore, of opinion that the challenge on the Act is unsustainable. In the result, these writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. The petitioner will pay the costs of the department in W.P. No. 1374 of 1961. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Petitions dismissed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in making the valuation of the firm" for determining the share to be paid to the retiring partners, did the arbitrator overstep the limits of his authority under the agreement of reference?
Held that:- The primary duty of the arbitrator under the deed of reference in which was incorporated the partnership agreement, was to value the net assets of the firm and to award to the retiring partners a share therein. In making the "valuation of the firm". his jurisdiction was restricted in the manner provided by paragraph-13 of the partnership agreement.
The specific use of the expression by the arbitrator that he had included the depreciation and appreciation of various items of property and the procedure followed by him including the orders therefore clearly establish that the expression used by him was not a mere surplusage. It is clear that the arbitrator has included in his valuation some amount which he was incompetent, by virtue of the limits placed upon his authority by the deed of reference, to include. This is not a case in which the arbitrator has committed a mere error of fact or law in reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his adjudication.
For the reasons set out by us in dealing with the first plea for setting aside the award, and that plea having succeeded, we do not think it necessary to enter upon the respective contentions of the parties on the second ground. Accordingly hold that the award was properly set aside by the Courts below. Appeal dismissed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d. In the case of the last assessment covered by W. P. No. 1104 of 1960, the provisional demand was for a sum of Rs. 6,45,204. I have stated that the families are opposed to the principles of devolution of property brought about by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. It should follow that the assessment in this case is liable to be quashed. Equally, the demand which again has not given effect to the provisions of section 31 and the penalty imposed in this regard have to be quashed. The result is that the validity of the assessments relevant to the first two deaths is upheld. But the orders imposing penalty do not comply with the law, and are quashed. Both the demand and the penalty in this case of the second assessment have to be quashed for failure to comply with the requirements of section 31 of the Act. In the case of the third death, the assessment demand and the order imposing penalty are all quashed. There will be no orders as to costs in any of these petitions.
-
1963 (11) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an application under s.13 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 is not maintainable against the State of Punjab?
Whether under s. 13 of the Act a "displaced creditor" could make a claim against the Government either of the State or of the Union, subject to the limitation of one year referred to in the opening words of the provision?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. High Court was right and that the revision petitions were properly rejected.
-
1963 (11) TMI 73 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ries with it the power to legislate on all matters which are ancillary or subsidiary to the main subject and merely applied that principle to the different situations arising in those cases. The principle of course is clear and cannot, as we have pointed out above, be disputed but the question is what result does the application of the principle give in the present case. There our answer is that section 26(3) does not for reasons which we have given, represent an exercise of ancillary or incidental power under the relevant legislative entry and must, therefore, be struck down. In this view of the matter we must declare section 26(3) as ultra vires the State Legislature in so far as it purported to tax allotment of goods of a firm amongst partners on dissolution. Our answer to question No. (1) will, therefore, be in the negative and question No. (2) will not arise. The applicant will pay to the opponents costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 450. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (11) TMI 72 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... for which the ban was lifted. The same reasoning must govern the decision of the present contention urged by Mr. M. M. Thakore based on section 46 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, and it must be held that inter-State sales effected during the period 1st April, 1951, to 6th September, 1955, can be taxed by the State by reason of the enactment of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, provided those sales otherwise come within the charging provisions of the Act. The sales effected by the assessee in the present case were, therefore, rightly included in the taxable turnover of the assessee and the Tribunal was right in rejecting the claim of the assessee for deduction in respect of those sales. In the result our answer to question (b) will be in the affirmative. So far as question (a) is concerned, as we have pointed out above, it is not necessary to answer it. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (11) TMI 71 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 2 K.B. 403 at 414., it is observed as follows I think it is clearly established in Attorney-General v. Clarkson 1900 1 Q.B. 156. that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked to in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that, subsequent legislation, if it proceeds upon an erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter that previous legislation but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Venkataratnam v. Sarvarayudu 1963 1 An. W.R. 91. For the reasons which we have endeavoured to give we are satisfied that there is no substance in these petitions. These petitions, therefore, are dismissed with cost. Advocate s fee Rs. 750 to be distributed amongst all the petitioners equally. Petitions dismissed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 70 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wers when it disclaimed its competence to entertain the appeals on the ground that the amount of penalty has not been deposited to enable the appeals to be entertained by it. The Tribunal would be deemed to have declained its jurisdiction to hear the appeals properly preferred when it refused to enter into the merits, because it held that it has no power to do so as tax includes penalty and that the penalty has not been deposited. In my opinion when it has erred in so refusing to exercise the jurisdiction which it has, writs of certiorari and mandamus must be issued by this Court. In the result, the orders passed by the Tribunal refusing to entertain the appeals without the penalty being deposited, are hereby quashed and in cases where the appeals have not so far been refused to be entertained, direction is given that the Tribunal would hear the appeals without insisting on the deposit of penalties. In view of the circumstances, I make no order as costs. Ordered accordingly.
-
1963 (11) TMI 69 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... phasizes the concept of the chargeability to tax being saved by the proviso. The repealed Act operated to fix the liability on all the dealers whose turnovers exceeded a particular figure, its central theme thereof being the imposition of tax on the sellers as also the purchasers of commodities covered by that Act. From whichever angle the matter may be viewed, the conclusion is inescapable that the proviso protects all obligations incurred by virtue of purchases or sales made under the repealed Act. When once that is saved, it is open to the department to quantify that obligation or liability by making the assessment and to collect it and, in the event of failure in making the payment, to have resort to the machinery set up for the collection of the tax. We, therefore, see nothing illegal either in assessing the petitioner to tax or demanding the payment thereof. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 68 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aid down by the Legislature and amounted to performance of the legislative function. The Legislature has not used such words. It is contended that such words should be read into the section. I can see no justification for reading such words into the section when the Legislature in its wisdom did not use them and I find it impossible to say that these words are there by necessary implication. For the court to read into the section words to the effect that the tax would be at such rate as was needed by the Corporation to meet its needs, would, in my judgment, amount to legislation and usurping the functions of the Legislature. The same is the position as regards the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933. 11.. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the levy of a cess by way of sales tax under section 11 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933, cannot be made. Judgment accordingly. 12.. The petitions are allowed as above. No costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... at right. The right of proceeding in revision was not a right conferred by the Constitution upon the dealer. Had it been a constitutional right, the Legislature would have been bound to provide that right, and even if it had not provided that right by statute the dealer would have been entitled to file a revision application. The right to file a revision application not being a fundamental right, it is not possible to hold that the requirement calling for the security before that right could be exercised amounted to a restriction upon any fundamental right. Accordingly, the question referred to us must be answered in the negative. We direct that a copy of this judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax. As no one has appeared on behalf of the respondent, the parties shall bear their own costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 50. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1963 (11) TMI 66 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n to the petitioners to prove that the purchases in question are exempt from taxation. The burden placed on the assessees by that proviso is only to prove that the transactions which are otherwise exigible to tax are exempt from taxation for any reason, e.g., to prove that a purchase transaction is not a last purchase or a first purchase as the case may be. There is no presumption that all transactions put through by a dealer are exigible to tax and consequently it is for him to prove that they are not liable to be taxed. For the reasons mentioned above, these petitions are allowed and the tax imposed on the petitioners to the extent dealt with above is set aside. In other words, the petitioners are not liable to pay any tax on the transactions claimed by them as having been put through as selling agents. The Assessing Authority will accordingly modify the orders of assessments. Revenue to pay the costs of the petitioners. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (One set). Petitions allowed.
-
1963 (11) TMI 65 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... g no other entry applicable to such an article in any of the Schedules to the Act, the residuary entry, namely, entry 22 in Schedule E, would apply to such an article. The Tribunal, therefore, in our view was not correct in applying entry 4 in Schedule D to the Act and in disagreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner, so far as this article is concerned, was right in his view that it would be the residuary entry, namely, entry 22 in Schedule E to the Act, which would apply. In the view that we take, our answers to the three questions referred to us are as follows Question No. 1.-In the negative. Question No. 2.-In the negative. Question No. 3.-The sale of embroidered pieces of cloth therein mentioned would be covered by entry 22 in Schedule E to the Act and not by entry 4 in Schedule D. The petitioners in reference No. 8 of 1963 will pay to the State of Gujarat the costs of both the references. References answered accordingly.
|
