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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 95 Records
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1963 (4) TMI 89 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... considered opinion, as indeed, I am not called upon to do so, on the tenability of the claim. It may, however, be stated that, as contended by Shri Awasthy, a case for exemption has to be made out by the assessee on whom the onus lies and exemptions from taxes have also to be construed liberally in favour of the revenue and against the taxpayer; they attract a rigid construction against the claimant and in favour of the taxpayer. The contention pressed on behalf of Shri Sikri that the charitable nature of the exemption claimed is apparent on the face of the record is difficult to uphold because it is a matter to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each assessment. In the end, Shri Sikri has half-heartedly thrown a suggestion that the petitioner is in any case a local authority but this contention was not persisted in. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but with no order as to costs. MEHAR SINGH J.--I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 88 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ase that renewal may be either repair or reconstruction, and renewal is repair only if it is restoration of, or replacement of, subsidiary parts of old machinery. If, on the other hand, there is replacement of the entire machinery or substantially the whole of it, it is a case of renewal of machinery and not repair. In our opinion, the principles of law laid down in that case govern the present case also and for the reasons elaborately given in that case we hold that the amounts of ₹ 34,306 for the assessment year 1953-54 and ₹ 14,095 for the assessment year 1954-55 incurred for replacement of the old and worn out sleepers by new ones were rightly treated as revenue expenditure by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1963 (4) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t it is a composite factory Which runs several industries one of which falls under Sch. I, it is likely that the increased rate may be made applicable to the factory as a whole. We ought to add that Mr. Pai conceded that subsequent to the decision of the appellant's writ petition in the High Court, the tiles industry has also been included in Sch. I.. but the revised rate has been made applicable to it. Mr. Pai contends that if the factory is treated as falling under s. 1(3) (1), a distinction should be made in the different industries run by the factory for the purpose of calculating the contribution of the employer to the Provident Fund. We do not propose to deal with this contention in the present appeal. That is a matter which may well have to be decided by the respondent, and it is not open to Mr. Pai to request this Court to decide such a hypothetical question in the present proceedings. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is of that type, then it may be that the City Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to deal with it and only the Court of Small Causes would have jurisdiction to do so in view of s. 28. As however no argument was advanced by counsel for the appellants on the basis of s. 51 nor the facts necessary for its application appear on the record, I do not feel called upon to express any opinion on the matter. I only draw attention to it to show that if the question does arise that has not been argued nor decided in this case. I think it also right to point out that it may be a moot question whether the appellants, having on their own statement entered into an agreement to defraud, in a manner of speaking, the superior landlord of his rights arising under the Act from an unlawful sub-letting, can be permitted to say that the real transaction between them and the respondent was a sub- tenancy. For these reasons I concern the order' proposed by my brother Das. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 85 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... From this case, I think it may be deduced that you cannot test the question whether the payment is properly a capital or a revenue payment by seeing whether it can be shown to be productive." That settles the point on the authorities. In conclusion we make a bare reference to a recent judgment which we delivered in this court in I.T.R. No. 10 of 1960, Liberty Cinema v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1964 52 I.T.R. 153, where we have discussed other authorities on legal expenses and it is not necessary for us to repeat those discussions in deciding the particular short point raised in this reference before us. On the authorities therefore and on the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the negative and hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 4,680-13-0 cannot be claimed as a revenue expenditure in the year of account. There will be no order as to the costs of this reference. LAIK J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t had in his petition pleaded the case that the order though in the form of determination of employment was intended to be one of dismissal as a matter of punishment and the form was adopted merely to conceal the true object of the Board, it would have given opportunity to the Board to meet that case and to produce all the evidence in that Connection in their possession. The question raised is one primarily of fact and it was never raised, nor explored in the High Court on proper pleadings. It would be taking the Board by surprise to allow the appellant to make out this new case at this stage. We therefore refuse to consider the question whether the order passed against the appellant pursuant to the resolution dated October 18, 1954 was for dismissal of the appellant from the service of the Board, as a punishment for misconduct. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 83 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll implications of the notice, the notice was still vague and invalid so far as the other share-holder such as the French Company was concerned, as the Court has as much to look to the interest of the absentee share-holders as those of the dissentient share-holders as the resolution passed in the general meeting binds them both. This approach-in the present context is purely academical. The French Company did not care to attend the meeting nor has it filed any objection that it was misled or prejudiced by any such notice on account of the absence of a proper explanatory note. In view of my finding that the explanatory note covered both the items and there was possibly nothing further to be added to it, no such question does arise for consideration. 65. Thus the contentions regarding the invalidity or insufficiency of notice and the consequent invalidity of this resolution regarding further issue of 39,000 shares cannot be accepted. 66. The appeal must accordingly be allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of any breach of the rules of natural justice. The conclusions of the departmental officers were fully borne out by the evidence before them and the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order either on the ground that the "approach to the evidence was not consistent with the approach in a criminal case," nor on the ground that the High Court would have on that evidence come to a different conclusion. The respondent had also ample opportunity of examining his witnesses after he was informed of the charge against him. The conclusion recorded by the punishing authority was therefore not open to be canvassed, nor was the liability of the respondent to be punished by removal from service open to question before the High Court. The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. The petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The order as to costs passed by the High Court will stand. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 81 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... em and which we have already dealt with, we have not found it necessary to consider the merits of the further contention urged by them. We have, therefore, heard no argument on the said contention and do not express any opinion with regard to the same. In the view that we are taking, the petitioners are entitled to have the notices of demand issued to them by the Income-tax Officer quashed and they are also entitled to a further order requiring the respondent not to take any further steps or proceedings in the enforcement of the said notices of demand. We accordingly order that the notices, which have been complained of by the petitioners in the present petition, be quashed and the respondent be directed not to take any further steps or proceedings in the enforcement thereof. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs from the respondent in Miscellaneous Petition No. 229 of 1962. There will be no order as to costs in the companion Miscellaneous Petition No. 230 of 1962.
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1963 (4) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly contention before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that as the business of Hindusthan Plastic Co. was being closed, the goods of that concern were purchased at the price which they paid for them. On the facts available to us, it appears that the burden or liability of the Hindusthan Plastic Co. was taken over by the assessee ; the partners of the assessee were also the partners of the Hindusthan Plastic Company ; and the transaction resulted in deflation of the profits of the assessee. The Supreme Court has said that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal must be sustained if it is found that on the evidence the Tribunal arrived at the correct conclusion. In the present case also, on the evidence adduced before the tax authorities, their conclusion appears to me to be justifiable. In the result the answer to the question raised must be in the affirmative. The applicant shall pay to the respondent the costs of this reference ; certified for counsel. Sen J.-I agree.
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1963 (4) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed summarily, as already stated, but by rejecting this application the Income-tax Officer could not clutch at jurisdiction to make the assessment under section 23(4), which the law does not give him. The action of the Income-tax Officer, therefore, in making the assessment under section 23(4) was clearly without jurisdiction, in the facts and circumstances of this case, and therefore that assessment order requires to be quashed. For the reasons given above the assessment order dated 19th November, 1962, is directed to be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The Income-tax Officer is further directed to proceed to make the assessment by assisting the petitioner to summon the books or if the Income-tax Officer so desires by deputing his Inspector or some other Income-tax Officer to Delhi to inspect the account books and then to make an assessment in accordance with law. The petition is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200. Petition allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re clearly beyond the period of one year. But then, as would be seen from sub- clause (ii) of clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25, the Commissioner has power to admit a revision application filed beyond the period of limitation on being satisfied that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the prescribed period. It cannot, therefore, be said that a writ, if granted by this court, would necessarily be infructuous. Nor can we go into the question of sufficiency of the cause for not filing the revision applications within the prescribed time. Consideration of that question would fall within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. In the result, the order of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (respondent herein) made on 30th January, 1962, is quashed and the respondent is directed to dispose of the revision applications filed by the petitioner in accordance with law. The respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioner.
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1963 (4) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that point and that might be the explanation for the state of affairs. The last of the points urged was that the award had not referred to or decided the claim of the appellants to relief from the respondents or some of them on the ground that they had misappropriated the moneys of the company and were, therefore, bound to bring the money back into hotch potch for division among the parties. The absence of any provision in regard to this claim is capable only of one interpretation and that is that arbitrator rejected the claim. It is, therefore, an instance where the silence of the award is a clear indication, having regard to the adjudication being professedly complete and de praemissis, that the claim in that respect was not upheld. This would not render the award incomplete. We consider therefore that none of the three points urged in challenge of the validity of the award on the ground of its incompleteness has any substance. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (4) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... respect of that part of the contract which was abandoned,. if any liability to pay interest had arisen it was for the respondent to claim it in settling the terms on which cancellation of the contract was to be made. In respect of the goods which had been returned by him, he could claim compensation for breach of warranty, but such compensation could not include interest as damages for detention of money. Interest was therefore allowed on a view of the law which appeared on the face of the award to be erroneous. This appeal must be partially allowed and the award of the umpire set aside in so far as it awards interest amounting to ₹ 68,833/12/3 and incidental expenses amounting to ₹ 1,25,000/-. The award in so far as it awards ₹ 1.32,417/10/- for loss suffered by the respondent in the matter of 6,34,270 packets of cigarettes is not liable to be set aside. In view of the partial success, there will be no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed in part.
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1963 (4) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ms to us that while framing r. 12 the rule making authority lost sight of fact that subs. 2 of s. 16 contemplates a reference not by the insurer but by the Corporation. Learned counsel urged that we should not place an interpretation upon the rule which will leave a serious lacuna in the working of the act. We-appreciate his contention but there is no escape from the result. The proceedings before the Tribunal were misconceived because the only way in which they could be initiated was by a reference by the Corporation and there was no such reference. No question of limitation arises because the period within which an insurer Must move the Corporation to make a reference has not yet been prescribed as required by sub-s. 2 of s. 16. It will be open to the Appellant to move the Corporation under s. 16(2) after such period is prescribed. In the result we quash all the proceedings before the Tribunal but in the particular circumstances make no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... object in view investigation, except with the previous permission of a Magistrate, is not permitted to be made by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Where however, a Police Officer makes some preliminary enquiries, does not arrest or even question an accused or question any witnesses but merely makes a few discreet enquiries or looks at some documents without making any notes, it is difficult to visualise how any possible harassment or even embarrassment would result therefrom to the suspect or the accused person. If no harassment to the accused results from the action of a Police Officer how can it be said to defeat the purpose underlying s. 5A ? Looking at the matter this way, I hold that what Mathur did was something very much short of investigation and, therefore, the provisions of s. 5A were not violated. Since no irregularity was committed by him there is no occasion to invoke the aid of the curative provisions of the Code. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 73 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... id suit. But at the same time, as observed earlier, the standard of a reasonably prudent man is expected of every litigant who comes to Court to have his controversy adjudicated upon with the result that approach to a Court lacking in jurisdiction etc. has to be measured with the yardstick just mentioned. Section 14 can thus hardly help a party guilty of negligence and undue indifference and inaction which seems to be the case before us. 8. For the foregoing reasons I am unable to differ from the order of the Court below and must in agreement with it hold that the plaintiffs have not succeeded in showing good faith and due diligence in approaching the Court in Kheri and in prosecuting the proceedings there. In this view of the matter it is hardly necessary to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the decision on issue No. 2. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but, without any order as to costs. R.P. Khosla, J. 10. I agree.
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1963 (4) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for him. Ordinarily this Court does not interfere in the matter of sentence in appeals under Art. 136 but we think in the circumstances disclosed in the present appeals when the officers and servants of the Board including the highest officer were behaving as if the moneys of the Board were their private property and the misappropriation took place mainly because the appellant was obliging these officers and servants of the Board, that the sentence already undergone by the appellant would meet the ends of justice. We ought to add that Mr. Mathur who appeared for the respondent State did not feel justified--and we think rightly-in pressing for the confirmation of the reduced sentence passed by the High Court in appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeals with the modification that the sentence m each case is reduced to the period already undergone. The appellant, if on bail, shall be discharged from his bail bonds in respect of these appeals. Appeals dismissed. Sentence reduced.
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1963 (4) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent in the first case was delivered on January 29, 1960, and that in the latter case on February 10, 1960. We are making these observations with a view to emphasize the fact that the question which has been raised for our decision in the present appeals was not raised, nor argued, in the case of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur and cannot, therefore, be said to have been decided even incidentally only by reason of the fact that amongst the departments which were held to have been pro- perly included in the award was the education department of the Corporation. If we had been satisfied that the said judgment had. decided this point, we would either have followed the said decision, or would have referred the question to a larger Bench. In the result, the appeals are allowed,, the orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal arc set aside and the petitions filed by the respondents under s. 33 C (2) of the Act are dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... XXII and did not purport to be under r. 9 of the said Order as well and that no specific prayer was made for setting aside the abatement. The limitation for an application to set aside abatement of a suit does start on the death of the deceased respondent. Article 171, First Schedule to the Limitation Act provides that. It does not provide the limitation to start from the date of the appellant’s knowledge thereof. The stand taken by the appellant was absolutely unjustified and betrayed complete lack of knowledge of the simple provision of the Limitation Act. In these circumstances, the High Court cannot be said to have taken an erroneous view about the appellant’s not establishing sufficient ground for not making an application to bring on record the representatives of the deceased respondent within time or for not making an application to set aside the abatement within time. We, therefore, see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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