|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 95 Records
-
1963 (4) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it was an agricultural implement it was irrelevant to consider whether it was predominantly used for this purpose or not. When it was irrelevant to consider whether an agricultural implement could be used for another purpose or not it was also irrelevant to consider whether it could be predominantly used for another purpose or not. None of the cases relied upon by Sri C.S.P. Singh supports him in his contention that centrifugal water pumps are agricultural implements. Our answer to the question is no . We direct that the copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the Court as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., shall be entitled to his costs of this reference from the assessee which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1963 (4) TMI 48 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s, authority to sell goods belonging to the principals or to purchase goods on their behalf, is a dealer. This definition will show that the commission agent employed by a dealer is included in the term dealer and a dealer or his commission agents are t two different persons. Faced with this situation Mr. Doabia merely contended that sales tax was paid on these goods by the commission agents. This contention is t borne out from the record. On the other hand, in paragraph 5 of the petition it is clearly stated that sales tax on these goods was paid and this fact is t denied in the return filed by the State. In this view of the matter the provi- sions of section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act do t come into play. That being so, the order of the Assessing Authority is quashed and the assessment of the petitioner under the proviso to section 5(2)(a)(ii) is set aside. The tax, if paid, should be refunded. The petitioner will have his costs, which are assessed at Rs. 50. Petition allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 47 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... passed the assessee is given an opportunity to submit a complete and correct return and to prove that the return submitted by him is complete and correct. If he fails to avail himself of this opportunity it is his own fault and he cannot now be heard to say that in spite of his failure no best judgment assessment can be made. It is not necessary to give him any further notice. Whatever he could do if he were given a further notice could and should have been done by him at the proper time. Our answer to the question is in the affirmative. We direct that the copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the Court as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the assessee shall pay Rs. 100 as costs of this reference to the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. Counsel s fee is assessed at 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1963 (4) TMI 46 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nity had been granted to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed decision to cancel the certificate of registration. So far as this ground is concerned, the same reasons must prevail as have prevailed with regard to the certificate under the State Act, i.e., the reasons for accepting the third contention against the order of cancellation of the certificate of registration granted under the State Act. Therefore the cancellation of the registration certificate granted under the Central Act must be quashed with the direction that the certificate be only cancelled after the petitioner has been given a proper opportunity of showing cause why it should not be cancelled. For the reasons given above, this petition is allowed, the orders of the Assessing Authority cancelling both the registration certificates granted under the State and the Central Acts are quashed. In view of the difficult nature of the matter involved, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... scable, that is to say, making an order of confiscation and offering to release them on payment of penalty. Such an order without giving an opportunity to the person affected is opposed to the plain terms of section 42 and the rules. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned Additional Government Pleader that rule 37 supports the view taken by the Board. Rule 37 deals with the position contemplated by the second proviso to section 42(3) of the Act, that is to say, the stage at which penalty is substituted for the order of confiscation. In this case, at no stage of the proceeding was a notice issued to a proper person, that is to say, the person affected. The view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is unexceptionable and the setting aside of that order by the Board has proceeded, to our minds, upon a misunderstanding of the correct legal position. The appeal is allowed and the appellant will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Appeal allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 44 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... medicines shall not be liable to be taxed except . It is this distinction between the two sets of words that was lost sight of by Sri Jagadish Swarup when he advanced the contention. The notification applies only to medicines manufactured in Uttar Pradesh and not to others which are left to be governed by section 3. The medicines sold by the assessee not being medicines manufactured are not governed by the notification and must, therefore, be governed by section 3. The second limb of the question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. Copies of this judgment should be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The costs of the reference should be borne by the parties, but counsel s fee may be assessed at Rs. 100. ASTHANA, J.-I agree and have nothing to add. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (4) TMI 43 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ault in payment of the tax cannot be attributed to contumacious conduct on his part, would become subjected to the penalty under section 13(2). We do not think that there could be any such doubt. The default in payment of the tax may be due to dishonesty, stubbornness, or mere whimsicality. Whatever be the reason, once the payment is not made in accordance with the requirements of sub-section (1), the liability under sub-section (2) to pay the additional amount (which is designated as a penalty) is incurred. This liability to pay the additional amount by way of penalty, being part of the law governing the payment of the tax is, by virtue of section 9(3) of the Central Act, applicable to a dealer under this Act who fails to pay within the prescribed time, irrespective of whether such default is or is not attributable to contumacious conduct. For the reasons above stated, the contentions urged by the petitioners fail and this revision petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 42 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... mount in dispute can be determined, the question of the petitioner paying five per cent. fee thereof does not arise and the fee payable is only the minimum of one rupee. 3.. It is now well-settled that a writ of certiorari can be issued not only in cases of illegal exercise of jurisdiction but also to correct errors of law apparent on the face of the record. The error of law committed by the learned Tribunal is apparent on the face of the record. He completely overlooked the Explanation as embodying the meaning of the words amount in dispute . 4.. The order of the learned Tribunal must therefore be quashed. The petitioner is entitled to a refund of the amount of fees, if any, paid in excess of the required amount in accordance with law. In the result, the application is allowed, the order dated 27th February, 1962, of the learned Tribunal is quashed and a writ of certiorari be issued as directed. Parties to bear their own costs. NARASIMHAM, C.J.-I agree. Application allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... arbitrary refusal. No doubt, the exercise of power under the proviso is discretionary. But, where a statute entrusts a taxing authority with such discretionary power, the discretion must be exercised according to law and reason, and neither arbitrarily nor according to whims. The petitioner states that he furnished security. But there is not a word in the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner to show that he paid any attention to the security furnished and on what grounds be declined to grant the prayer. If the security is furnished, and the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied about its sufficiency, he is expected to grant stay in terms of the proviso. It seems to me that, in this case, as the order of the Deputy Commissioner shows, he declined to exercise the power entrusted to him by the proviso to subsection (4) of section 33. The petition is allowed. The Deputy Commissioner is directed to dispose of the stay petition of the petitioner afresh. No costs. Petition allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... were produced before us in this connection and they clearly show that the f.o.b. and shipping charges were separately indicated in the bills in addition to the cost of the goods such charges so separately indicated would not form part of the sale price as defined in the Act. The C Form declarations furnished by the purchasing dealer are therefore correct in the sense that they declare the value of the goods purchased by that dealer. The learned Additional Government Pleader concedes that since the bills set out these shipping charges separately, they would not form part of the sale consideration and their non-inclusion in the C Form declarations is not therefore a vitiating circumstance. It follows therefore that the declarations are valid and no defect exists which justifies the rejection of the claim to the concessional rate of tax under section 8(1) of the Act. The petition is allowed. The assessees will be entitled to their costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... et requisites should be taken as referring only to objects of the same kind or nature and not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. A hairpin could not be treated as of the same category, as it could not be used either for cleansing or beautifying the body. It is only used for holding the hair. We therefore feel that the words toilet requisites should be given a restrictive meaning and should not be taken to include every kind of goods, but only goods of the nature enumerated in item 51. It may be pointed out here that the State also has thought fit to delete the words toilet requisites and cosmetics from the articles mentioned in item 51, by Amending Act 6 of 1963. We therefore agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that the hairpins cannot be included in the list of items enumerated in item 51, and that the turnover relating to hairpins should be assessed under item 23 only. The revision is therefore dismissed with costs, Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... separately dealt with in the Central Act 58 of 1957. Now coming to the legislative practice, in the Finance Act No. 13 of 1960, it is mentioned that sugar means any form of sugar containing more than ninety per cent. of sucrose the word sugar means any form of sugar in which the sucrose content, if expressed as a percentage of the material dried to constant weight at 105 Centigrade, would be more than ninety. Hence I have to conclude that both sugar and sugar candy were the subject-matter of legislation in Central Act 58 of 1957........ We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Mysore High Court upon this question. We have also expressed our independent conclusion upon the matter, that is to say, that sugar which was exempted by the notifications of the State Government did in the context in which the exemption was granted take in sugar candy. The petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it ignores the other part of the section whereunder the liability to pay over to the State is cast in respect of amounts collected in a transaction which does not admit of the collection of any tax under the Act. The underlying principle of the section is where a dealer purporting to exercise a right conferred upon him to pass on a tax collects an amount which he designates as a tax even when the transaction is not one subject to the levy of tax, he has nevertheless to pay over the amount to the State, and in this case we have pointed out that the tax was clearly one calculated upon this sale transaction and the sale price, and though styled as tax paid to the first seller, it was in fact not so. The order of the Tribunal has misconceived the factual position, which has not been controverted during the course of the arguments by the learned counsel. The order of the Tribunal is set aside. The petition is allowed there will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... al order in revision is made by the Board within that period of four years, the Board loses the jurisdiction to make any order in revision. Conformably to that decision of ours, if section 34(2)(b) is to be construed as preventing the exercise of the power of revision by the Board even by the mere filing of an ineffective appeal far beyond the period of limitation, it seems to us that this power of revision would be rendered almost nugatory as we said once before, any assessee can effectively prevent the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by merely filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation. That could not be the intention of the Legislature in making use of an expression of a positive kind, viz., has been made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal . We accordingly hold that, in the circumstances, the jurisdiction in revision was properly exercised by the Board. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 35 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 13 or any law. The section therefore confers wide and unrestricted powers on the Sales Tax Officer to resort to the mode of recovery prescribed under the section despite the pendency of another proceeding in the Certificate Court. The Sales Tax Officer is not bound to treat what was granted under the instalment order as the only money payable. Reliance was placed on a single judge decision of the Calcutta High Court in Elbridge Watson v. R.K. Das 1951 19 I.T.R. 538. This decision was set aside by a Division Bench decision in Union of India v. Elbridge Watson 1951 20 I.T.R. 400. Further on facts the Commissioner of Sales Tax held that the department never agreed to grant instalments in favour of the petitioner. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot take a different view. 5.. Both the contentions fail. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee of Rs. 100 (rupees one hundred). NARASIMHAM, C.J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cifically provided under section 5 itself, and the reference to section 3 in that part of the section which deals with the rates of tax is only intended to refer to the goods in respect of which different rates of tax are levied. Though the rates specified in section 5 are no doubt identical with the rates set down in section 3, the tax in the case of such dealers is imposed by section 5, which is the charging section. The argument of the learned counsel that the non obstante clause confers a right upon the assessee, even though he is registered under the Central Sales Tax Act, to the benefit of taxation at the compounded rates under section 7 does not conform to the pattern of the taxation which sections 3, 5 and 7 lay down. We are therefore satisfied that the Tribunal rightly held that the petitioner was not entitled to the privilege of taxation at the compounded rates of levy under section 7. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tilised in other processes resulting in a product which the dealer sells. It seems to us therefore that the profit motive is inherent even in the purchase transaction. Learned counsel argues that if a dealer purchases kerosene oil for illuminating his premises and if kerosene oil should be taxable on purchase, it would be illogical to tax a dealer when the goods are used for the purpose of his consumption. This illustration certainly does not fit in with the present picture. In the case of such a dealer it is his domestic consumption that is contemplated and it is not a purchase as a dealer. If that distinction is borne in mind, the purchase which necessarily goes into the composition of the goods that he sells is in the course of the business as a dealer and has undeniably the necessary profit motive therein. It follows therefore that the assessment in the present case was correctly made. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.
-
1963 (4) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e that the word used in the notification should be understood not according to its popular meaning but according to an artificial meaning. The notification does not become a part of the Act and it cannot be said that only the Legislature was competent to define words used in it and that the State Government had no power to do so. The State Government certainly has no power to define words used in a statute and it has not claimed to exercise such a power by making rule 2(d-1). Our answer to the question is, therefore, in the negative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 100. The counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (4) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wool does not include woollen cloth and, therefore, it cannot be said that all kinds of cloth are not included in serial No. 2. We are unable to accept the contention of Sri Jagadish Swarup that the sale of canvas cloth by the assessee is not covered by entry No. 2 of the notification dated 8th June, 1948. Our answer to the question is as follows The word goods in the two notifications refers to and qualifies canvas also. Canvas cloth as distinct from goods made out of canvas, is not covered by entry No. 9 of the notification. Canvas cloth is covered by serial No. 2 of the notification dated 8th June, 1948. We direct that copies of this judgment be sent to the Judge (Revisions) and the Sales Tax Commissioner, U.P., under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of Court as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The assessee shall pay costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. The counsel fee is also fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1963 (4) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... les laid down in the cases cited above, we hold that the appellant is not a trader or dealer doing any business as such. He is not offering any goods for sale and, as stated already, there is also no transfer of property involved in the transactions. In Benjamin on Sale, 8th Edition, page 163, the difference between a contract of sale and contract for work is well brought out by an illustration. It is stated The difference may perhaps be illustrated by a man who goes to an artist and says Paint my portrait, and one who goes into an artist s studio or an art shop and says Sell me a picture . In the present case, the customers go to the appellant s studio and say Prepare a design, paint a picture and touch the slides . It cannot be said that there is any contract for sale of goods. The appellant cannot therefore be called upon to pay sales tax on these transactions. The appeals are accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in T.C. 131 of 1962 only. Appeals allowed.
|
