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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 95 of 95 Records
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1963 (4) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to effect an exchange or barter. It is clear from the facts of this case that the disputed turnover relates to sale of brass sheets by the assessee to its customers. During the course of the transactions there is an element of sale both at the time when the assessee receives copper scrap from the customers and when the assessee returns brass sheets to them, with only the latter of which we are here concerned. The assessee s counsel further contended that the transactions should be treated as works contracts and relied on the decision in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd.(2) We do not think it necessary to discuss it as the principles laid down in that case will not, in our opinion, be applicable to the facts of this case. We therefore agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the disputed transactions are sales liable to be assessed under the Act. The revision is accordingly dismissed with costs. (Court fee Rs. 100). Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te sale in order to enable the authorities to verify the factum of such sale, for it is only on that being established that the claim to refund becomes eligible. It is true that the expression used in section 5-A(5) is where a tax has been levied . But in the context of the provision, it seems to us that it must really be understood as where a tax has become leviable . If a transaction inside the State has attracted the levy of tax and a subsequent interState transaction has entitled the assessee to the refund of the State sales tax, he has to furnish the necessary statement as prescribed, and unless the conditions prescribed are complied with, the claim to refund must fail. We are therefore satisfied that it is not open to the assessees, to claim that they can wait till an assessment is actually made under the State sales tax law before they need press the claim to refund. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll specify the class or classes of goods for the purposes of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act. If specification is needed, that object is not certainly served by using words of generic import. In that sense the certificate of registration was irregular and called for amendment. I turn now to the last argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Under section 15 of the Act, the Commissioner can delegate his power, in writing, to any person appointed under section 3 to assist him. Under rule 71, made under the rule-making powers conferred by the Act, the Commissioner can delegate the power of amending a certificate of registration to the Commercial Tax Officers. Therefore, the Commercial Tax Officer has the power to amend registration certificate. That being so, the last argument made on behalf of the petitioner must fail. In the result this Rule must be discharged with costs, hearing fee assessed at three gold mohurs. Rule discharged.
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1963 (4) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n anyone aspect of the matter. They examined the terms and pointed out that if the assessee failed to supply the flower, or if the flower was destroyed before it was picked or damaged after it was stored, the assessee was not entitled to payment of any kind. It was only on the supply being made in fulfilment of the terms of the contract that he was entitled to payment. The fact that he had to collect or that he had to store or that he had to transport were all subsidiary incidents leading to the actual supply and sale of the goods. It was only the final incident, viz., the supply, that entitled the assessee to payment. From these terms, the learned judges concluded that it was a sale transaction. It seems to us that the principle of that decision is no less applicable to the facts of this case. We are accordingly satisfied that the Tribunal reached the correct conclusion in the matter. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er, the assessee should file it within one year from the date of order, and the Commissioner would be entitled to pass an order on that application even beyond the period of one year. Section 33B which provides for the Commissioner s powers of revision against the order passed by the Income-tax Officer is also similar to the provisions of section 33A. We do not think that the decision in Kadirvel Nadar v. State of Madras, T.C. No. 17 of 1959, lends any assistance to the learned Government Pleader in contending that the Board has powers in the instant case to pass the order beyond 4 years from the order of the Commercial Tax Officer. The language of section 34 is express, explicit and mandatory, and it is quite clear that the instant order of the Board offends the provisions of section 34 of the Act. In the result the appeal is allowed. The order of the Board of Revenue is set aside. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondent. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ption that is given to the dealer under section 7(1) of the Act has to be exercised at the commencement of the year at the time the dealer submits the return. It is made dependent upon the permission being granted by the assessing authority and on the further condition that he pays the tax in advance. The conclusion therefore seems to be inescapable that it is not open to the dealer to wait till the end of the year and to ask at the time of his final assessment that his tax liability should be computed on the basis of section 7. We are, therefore, of the view that it was not open to the Tribunal to have directed the assessment of the dealer under section 7 of the Act when he had not exercised his option in the manner indicated above. The order of the Tribunal is accordingly set aside. The assessment of the assessee in this case will therefore follow the mode of normal assessment under section 3 of the Act only. There will however be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es for determining when a sale is said to take place outside a State and not for any other purpose ..... we hold that sub-section (2) of section 4 was not enacted for determining which is an appropriate State to collect the tax in the case of a sale falling under clause (b) of section 3. In the light of the above, it is clear that the Tribunal having held that the sales in question were inter-State under section 3(b) erred in bringing to aid section 4(2)(a) or 4(2)(b) in determining the appropriate State. The Tribunal also failed to note that if appropriation to the contract is to have the effect of transferring the property and resulting in a completed sale, such appropriation should be unconditional, which is not the case here. It follows that the order of the Tribunal in so far as it determined that the Madras State is the appropriate State has to be set aside. This revision petition is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred only). Petition allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 22 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... scretion. 5.. It was open to the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, while hearing the second appeal to examine the propriety of the order of the Assistant Commissioner on the materials available and also on the additional material that he may care to admit and then to set aside that order on other grounds, if he chose, but he should not have held that the order was illegal. 6.. For these reasons the questions are answered as follows (1) The Tribunal was not right is saying that in disposing of an appeal under section 23(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, the Assistant Commissioner (first appellate authority) was not entitled to take into consideration additional grounds of appeal different from those taken in the memorandum of appeal. (2) The order of the Tribunal could not therefore be maintained as valid in law. There will be no order for costs in these three cases but the reference fees deposited will be refunded to the petitioner. MISRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efore us on behalf of the State. In the view we have expressed that all the sales by the assessee to the Bangalore carpet dealer were really non-Explanation sales with reference to the Madras State, and were sales outside the State of Madras, we do not think that the State can justify the assessment of his business turnover, because of the Validation Act or because of the principle laid down in the Ashok Leyland case 1961 12 S.T.C. 379. It is conceded on behalf of the Government that, if the assessee were to succeed in his revision petitions, the petitions filed by the Government cannot be sustained. In the result, T.C. Nos. 202 and 203 of 1961 are allowed. The petitioner will get his costs from the State in T.C. No. 202 of 1961. T.C. Nos. 155 of 1961 and 22, 23 and 24 of 1962 are dismissed, but without costs. We wish to make it clear, that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions raised by the State in their revision petitions. Ordered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was not made personally against him. It follows, therefore, that no proceedings could be taken under section 24(2)(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, to collect the tax personally from the petitioner, since the liability was not personal to him. The fact that creditors, like the provision shop, who supplied provisions to the petitioner were able to obtain a decree against the petitioner personally does not help the department. The decree there is clearly based on the contract between the petitioner and the decree-holder. There is no such basis to support the recovery proceedings against the petitioner personally, in respect of the sales tax arrears due from the canteen. Though the rule asked for is one of certiorari, the proper direction should be to forbid the State from proceeding further to collect the arrears of tax personally from the petitioner. There will be a rule to that effect. The petition is allowed, as one for prohibition. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich she had obtained by transfer. In the circumstances, I think the proceedings taken against the petitioner under section 24(2)(b) do not appear to be proper. The right thing for the department to do would be to serve a demand notice on the petitioner and call upon her to satisfy them as to what were the assets of the erstwhile firm that stood transferred to her by the deed dated 1st October, 1956, and why they should not be proceeded against for the recovery of the arrears. Though the petitioner asked for quashing the proceedings, I think the appropriate direction to be given by this Court should be a rule prohibiting the department from proceeding with the recovery until they have served such a demand on the petitioner asking her to specify the assets which she had got by transfer from the erstwhile firm and to show cause why they should not proceed against. There will be an order accordingly. The petitions are allowed in those terms but with no costs. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 18 - SUPREME COURT
EXEMPTION — TEXTILE GOODS — ADDITIONAL DUTY OF EXCISE — CONSTRUCTION OF NOTIFICATION GRANTING EXEMPTION — GOODS NOT SUBJECT TO LEVY OF EXCISE DUTY UNDER CLAUSE 3, ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF EXCISE (LEVY AND DISTRIBUTION) BILL, 1957
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1963 (4) TMI 10 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Restrictions on commencement of business ... ... ... ... ..... a preliminary step it will not in any way exonerate a company from the necessity of complying with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 149, if it had issued a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for its shares as has been done in this case. The order of the Regional Director which is sought to be quashed is exhibit C dated March 31, 1962, of the affidavit of the Registrar dated July 25, 1962. The prayer for quashing the said order is not pressed before me, and does not, therefore, arise for consideration. According to the learned Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the Registrar the appellant is not entitled to a certificate under sub-section (3) of section 149 even if the company comes under sub-section (2) of that section. In the view we have taken this contention does not arise for consideration and is not considered in this judgment. In the light of what is stated above the appeal has to be dismissed and we do so with costs advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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1963 (4) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Assessment Order, Court Fee ... ... ... ... ..... ase under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act. Though it appears that there was one order of reference to the High Court and the High Court treated the case as a single case of reference, it could be said that there were in fact a number of references. The present case however originated out of one petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of various assessment orders. Obviously here, there was only one proceeding. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders for the petitioner had by a single petition challenged them all together. When an appeal is taken to this court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, it is impossible to contend that there are more appeals than one. Therefore, the appellant before us is liable only to pay one set of court-fee and other charges as in a single appeal. Action may be taken accordingly by the office, if necessary, by refunding the excess charges made.
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1963 (4) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Search - Inspection of godown ... ... ... ... ..... n Section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the learned Judge was quite wrong in rejecting the entire prosecution case on the footing that the alleged search was illegal. 7.One of the convictions was for theft of a Parker fountain-pen under Section 379, Indian Penal Code. This conviction could not possibly have been upset even upon the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Besides, the manner in which P.W. 1 had been assaulted, as set out above, could not have been an act of justification, even if the said view taken by the learned judge were correct. The learned trying Magistrate has elaborately discussed the evidence of their evidence is quite sound. I am, therefore, of the opinion that both the respondents were wrongly acquitted by the learned Addtional Sessions Judge in appeal. 8. In the result, the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is set aside and that of the trying Magistrate is restored and the appeal is accordingly allowed.
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