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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 61 Records
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1966 (3) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ln has no site and is not a roofed structure. It was a mere pit with some bricks by its sides. It is also admitted in this case that there was no structure standing on the Bhatta. Upon these facts, it is clear that the brick kiln has no walls and no roof but it is a mere pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the brick kiln leased out to the appellant, in the present case, is not a "building" within the meaning of s. 9 of the Act. It follows, therefore that the title to both the plots nos. 596 and 597 along with the brick kiln vested in the State Government with effect from July 1, 1952 and the respondents are not entitled to claim any rent from the appellant for the period from October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953. o p /o p For the reasons expressed, we hold that suit no. 1125 of 1953 filed by the respondents should be dismissed and these appeals must be allowed with costs. o p /o p Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1966 (3) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f. The appellant had claimed in para 17 of the petition that the claim of the State for recovery of the deficiency on re-sale was not covered under any other provision of law so as to make it recoverable as arrears of land revenue. That question has still to be investigated and it would be for the State to show whether the amount can be recovered under any provision of law or rules relating to forest contracts. So the matter will have to be remanded for further investigation on these lines. We therefore allow the appeal and hold that s. 155(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code does not assist the State in realising this amount as arrears of land revenue. We however remand the matter to the High Court for determining after hearing both parties whether there is any other provision of law or rules which would permit the recovery of this amount in view of the conditions of auction. In the circumstances we order parties to bear their own costs of this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... emselves in status and agreed to have a document executed for effectuating the partition. Dealing with the document, the Judicial Committee held that the document did not by itself create, assign, limit or extinguish any right or interest in immovable property but only created a right to obtain another document. The decision in Hari Sankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha , was relied upon by analogy. There an agreement in writing which contained all the essentials of the transaction of a mortgage was held to be a document hit by Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. It was held to be a document containing the bargain made between the parties and constituting a transfer of the property by way of mortgage and, therefore, it required registration. Further citation is unnecessary. 23. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the document, Ex. B-1, does not require registration. 24. In this view, no other question arises for consideration. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nication addressed to the appellant it appears to be assumed that a public servant can be punished even without proof of any corrupt practice if the cumulative evidence that he was suspected in a number of instances to be corrupt or is generally believed to be a corrupt officer, is available against him. In our opinion, the view thus expressed by the Government Order is open to serious objection. It may be that in disciplinary proceedings taken against public servants, the technicalities of criminal law cannot be invoked, and the strict mode of proof prescribed by the Evidence Act may not be applied with equal rigour; but even in disciplinary proceedings, the charge framed against the public servant must be held to be proved before any punishment can be imposed on him. 17. The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. There would be no. order as to costs.
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1966 (3) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he accounts. As regards one item, viz., rebate in marine insurance, the trial court has ordered that the plaintiff should be given credit for a small sum of ₹ 157/- though there was no evidence of fraud on the part of the defendants. The trial court has rejected the claim of the plaintiff for reopening the accounts on any other ground and in view of our finding that the legal relationship between the parties was not one of agency, we see no reason for interfering with the decision of the trial court on this aspect of the case also. For the reasons expressed, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court in O.S. Appeal No. 22 of 1955 dated the 15th December, 1959 and restore the judgment and decree of the trial Judge dated May 6, 1954 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff and granting a decree for the counter-claim of the defendants. The defendants are entitled to the costs of this appeal in this Court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd Member of the Public Service Commission, Shri Appajappa, was an ordinary B. E. Graduate with only 49.8 marks. But even if he had only 49.8 of the marks, this is not conclusive to show that he should not have been selected because the whole object of interviewing candidates is to judge their eligibility or suitability apart from the standard displayed by them in the written examination. We are unable to hold that on these facts any mala fides or collateral object has been proved. In the result the appeals both of the State and the other appellants are allowed and judgment of the High Court set aside. We may mention that some of the appellants have not prosecuted their appeals but there is no reason why they should not have the benefit of this judgment, and exercising our powers under art. 142 of the Constitution, we direct that in order to do complete justice they should also have the benefit of the judgment given by us. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the public and there should be no restraint on the publication of the report of the Court proceedings. The publicity generates public confidence in the administration of justice. In rare and exceptional cases only, the Court may hold the trial behind closed doors, or may forbid the publication of the report of its proceedings during the pendency of the litigation. Long ago, Plato observed in his Laws that the citizen should attend and listen attentively to the trials. Hegel in his Philosophy of Right maintained that judicial proceedings must be public, since the aim of the Court is justice, which is a universal belonging to all. The ancient idea found its echo in the celebrated case of Scott v. Scott( 1913 A.C. 417,). Save in exceptional cases, the proceedings of a Court of justice should be open to the public. The petitions are not maintainable, and are dismissed. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority these Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1966 (3) TMI 76 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Collector invites the criticism that he exercised his power without the application of his mind to the question whether there was sufficient cause for extension. His order makes it clear that he was of the view that there was sufficient cause, and, that statement in the order is what induces the belief in our minds that he did consider the question whether he should exercise the power or not and came to the conclusion that he should, having been satisfied that there was sufficient cause for its exercise. (45) In the view that we take, it is not necessary for us to examine the correctness or otherwise of the postulate whether, from an order made by the Collector under the proviso to Section 110(2), an appeal lies under Section 128, or a revision petition under Section 131. (46) We dismiss these writ petitions. The petitioners must pay the costs of these writ petitions to the opposite side. Advocate's fee Rupees one hundred (Rs. 100/-), one set. (46) Petitions dismissed
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1966 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
whether by disposing of the plant and machinery without permission an offence was committed and if so, by whom ?
Held that:- In our judgment both these questions must be answered in favour of the State of West Bengal. It was overlooked in the High Court that under the proviso to clause 12 of the Order of 1955 the licence, although granted before that Order was brought into force, came under its terms. The words of that proviso refer to a 'licence issued' under any of the earlier orders as something done or action taken under the corresponding provision of the 1955 Order.
The High Court erred in interfering with the conviction of the respondent. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the acquittal ordered by the High Court and restore the conviction under s. 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, recorded by the Presidency Magistrate together with the fine of ₹ 200 or simple imprisonment for one month.
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1966 (3) TMI 74 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the acquisition of gain. Nor can Mr. Government Pleader derive any assistance for his contention from the 14th bye-law since that bye-law does no more than to make provision for the disposal of a profit, if one is nevertheless made. When a canteen like the one established by the petitioner has to sell food and refreshments to the members of the railway staff at standardised rates notwithstanding the meticulous attention paid to the prescription of rates, it is not inconceivable that eventually the sales yield a small profit as they indeed yielded during two years or that the canteen incurs loss as it did incur in two other years. So, it was that the 14th bye-law, which envisaged the coming into being of a profit, without there being any motive to earn it, made provision as to how that profit should be appropriated. In our opinion, the assessments were beyond the competence of the Commercial Tax Officer and we quash them. We make no direction as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s business was rejected, he stopped that business. As the section does not prohibit the carrying on of the business, until the application for its registration has been granted, a person can carry on the business pending the disposal of that application. Hence the respondent cannot be held to have violated section 14(1)(c)(ii) by carrying on his business in the circumstances mentioned above. As for the offence under section 14(1)(c)(i), I am of the opinion that, as the deposit of the amount of tax calculated on the turnover shown in the return, is distinct from, and not an integral part of, the return itself the respondent by not depositing the tax in advance, cannot be held to have failed to submit the return of his turnover. Hence on a bare reading of this section the respondent cannot be held to have committed either of the offences and his acquittal thereunder-must, therefore, be affirmed. The result therefore is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 72 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n and whatever services are required in packing the cement, are rendered by the Associated Cement Companies Ltd. on behalf of the State Trading Corporation. The clear meaning of this contention is that the producer rendered the service on behalf of the Corporation for the consumer, and so the argument that that contention was not urged before the Commercial Tax Officer is unavailable. We therefore allow this revision petition and modify the orders made by the Deputy Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. We hold that the petitioner was entitled to the deduction of the sum of Rs. 1,24,156.95, which represented the packing charges, under the provisions of rule 6(5)(f)(ii) of the Rules. The Commercial Tax Officer will now modify his assessment accordingly and if the tax attributable to this amount has been paid, it will be refunded. The petitioner is entitled to the cost of this revision petition. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. AHMED ALI KHAN, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 71 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e without jurisdiction. I, however, agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of assessment so far as it relates to the imposition of penalty is not valid. Section 10(7) under which the Assessing Authority purports to have acted clearly provides that before imposing the penalty the Assessing Authority has to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the dealer. Admittedly, in the instant case no notice was issued to the petitioner against the action proposed to be taken under this provision of law, nor was he heard on that matter. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the imposition of penalty on the petitioner is not valid and the demand notice so far as it relates to the amount of penalty cannot be enforced against the petitioner-firm. The petition is, accordingly, accepted to this extent. The necessary writ shall issue. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 70 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been such escape. We, therefore, lean to the view that since the period of limitation within which the assessment which the Commercial Tax Officer proposed to make under section 14(6) is that prescribed by section 15 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act which had expired long before the impugned notices were issued by him, the notices which he issued were clearly beyond his competence. What flows from this conclusion is that the imposition of a penalty which the Commercial Tax Officer proposed to do under section 14(7) which is possible only while making an assessment under sub-section (6) is also not possible since the assessment in the course of which that penalty could be imposed is itself not possible. These writ petitions, therefore, succeed. We quash the notices issued to the petitioner in both these cases. We also make a further order quashing the proceedings which the Commercial Tax Officer has commenced in pursuance thereof. In the circumstances, no costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 69 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onable cause would mean a cause such as that the time given for making the payment was insufficient or that the demand notice was received very late with the result that the time left for making the payment was very short or some cause analogous thereto. As the failure to deposit the sales tax in none of these cases was due to a cause of the kind mentioned above, the respondents cannot be held to have made out reasonable cause for their failure to make the payments of the assessed tax in time and their acquittal cannot therefore be justified. The next question to be considered is as to the amount of penalty which should be imposed upon the respondents. In my opinion having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, a token penalty in each of these appeals would suffice to meet the ends of justice. I, therefore, allow all these appeals, set aside the orders of acquittal and sentence the respondents to a penalty of Rs. 50 each in all these appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 68 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thority, therefore, cannot travel beyond the order passed or proceedings recorded by the inferior authority and make fresh enquiry and pass orders on merits on the basis of the said enquiry. If it is not construed in this manner, the distinction between appeal and revision would be effaced. In the circumstances of this case it does not appear to be necessary to dilate upon the distinction between an appeal and a petition for revision as brought out in the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to above. Suffice it to say that the sanctity of the right of revision conferred by the Legislature within the scope of that right cannot be impaired by rules of the type that have been impugned in the instant case. On account of the peculiar facts of this case no interference with the impugned orders of the revisional authority is called for in this petition. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
Acquittal orders - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The acquittal of the appellant for offences he was charged with was unwarranted. We would, therefore, have, after setting aside his acquittal in each of the three cases, convicted and sentenced him under section 29(1)(d) of the Act but for the fact that when special leave was granted an undertaking was given by the State that irrespective of the result of the appeal the respondent would not be prosecuted. Probably what was meant was that the State would not press for conviction and sentence of the respondent.
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1966 (3) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Entitlement to rebate under section 5 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Considering the pattern of the transactions disclosed it leaves no room for doubt that the contracts either provided for delivery of the goods to customers outside Uttar Pradesh or at any rate for such delivery pursuant to directions given by the purchasers & the appellant is entitled to rebate in respect of the said transactions under section 5 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
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1966 (3) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... to the appellant the services of his lawyer. Since the creditor has been granted the services of his lawyer, it would be injustice to deny it to the appellant. He will therefore be entitled to the services of his lawyers during the examination to assist the officer in keeping the examination within the bounds prescribed by the court. But lawyers for neither side will have the right of general address. If the creditor agrees not to have his lawyer present, then the officer conducting the examination may exclude the presence of lawyers altogether. The order will therefore be that the appeal succeeds in part only. The order made by the court below will be sustained, with the addition that the examination will be confined within the headings set out above and that the appellant will be entitled to the presence of his lawyers at the examination, as set out above. Each party will bear and pay his or their own costs of the appeal. Certified for two counsel. Masud, J. mdash I agree.
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1966 (3) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order and Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc.
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