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Showing 41 to 60 of 61 Records

• 1966 (3) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether XXIX, rule 3, of the Code, did not provide for any penalty in case the director required to appear in court failed to do so?

  Whether the court can, as it did in the present case, strike off the defence of the appellant for the default made by its director to appear in court

  Held that:- There is nothing in Order XXIX of the Code, which, expressly or by necessary implication, precludes the exercise of the inherent power of the court under section 151 of the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a case of default made by a director who failed to appear in court, when he was so required under Order XXIX, rule 3, of the Code, the court can make a suitable consequential order under section 151 of the Code as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

  It is not necessary in this case to define the exact relationship of a director qua company. The acts of the directors within the powers conferred on them may be binding on the company. But their acts outside the said powers will not bind the company. It is not possible to hold that the director, in refusing to respond to the notice given by the court, was acting within the scope of the powers conferred on him. He is only liable for his acts and not the company. If it was established that the company was guilty of abuse of the process of the court by preventing the director from attending the court, the court would have been justified in striking off the defence. But no such finding was given by the courts below. Thus the orders of the courts below are not correct. Appeal allowed.

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• 1966 (3) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
  

  Winding up - Appeals from orders

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the winding up proceedings. It was however argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial judge had practically come to a conclusion that the case called for winding up order and as such it should be treated as a judgment and his client should be allowed to urge his appeal to show that the conclusion of the learned judge was not correct. I do not think that this argument can be acceded to. In order to find out whether the application for winding up is an abuse of the process of the court or not, the learned trial judge had to examine the respective contentions of the parties and he also had to form tentative views about the same in the circumstances of the case. Any observation then made will not, however, bind the learned company judge ultimately hearing the application. Our conclusion therefore is that the order is not appealable and as such the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Masud J.-I agree.

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• 1966 (3) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether, if proceedings were taken against the company under section 46(5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the company was deprived of the opportunity to pay the sum due to the respondent or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor within the meaning of section 434(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act?

  Whether there was a bona fide dispute in respect of the liability of the company to the joint family?

  Held that:- No doubt courts have held, in our view rightly, that a statutory notice under section 434(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act shall strictly comply with the provisions of the said section.

  In the instant case the receiver asked the debtor to pay the amount due to the joint family to the Additional Collector, Bombay, towards the income-tax due from the joint family. The debtor was not only not asked to do something which was legally prohibited but was asked to comply with the Collector's requisition under section 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. By not doing so, the company clearly neglected to pay the amount within the meaning of section 434 of the Indian Companies Act.

  In the present case, Narayanlal Bansilal was not only the karta of the joint family but was also the chairman of the board of directors of the company. In the partition suit he filed an affidavit wherein he stated from which it is manifest that the alleged dispute was not bona fide but was only a part of a scheme of collusion between the company and the karta of the joint family. There are, therefore, no merits in any of the contentions raised by the company. Appeal dismissed.

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• 1966 (3) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
  

  Proprietary interest

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... rship was not intended to be covered by this proviso. On a reading of the proviso, I am unable to accept this contention. Every partner has admittedly a proprietory interest in a partnership and if one of the partners of a firm is also a partner in another firm, he will have proprietory interest in both the partnerships. This position is not disputed. According to the proviso Where a person (which certainly includes a partner in a partnership firm) has proprietory interest in more than one factory the exemption of 20,000 sq. metres granted is to be shared between the factories. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioners that the intendment of the notification was that it was to cover only cases where the same person as opposed to a partner owned interest in two factories. I am unable to discern any such intendment from the language of the proviso. The contentions of the learned counsel fail and these two petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

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• 1966 (3) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Prosecution, confiscation and penalty (Customs) - Smuggling - Prosecution - Evidence - Confessional statement

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• 1966 (3) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Casual And Non-recurring Receipt

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... r behalf. In view of these authorities and the recitals of the instrument of partnership dated 29th September, 1954, it should be held that it did not fail to provide for the losses relating to the minor s four annas share. In any event, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Kylasa Sarabhaiah v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shah Mohandas Sadhuram, such instruments of partnership should be construed reasonably. If the instrument in this case is so construed in the light of the fact that the minor was admitted to the benefits of the partnership, the position in regard to the losses relating to the minor s share does not remain undefined or unspecified. In view of the foregoing considerations, our answer to the question referred to us is that, in the circumstances of this case, registration of the assessee-firm could not be refused. Since the assessee has succeeded, all costs of this reference shall be paid by the department. Hearing fee, Rs. 100.

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• 1966 (3) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  

  Firm - order refusing renewal of registration u/s 26A - validity

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... plated in section 23(4) is dealt with specifically in the proviso to that section whereas the case of refusal of registration or refusal of renewal of registration is to be found in the powers enumerated in sub-section (4) of section 23 and that power is attracted by special limbs of sub-section (4) of section 23. No separate notice is envisaged in the case of refusal to register or refusal renew a registration contemplated in sub-section (4). For these reasons I am of opinion that there is no merit and substance in the contentions advanced on behalf of the assessee. The facts and circumstances of the present case indicate that the assessee did not produce books that the assessee was called upon to do so. The authorities, in the facts and circumstances of the case, refused the renewal of registration and that is one of the powers conferred on the revenue authorities. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. The revenue is entitled to costs. D. BASU J.- I agree

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• 1966 (3) TMI 14 - PATNA HIGH COURT
  

  Interest - land was acquired for the assessee-company by the Govt. under the Land Acquisition Act, it can be safely presumed that the acquisition was for the purpose of the business of the company - payment of interest under consideration was in relation thereto - interest was not paid on any capital borrowed for the purposes of the business - not permissible deduction u/s 10(2)(iii).

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• 1966 (3) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  

  Computation of the assessee`s business profit - money which was paid to the trustees in the previous accounting years was not money paid. It was clearly set apart for the purpose of meeting the liability which had already ripened in the relevant accounting year - held that putting aside of the money in the previous years is not an expenditure within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv)

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• 1966 (3) TMI 12 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the loss of Rs. 47,250 was sustained in speculative transactions within the meaning of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 24, read with Explanations 1 and 2 and clause (a) of the proviso to Explanation 2 - Held, yes

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• 1966 (3) TMI 11 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  ITO not only informed the petitioner under what provisions of law he was demanding the material, but the petitioner was also informed that these statements were called for - ITO was competent to issue notice u/s 142

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• 1966 (3) TMI 10 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
  

  Compulsory Deposit Scheme - Whether, paragraph 4 of the Compulsory Deposit (Income-tax Payers) Scheme, 1963, made by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by section 5 of the Compulsory Deposit Scheme Act, 1963 is constitutionally valid - Held, yes

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• 1966 (3) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Petitioner complain that the Income-tax Officer has not paid adequate regard to section 220, sub-clause (6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act 43 of 1961), under which the Income-tax Officer has a discretion, when an appeal is pending, to " treat the assessee as not being in default in respect of the amount in dispute in the appeal ".

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• 1966 (3) TMI 8 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
  

  Voluntary Disclosure - though the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax dated 25th March, 1965, rejecting the disclosure statement is quashed, no relief can be given to the petitioner-company and the petition must, therefore, fail.

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• 1966 (3) TMI 7 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Notice u/s 147 - Whether the ITO was justified in assuming jurisdiction under s. 147(a) of the Act to reassess the income - held that ITO was wrong in determining that there has been a non-disclosure in regard to some relevant material facts and that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

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• 1966 (3) TMI 6 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Total wealth - a present liability to pay a sum of money which is ascertainable only in the future constitutes a `debt` in law - the balance amount of compensation which is to be ascertained in future u/s 39 of Act XXVI of 1948 and paid to the assessee is a debt owing to the assessee - therefore, it is an asset of the assessee which has to be included in assessing the total wealth of the assessee

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• 1966 (3) TMI 5 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
  

  Total income - includibility of remuneration received by karta of the assessee-HUF - services rendered to the firm of C and Company and the sub-partnership in which he is a partner representing the interests of the assessee-HUF - held that it is includible in total income

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• 1966 (3) TMI 4 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
  

  ITO made an order of assessment treating the income as an income from other sources - Held that service of a notice prescribed in sub-s. (2) of s. 24B of the IT Act, 1922, is not a condition precedent to the commencement of proceedings for exercising jurisdiction to assess the estate of the deceased

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• 1966 (3) TMI 3 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
  

  There was no provision under the Act or the Rules which authorised the tax authorities to spread over a number of years the expenditure incurred in the accounting year and for which the assessee was entitled to deduction under s. 5(k) - Tribunal was not justified in law in reducing the allowable expenditure

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• 1966 (3) TMI 2 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  

  Erection of plant - business in the manufacture of butynol and acetone - there was no commencement of the business of manufacture - so, amount claimed as business expenditure cannot be allowed under s. 10(2)(xv)

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