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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 66 Records
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1969 (7) TMI 102 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al of the Tribunal to refer such questions was not justified. We would have accordingly directed the Tribunal to state a case and refer those questions to the High Court which according to it are questions of law arising out of its order. 8.. Asking for a statement of the case in S.J.Cs. 99 to 102 of 1964 does not however arise in view of our order passed in O.J.C. No. 450 of 1969 heard inter partes on the identical matters. Therein we have quashed the appellate order of the Tribunal and have directed it to rehear the four appeal cases in accordance with the observations made therein and in accordance with law. As the appellate order of the Tribunal no longer exists in view of our decision in O.J.C. No. 450 of 1969 , the question of calling for further references does not arise. In this view of the matter all the eight references are discharged. In the circumstances the parties to bear their own costs. PATRA, J.-I agree. References discharged. Since reported at p. 171 supra.
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1969 (7) TMI 101 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shed by the assessee. 12.. The next question for consideration is whether we would issue a writ of certiorari quashing the appellate order of the Tribunal and directing it to rehear the matter. On a careful perusal of its judgment it seems quite clear that the case was disposed of mostly, if not only, on the basis of this rule. All the points of law raised by the assessee in S.J.Cs. 99 to 102 of 1964 were not touched in the judgment as the Tribunal seems to be of opinion that contravention of rule 12(10) was sufficient to decide the case against the assessee. Unless the case is reheard injustice would work out. We would accordingly quash the appellate order of the Tribunal by a writ of certiorari and issue a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to rehear the appeal in the light of the observations made by us and in accordance with law. The writ application is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances parties to bear their own costs. PATRA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1969 (7) TMI 100 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the evidence and circumstances of this case, we hold that panmohuri is also an oil-seed. So far as Pippali (long pepper) is concerned, no evidence is produced to show that oil can be extracted therefrom. When specifically questioned about it, Sri Mohanty, learned counsel for the respondent rightly conceded that pippali cannot be held to be an oil-seed. 7.. We accordingly answer the two questions referred to us as follows (1) Jeera, dhania, Panmohuri, methi and postak are oil-seeds, but not Pippali within the meaning of section 14 of the Central Act. (2) The communication No. 4(8)-ST/57 dated the 31st January, 1958, of the Government of India is not legally binding on the State Government, but may be taken into consideration as any other piece of evidence for deciding whether a particular article is or is not an oil-seed. 8.. The reference is accordingly answered. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. MISRA, C.J.-I entirely agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (7) TMI 99 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a dictionary, the English equivalent of sataranji is given as carpet. Thus, the argument of Mr. Mohanty that sataranji does not come within the purview of carpet is not only concluded by the finding of the Tribunal but is also contrary to the accepted meaning of the word in common parlance. 6.. Mr. Mohanty next contended that if sataranjis are not carpets, then the rate of tax should not be seven per cent. but would be three per cent. as being declared goods under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. This question has not been referred to this Court and does not arise out of the order of reference and was never argued at any stage. We express no view on this contention. 7.. In the result we would answer the question by saying that sataranjis are carpets and fall within the ambit of entry 40 and outside entry 33. The Tribunal took a wrong view. The reference is accepted. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. PATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (7) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under that provision is that a person being a registered dealer, falsely represents when purchasing any class of goods that goods of such class are covered by his certificate of registration. The words if the offence had not been committed clearly point to the result that the tax for purposes of assessing one and a half times thereof is not that which would have been levied on the basis that the C Forms had not been complied with or have been misused, but, as if they have been used in a proper way. If that were not the case, there would be no meaning to the last words we have referred to. Our attention has been invited to M. Pais and Sons v. The State of Mysore(1). It is true the Mysore High Court, in this case, took a view which is in support of that taken by the department in this case. But, with due respect, the decision does not take into account the concluding words, if the offence had not been committed , in section 10-A. The tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
Claim for exemption of "freight and packing and delivery charges" in respect of which separate bills were made out when selling the goods at Ernakulam
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no substance in the contention raised by counsel for the appellant that in authorising the levy of sales tax on transport charges which formed a component of the price for which the goods were sold, the State Legislature had trespassed upon the legislative field reserved to the Centre by List I, entry 89-the power to levy taxes on railway fares and freights. The tax levied is not a tax on railway freight & it is a tax on turnover, that is, on the aggregate of sale price received by the dealer in respect of sale-of goods. The fact that the price includes the expenditure incurred by the company for railway freight for transporting the goods from the factory site to its place of business does not make the tax imposed upon that component a tax on railway freight.
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1969 (7) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent was liable to pay sales tax for supplying and fixing wooden windows and doors together with frames and painting them when the construction of the police lines building took place at a place called Pali?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The primary undertaking of the contractor was not merely to supply the windows but to fix the windows. If the windows were not properly fixed the contract could not be complete. The view of the High Court accepted that it was only upon the fixing of the window-leaves and when the window-leaves had become a part of the building construction that the property in the goods passed under the terms of the contract.
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1969 (7) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the revisional powers conferred on the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax under section 15(1) of the Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125, hereinafter called the Act, could be exercised in the present case after the expiry of a period of three years mentioned in rule 33 of the Rules framed under the Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Although it is stated in the judgment of the High Court that the present cases were of escaped turnover we are altogether unable to endorse that view. The question which the Deputy Commissioner had to consider was one of the legality, propriety and regularity of the exemption of the turnover granted under the licence in respect of the auction sales. This fell strictly within the purview of section 15(1) of the Act and there was no question of any action being taken under rule 33 on the ground that there had been escapement of turnover. The period of limitation for such proceedings is prescribed by section 15 itself to be four years from the date on which the order was communicated to the assessee.
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1969 (7) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amount expended for freight and for "handling charges" of goods from the factories to the warehouse at Ernakulam is liable to be excluded from the taxable turnover?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal was right in holding that the exemption under clause (f) of rule 9 applies when the freight and charges for packing and delivery are found to be incidental to the sale and when they are specified and charged for by the dealer separately and expenditure incurred for freight and packing and delivery charges prior to the sale and for transporting the goods from the factories to the warehouse of the company is not admissible under rule 9(f).
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1969 (7) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the expression "sugar" included guy?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. "cane jaggery" and "palm jaggery" are not commodities of the same class, and in any event in imposing liability to tax on transactions of sale of "cane jaggery" and exempting "palm jaggery", no unlawful discrimination denying the guarantee of equal protection was practised. There is no substance in the contention that the Act which imposes tax on "cane jaggery" and the notification which exempts "palm jaggery" from liability to tax imposes a colourable exercise of authority. If the Legislature has the power to impose the tax, its authority is not open to challenge on a plea of colourable exercise of power.
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1969 (7) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up and Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1969 (7) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... it had been the court in which such proceedings were brought. Obviously the present petition does not and cannot fall within the purview of section 633(2). Mr. Hegde has been unable to point out any other provision of the Companies Act which could enable the court to relieve the petitioner of his liability to file returns under the Companies Act. This petition is, therefore, misconceived and not maintainable. Mr. Hegde then applied that he should be allowed to amend the prayer in the petition. No draft of the application for amendment was submitted to me. Since, in my opinion, the petition is not maintainable and must be dismissed, to permit any amendment would be really to substitute a new petition on the file of the court. I, accordingly, refuse Mr. Hegde s application for amendment. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In view of the fact that this petition was originally filed by the petitioner in person, there will be no order as to costs of the petition.
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1969 (7) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Registration of change of name and its effects thereof ... ... ... ... ..... has been shown by the Income-tax Officer who made the assessment on August 29, 1949, without caring for the letter which was addressed by the appellant-company to the Income-tax Officer on February 4, 1948 (vide page 85 of the paper book). This very Income-tax Officer, in the certificate proceedings, applied for substitution of the name of the certificate debtor (vide page 34 of the paper book). It is not clear to us why he rose from his slumber so late. The higher authorities of the income-tax department, who are very keen to stop evasions of payment of income-tax, should be keener to manage their own house and put it in order. It is these drain-pipes through which leakage occurs and, we believe, proper enquiry would be made in this matter when a copy of this judgment is forwarded by the Registrar of this court to the respondent No. 1. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, we would make no order as to costs. Ajay K. Basu J. mdash I agree.
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1969 (7) TMI 56 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... hat he paid cash under a contract with a non-existent person. The plaintiff company is entitled in my opinion to have the contract specifically performed, but the claim for rectification is in my judgment misconceived. Either the plaintiff company was a party to the contract, or there was no contract, and I cannot rectify a non-existent contract. The plaintiff company set up an alternative case of estoppel, resting on the fact that the defendant, with the permission, as I find, of Mr. Brewster, went into possession of the property. In view of my decision that it was a party to the agreement, I express no opinion whether Mr. Sunnucks was successful in getting into the saddle of that unruly horse. I will declare that the plaintiff company, although erroneously named as Goldsmith Coaches (Sicklesmere) Ltd., was a party to the agreement in the pleading mentioned, and that the said agreement ought to be specifically Performed and will make the usual order for specific performance.
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1969 (7) TMI 47 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up – Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... rder aside. Accordingly, subject to one matter, I dismiss the motion so far as paragraph 3 of the notice of motion is concerned. In the circumstances, I do not think I need say anything about paragraph 2 except that it fails. The one matter that I reserved under each head is, of course, the verification of the liquidator s statement by affidavit. Strictly, I suppose, I should adjourn the motion until this has been done, and then dispose of the matter but if counsel on both sides have no objection, I propose to dismiss the motion now, subject to the filing of such an affidavit within seven days, with liberty to apply. Finally, as I have already indicated, I direct that the words in the order relating to books, papers, and so on, be struck out. Perhaps this provides an instance where the time-honoured words that appear in paragraph 4 of the notice of motion, namely, that such other order may be made as to this honourable court shall seem fit, for once perform a useful function.
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1969 (7) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... lication to make the Central Government a party to this petition. This matter was heard by me in part as early as on June 21, 1968, when it was adjourned for a fortnight. Since then the matter could not be taken up by me again on account of the exigencies of the Court s work until it was called on for hearing on July 10, 1969. The point that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief as the Central Government was not a party was in fact taken by learned counsel for the respondent when the matter was heard by me on June 21, 1968. Yet the petitioners have not taken any steps in that behalf. That being so, this application is rejected and the Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. The facts involved in matter No. 19 of 1968, Banwarilal Pasari v. D. R. Kohli and Ors. are the same as in this application. For the reasons mentioned in this judgment the Writ petition in matter No. 19 of 1968 is dismissed. The rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (7) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the present case the investment was made by renewal of fixed deposit receipts after August 16, 1953, for a purpose which the bank knew was inconsistent with Purnabai's fiduciary character and duty?
Held that:- We are unable to hold, in the circumstances, that bona fide possession and enjoyment of the property gifted was immediately assumed by Suryakant and thenceforward retained by him to the entire exclusion of Purnabai. The right retained by Purnabai to have the receipts made out in her name jointly with Suryakant and the power to recover the amount from the bank without the concurrence of Suryakant clearly indicate that she was not excluded, but she had retained important benefits in herself in the fixed deposit receipts.
It is true that the third receipt was encashed during the lifetime of Purnabai, and the amount was invested in the name of Suryakant alone. But the encashment and reinvestment were within two years of the death of Purnabai and the amounts so reinvested were liable to be included in the estate of Purnabai.
The argument that fixed deposit receipts had remined exclusively in the possession of Satyanarayana as guardian of Suryakant and they were obtained by him from Purnabai for the purpose of renewal is not supported by any evidence. There is also no evidence that in obtaining the receipts in the joint names Purnabai acted as a guardian of Suryakant nor that the was a benamidar of Suryakant. We are of the view that the High Court was right in answering the question against the appellant.
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1969 (7) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State Government could invest the Tahsildar with the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer under the sub-clause (ii) of clause (44) of section 2 of the Act read with sub-rule (2) of rule 7 of the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 with effect from a date prior to the date of the notification, i. e., retroactively or retrospectively?
Held that:- It is difficult to hold in the present case that the Taluka Tahsildar could be authorised by the impugned notification to exercise powers of a Tax Recovery Officer with effect from a date prior to the date of the notification.
As the legislature can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively there can be hardly any justification for saying that the President or the Governor should not be able to make rules in the same manner so as to give them prospective as well as retrospective operation. For these reasons the ambit and content of the rule making power under article 309 can furnish no analogy or parallel to the present case. The High Court was consequently right in coming to the conclusion that the action taken by the Tahsildar in attaching the shares was unsustainable. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 28 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Four out of five partners bring a building into the partnership on the condition that on dissolution the building was to go to the four partners only - whether the building can said to be belonging to the partnership - whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was entitled to depreciation under section. 10(2)(vi) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in rest of the building - Question answered in the affirmative
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1969 (7) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Garnishee Order for tax arrears under s. 226(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 - Whether the grant payable by the Coal Board to a coal company under Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act, 1952 could be subjected to garnishee order
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